History of the ICSID Convention

Documents Concerning the Origin and the Formulation of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States

Documents in English

Volume II-1

International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
Centre International pour le Règlement des Différends Relatifs aux Investissements
Centro Internacional de Arreglo de Diferencias Relativas a Inversiones
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States

Documents Concerning the Origin and the Formulation of the Convention

VOLUME II, PART 1
DOCUMENTS 1-43

International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
Centre International pour le Règlement des Différends Relatifs aux Investissements
Centro Internacional de Arreglo de Diferencias Relativas a Inversiones

Washington, D. C., 1968
INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The Legislative History of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States is assembled in four volumes. Volume I reproduces each article of the Convention in English, French, and Spanish, followed by notes setting forth successive drafts of the provision and references to discussion thereof during the preparation of the Convention. It also contains a complete list of all the documents produced by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the Bank) in the course of drafting the SID Convention.

The documents assembled in this volume—which consists of two parts—are placed in chronological order, with the exception of the documents pertaining to the Legal Committee, which met from November 23 to December 11, 1964. For these, a grouping of documents by subject matter has been attempted around the chronologically reproduced summary records of the sessions dealing with each subject. Most of these documents were originally distributed as mimeographed Bank, or Legal Committee documents, and retain their identifying number.

Volumes III and IV contain, respectively, the corresponding French and Spanish documents, when they exist. Each document, in whatever language, is given the same number in the three documents volumes.
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Settlement of Financial and Economic Disputes between Governments and Private Individuals or Corporations

1. The many studies which have been undertaken in recent years concerning ways and means to promote private foreign investment have almost invariably discussed the problem of the settlement of disputes between foreign private investors or entrepreneurs and the Government of the country where the investment is made. In many cases these studies have recommended the establishment of international arbitration and/or conciliation machinery.

2. The nature of the problem may be briefly described as follows:

(a) In the absence of an agreement to the contrary between the foreign investor and the host Government, the investment is subject to the laws of that Government (local law) and the redress of grievances which the investor may seek by direct access to that Government is equally determined by local law.

(b) If the investor feels aggrieved by actions of the host Government he may invoke the diplomatic protection of his national State or he may request his national State to espouse his case and bring a claim before an international tribunal. It is to be noted, of course, first, that in some countries the foreign investor may, as a condition of entry, be required to waive diplomatic protection and, second, that even if the national State is willing to espouse the investor's case, it may find that the host Government is unwilling to submit to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal. However, even in the absence of these obstacles, the present situation may be regarded as unsatisfactory because of the investor's inability to proceed with an international claim directly against the host Government. The necessity of espousal of his case by his national Government before an international claim can be lodged, introduces a political element. An investor may well find that his national Government refuses to espouse a meritorious case because it fears that to do so would be regarded as an unfriendly act by the host Government. And this consideration is even more likely to cause the national Government to refrain from acting if the merits of the investor's case are not wholly clear in its view, thus withholding from the investor an opportunity to have his case judged by an impartial tribunal.

(c) In an attempt to overcome these difficulties, some investors, mostly large corporations especially in the field of extractive industry, have been able to negotiate arbitration agreements with host Governments, providing for detailed rules regarding the selection of arbitrators, the arbitral procedure and, in some cases, the law to be applied by the arbitral tribunal. It is quite
clear that only a few investors can be in a position to negotiate such agreements. Moreover, the validity of such agreements is sometimes questioned. If the Government refused to proceed with the arbitration, the investor's remedy would once again be either a request to his national State for diplomatic intervention or for an espousal of his case before an international tribunal.

(d) The absence of adequate machinery for international conciliation and arbitration often frustrates attempts to agree on an appropriate mode of settlement of disputes. Tribunals set up by private organizations such as the International Chamber of Commerce are frequently unacceptable to governments and the only public international arbitral tribunal, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, is not open to private claimants.

3. The nature of the problem, as outlined above, suggests a solution along the following lines:

(a) a recognition by States of the possibility of direct access by private individuals and corporations to an international tribunal in the field of financial and economic disputes with Governments;

(b) a recognition by States that agreements made by them with private individuals and corporations to submit such disputes to arbitration are binding international undertakings;

(c) the provision of international machinery for the conduct of arbitration, including the availability of arbitrators, methods for their selection and rules for the conduct of the arbitral proceeding;

(d) provision for conciliation as an alternative to arbitration.

4. With respect to 3(a), this recognition would be best evidenced by inter-governmental action in creating international arbitral machinery to which private individuals and corporations might have direct access. The jurisdiction of such a tribunal would be based on consent, whether in the form of an advance undertaking to submit any specific dispute that might arise, (or a defined group of disputes) to the tribunal, or by an ad hoc submission in respect of a dispute which has already arisen. In other words, the tribunal would have no compulsory jurisdiction, and access to it would be voluntary. Nor need the establishment of such machinery interfere with the customary principle of international law pursuant to which claims cannot be brought before an international tribunal until local remedies (whether administrative or judicial) have been exhausted. This rule could be left intact, although it would, of course, be open to any government to agree that the procedure before the international arbitral tribunal would be in lieu of whatever local procedures or remedies may be available. In other words, the existence of an international arbitral tribunal to which private individuals and corporations could have access would provide an international jurisdiction to private claimants with substantially the same access as States-claimants have to the International Court of Justice or other international tribunals.
5. With respect to 3(b), it was noted earlier in this memorandum that the binding force of agreements by governments to arbitrate disputes with private parties is sometimes questioned. It would, therefore, be essential to have the binding force of such agreements, properly entered into, recognized in a treaty among states.

6. With respect to 3(c) (the provision of international machinery for the conduct of arbitration), a number of ways are open. On one end of the scale would be the creation of a permanent tribunal staffed by arbitrators, elected or appointed for a fixed period and operating under established rules of procedure. At the other end would be a panel of names, either submitted by the States-parties to the tribunal or designated by some other authority, from which the arbitrators would be selected. What would be needed, in addition, as a minimum, would be standard rules of procedure which would apply unless the parties agreed otherwise.

7. With respect to 3(d) (provision for conciliation as an alternative to arbitration), it may be noted that the Bank's own experience, among others, has indicated the value of conciliation which is less formal and politically more palatable than arbitration. As in the case of arbitration, recourse to this method of settlement would be facilitated and promoted if machinery therefor were available, based on an international agreement. The machinery might follow the general lines of any machinery established for arbitration.

(September 19, 1961, Vienna)
Excerpt from address by President Eugene R. Black to the Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors

"Another subject that is frequently mentioned in this connection is the settlement of disputes between governments and private investors. As most of you know, the Bank as an institution, and the President of the Bank in his personal capacity, have on several occasions been approached by member governments to assist in the settlement of financial disputes involving private parties. We have, indeed, succeeded in facilitating settlements in some issues of this kind, but the Bank is not really equipped to handle this sort of business in the course of its regular routine.

At the same time, our experience has confirmed my belief that a very useful contribution could be made by some sort of special forum for the conciliation or arbitration of these disputes. The results of an inquiry made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations' show that this belief is widely shared. The fact that governments and private interests have turned to the Bank to provide this assistance indicates the lack of any other specific machinery for conciliation and arbitration which is regarded as adequate by investors and governments alike. I therefore intend to explore with other institutions, and with our member governments, whether something might not be done to promote the establishment of machinery of this kind."

1 See U.N. ECOSOC documents E/3325 of February 26, 1960, and E/3492 of May 18, 1961
1. The Executive Directors will recall that in my annual address at the meeting in Vienna I referred to the problem of providing machinery for the arbitration and conciliation of disputes between governments and foreign private firms or individuals. The text of my statement was as follows:

(See Doc. 2)

2. I now would like to explore this matter further with the Executive Directors.

3. The first question for discussion is whether it would be appropriate and useful for the Bank to take an initiative in furthering the idea of arbitration and conciliation of so-called investment disputes. Improved methods for the settlement of investment disputes would contribute to an improvement in the investment climate and would thereby tend to promote the flow of private foreign capital, an objective of special concern to the Bank. Moreover, this is a field in which the Bank has some competence. We have done quite a lot of work in the way of conciliation and quasi-arbitration; this work not only has done credit to the Bank, but also has given tangible evidence of the potentialities of these procedures. Furthermore, the Bank is regarded as an impartial institution not motivated by political considerations and with an understanding of the problems of capital-exporting and capital-importing countries alike. This means that a recommendation or proposal emanating from the Bank may be expected to receive wide attention and respect.

4. For all these reasons I think that it would be useful and appropriate for the Bank to undertake an active study of the possibilities that international arrangements might be promoted which would facilitate the settlement of investment disputes by means of arbitration or conciliation procedures. At this time I have no detailed proposals to offer for these arrangements, but I would like to have a general discussion of the subject in a meeting of the Executive Directors.

5. I suggest that this discussion should take place against the background of the analysis presented in the memorandum of the General Counsel, circulated on August 28, 1961 (Sec/61-192). For purposes of our discussion the broad principles outlined in that memorandum might be carried somewhat further as follows:

Suppose that States which might desire to participate should enter into an international agreement establishing a new institution which could offer the services of a panel of qualified persons willing to act as arbitrators or con-
ciliators in specific investment disputes. The institution might be called the Arbitration and Conciliation Center. Sponsorship by the Bank, and some continuing link with the Bank, would in my opinion help to inspire confidence in the institution. On the other hand, its relationship to the Bank should in no way impair the independence of the Center in the exercise of what is a quasi-judicial function.

Adherence to the agreement would not by itself obligate any State to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the Center; use of the Center would be entirely voluntary. Jurisdiction might be conferred on the Center either by a unilateral declaration of a State agreeing in advance to the submission of particular types of disputes to arbitration or conciliation by the Center, or by agreement between a State and a particular investor. An example of the latter would be an investment agreement between a private investor and a State, providing for arbitration or conciliation by the Center of disputes arising under that agreement.

While, as stated, the international agreement establishing the Center would not of itself oblige members to submit to its jurisdiction, the agreement would provide, first, that once a State had voluntarily agreed to submit a specific dispute or group of disputes to the jurisdiction of the Center, this agreement would be a binding international obligation, and second, that once jurisdiction had thus been established, the private party might proceed against a State directly before the Center, that is to say, without getting its own government to sponsor its case. The international agreement would also provide appropriate safeguards against frustration of an undertaking to arbitrate by reason of failure of one of the parties to designate arbitrators or otherwise to cooperate in the proceedings.

The Center would have to have a head (call him a Secretary-General) with a small staff and the panel of arbitrators or conciliators. Who might elect the Secretary-General and how might the members of the panel be appointed? The Center might have a Governing Council consisting of the Governors of the Bank representing the member countries participating in the Center, presided over by the President of the Bank. The Governing Council might elect the Secretary-General on the recommendation of the President of the Bank, and might appoint the members of the panel on the basis of nominations made by the participating member countries, the selection in each case requiring both a majority of the participating Governors and a majority of the voting power of the participating members. Thereafter, the selection, from the panel, of persons to act as arbitrators or conciliators in any specific case would be left to the agreement of the parties to the dispute or to some outside authority designated by them in advance, or, failing such designation, to the Secretary-General.

In connection with a detailed proposal other questions would have to be answered, some of them of a technical legal nature, but at the present time there may be no need to go beyond this broad outline.
6. An agreement along the foregoing lines would, of course, have only limited scope. It would provide machinery but it would not make the use of that machinery compulsory. Nor would it lay down substantive rules of law regarding the treatment of foreign investment. I do not consider that it would be realistic to try for a more far-reaching agreement at this time. On the other hand, a proposal such as that outlined should be non-controversial and its adoption would, in my opinion, constitute an important step toward the removal of what is one of the impediments to the flow of international capital.

[SecM 62-17 (January 19, 1962)]
Note by the General Counsel transmitted to the Executive Directors

SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES

1. During the preliminary discussion in the meeting of the Executive Directors on January 9, 1962, a number of questions were asked regarding the considerations leading up to the proposals in the President's Memorandum (R 61-128) and the implications of those proposals. The purpose of this note is to present, in systematic order and in somewhat expanded form, the general questions raised and the comments of the General Counsel on those questions made at the meeting, in the belief that such a presentation may be helpful in the further consideration of this matter by the Directors and the Governments of the countries they represent.

2. The proposals under discussion deal with conciliation and arbitration. It may be useful at the outset to establish the meaning of these terms in the context of the proposals. In distinguishing conciliation or mediation from arbitration it has been said that "mediation recommends, arbitration decides". It is with these alternative approaches to the settlement of disputes that the proposals are concerned.

3. Conciliation is used in the proposals in the sense of any proceeding or method for the adjustment of a dispute, aimed at bringing the parties to an agreed solution with the assistance of one or more persons ("conciliators") empowered to make recommendations. Arbitration is used in the sense of a proceeding contemplating the final decision of a dispute between two or more parties by judges of their own choice or designated by an agreed method.

1/ This note does not deal with suggestions made at the meeting for specific alternatives within the general framework of the President's Memorandum for instance regarding the manner of designation of panel members and the role of the Secretary-General.
Activities of the Center as Compared with Those Hitherto Performed by the Bank

4. The question was asked whether the establishment of the Center would not essentially amount to "institutionalizing" the Bank's present activities in assisting in the solution of investment disputes, and whether there was justification for setting up more or less elaborate machinery without knowing how much use would be made of it.

5. The present activities of the Bank, and of the President of the Bank, in the field of investment dispute settlement fall into three categories. The first comprises the two cases involving full scale conciliation, namely the Suez Canal Compensation and City of Tokyo Bonds cases. There have been requests for this type of service in connection with other disputes which the President has declined to accept. The second comprises a larger number of cases in which the President has undertaken to designate impartial arbitrators, umpires or experts in connection with the solution of existing or future disputes. The third category comprises instances in which the Bank seeks to help parties to disputes to agree on a method of solving their dispute outside the framework of the Bank, for instance by recourse to commercial arbitration (as in the case of the dispute between Colombia and Parsons & Whittemore).

6. One of the ideas underlying the present proposals is to relieve the Bank of some of the extra-curricular burdens it is from time to time asked to assume, and to transfer these burdens to an organ somewhat removed from, although linked to, the Bank. To that extent one could say that they aim at "institutionalizing" the Bank's present dispute settlement activities. But the proposals have as a broader aim the encouragement of recourse to conciliation and arbitration in general through making available suitable machinery therefor.

7. The term "machinery" may have led to some confusion because in the context of the proposals it has been used both to denote the institutional or administrative apparatus and to describe the aggregate of mechanisms to be provided to assist in the settlement of investment disputes, of which the administrative apparatus is only one.

8. The "machinery" of the Center in the sense of administrative apparatus would be very light. Until recourse to the Center made a larger staff necessary, the apparatus could be limited to one official, the Secretary-General, and such administrative and clerical help as he might need. (There is precedent for this in the Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration). Since the Center would be established in some relationship to the Bank, it would presumably have its seat at the Bank's headquarters, making for maximum flexibility and economy in the provision of administrative and clerical services.

9. The "machinery" of the Center in the broader sense of the term would include:

(a) The administrative apparatus referred to above;

(b) A roster of persons, possessing the required qualifications for conciliators or arbitrators of investment disputes, who would have declared their willingness to act in those
capacities in connection with disputes submitted for settlement under the auspices of the Center.

(c) Rules which would apply in the absence of agreement to the contrary between the parties to a dispute and which would cover such matters as:

(i) the procedure to be followed in conciliation and arbitration;

(ii) the appointment of conciliators or arbitrators in the event of failure of a party to designate, or to agree with the other party on the designation of, a conciliator or arbitrator.

10. The question was also asked whether establishment of the Center might not involve the Bank in disputes with which it would prefer not to be concerned. At the present time, the Bank is free to accept or reject a request for its services in connection with dispute settlement. By contrast, if the Center were established and the parties to a dispute had agreed to a proceeding under the auspices of the Center, there would presumably be no way in which the services of the Center could be refused.

11. It is true that the Center would not have the discretion which the Bank can now exercise. However, it is hard to see how this could be a source of embarrassment to the Bank. The proceeding in question, whether conciliation or arbitration, would not be conducted either by the Bank itself or by the Center, but by conciliators or arbitrators selected from the roster of the Center or indeed, if the parties so decided, by persons outside the roster.

12. The further question was asked whether establishment of the Center would not deprive parties to a dispute of the valuable possibility of requesting the services of the Bank, or of the President of the Bank.

13. Establishment of the Center would not mean that the Bank could or would no longer act directly in connection with investment disputes. It would mean that the Bank would be in a position to be more selective and to limit its intervention, which invariably involves the President and his associates in a heavy expenditure of time and effort, to instances in which this would be justified by special circumstances.

Criteria Guiding Recommendations and Decisions in Proceedings under the Auspices of the Center

14. The question was asked whether the fact that the Bank can itself be regarded as an "investor" would not tend to raise doubts as to the impartiality of a Center sponsored by, and affiliated with, the Bank.

15. The Bank is an international cooperative institution which lends funds for the benefit of its members which are also its shareholders. The fact that it is a creditor of most of its members has never put its impartiality in question. This would seem to be borne out by the requests addressed to the Bank by member governments for assistance in the solution of investment disputes. Apart from this, the administrative apparatus of the Center would not, as noted earlier, itself engage in conciliation or arbitration.
16. The question was also asked which rules of law an arbitration panel
would apply in deciding a dispute before it.

17. It is characteristic of arbitration that the parties are free in
the choice of the law to be applied by arbitrators. Example of such choice
would be the national law of one of the parties, the principles of law
common to the legal systems of the two parties, general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations, principles of international law or any
combination of the foregoing. The parties may also provide that the
arbitrators shall not be bound by rules of law, but shall decide ex aequo
et bono, according to the dictates of equity and justice. Since one of
the principal purposes of the international agreement establishing the
Center would be to fill gaps left by the parties, the agreement would pre-
sumably contain rules regarding the law to be applied in arbitration pro-
ceedings in the absence of agreement between the parties. What these
(supplementary)rules should provide is a matter for further consideration.

The Voluntary Nature of Conciliation and Arbitration Machinery

18. Underlying some of the questions appeared to be a desire for further
clarification of the voluntary nature of the contemplated conciliation and
arbitration machinery, especially in the context of the suggestion that the
international agreement creating the Center should establish the binding
character of undertakings to have recourse to conciliation or arbitration.

19. The proposals are based on the view, which is confirmed by the prac-
tice of States, that international conciliation and arbitration can be
useful vehicles for the adjustment and settlement of investment disputes.
The proposals seek to encourage, and to make more effective, the use of
these methods in appropriate cases by providing suitable machinery.

20. In accordance with this objective, signature of or later adherence
to the suggested international agreement would in no way obligate any govern-
ment, either legally or morally, to agree to submit any particular dispute
or type of dispute to conciliation or arbitration under the auspices of the
Center. The position in this respect would remain as it is today and would
not be changed in any way by the suggested agreement. One might add the
obvious observation that no government would be under any obligation to
become a party to the agreement, assuming one were drafted and submitted
to governments, if the government in question was opposed in principle to
the use of international conciliation or arbitration of investment disputes.
Both the agreement itself and the use of the machinery established thereby
would be offered on a voluntary basis and universality of participation
would not be essential. The fact is, however, that many governments do
include provisions for international conciliation and/or arbitration in
certain types of agreements with foreign investors and that many govern-
ments are willing in principle to consider international adjustment of
disputes arising with foreign investors in cases in which no previous
contractual arrangements for such adjustment were made. This is the
justification for exploring the possibilities of an international agree-
ment which would facilitate recourse to these methods of dispute settle-
ment.

21. One could, of course, carry the voluntary character of the concilia-
tion and arbitration machinery to the point where the consent of both par-
ties would be a condition of the use of that machinery at any point of time.
In that event either party could refuse to abide by an earlier agreement to
have recourse to conciliation or arbitration, could presumably withdraw from any such procedure at any time after it had started and, in the case of arbitration, would be free to accept or reject the award. But this would be destructive of the minimum degree of certainty which contracting parties would expect. For this reason it has been suggested that agreements for the conciliation or arbitration of existing or future investment disputes should be recognized as binding undertakings. As a corollary the international agreement would have to make provision for the implementation of such undertakings in the event one of the parties should fail to cooperate in the proceedings.

22. In this connection the question was asked what the position would be in the case of an agreement to arbitrate, if one of the parties refused to cooperate on the ground that the claim made by the other party was not within the terms of the undertaking to arbitrate.

23. Unless parties are to be left free to make themselves the judges of their own obligations, the question of "jurisdiction" must be decided by some authority. It is a well-established rule of international law that, unless the parties otherwise provide, the arbitral tribunal is the judge of its own jurisdiction. Accordingly, the position would presumably be that the arbitral tribunal or panel would be constituted and would, before dealing with the merits of the case, decide on the preliminary objections to its jurisdiction made by one of the parties.

24. The further question was asked whether the foregoing would hold true if a clearly frivolous or vexatious claim were presented.

25. The position would not be different in principle. However, as a practical matter it would appear to be proper in such an extreme case for the Secretary-General of the Center to seek to dissuade the claimant from proceeding with his claim. Furthermore, provision might be made for the assessment of special costs against a party found by the arbitrators to have brought a frivolous claim.

Mutuality of Access; Enforcement of Awards

26. The question was asked whether the proceedings under the auspices of the Center would be limited to proceedings at the request of an investor, and in which way an arbitral award could be enforced against the investor or the government, as the case might be.

27. The conciliation and arbitration machinery would be available to governments and investors alike within the limits of agreements entered into between them. (It may be of interest to note in this connection that in a recent case the initiative for a request for the Bank's assistance in solving a dispute between a government and a private foreign corporation came entirely from the government.)

28. As regards enforcement a distinction must be made between private parties and governments. While under general law certain difficulties may arise in connection with the enforcement of an award against a private party, the international agreement can make suitable provision to solve these difficulties. (The position in this respect would be greatly improved by a widespread adherence by governments to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.) As regards govern-
ments, enforcement is severely limited by the operation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Bank, even though it possesses international status and personality, has not asked its member governments to waive their sovereign immunity in connection with the enforcement of arbitral awards rendered under the terms of the Bank's loan and guarantee agreements. And there is no thought of dealing with the question of sovereign immunity in the suggested international agreement under which the conciliation and arbitration machinery would be created. On the other hand, the importance of the problem must not be exaggerated. The record of compliance by governments with international arbitral awards is very good. Problems have arisen in the past with respect to the implementation of agreements to arbitrate, but the refusal of governments to proceed with arbitration has been based on their contention that the obligation to arbitrate was unenforceable or had been extinguished. If, as has been suggested, the international agreement would remove any doubt as to the legally binding character of an undertaking to arbitrate, there is no reason to believe that governments would not abide by such undertakings.

State-owned Enterprises as Investors

29. The question was asked whether it was intended by the term "private investors" to exclude disputes between governments and foreign state-owned enterprises.

30. There would appear to be no reason why a state-owned enterprise, if it elected to assimilate itself to a private enterprise rather than a government agency, should not be permitted to make use of the machinery of the Center, if the government party to the dispute agreed.

Financing the Center

31. The question was asked how a Center associated with the Bank would be financed.

32. The President would be willing to recommend that the cost of the administrative apparatus be borne by the Bank. In any event the cost would be slight. On the other hand, the cost of proceedings under the auspices of the Center, such as the fees and expenses of conciliators and arbitrators would have to be borne by the parties to such proceedings. Consideration might be given to a registration fee payable by parties who make use of the services of the Center.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration as an Alternative to the Center

33. The question was asked whether consideration should not be given to use of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, especially since it is reported that the Bureau of that Court is engaged in the formulation of rules for the use of its facilities for disputes between governments and private parties.

34. The Permanent Court of Arbitration was created under the Conventions of 1899 and 1907 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. The Court was created to settle "disputes between states by judges of their own choice, and on the basis of respect for law" (Art. 37 of the 1907 Convention). The Convention of 1907 lays down rules of procedure for disputes between states as well as provisions for the appointment of arbitrators from a panel composed of persons "of known competency in questions of international law" selected by each of the contracting powers. Article 47 of the Convention
authorizes the Bureau of the Court "to place its offices and staff at the
disposal of the contracting powers for the use of 'any special board of ar-
bitration!" , that is, an arbitral tribunal not constituted pursuant to the
Convention. In 1935 the Administrative Council of the Court, which under
the Convention is composed of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Nether-
lands as chairman and the diplomatic representatives of the other contracting
powers accredited to The Hague as members, interpreted Article 47 to permit
the Bureau, at the request of a contracting power, to make its administra-
tive services available for an arbitral proceeding between a state and a
private party. The case which gave rise to this interpretation, an arbitral
proceeding between China and the Radio Corporation of America, is the only
known instance of recourse to the services authorized under Article 47. The
Bureau is now reportedly engaged on a study of rules of procedure which
parties might adopt if they made use of Article 47.

35. In comparing the arrangements under Article 47 of the Convention of
1907 and the suggested international agreement creating the Center, one
might note, among other things, that under the first alternative there would
be lacking the recognition of the binding character of undertakings to have
recourse to conciliation and arbitration, there would be no panel of con-
ciliators and arbitrators and no method of filling gaps in the constitution
of a conciliation commission or arbitral tribunal. Furthermore there would
presumably be no provision at all for conciliation, since Article 47 is
limited to arbitral proceedings. To establish more effective mechanisms
under the Convention of 1907 would appear to require its extensive amendment.
Finally, only 47 of the 74 members of the Bank participate in the Permanent
Court of Arbitration.

Cooperation between the Center and the Bureau
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration

36. The question was asked whether there would be room for cooperation
between the Center and the Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

37. Proceedings under the auspices of the Center might normally be con-
ducted at its seat in order to have the benefit of the Center's administra-
tive facilities. But such proceedings could be conducted at any place
selected by the parties. If the Bureau were authorized and prepared to
make its administrative facilities available for arbitral proceedings under
the auspices of the Center, there would be no reason why the Center could
not arrange for the cooperation of the Bureau in cases in which the parties
desired the proceedings to take place at The Hague.
MEMORANDUM OF MEETING OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON THE SUBJECT OF "SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES", TUESDAY, MARCH 13, 1962

1. Sir William Iliff, acting as Chairman in the absence of Mr. Black, invited the Directors to continue the informal and preliminary discussion on the subject of settlement of investment disputes, which had been started at the meeting of January 9, 1962. The papers before the meeting were SecM61-192, dated August 28, 1961; R61-128 dated December 28, 1961; and SecM62-17, dated January 19, 1962. The following statements were made.

2. Mr. Aragones: No instructions had been received from the Greek or Italian Governments, but the Spanish Government had brought up the following points:

   (a) It was of great importance to determine clearly the rules of law to be applied in proceedings under the auspices of the Center. If the litigation involved private investors in a foreign country, the internal law of such country should apply. The establishment of an arbitration Center would not eliminate prior use or exhaustion of diplomatic channels. There might be a possible danger of conflicting decisions between local courts and the Center, even if both were applying the same rules of law.

   (b) It was also necessary to establish rules for the solution of questions of private international law (conflict of laws).

   (c) The Center ought not to become involved in cases not having an international character.

   (d) Provision was required to discourage groundless or vexatious claims, possibly along the lines of paragraphs 24 and 25 of Document SecM62-17.

   (e) The problems involved in the enforcement of awards needed to be clarified; and the countries parties to the agreement ought to establish internal rules of law to enforce awards within their territories. Further attention needed to be given also to the question of enforcement outside the territories of the contracting states.

   (f) Since the agreement conferred upon the citizens of the contracting states the capacity to proceed against foreign governments before an international forum, it was essential to define carefully which individuals and corporations were to be regarded as nationals of a contracting state.

   (g) The OECD Committee of Invisible Transactions was known to be drafting a convention for the protection of foreign property. Article 6

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*This memorandum consists of staff notes of the discussion in the Meeting, and is not an approved record.*
of the draft contemplated the creation of an arbitral tribunal. Did the proposed tribunal overlap or duplicate the functions of the Center?

3. Mr. Broches: The points raised by Mr. Aragones deserved careful consideration. With respect to the proposed OECD convention, it would establish substantive rules of law for the protection of private foreign investment, and would provide in certain cases for compulsory adjudication of claims arising under the convention. The proposed convention would go much further than the agreement suggested in the papers before the Board. While the proposed Center would not exactly duplicate the convention's tribunal, the proposal for the creation of the Center would lose much of its importance if the OECD convention were adopted and adhered to by a substantial number of capital-exporting and capital-importing countries.

4. Mr. Lundgren: Two of the countries he represented were definitely in favor of the Bank's proposal, and the remaining three had not objected, one of the latter on the assumption that broad agreement could be reached among most of the member countries. Personally he thought that the Bank's initiative was appropriate and useful and supported the proposal in the sense that he wished to see more work done on it.

5. Mr. Koinzer: His Government welcomed the Bank's initiative. The memorandum of the General Counsel of January 19, 1962 was being studied by the authorities of his country, and their first impression was that they would be able to agree with the leading principles in it. Establishment of the proposed machinery might be very helpful to private foreign investment, and be capable of quicker realization than the more far-reaching OECD proposals. His Government felt, however, that the OECD discussions should be continued, and he personally shared the view of Mr. Broches that if the OECD proposal were adopted, the Bank's proposal might lose much of its importance.

6. His Government had not yet formed an opinion on the more technical or organizational questions but agreed that the Center should be a very small apparatus suitable for use ad hoc. The Bank might look at the examples of the International Chamber of Commerce and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Questions of jurisdiction, procedure and applicable law might be dealt with in bilateral agreements between interested countries (or in the absence of such bilateral agreements it could be decided ad hoc). Germany had concluded a number of so-called investment promotion treaties with different countries, and hoped to conclude more. The Bank's proposal might be a valuable supplement.

7. All possible combinations of conciliation and arbitration should be left open, such as: (a) obligatory conciliation prior to arbitration, (b) arbitration without preceding conciliation, (c) conciliation with subsequent arbitration, and (d) conciliation without obligatory subsequent arbitration. He agreed with paragraph 30 of Document SecM62-17 regarding the eligibility of state-owned enterprises.

8. Mr. Elmandira: Some of the Governments he represented had responded favorably to the proposal; others required more time. His personal suggestions were the following.

9. Conciliation seemed preferable to arbitration because (a) the Bank had had successful experience with conciliation, and (b) conciliation did
not in any way infringe or appear to infringe upon a country's sovereignty. It was true that arbitration, if freely accepted, was not an infringement of sovereignty either, but it had the psychological disadvantage that smaller and newer countries, cautious in these matters, might interpret it as a curtailment of their sovereignty. Conciliation being more acceptable than arbitration, it was likely to be more effective.

10. It was essential that the Center be viewed by member countries as an impartial body rather than an emanation of the Bank. In the latter case, the Center might become a liability rather than an asset, since in the minds of many governments the loans and decisions of the Bank might be, or might appear to be, influenced by the attitude of the Center vis-à-vis the applicant. In this respect, he recommended a large panel with representatives from different parts of the world representing different systems of law. There might be rotation of the membership of the panel.

11. Mr. Krishna Moorthi: His Government was considering many important aspects of this proposal; for instance, whether such a Center was by itself necessarily expedient and proper for the encouragement of foreign private enterprise coming into developing areas. If such a Center was necessary or expedient, was it to be considered equally necessary and expedient that such Center should be set up in association with the Bank? His Government had also noted that a number of agreements concluded in recent years contemplated arbitral proceedings before various bodies, including the International Chamber of Commerce. On the whole, his Government felt that the matter was very complicated and therefore had asked for more time for presenting their views.

12. Mr. Khosropur: The proposal was very useful. The Center would be an independent body and the link with the Bank would not impair its independence. Although the international agreement would not make the use of the Center mandatory, it might in practice have a great deal of business, because many foreign investors would insert a clause in their agreements providing that disputes should be referred to the Center; and many governments might insert similar clauses in their commercial treaties. The Center might therefore be very busy and might need a very large panel.

13. With reference to paragraph 21 of the General Counsel's memorandum (SecM62-17), why did an undertaking to have recourse to conciliation have to be recognized as a binding undertaking? mediation did not decide, it only recommended. The Chairman and Mr. Broches explained that the binding character of such an undertaking was limited to cooperation in the mediation proceedings. An undertaking to go to mediation did not however mean an agreement to accept the recommendations of the mediators.

14. Had the Permanent Court of Arbitration been contacted by the Bank?, and would the Center in its function have any impingement even indirect upon the jurisdiction of that Court? Mr. Broches stated that there would be no conflict at all because the Permanent Court was set up to deal with disputes between states. He added that through various channels the Secretariat of the Permanent Court was aware of the Bank's studies.

15. Mr. Leddy requested clarification. As he understood it, the convention would not require advance agreement by the parties to mediate in any particular case. The parties would still be free to decide whether to insert this clause in their agreements or not. Consequently, the only
binding obligation assumed by states adhering to the proposed convention would be that whenever they stipulated to mediate, such stipulation would be binding. But they were free not to make such stipulation. Mr. Broches said that this understanding was entirely correct.

16. Mr. Leddy: His Government was interested in this proposal. In order to arrive at a judgment on such a proposal it would have to be further elaborated in the form of a draft text. His Government noted the fact that a convention of this kind would require some form of legislative action before they could adhere to it. For the time being, he wanted to raise one important issue: namely, the method of appointing members of the panel. He thought that in the staff documents a suggestion was made that the proposed mechanism would in effect involve a sort of weighted voting system which, in his opinion, might tend to offend the concept of impartiality. However, there might equally be objections to any non-weighted voting method or to a one-country, one-vote system. The possibility of the Management of the Bank appointing arbitrators in specific cases should also be explored, in order to assure the impartiality of such arbitrators.

17. The project sponsored by the OECD involved the establishment of substantive rules of law in the field of protection of private property, and the United States had serious reservations as to its feasibility and desirability. The United States had considerable experience with similar efforts in the past, especially in the field of Inter-American relations, and they were not very encouraged by that experience to believe that it would be feasible to reach agreement on such rules. Since the Bank's proposal did not attempt to establish such substantive rules of law, his Government did not look at it with the same reservations as they had for a multilateral investment code.

18. Mr. Waitzenegger: Brief preliminary comments indicated that it seemed too early to create, in the form of an institution, a system for the settlement of disputes between governments and private parties. This matter had many implications, involved difficult problems, and required further work and reflection. Arbitrations by the Bank had been successful in many cases, but it was certain that the personal and informal character of the procedure was at the root of the success. His Government preferred to continue in this way. The creation of the Center would give rise to many legal and psychological problems. Such a Center did not seem entirely in line with the purposes and provisions of the Articles of Agreement and might not prove to be an asset to the reputation of the Bank. Its creation seemed premature at a time when many other schemes, including particularly a multilateral system of insurance, were being studied, which could have implications for the question of conciliation and arbitration. Moreover, the relationship of the proposed Center with the Permanent Court of Arbitration and other similar bodies was not clear. The French Government reserved its position on the Bank's proposal.

19. Mr. Hudon: The idea of creating the proposed Center generally appealed to the Canadian authorities. Some of the features in the proposal which they considered particularly attractive were: (a) the small size of the proposed organization which would act only as a channel through which conciliators or arbitrators could be appointed; (b) the link with the Bank which would help considerably in creating confidence in the Center; and (c) the proposal was modest and did not raise false hopes.
The rules would be flexible and each case could be approached on an ad hoc basis. The proposal would have to be elaborated, however, before any final judgment could be passed on it.

20. Mr. Garland: His Governments had given only preliminary consideration to the proposal. At that stage they did not wish to oppose it, but they were not ready to define their final position. The general attitude was that the approach to this question should be careful and cautious, should preserve continuity with previous practice, and ensure a basis of selection of issues for arbitration.

21. While there were no doubt various considerations which favored setting a new organization under the aegis of the Bank, possible alternatives should be considered very carefully and should not be dismissed too summarily. In this connection, attention should be given to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The authorities of one country were not convinced that the Permanent Court of Arbitration was an unworkable alternative. Possibly some modification could be made to the Court's rules and some flexibility given to its procedures. The Bank itself, in its reply to the UN questionnaire, had stated that the choice of an appropriate forum was an important matter, and an ECOSOC Resolution had requested the Secretary General, in cooperation with the Bank, to continue studies on this matter. What was important was that, if a Center was to be established with the Bank, there should be general international concurrence and approval, both on the part of countries and of agencies. He reserved the position of his country with respect to any detailed formulation of the proposal. However, while at that stage his country had hesitations and possible reservations, this was not to be taken as an indication of any desire to hold up the development of the proposed scheme.

22. Mr. Broches: The Bank’s answer to the UN questionnaire meant to imply that the Bank would be a more appropriate forum for such a discussion; this had been explained to the UN Secretariat. The reason for putting the answer in that form was that the questionnaire asked whether the UN would be an appropriate forum to discuss the matter, and whether the UN could perform a useful role in the attempt to arrive at a convention. It appeared that the UN would not be the proper forum because the political tensions there would make it difficult for a discussion on conciliation and arbitration to go forward. The UN Secretariat was aware of Mr. Black's initiative, and of the fact that the Bank had started exploratory discussions. The Management agreed that the Bank should not carry its current proposal very far unless the UN welcomed such activity. Furthermore, if the aim was that arbitration clauses or agreements to seek recourse to mediation were to be binding undertakings, a new international agreement would be required. Such agreement could not be brought under the treaty setting up the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

23. Mr. Garland suggested the possibility of revising the Hague Treaty at the same time. Mr. Broches commented that the Hague Treaty dealt with a situation that had largely ceased to exist, as indicated by its date. Although the Secretariat of the Permanent Court permitted the use of its administrative facilities by all types of parties, there were about 30 members of the Bank which were not parties to the Treaty. A revision of the Hague Treaty did not appear to be feasible. The new element in the Bank's proposal was that, while access to the Center would be voluntary, a voluntary undertaking to have access would become binding.
24. Mr. Lieftinck: The reaction of the Netherlands to the proposal was positive. The Netherlands Government would agree to a solution along the lines drawn by the General Counsel in the paper SecH 61-192 dated August 28, 1961, the main elements of which were: recognition by states of the possibility of direct access by private individuals and corporations to an international tribunal in the field of financial and economic disputes with governments; and recognition by states that agreements made by them with private individuals and corporations to submit such disputes to arbitration were binding international undertakings. They considered these very important if not essential elements. The Netherlands Government also favored a provision for conciliation as an alternative to arbitration. They agreed that it would be useful to provide for some international machinery for the conduct of arbitration and conciliation, including the availability of a panel of arbitrators or mediators.

25. The Netherlands Government felt, however, that further studies were required with respect to the cooperation between the proposed Center and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The purposes to be attained by the Bank's proposal could not be fully achieved on the basis of existing conventions, nor would it be promising to try to amend these conventions to suit such purposes. There was need for a new convention, and every possible simplification of the suggested machinery that could be realized by a close cooperation with the Permanent Court of Arbitration should be fully investigated.

26. The creation of the Center should not preclude the Bank or its President from acting as arbitrator or conciliator in special cases. It would be useful to have the President of the Bank appointed President and member of the proposed Governing Council. As to the Center, it should be a purely administrative body. With respect to the election of the proposed Secretary General he endorsed the views expressed by Mr. Leddy. He was in favor of the staff preparing a draft convention, which would make it easier for governments to reach a position with respect to the whole matter.

27. Mr. Pitblado: His authorities welcomed the Bank's initiative in advancing this proposal for consideration and were pleased with the general modesty of the approach. They attached considerable importance to preserving the possibility of the Bank and its President continuing to play a part in the settlement of disputes. Questions had been raised whether a body of this sort, set up in connection with the Bank, would be helpful on balance to the Bank and to its member governments. Governments would be in a better position to consider the matter both in principle and in detail if a paper could be prepared both setting out more detailed proposals, and describing the background more fully, indicating what had already been done and what were the alternative possibilities for action.

28. Mr. van Campenhout: Belgium, Austria and South Korea favored the idea that study of a Center of the kind proposed be undertaken by the Bank. He did not have as yet reactions from Luxembourg and Turkey. It was important not to overlook the existence of other international judicial bodies, particularly those located in the Hague, which could, at the administrative level or otherwise, provide services or ideas. Procedure should be simple and particular emphasis should be given to the procedure for designation of mediators or arbitrators. Such procedure should ensure the impartial designation of impartial men.
29. Mr. Broches said that the staff had started to prepare a collection of precedents in this field which would be helpful in preparing more specific proposals.

30. Mr. Chen: His Government was in favor of the proposal in principle, but since it was a complicated problem, they had referred it to the competent legal authorities for further comments.

31. Mr. Suzuki: Three of his four countries were pleased with the initiative taken by the Bank, but reserved their position until the details were known. He asked whether the proposed agreement would be the kind of convention or treaty which would have to be ratified by Parliaments.

32. Mr. Broches said that the need for a convention arose because of two elements in the proposal: the recognition by governments of direct access by private parties to an international forum; and their recognition of the binding character of agreements entered into with private parties. It would depend on each country's constitution whether such a convention would have to be ratified or approved by Parliament.

33. Mr. Haus Solis: One of his Governments did not favor the project as proposed. Another implied doubts about the practicality of changing present legislation to accomplish the purposes of the project. His personal opinion had been stated in the previous Meeting and remained the same. Further informal meetings should be held in order to clarify this increasingly complex matter.

34. The Chairman closed the discussion stating that a more detailed proposal would be prepared by the staff for further consideration.
was discussed in general terms. Summaries of these discussions have been circulated as Sec M 62-17, dated January 19, 1962, and Sec M 62-68, dated April 10, 1962.

At the March 13 meeting it was decided that the General Counsel should formulate some concrete suggestions, possibly in the form of a draft convention, in order to facilitate further discussion of the question.

The attached document has been prepared by the General Counsel with that purpose in mind. It is not to be regarded as a proposal, but merely as a basis for discussion.

The form of the working paper, namely that of a draft convention, has made it necessary to treat the problem in considerable detail and this, in turn, has necessitated choices on a great number of points not all of equal importance, among alternative possibilities. Comments have been added where this appeared to be useful either to explain the provision or to indicate possible alternatives.

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Article I

Purpose

The purpose of this Convention is to promote the resolution of disputes arising between Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States by encouraging and facilitating recourse to international conciliation and arbitration.

Comment

It may be useful to make clear at the outset that the procedures envisaged in the Convention for the settlement of disputes would be available at the instance of States as well as of private parties. The draft covers disputes involving claims by as well as against States.
Article II

Undertakings to have recourse to conciliation or arbitration

Section 1. The provisions of this Article shall apply to any undertaking in writing to have recourse to conciliation or arbitration pursuant to the provisions of this Convention for the resolution of any existing or future dispute between a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State.

Comment

Article II deals with the legal effect of undertakings to have recourse to conciliation or arbitration. Section 1 limits the scope of the Article to undertakings which:

(a) contemplate conciliation or arbitration pursuant to the Convention;
(b) are expressed in writing;
(c) relate to a dispute between a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State.

To the extent that the provisions of Article II constitute a development, rather than a mere codification, of existing international law, it is to be expected that States would not wish the provisions to apply automatically to undertakings given in the past, or to all undertakings given in the future. Hence the requirement that the undertaking must contemplate proceedings "pursuant to the provisions of this Convention".

While the undertaking is required to be in writing, there is no requirement that it be executed in any particular form. Furthermore, it may be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral.

The limitation mentioned under (c) above is necessary, first, to exclude disputes between States and their own nationals and, second, to assure reciprocity.

It will be noted that Section 1 contains no limitations as to the nature of the dispute. Although the Convention and the Center would be intended to be used primarily in connection with what are commonly referred to as "investment disputes", there is no need to write a limitation to that effect into the Convention, since it is up to the parties to an undertaking to decide whether they want to bring it within the terms of the Convention. Moreover, it is difficult to define the term "investment dispute" with the precision required to avoid disagreements arising as to the applicability of the Convention to a given undertaking. And uncertainty on this score would tend to undermine the primary objective of Article II, namely to give confidence that undertakings to have recourse to conciliation or arbitration will be carried out.
Section 2. An undertaking to have recourse to conciliation constitutes a legal obligation and must be carried out in good faith.

Section 3. An undertaking to have recourse to arbitration constitutes a legal obligation and must be carried out in good faith. Such an undertaking carries with it the obligation to comply with the arbitral award and carry the same out in good faith.

Comment

Sections 2 and 3 lay down the basic rule that while the Convention imposes no obligation either on States or on parties other than States to undertake to have recourse to conciliation or arbitration (see Article II, Section 6) undertakings once given constitute legal obligations.

The second sentence of Section 3 is an adaptation of a generally accepted principle of international arbitration to the effect that "recourse to arbitration implies an engagement to submit in good faith to the award" (Article 37 of the Hague Convention of 1907).

Section 4. Except as otherwise stated therein, an undertaking to have recourse to arbitration shall be deemed to be an undertaking to have recourse to arbitration in lieu of any other remedy.

Comment

In connection with an agreement to have recourse to arbitration doubt could conceivably arise as to whether the parties intended either (a) to reserve the right to pursue other remedies or (b) to require that other remedies be exhausted prior to recourse to arbitration. Section 4 is intended to remove doubts on both scores by providing that, in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary, arbitration is to be in lieu of any other remedy.

Section 5. No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection or bring an international claim in respect of a dispute (a) which one of its nationals and another Contracting State shall have undertaken to submit to arbitration, or (b) which one of its nationals shall have submitted to arbitration pursuant to an undertaking of another Contracting State, or (c) which another Contracting State shall have submitted to arbitration
pursuant to an undertaking of such national; provided, however, that
nothing herein contained shall affect the right of a Contracting State to
give diplomatic protection or bring an international claim in respect of
an alleged violation by another Contracting State of any of its obligations
under this Convention with respect to such dispute.

Comment

The Convention recognizes the right of a private party, within
the limits laid down in the Convention, to proceed against a foreign
State before an international arbitral tribunal in its own name,
rather than seek the diplomatic protection of its national State or
have that State bring an international claim. It would seem to be
a natural concomitant of the recognition of the private party's
right of direct access to an international jurisdiction, to exclude
action by its national State in cases in which such access is avail-
able under the Convention; and the same would seem to be true in
cases in which the private party is a defendant rather than a
plaintiff.

Since the exclusion of the national State rests on the premise
that the other Contracting State will abide by the provisions of the
Convention, the rule of exclusion is subject to an exception in the
event that premise falls away; in that event the right to give
diplomatic protection and to bring an international claim remains
unaffected.

Section 6. Nothing contained in this Convention shall obligate any
Contracting State (a) to undertake to have recourse to conciliation or
arbitration in any particular case, or (b) to have recourse to conciliation
or arbitration in the absence of an undertaking to that effect, or (c) shall
limit the freedom of any Contracting State or of any national of
any Contracting State to stipulate in any such undertaking that one
or more of the provisions of this Convention shall not apply to
such undertaking.

Comment

Clauses (a) and (b) of this section state the obvious; they
have been inserted to remove any possible doubt as to the optional
character of the Convention. Clause (c) underscores this optional
character even further by giving parties to a dispute a choice
between being governed by the Convention in its entirety and ex-
cluding the applicability of certain provisions of the Convention.
Article III

The International Conciliation and Arbitration Center

(a) Establishment and Organization

Section 1. There is hereby established the International Conciliation and Arbitration Center (hereinafter called the Center). The Center shall have full juridical personality.

Section 2. (1) The seat of the Center shall be at the headquarters of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (hereinafter called the Bank).

(2) The Center may make arrangements with the Bank for the use of the Bank's offices and other services and facilities.

(3) The Center may also make arrangements with the Administrative Council of the Permanent Court of Arbitration for the use of the organization and facilities of that Court within the scope of the Hague Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes of 1899 and 1907 and the decisions of the Administrative Council of the Court.

Comment

The assumptions and considerations underlying this section may be briefly set forth as follows:

(a) It has been assumed that the Center would be sponsored by the Bank and would have an administrative link to the Bank.

(b) Since it will be impossible to predict the volume of business that will come to the Center, the "machinery" must be characterized by flexibility and economy. This is sought to be achieved here by opening the possibility of using the Bank's facilities. And see further Sections 4, 7 and 9(2) of this Article.

(c) To the extent practicable, there should be cooperation with the Hague Court. Under Article 47 of the Hague Convention of 1907 and the decisions of the Administrative Council of the Hague Court, the Bureau of that Court is authorized to make its offices and staff available for conciliation or arbitration proceedings between a State and a party other than a State, provided the State
concerned is a party to the Convention. Some 25 members of the Bank are not parties to the Convention. See also Section 11(2) of this Article.

Section 3. The Center shall have a President, an Administrative Council, a Secretariat, a Panel of Conciliators and a Panel of Arbitrators (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Panels).

(b) The President

Section 4. The President of the Bank shall be ex officio President of the Center. The President shall be Chairman of the Administrative Council but shall have no vote except a deciding vote in case of an equal division.

Section 5. During any absence or inability to act of the President of the Bank, and during any vacancy in the office of President of the Bank, the person who shall be the chief of the operating staff of the Bank shall act as President of the Center.

Section 6. The President shall serve as such without compensation from the Center.

c) The Administrative Council

Section 7. The Administrative Council shall be composed of one representative and one alternate representative appointed by each Contracting State. No alternate may vote except in the absence of his principal.

Comment

Consideration should be given to the question whether the parties to the Convention should, because of its Bank sponsorship and the administrative link between the Center and the Bank, be limited to members of the Bank. The reasons for making Bank membership a prerequisite of participation in IFC and IDA do not apply to the same extent in this case.

As an alternative Section 7 might provide that each governor and alternate governor appointed by a member of the Bank which is
also a Contracting State shall be ex officio the representative and alternate representative of the State in question.

Section 8. The Administrative Council shall be the principal organ of the Center and shall, within the limits of the provisions of this Convention, adopt such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers as may be necessary or useful for the operation of the Center and the achievement of the purposes of this Convention. The Administrative Council may delegate any of its powers to the President, except the power to appoint the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretaries-General.

Comment

The principal functions of the Administrative Council might be, in addition to its statutory task in connection with the appointment of the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretaries-General, the adoption from time to time of rules of procedure, the approval of the budget of the Center and the approval of an annual report.

Section 9. (1) The Administrative Council shall hold an annual meeting and such other meetings as may be provided for by the Administrative Council or called by the President. The Administrative Council may by regulation establish a procedure whereby the President may obtain a vote of the Administrative Council on a specific question without calling a meeting of the Administrative Council.

(2) The annual meeting of the Administrative Council shall be held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the Bank.

(3) A quorum for any meeting of the Administrative Council shall be a majority of the members.

(4) Each member of the Administrative Council shall cast one vote and all matters before the Council shall be decided by a majority of the votes cast.
(5) Members of the Administrative Council shall serve as such without compensation from the Center.

Comment

The question of voting rights cannot be considered outside the context of the task of the Administrative Council. To the extent that the Council would deal with important substantive or policy matters, it is possible that on certain issues there would be a clear split between the capital exporting and capital importing countries. For instance, if the Administrative Council were to elect the panels, or if the Secretary-General, who is appointed by the Council, were a quasi-judicial, rather than an administrative official, the question of voting power might well take on considerable importance. If each member had one vote this would, assuming that all members of the Bank became parties to the Convention, give control over these matters to the capital importing countries. On the other hand, if the weighted voting system of the Bank were carried over into the Council, the capital exporting countries would be in control. In order to avoid either alternative one could devise a system under which a majority vote in the Council would require the vote of a majority of the members representing a majority of the voting power of the members determined in accordance with the Bank formula.

Whatever the merits of the double voting test, it does not appear to be appropriate in the present draft, since the panels would be composed of persons designated by the respective Contracting States (and in addition some persons designated by the Chairman) and the Secretary-General would not possess any judicial or quasi-judicial powers. Nor does it appear that there are any other matters within the competence of the Council that could lead to major controversies between the capital exporting and the capital importing countries as groups. The draft has therefore adopted the simple one-member-one-vote formula.

(d) The Secretariat

Section 10. The Secretariat shall consist of a Secretary-General, one or more Deputy Secretaries-General and staff.

Comment

Since the Secretary-General will have certain formal duties to perform in connection with proceedings under the auspices of the Center, it would seem desirable to provide for at least one deputy.

Section 11. (1) The Secretary-General and Deputy Secretaries-General shall be appointed by the Administrative Council upon the nomination of the President.


(2) The office of Secretary-General or Deputy Secretary-General shall be incompatible with the exercise of any political function, and with any employment or occupation other than employment by the Bank or by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, except as the Administrative Council, with the concurrence of the President, may otherwise decide.

Comment

The considerations underlying this section are the following:

Even though the Secretary-General's statutory powers would be limited to administration (see Section 12 of this Article), he could in practice perform a valuable task in promoting use of the Center's facilities and by giving informal assistance and advice to the parties in connection with proceedings under the Center's auspices. His effectiveness will depend on his competence as well as on the degree of confidence which he is able to inspire. If it could be expected with a reasonable degree of certainty that activities under the Convention would be such as to provide a full time occupation for a Secretary-General and one deputy, it would be desirable to provide that they, or at least the Secretary-General himself, may not hold any other office or engage in any other occupation or activity. Since no such degree of certainty exists, the draft permits the Administrative Council to make exceptions to the rule and, in addition, specifically excludes from incompatibility employment by the Bank or by the Hague Court. These provisions give the Administrative Council and the President, who is the nominating authority, adequate flexibility.

Section 12. (1) The Secretary-General shall be the principal administrative officer of the Center and shall be responsible for its administration, including the appointment of staff, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and the rules to be adopted thereunder.

(2) During any absence or inability to act of the Secretary-General, and during any vacancy of the office of Secretary-General, the Deputy Secretary-General shall act as Secretary-General. If there shall be more than one Deputy Secretary-General, the Secretary-General shall determine in what order they shall act as Secretary-General.

(e) The Panels

Comment

Because of the optional and flexible character of the Convention as a whole and of access to the Center in particular, the
Panels have limited significance. Parties to proceedings under the auspices of the Center are entirely free to agree to use conciliators or arbitrators who do not form part of the Panels. On the other hand, as will be seen from Articles V and VI of the draft, unless the parties agree otherwise, conciliators and arbitrators will be selected by them from the respective Panels, and the President, when called upon to appoint a conciliator or arbitrator, will likewise make the selection from the Panels.

The composition of the Panels could be determined in a number of different ways. One method would be to have the Contracting States elect a certain number of panel members from among candidates nominated by each Contracting State. While this method would have certain advantages, particularly in encouraging States to nominate candidates of high quality, it has the disadvantage of necessitating a somewhat complicated voting procedure in order to assure a balanced composition of the Panels as between candidates nominated by the capital exporting and capital importing countries respectively. (See the comment on Article III, Section 9).

The method adopted in the draft largely follows the system of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, in leaving the composition of the Panels primarily to the Contracting States. Under the draft the President would have the right to designate a specified number of panel members in addition to those designated by the Contracting States. He might exercise this right after the States had made their designations to achieve the balanced representation on the Panels not only of different legal systems but also of different forms of economic activity. (It is to be noted that the Panels would not be composed only of legal experts but of experts in other fields as well).

Section 13. (1) The Panel of Conciliators shall consist of qualified persons, designated as hereafter provided, who are willing to serve as members of the Panel.

(2) Each Contracting State shall designate not more than ___ persons to serve on the Panel, who may, but need not, be its own nationals.

(3) The President shall have the right to designate up to ___ persons to serve on the Panel.

Section 14. (1) The Panel of Arbitrators shall consist of qualified persons, designated as hereafter provided, who are willing to serve as members of the Panel.

(2) Each Contracting State shall designate not more than ___
persons to serve on the Panel, who may, but need not, be its own nationals.

(3) The President shall have the right to designate up to
persons to serve on the Panel.

Section 15. (1) Panel members shall serve for four years.

(2) In case of death or resignation of a member of either
Panel, the Contracting State or the President, as the case may be, which
or who had designated the member, shall have the right to designate another
person to serve for the balance of that member's term.

Section 16. (1) The same person may be designated to serve on both Panels.

(2) If a person is designated to serve on a Panel by more than
one Contracting State, or by one or more Contracting States and the President,
he shall be deemed to have been designated by the authority which first
designated him.

(3) All designations shall be notified to the Secretary-General
and any designation shall take effect from the date when the notification
is received.

Section 17. (1) The Contracting States shall pay due regard to the impor-
tance of Panels composed of persons of high moral character and recognized
competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance and, to that
end, shall, before designating Panel members, seek such advice as they may
dee appropriate from their highest courts of justice, schools of law, bar
associations and such commercial, industrial and financial organizations as
shall be considered representative of the professions they embrace.

(2) The President shall, in designating members to the Panels,
pay due regard to the importance of assuring the representation on the
Panels of the principal legal systems of the world and of the main forms
of economic activity.
(f) Financing the Cost of the Center

Section 18. To the extent that the cost of the Center cannot be met out of fees and other charges for the use of its facilities, or out of other receipts, it shall be borne by the Contracting States in proportion to their respective subscriptions to the capital stock of the Bank except that as to Contracting States which are not members of the Bank, the Administrative Council shall determine the basis for their proportionate share.

Comment

The words "or out of other receipts" have been included in order to take account of the possibility that the Bank might finance the cost of the Center. For the bracketed language see comment on Section 7 of this Article.

(g) Privileges and Immunities

Section 19. The Center shall be immune from all legal process.

Section 20. (1) The President, the members of the Administrative Council, and the officers and employees of the Secretariat (i) shall be immune from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity; (ii) not being local nationals shall be accorded the same immunities from immigration restrictions, alien registration requirements and national service obligations, the same facilities as regards exchange restrictions and the same treatment in respect of travelling facilities as are accorded by Contracting States to the representatives, officials and employees of comparable rank of other Contracting States.

(2) Paragraph (1) (i) of this Section shall also apply to persons acting as conciliators or arbitrators in proceedings pursuant to this Convention, and to persons appearing as parties, representatives of parties, agents, counsel, experts or witnesses in such proceedings, but only in connection with their travel to and from the seat of the Center or other location...
where the proceedings are held and their stay at such location for the purpose of such proceedings.

Section 21. (1) The archives of the Center shall be inviolable.

(2) The official communications of the Center shall be accorded the same treatment as is accorded to the official communications of other Contracting States.

Section 22. (1) The Center, its assets, property and income, and its operations and transactions authorized by this Convention, shall be immune from all taxation and customs duties. The Center shall also be immune from liability for the collection or payment of any taxes or customs duties.

(2) No tax shall be levied on or in respect of salaries or emoluments paid by the Center to the President, members of the Administrative Council or officials or employees of the Secretariat who are not local citizens, local subjects or other local nationals.

(3) No tax shall be levied on or in respect of honoraria, fees or other income received by persons acting as conciliators or arbitrators in proceedings pursuant to this Convention for their services in such proceedings, if the sole jurisdictional basis for such tax shall be the location of the Center or the place where such proceedings are conducted or the place where such income is paid.

Article IV

Jurisdiction of the Center

Section 1. (1) The jurisdiction of the Center shall be limited to disputes between Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States and shall be based on consent.
(2) The consent of any party to a dispute to the jurisdiction of the Center may be evidenced by an undertaking of such party within the meaning of Article II, Section 1, of this Convention or by the acceptance by such party of the jurisdiction of the Center in respect of a dispute submitted to it by another party.

(3) Except as otherwise agreed between the parties, the Center shall not exercise jurisdiction in respect of disputes involving claims of less than the equivalent of one hundred thousand United States dollars determined as of the time of submission of the dispute.

Comment

Paragraph (1) states the basic principle that the activities of the Center must be based on consent. Paragraph (2) distinguishes between consent given in advance, evidenced by an undertaking within the meaning of Article II, Section 1, which— it will be recalled—is binding, and ad hoc consent evidenced by voluntary acceptance by a party of the jurisdiction of the Center in respect of a particular dispute submitted to it by another party. Paragraph (3) places a monetary limit on claims to be submitted to the Center. Arbitration is not an inexpensive procedure and parties should not be forced to have resort to it if the amount claimed remains below a certain limit which, for purposes of illustration, has been put at the equivalent of U.S. $ 100,000.

Section 2. If a Contracting State or a national of a Contracting State shall have given an undertaking to have recourse to conciliation and, having been requested by another party to proceed to conciliation, shall deny the existence of a dispute or shall deny that the dispute is within the scope of the undertaking or that the undertaking is valid, whether such disagreement arises before or after the constitution of a Conciliation Commission, either party may submit such disagreement to arbitration in the same manner and with the same effect as if the parties had expressly undertaken to have recourse to arbitration for the resolution of such disagreement pursuant to this Convention.

Comment

The solution here proposed takes cognizance of the difference between the undertaking to have recourse to conciliation, which
constitutes a legal obligation, and the conciliation proceedings in which the emphasis is on efforts to achieve an amicable settlement and which may lead at the most to a non-binding recommendation. In these circumstances it would seem preferable that a dispute concerning the obligation to have recourse to conciliation be settled not by the Conciliation Commission but through arbitration.

Section 3. Neither a Contracting State nor a national of a Contracting State may refuse to carry out an undertaking to have recourse to arbitration claiming that there is no existing dispute or that the existing dispute is not within the scope of the undertaking, or that the undertaking is invalid, but the party making such claim shall be entitled to have such claim disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal as a preliminary question.

Comment
This provision is merely a reflection of the general principle (stated in Section 5 of this Article) that the Arbitral Tribunal is the judge of its own competence.

Section 4. (1) If at any time, whether before or after the constitution of a Conciliation Commission or an Arbitral Tribunal, a Contracting State which is a party to a dispute (in this Section referred to as the State party) shall claim that the Center lacks jurisdiction on the ground that the other party (in this Section referred to as the non-state party) was not a national of another Contracting State on the date when the dispute was submitted to the Center, the State party may serve a notice to that effect on the non-state party and on the Secretary-General of the Center. Receipt of the notice by the Secretary-General shall have the effect of staying any proceedings which may be in progress and of suspending the running of any periods of time applicable to the dispute until such time as the question of jurisdiction shall have been disposed of as hereafter provided.

(2) The Secretary-General shall promptly and by rapid means of communication address a copy of the notice to the Contracting State or
States of which the non-state party claims to be a national.

(3) If, upon the expiration of 60 days after dispatch by the Secretary-General of the copy of the notice, neither the Contracting State or States to which it was addressed, nor any other Contracting State shall have claimed that the non-state party is its or their national, the Secretary-General shall declare that the Center is without jurisdiction and shall so inform the parties to the dispute and the Conciliation Commission or the Arbitral Tribunal, as the case may be, if one shall have been constituted.

(4) If, within 60 days after dispatch by the Secretary-General of the copy of the notice, any Contracting State shall have notified the Secretary-General that it regards the non-state party as its national, the Secretary-General shall promptly send a copy of that notice to the State party by rapid means of communication.

(5) If, within 60 days after dispatch by the Secretary-General of the copy of the notice referred to in (4) above, the State party shall have notified the Secretary-General that it maintains its objections to the jurisdiction of the Center, the Secretary-General shall inform all Contracting States that a disagreement has arisen regarding the interpretation and application of this Convention within the meaning of Article IX.

(6) If the State party shall not, within 60 days after dispatch by the Secretary-General of the copy of the notice referred to in (4) above, have notified the Secretary-General that it maintains its objections to the jurisdiction, it shall be deemed to have withdrawn its objections, and the Secretary-General shall so inform the parties to the dispute and the Conciliation Commission or the Arbitral Tribunal, if one shall have been constituted.

Comment

The objection to the jurisdiction dealt with in this section is based not on a dispute as to the agreement of the parties, i.e.
the consent of the parties which is an indispensable prerequisite
for the jurisdiction of the Center, but as to the applicability of
the Convention to the dispute, which is another indispensable
element. While the first interest only the parties, the second
is of interest to the Contracting States. For that reason Section
4 prescribes a different method for deciding whether the objection
is well-founded.

Section 5. Except as herein otherwise provided, or as otherwise agreed
between the parties, any Conciliation Commission and any Arbitral Tribunal
constituted pursuant to this Convention shall be the judge of its own
competence.

Article V

Conciliation

Section 1. Any dispute within the jurisdiction of the Center may be the
subject of a request for conciliation by a Conciliation Commission.

Section 2. The Conciliation Commission shall consist of a sole conciliator
or several conciliators appointed as the parties may have agreed. In the
absence of agreement the Conciliation Commission shall consist of three
conciliators, one appointed by each party and the third appointed by
agreement of the parties, all appointees to be selected from the Panel of
Conciliators.

Section 3. (1) If the Conciliation Commission shall not have been constituted
within three months after the request referred to in Section 1, the President
shall, at the request of either party, appoint the conciliator or conciliators
not appointed pursuant to Section 2. Before making any such appointment, the
President shall instruct the Secretary-General to consult with the parties
and to report to him any information or views which may assist him in making
the appointment.
(2) In making any appointment under this section the President shall select the appointee from the Panel of Conciliators.

Comment

As to the role of the President as appointing authority, see the comment on Section 3 of Article VI below.

Section 4. (1) Except as the parties shall otherwise agree, the Conciliation Commission shall conduct the conciliation proceedings in such manner, in accordance with the Conciliation Rules adopted under this Convention or otherwise, as may appear to the Commission to be most conducive to a resolution of the dispute.

(2) The Conciliation Commission may at any stage of the proceedings recommend terms of settlement to the parties. If the parties shall reach agreement, the Commission shall draw up a report noting the submission of the dispute and recording that the parties have reached agreement. Except as the parties shall otherwise agree, the report shall not contain the terms of settlement accepted by the parties.

Section 5. If at any time it appears to the Conciliation Commission that there is no likelihood of agreement between the parties, the Commission may declare the proceedings closed. The Commission shall in that event draw up a report noting the submission of the dispute and recording the failure of the conciliation effort. Unless the parties otherwise agree, the report shall not contain the terms of settlement, if any, recommended to the parties by the Commission.

Section 6. The parties shall give the Conciliation Commission their full cooperation in order to enable the Commission to carry out its task, and shall give the most serious consideration to the Commission's recommendations.

Section 7. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of Section 6 of this
Article, neither party to a conciliation proceeding shall be under any obligation to accept any recommendation made by the Conciliation Commission.

(2) Neither party to a conciliation proceeding shall be entitled in any later proceeding concerning the same dispute, whether before arbitrators or in a court of law or otherwise, to invoke or rely on any views expressed or statements or admissions or offers of settlement made by the other party in the conciliation proceeding, or the recommendations, if any, made by the Conciliation Commission therein.

Comment

Paragraph (2) of Section 7 is intended to encourage the parties to seek agreement rather than maintain fixed positions out of fear that a conciliatory attitude might prejudice their position in a later proceeding if the conciliation effort failed.

Section 8. Except as the parties otherwise agree, or as the Conciliation Commission otherwise decides, any conciliation proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the Conciliation Rules adopted under this Convention and in effect at the time when the consent on which the proceeding is based was given.

Article VI

Arbitration

Section 1. Any dispute within the jurisdiction of the Center may be the subject of a request for arbitration by an Arbitral Tribunal.

Section 2. The Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator or several arbitrators appointed as the parties may have agreed. In the absence of agreement the Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators, one appointed by each party and the third appointed by agreement of the parties, all appointees to be selected from the Panel of Arbitrators.
Comment

The second sentence of Section 2 adopts what is probably the most usual method for the constitution of an arbitral tribunal. It can be argued that it is the least desirable method because of the danger that each party will look upon the arbitrator to be appointed by it as an advocate. Under this pessimistic assumption the umpire would be the only true arbitrator. It has been argued for this reason that it would be preferable to have either a sole arbitrator or a tribunal consisting of five members of whom only two would be directly appointed by the parties. The draft has not followed either alternative because it is believed that a sole arbitrator would not be generally acceptable as a matter of principle and because a five member tribunal would add considerably to the cost of the proceedings. The parties would be free, of course, to make any agreement they thought fit as to the manner of constituting the tribunal as well as regarding the number of arbitrators. It will be noted from the following sections of this Article that an attempt has been made to avoid some of the dangers of having "party arbitrators".

Section 3. (1) If the Arbitral Tribunal shall not have been constituted within three months after the request referred to in Section 1, the President shall, at the request of either party, appoint the arbitrator or arbitrators not appointed pursuant to Section (2). Before making any such appointment, the President shall instruct the Secretary-General to consult with the parties and to report to him any information or views which may assist him in making the appointment.

(2) In making any appointment under this section, the President shall select the appointee from the Panel of Arbitrators.

Comment

It is a necessary corollary of the binding character of an undertaking to have recourse to arbitration that the Convention contain provisions designed to prevent frustration of that undertaking by an unwilling party. This is the purpose of the appointment procedure laid down in Section 3. It will be noted that, as in the case of conciliation (Section 3 of Article V), the President has been designated the appointing authority, except, of course, as the parties may otherwise agree. Beyond the requirement that the appointee must be selected from the Panel, the President is left free in his choice. It will be noted that the President would exercise his power of appointment even if he were of the same nationality as one of the parties, and that he would not be required to see to it that the arbitrator appointed by him in lieu of an unwilling party be of that party's nationality or that the umpire be of a nationality other than those of the parties. While none of these points are essential, it can be argued in favor of the solution embodied in the draft that in disputes of the type likely to be
submitted to the Center nationality does not have the same importance as in political disputes, that the President would presumably wherever possible appoint a tribunal on which the nationalities of the parties would be represented by two arbitrators with an umpire of a different nationality, and that the flexibility provided by the draft would be of practical importance in the -- probably unusual -- case in which all members of the Panel of the nationality of one of the parties would be unable or unwilling to act, or would be disqualified. But the basic consideration underlying the draft is that the appointing authority must be a person who, because of his office, may be conclusively presumed to be capable of showing impartiality in the selection of arbitrators under all circumstances. It may be noted that under the Bank's Loan Regulations the President of the International Court of Justices and the Secretary-General of the United Nations have a similar unrestricted power of appointment.

Section 4. Except as the parties otherwise agree, any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the Arbitration Rules adopted under this Convention and in effect at the time when the consent on which the proceeding is based was given. If any question of procedure arises which is not covered by the applicable Arbitration Rules, the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide that question.

Section 5. (1) In the absence of any agreement between the parties concerning the law to be applied, and unless the parties shall have given the Arbitral Tribunal the power to decide *ex aequo et bono*, the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide the dispute submitted to it in accordance with such rules of law, whether national or international, as it shall determine to be applicable.

(2) The Arbitral Tribunal may not bring in a finding of *non liquet* on the ground of the silence or obscurity of the law to be applied.

Comment

In the absence of any basis for determining a generally valid rule concerning the law to be applied by arbitrators, the matter has been left to the parties or, in the absence of agreement between the parties, to the arbitral tribunal. The parties may also give the tribunal the power to decide *ex aequo et bono*, without being bound by rules of law.

Section 6. Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Arbitral Tribunal shall have the power to prescribe, at the request of either party, any provisional
measures necessary for the protection of the rights of the parties.

Section 7. Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Arbitral Tribunal shall have the power to hear and determine any counter-claims arising directly out of the subject-matter of the dispute.

Section 8. All questions before the Arbitral Tribunal shall be decided by a majority of the Tribunal.

Section 9. (1) The Arbitral Tribunal shall render its award in writing. An award signed by a majority of the Arbitral Tribunal shall constitute the award of the Tribunal.

(2) The award may be rendered by default.

Comment
The power to render an award by default is also possessed by the arbitral tribunals provided for in the Bank's Loan Regulations. It is a necessary corollary of the binding character of the undertaking to have recourse to arbitration.

Section 10. The award shall be final and binding on the parties. Each party shall abide by and comply with the award immediately, unless the Arbitral Tribunal shall have allowed a time limit for the carrying out of the award or any part thereof.

Section 11. (1) Any dispute between the parties as to the meaning and scope of the award may, at the request of either party made within _ months after the date of the award, be submitted to the Arbitral Tribunal which rendered the award. Such a request shall stay the execution of the award pending the decision of the Tribunal.

(2) If for any reason it is impossible to submit the dispute to the Tribunal which rendered the award, a new Arbitral Tribunal shall be constituted in accordance with the terms of the agreement, if any, between
the parties regarding the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal which rendered
the award, and otherwise pursuant to the provisions of this Article.

Section 12. (1) An application for revision of the award may be made by
either party on the ground of the discovery of some fact of such a nature as
to have a decisive influence on the award, provided that when the award was
rendered that fact was unknown to the Arbitral Tribunal and to the party
requesting revision and that such ignorance was not due to the negligence of
the party requesting revision.

(2) The application for revision must be made within six months
of the discovery of the new fact and in any case within ten years of the
rendering of the award.

(3) The application shall, if possible, be submitted to the
Arbitral Tribunal which rendered the award. If this shall not be possible,
a new Arbitral Tribunal shall be constituted in accordance with the terms
of the agreement, if any, between the parties regarding the constitution
of the Arbitral Tribunal which rendered the award, and otherwise pursuant
to the provisions of this Article.

Article VII

Provisions Common to Conciliation and Arbitration

Section 1. Except as otherwise agreed by the parties, each party to a
conciliation or arbitration proceeding shall bear its own expenses and the
fees and expenses of the Center and of the Conciliation Commission or the
Arbitral Tribunal, as the case may be, shall be divided between and borne
equally by the parties; provided, however, that if a Commission or Tribunal
determines that a party has instituted the proceedings frivolously or in
bad faith, it may assess any part or all of such fees and expenses against that party.

Section 2. The fees and expenses of the Center to be charged to the parties shall be fixed by the Secretary-General within the limits approved from time to time by the Administrative Council.

Section 3. The fees and expenses of any Conciliation Commission or Arbitral Tribunal shall, in the absence of agreement with the parties, be fixed by the Commission or Tribunal concerned after consultation with the Secretary-General.

Section 4. (1) Conciliation and arbitration proceedings shall be held either at the seat of the Center or, to the extent permitted under any arrangements made pursuant to Article III, Section 2 (3), at the seat of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, as the parties may agree. In the absence of agreement on this point between the parties, the Secretary-General shall determine the place where the proceedings shall be held after consultation with the parties and with the Conciliation Commission or Arbitral Tribunal, as the case may be.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this section, proceedings may be held away from the seat of the Center or the seat of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, if the parties so agree and if the Conciliation Commission or Arbitral Tribunal, as the case may be, so approve after consultation with the Secretary-General.

Comment

Paragraph (1) of Section 4 is based on the assumption that the Contracting States would wish a close cooperation between the Center and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. (See in this connection also Article III, Sections 2 and 11).

Section 5. Once a Conciliation Commission or an Arbitral Tribunal shall have
been constituted and proceedings shall have begun, its composition shall remain unchanged; provided, however, that if a conciliator or arbitrator shall die or become incapacitated, or shall have resigned, the resulting vacancy shall be filled by the method used for the original appointment, except that if a conciliator or arbitrator appointed by a party shall have resigned without the consent of the Commission or Tribunal of which he was a member, the resulting vacancy shall be filled by the President.

Comment

The principal clause of Section 5 embodies what is called the "principle of immutability" and is intended to preclude the replacement of Panel members by the parties during the proceedings with a view to influencing the outcome of the proceedings as well as the resignation of Panel members under pressure. Under the draft the principle is applied to both conciliation and arbitration proceedings. It is clearly important for the latter; whether it should apply to the former is less clear.

As a protection against resignation of a Panel member under pressure of the party which had appointed him, a vacancy created by resignation without the consent of his fellow members will be filled not by the appointing party but by the President. Other vacancies will be filled by the method used for the original appointment.

Section 6. (1) A party may propose the disqualification of a conciliator or arbitrator on the ground that he has an interest in the subject matter of the dispute or that he had, prior to his appointment, dealt with the dispute in any capacity whatever.

(2) The proposal shall be made at the beginning of the conciliation or arbitration proceedings, unless the facts on which the proposed disqualification is based were not then known and knowledge of them could not reasonably be imputed to the party making the proposal.

(3) The decision on the proposed disqualification shall be taken by the other members of the Conciliation Commission or Arbitral Tribunal, as the case may be, or, in the case of a single conciliator or arbitrator, by the President. If the decision is that the proposal is well-founded, the conciliator or arbitrator in question shall resign.
Article VIII

Recognition of Arbitral Awards by Contracting States

[Here will be inserted a provision substantially to the effect that Contracting States will give to awards rendered pursuant to the Convention the most favorable treatment they give to foreign arbitral awards whether under their internal law or pursuant to the Geneva Convention of 1927 on the execution of foreign arbitral awards or the United Nations Convention of 1958 on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.]

Article IX

Interpretation

[Here will be inserted a provision providing for the settlement of disputes among Contracting States regarding the interpretation or application of the Convention. The section might provide for the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.]

Article X

Definitions

[To be supplied. Among the terms to be covered would be "party" and "national".]

Article XI

Final Provisions

[To be supplied. This Article would provide for such matters as signature, acceptance, accession, entry into force, territorial application, withdrawal, the inauguration of the Center and administrative details such as depositary arrangements and arrangements for registration.]
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES

1. In connection with the working paper on Settlement of Investment Disputes, R62-1(SD) dated June 5, 1962, Mr. Black would appreciate it if the Executive Directors and Alternates would try to obtain the views of their countries at as early a date as possible. Although it has been proposed that there be a meeting of Executive Directors on this subject on Tuesday, September 11, 1962, Mr. Black believes it might be possible to hold this meeting at an earlier date, if sufficient comments are received in time.

2. For the information of the Executive Directors, the General Counsel has sent the working paper on a confidential basis to officials of the Secretariats of the United Nations and the OECD; also to the Dutch Foreign Office (which chairs the Administrative Council of the Permanent Court of Arbitration), to be passed on to the Secretary General of the Permanent Court if they consider this appropriate.

R 62-2 (SD) (August 31, 1962)
Note from the President to the Executive Directors proposing that they submit a report to the Board of Governors

During the first half of this year the Executive Directors and the Management have explored informally and in broad general terms the question of the establishment of machinery sponsored by the Bank for the conciliation and arbitration of so-called investment disputes between governments and private parties. It was then decided that further consideration of the subject would be facilitated by a more detailed formulation of possible proposals and a Working Paper was prepared for that purpose.

As the Executive Directors know, I believe that the creation of international conciliation and arbitration machinery could make a substantial contribution to the flow of private capital to the developing countries. It is my hope that our discussions will result in a draft of agreement providing for such machinery which could be submitted to governments.

I am therefore of the opinion that it would be highly desirable that
the Board of Governors, at the forthcoming annual meeting, expressly
authorize the Executive Directors to make a study with a view to determining
whether the establishment of such international conciliation and arbitration
machinery would be desirable and practicable and, if the result of their
study warranted such action, to draft an agreement providing for such
machinery and to submit it to governments.

In view of the technical nature of the subject matter which would
require the participation of legal experts in the drafting of such an
agreement, the Executive Directors should have discretion regarding
the procedure to be followed by them in their consideration of the
matter, so as to permit them, for instance, to establish committees
of legal experts or other governmental representatives.

Draft of a proposed report of the Executive Directors to the
Board of Governors is attached hereto, together with a draft resolu-
tion to be adopted by the Board of Governors.

* * *

The decision on whether to proceed on this basis should in my

With regard to the Working Paper, I propose that since only a
few Directors have as yet received comments from the governments they
represent we postpone our discussions until after the Annual Meeting.
I consider it very important that those Directors who have not yet
received comments urge the governments they represent to submit their
comments promptly in writing. These comments need not at this time be
addressed to questions of drafting or other details. The purpose of the
Working Paper is to focus on issues of principle and it would be most
helpful if the comments addressed themselves to these issues.

(DRAFT)

REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS

Settlement of Investment Disputes,

1. As noted in the Bank's Annual Report, the Bank during the
past year started a study of the desirability and practicability
of establishing special institutional facilities for the concili-
ation and arbitration of disputes between governments and private
investors.
2. The Executive Directors consider it desirable that this study be pursued and recommend that the Board of Governors request the Executive Directors to consider the subject matter with a view to determining whether the establishment of facilities, sponsored by the Bank, for the conciliation and arbitration of such disputes, would be desirable and, if the results of their study warrant such action, to draft an agreement providing for such facilities for submission to governments.

3. The Executive Directors intend, in any further consideration of the subject matter, to adopt such procedures as may appear most appropriate to assure participation in the work by legal and other representatives of governments, including the establishment of committees of experts.

4. In view of the foregoing, the Executive Directors recommend that the Board of Governors approve the present report and adopt the attached draft resolution.

(DRAFT RESOLUTION)

Settlement of Investment Disputes

RESOLVED:

THAT the Executive Directors are requested to consider the desirability of establishing institutional facilities, sponsored by the Bank, for the settlement through conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between governments and private parties and, if they conclude that such action would be advisable, to draft an agreement providing for such facilities for submission to governments.
Study of Settlement of Investment Disputes

1. As noted in the Bank's Annual Report, the Bank during the past year started a study of the desirability and practicability of establishing special institutional facilities for the conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between governments and private investors.

2. The Executive Directors consider it desirable that this study be pursued and recommend that the Board of Governors request the Executive Directors to consider the subject matter with a view to determining whether the establishment of facilities, sponsored by the Bank, for the conciliation and arbitration of such disputes, would be desirable and, if the results of their study warrant such action, to draft an agreement providing for such facilities for submission to governments.

3. The Executive Directors intend, in any further consideration of the subject matter, to adopt such procedures as may appear most appropriate, including participation in the work by legal and other governmental experts, and to consult, as may be appropriate, with other interested international institutions.

4. In view of the foregoing, the Executive Directors recommend that
the Board of Governors approve the present report and adopt the attached
draft resolution.'

1 The Draft Resolution is identical to Resolution No. 174 appearing in Doc. 11, and is not reproduced here.

(September 18, 1962, Washington)
Excerpt from address by the President to the Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors

For some time, the Executive Directors of the Bank have been studying a second idea that also is aimed at increasing confidence in international private investment, namely, the establishment, under the sponsorship of the Bank, of some kind of machinery for the conciliation or arbitration of international disputes arising between governments and private parties. A working paper on the subject has been circulated, and we are now receiving comments from governments. I hope that you will agree with me that this approach is an interesting and promising one, and that you will approve this resolution on your agenda specifically authorizing the Directors to study the matter.

(September 18, 1962)
Resolution No. 174 of the Board of Governors

Resolution No. 174

STUDY OF SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES

RESOLVED:

THAT the Executive Directors are requested to consider the desirability and practicability of establishing institutional facilities, sponsored by the Bank, for the settlement through conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between governments and private parties and, if they conclude that such action would be advisable, to draft an agreement providing for such facilities for submission to governments.

(Adopted September 18, 1962)
OUTLINE OF PROVISIONS OF WORKING PAPER RELEVANT TO RELATIONSHIP OF THE CENTER TO THE BANK

A. GENERAL

(i) Seat of Center at Bank headquarters
   Art. III, Sec. 2 (1)
(ii) Possible arrangements for use of Bank's services and facilities
   Art. III, Sec. 2 (2)
(iii) President of Bank ex officio President of Center and of Administrative Council
     Art. III, Sec. 4
(iv) Governors possibly to act as ex officio members of Administrative Council
     Cf. comment on Art. III, Sec. 7
(v) Annual meeting of Administrative Council held in conjunction with Bank's Annual Meeting
    Art. III, Sec. 9 (2)
(vi) Employment by the Bank not incompatible with function of Secretary-General
    Art. III, Sec. 11 (2)
(vii) Possibility that Bank might pay costs of Center
     Cf. comment on Art. III, Sec. 18

B. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF PRESIDENT OF BANK AS EX OFFICIO PRESIDENT OF CENTER AND ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL

(i) May receive delegated powers from Administrative Council
    Art. III, Sec. 8
(ii) May call meetings or obtain vote of Administrative Council
     Art. III, Sec. 9 (1)
(iii) Nominate candidate for Secretary-General
     Art. III, Sec. 11
(iv) May designate persons to serve on panels of conciliators and arbitrators
     Art. III, Secs. 13 (3) and 14 (3)
(v) May appoint conciliators in case of failure of parties to appoint
    Art. V, Sec. 3
(vi) May appoint arbitrators in case of failure of parties to appoint
    Art. VI, Sec. 3
(vii) Decides on challenge of single conciliator or arbitrator
     Art. VII, Sec. 6 (3)
C. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF SECRETARY-GENERAL

(i) Principal administrative officer of Center  
Art. III, Sec. 12 (1)

(ii) May be instructed by President to consult with parties to assist President in choosing conciliators or arbitrators  
Art. V, Sec. 3 (1) and Art. VI, Sec. 3 (1)

(iii) Fixes fees and expenses of Center to be charged to parties within limits set by Administrative Council  
Art. VII, Sec. 2

(iv) May be consulted on fees and expenses of Conciliation Commissions and Arbitral Tribunals  
Art. VII, Sec. 3

(v) May determine place of proceedings and must be consulted on place of proceedings other than Washington or The Hague  
Art. VII, Sec. 4

SID 62-1 (December 28, 1962)
Memorandum of the meeting of the Committee of the Whole, December 18, 1962, not an approved record.

1. There were present: omitted

2. The Chairman recalled that the possibility of establishing conciliation and arbitration machinery had been discussed by the Directors, in general terms, at meetings in January and March. The discussions had dealt with the creation, under Bank sponsorship, of machinery for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes, and the adoption by governments of general principles regarding the use of such machinery. In the management's view, these two elements were closely linked; neither would be fully effective alone. Some Directors had thought the idea meritorious; others had reservations. But there had been general agreement that it would be desirable to have the General Counsel prepare a document indicating in some detail how such machinery might function, as a basis for further discussion. This document (R62-1 (3D)) had been distributed to the Committee. While undoubtedly it raised a number of issues on which Directors would wish to be advised by legal experts of their own countries, there were several issues of principle which could usefully be discussed in the Committee. The Chairman suggested that these be considered first, to be followed by discussion of the general question of the relationship of any such Conciliation and Arbitration Center to the Bank.

3. Mr. Broches proposed that the Committee begin by taking up provisions of Article II, in order. Section I defined the scope of the Article, indicating the kinds of disputes to which the general rules spelled

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1 Executive Directors' Committee of the Whole on Settlement of Investment Disputes, hereinafter referred to as the Committee of the Whole
2 Doc. 6

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out in the following sections would apply. As the comment on Section 1 noted, the Article would apply to any undertaking to have recourse to conciliation or arbitration pursuant to the convention, but it would be limited to disputes arising between a contracting state, that is a state which was a party to the convention, and a national of another contracting state.

4. Mr. Broches called attention to the fact that the document did not limit or define the types of disputes which might be submitted to conciliation or arbitration under the auspices of the Center. It was difficult to find a satisfactory definition. There was the danger that recourse to the services of the Center might in a given situation be precluded because the dispute in question did not precisely qualify under the definition of the convention. There was the further danger that a definition might provide a reluctant party with an opportunity to frustrate or delay the proceedings by questioning whether the dispute was encompassed by the definition. These possibilities suggested that it was inadvisable to define narrowly the kinds of disputes that could be submitted. Moreover, Mr. Broches added, a contracting state would be free to announce that it did not intend to use the facilities of the Center for particular kinds of disputes. Indeed, the fact that a state had signed the convention did not of itself constitute an obligation to submit any dispute. Section 1 as drafted was, however, subject to the possible criticism that it did not make it sufficiently clear that disputes to be submitted must be legal disputes, concerning legal rights, contractual rights or property rights, rather than political or commercial disputes. Mr. Broches thought it would be well to add a limitation to that effect.

5. Mr. Lieftinck, after expressing his appreciation of the work done in preparing the draft convention, recalled his earlier comments on the desirability of settling disputes between governments and nationals of other states by arbitration and conciliation; on the usefulness of a special convention providing rules and machinery for the purpose; and on the importance of the institutional arrangements, particularly with respect to the functions and organization of the proposed Center and its relation to the Bank and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. He had also commented earlier on the administrative council and the composition of the panels. In his present statement, he would confine himself to those points concerning which the Netherlands would propose changes, deletions or additions in the draft document.

6. Noting that in the first sections of Article I and Article II, the word "resolution" appeared, Mr. Lieftinck suggested that the term "settlement" be substituted as being more common usage.

7. Mr. Lieftinck agreed with Mr. Broches that it would be desirable to make clear that the facilities offered under the convention did not extend to political or commercial disputes.

8. Mr. Lieftinck proposed that Sections 2 and 3 be amended to read "An undertaking between a contracting power and the national of another contracting power to have recourse to conciliation [or arbitration] constitutes a legal obligation as between these contracting powers that the undertaking shall be carried out in good faith." He added that perhaps the words "and the nationals of these contracting powers" should
be inserted before the words "that the undertaking shall be carried out in good faith."

9. Mr. Lieftinck questioned the need for Section 6. He appreciated that there was some advantage in giving contracting states explicit assurance that acceptance of the convention did not obligate them to have recourse to conciliation or arbitration, in general or in any particular case. If it was thought necessary to give that assurance, the Netherlands was prepared to accept it. However, insofar as subsection (c) reserved to contracting states and their nationals freedom to stipulate that any provision of the convention should not be applicable to an undertaking to submit a dispute to arbitration or conciliation, he seriously doubted the desirability of so sweeping a provision. Sections 2 and 3 of Article II, declaring that an undertaking to have recourse to arbitration or conciliation constituted a legal obligation and must be carried out in good faith, were the essence of the convention. Contracting states should not be enabled to free themselves of this obligation by their own stipulation. He proposed that what he described as the "remaining freedom" of Section 6 (c) be further limited so that the obligations of Sections 2 and 3 would stand.

10. Because he was leaving for the Netherlands, Mr. Lieftinck asked to be allowed to present his comments on Article III as well. He suggested that the entity to be created by the draft convention be described as a "Secretariat", rather than a "center", to eliminate what he considered an undesirable connotation of size and importance; perhaps it might also be indicated that the Secretariat would perform only procedural functions. To this end, he suggested the title "International Secretariat for Conciliation and Arbitration Procedures", or even "International Registry". For somewhat the same reason, Mr. Lieftinck questioned the need for the provision of Section 1, giving the Center full juridical personality; he did not feel strongly about this point.

11. Mr. Lieftinck commented that to incorporate in the convention itself a provision that the seat of the Center should be at the Bank's headquarters (as in Section 2(1)) would make it difficult to change the locale, should another location appear desirable in the future. A provision in the by-laws would give greater flexibility. For the same reason, he proposed that the substance of Section 2(2) and (3) be transferred to the by-laws. Because it was desirable that the Center have a close relationship with the Permanent Court of Arbitration, he proposed that the provisions of Section 2(3), concerning arrangements for the use by the Center of the Permanent Court's facilities, be made mandatory.

12. Mr. Lieftinck questioned the provision in Section 3, for a President of the Center. He suggested that the section be amended to read, "The Center shall have a Secretary-General, an Administrative (perhaps Advisory) Council, a President of the Administrative (Advisory) Council, a Panel of Conciliators, and a Panel of Arbitrators." It would follow that the provision of Section 4, that the President of the Bank shall be ex officio President of the Center, should be deleted. Whether the President of the Bank should be the President of the Administrative Council depended upon whether it was thought desirable to have a very close link between the proposed new machinery and the Bank. He would prefer a looser relationship,
but in any case thought there was no need to make it mandatory that the President of the Bank serve as Chairman of the Council.

13. Mr. Lieftinck noted that the comment on Section 7 in the Working Paper raised the question whether Bank membership should be a requisite for contracting states. He did not think it should be. Hopefully, countries which were not members of the Bank would be willing to accept the convention, and he thought this should not be precluded. He noted that this conclusion had consequences for other aspects of the convention.

14. Mr. Lieftinck took issue with the provisions of Section 8, insofar as they contemplated that the Administrative Council would be an organ of the Center. He favored the reverse: the Center should be the main organ of the Administrative Council. This need not, however, be explicitly stated. It would suffice to delete the words "shall be the principal organ of the Center and"

15. Mr. Lieftinck endorsed the proposed one-member one-vote formula of Section 9.

16. Mr. Lieftinck had no objection to the provisions of Section 10. The Secretariat should be a procedural agency.

17. Mr. Lieftinck agreed with the provisions of Section 11(1), with the qualification, consistent with his earlier proposal, that the "President" meant the Chairman of the Administrative Council, not the President of the Center. He also agreed with the provision of Section 11(2), that the office of Secretary-General or Deputy Secretary-General should be incompatible with the exercise of any political function, and with any employment or occupation other than employment by the Bank. Referring to his earliest endorsement of a close link between the "Center" and the Secretariat of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Mr. Lieftinck added that while he would not object if the Secretary-General were to be an employee of the Bank, he would prefer that he be a joint employee of the Bank and the Permanent Court.

18. Mr. Lieftinck strongly favored leaving the composition of the panels primarily to the contracting states, as provided in Sections 13 and 14. He recognized that there might be instances in which appointments to the panels had to be made by the President of the Council, but this procedure should be exceptional, and only where a contracting state had failed to appoint a sufficient number of persons.

19. Mr. Lieftinck proposed that there be added to the requisite qualifications of panel members in Section 17 the capacity and willingness to exercise independent judgment. Independence of judgment would be decisive for the effectiveness of the new machinery.

20. Mr. Lieftinck noted the arrangements proposed in Section 18 for meeting the costs of the Center, and commented that if the convention were open to non-Bank members, the proposed arrangements would not be feasible. In any event, he thought a more acceptable basis would be to call for contributions in proportion to contributions made to the Universal Postal Union; this would parallel comparable provisions pertaining to costs of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

21. Mr. Broches said that, as his introductory comments indicated, he was in accord with Mr. Lieftinck on the need for a clear indication in the con-
vention that its scope would extend only to disputes relating to contractual or property rights. It would be necessary to consult with legal experts in various countries before deciding what precise formulation would meet with greatest acceptance.

22. Mr. Broches took Mr. Lieftinck's point concerning the desirability of making even more clear, in Sections 2 and 3 of Article II, that the legal obligation created by an undertaking to have recourse to conciliation or arbitration was an international obligation and therefore bound a state vis-a-vis other states. He agreed that this was desirable; the difficulty lay in determining how to achieve that objective without obscuring or casting doubt on the fact that the obligation was intended to be equally binding on the private party. He would want to give further thought to the best way of making both these points clear.

23. Mr. Broches agreed with Mr. Lieftinck that Section 6(c) as drafted went too far. It had been so phrased in order to permit maximum flexibility, but very likely there were other ways by which this could be achieved, which did not have the potential of emasculating the convention. He would give this section, too, further thought.

24. Mr. van Campenhout expressed the view that it would be desirable to define the kinds of disputes which might be submitted to the Center. He thought that some Governments might find it more difficult to adhere to the convention in the absence of such definition. It was also desirable as a means of Justifying an association between the Bank and the Center. He thought a simple reference to "legal disputes" might not suffice, although he had no specific alternative to offer. Perhaps an effective and appropriate way to avoid argument by parties concerning the competence of the Center would be to provide for a referral of questions concerning competence to the International Court of Justice.

25. Mr. van Campenhout questioned the necessity of Section 2 in Article II; Section 3 appeared to duplicate it. Mr. Broches pointed out that one referred to conciliation, the other to arbitration.

26. Mr. van Campenhout associated himself with Mr. Lieftinck's comments on Section 6(c).

27. Mr. Krishna Moorthi said that his country had serious reservations about the substance of the convention, and that his comments were made against that background. He took exception to the words "encouraging and facilitating" in Article I. Disputes between states and foreign investors in those states should, Mr. Krishna Moorthi thought, as far as possible be decided either by consultations and negotiations between the parties or in the national courts. It was only where these approaches failed that recourse should be had to international conciliation or arbitration. In any case, it should not be a purpose of the Bank to create and facilitate recourse to the Center. If disputes could be settled otherwise, there was no need to encourage their submission to the Center. He thought nothing would be lost, and indeed there might be some gain, if there were to be substituted for the words "encouraging and facilitating" the words "providing for."

28. Mr. Krishna Moorthi noted that Article II, Section 6, would permit a contracting state to attach as many reservations as it wished to its acceptance of the convention. But in practice, he thought a state which did
accede with reservations would find itself under continued pressure to make its accession to the convention progressively less conditional. In part for this reason he thought it highly desirable that the scope of the Center's competence be clearly defined in the convention itself. To attempt to achieve a definition of scope through the declarations of individual contracting states concerning the circumstances in which each would be prepared to employ the Center's facilities would not be satisfactory, in view of the pressures to which he had just referred. It was extremely important, in his view, that the convention and the Center not appear to derogate from the respect owed to national laws and national courts. Arbitration should not be in lieu of any other remedy. The convention should make clear that arbitration and conciliation could be had only under certain exceptional circumstances with reference to closely defined jurisdiction; the aim should be to provide for the minimum of action for the Center, and this should be the maximum expected of any state.

29. Mr. Krishna Moorthi wondered what the second sentence of Section 3 of Article II added that was not already encompassed in the reference in the first sentence to "legal obligation."

30. Mr. Krishna Moorthi thought that the provisions in Section 4 that an undertaking to arbitrate would be an undertaking to follow this course "in lieu of any other remedy" reinforced his argument for the need, in Section 1, to define the actual ambit of operation of the center.

31. Mr. Krishna Moorthi noted that under Section 5, if an award had been given in favor of an individual against a state, and the state failed to comply with the award, the individual might seek the diplomatic protection of his own government, or have an international claim brought by that government. He had no difficulty with this provision, but he thought it somewhat one-sided. He proposed that there be a balancing provision that where an arbitral award was made in favor of a state, the state of which the individual party was a national must give its fellow state all possible assistance within the scope of its national laws to carry out the award.

32. Mr. Broches agreed with Mr. Krishna Moorthi that the proposed new machinery should not be a substitute for local courts and local law. It was not intended to be. International proceedings became important in the abnormal case, where the normal ways of dealing with disputes proved unsatisfactory, perhaps because of a lack of governmental or judicial stability; perhaps because new legal relationships were being created for which there was as yet no appropriate or competent local forum. Implicit in the convention was the thought that it would be used only in these and other "appropriate cases". Perhaps this might be explicitly recognized in a document which might accompany the convention without being part of it.

33. As for Mr. Krishna Moorthi's point that contracting states would be subject to pressures to submit disputes to arbitration, even though they would be equally free to refrain, Mr. Broches thought this would depend in large part on how the convention was presented. Bank sponsorship, in particular, would make clear, Mr. Broches thought, that the convention was not a one-sided attempt to create a new sort of extra-territoriality for foreign private investment. A document accompanying the convention
could also make this clear. Mr. Broches expressed the hope that the
convention might be adopted without reservations. But it might be that
in the legislation approving the convention a government might seek
authority in advance to submit particular classes of disputes to
conciliation or arbitration; this would be a way of announcing to investors
what the government might be willing to do at the given time. Another
government might prefer to seek a specific authorization after a dispute
had arisen.

34. Referring to Mr. Krishna Moorthi's point that it was important,
to minimize the possibility of "friendly persuasion" under Section 6,
to define clearly and narrowly the scope of the Center's jurisdiction,
Mr. Broches said that most of the definitions of investment disputes
discussed in this connection would, in his opinion, create a serious
danger of jurisdictional wrangles. It was all very well to propose
that the International Court, or some other forum, might settle
these arguments, but the object of the convention was to provide a
speedy solution to a basic dispute, and not to invite an inter-
national proceeding with lengthy introductory and preliminary claims.

35. Mr. Broches agreed, and thought there would be general agree-
ment, with Mr. Krishna Moorthi's comment that local courts and local
law should be respected. Section 4 of Article II was not intended to
elevate arbitration procedures over local law. It was designed,
rather, to avoid any question whether, once there was an agreement to
arbitrate, that avenue was immediately available or whether it was
necessary to pursue other remedies first. Mr. Broches thought this
approach the more desirable, but alternatively the convention could
provide that in the absence of agreement to the contrary, the parties
must first exhaust local remedies; this was the general rule of inter-
national law.

36. Mr. Broches added that the difficulty with Article II was that
it must cover three different situations. One, hardly ever likely to
obtain, was the situation in which a government, when accepting the
convention or parallel therewith, made a general statement that it would
submit to arbitration a defined class of disputes with all comers. The
second, and more likely, situation was that an arbitration clause
would be incorporated in an investment agreement. In that event, the
scope of any possible arbitration would be clear: it would be limited
to disputes arising out of that contract. This was likely to be a
case in which the parties indeed intended to have recourse to arbitra-
tion in lieu of any other remedy. The third situation would be one in
which a dispute had arisen and the government and the investor then
decided to arbitrate, presumably because they considered this preferable
to having the investor first exhaust his legal or administrative remedies.

37. Mr. Broches then referred to Mr. Krishna Moorthi's point about
the one-sidedness of Section 5 of Article II. Section 5 was in fact
an innovation. Under international law it was generally understood
that a state always had the right, and according to some, the duty,
to press a claim for the protection of its nationals which it considered
an essential interest. Section 5 excluded the exercise of this right,
because the private individual would have direct access to an international
body for the adjudication of his claim. Since the exclusion of the
national state was based on the assumption that the other state would
perform certain obligations, there would be no justification for the
exclusion if the latter did not live up to its obligations. The counter-
part, if a private party did not comply with its obligations, would be
that the state which had obtained an award in its favor could proceed to
enforce it against the private party. If the private party owned property
within the jurisdiction of the state which had obtained an award in its
favor, the state could enforce the award in the courts under its own law.
If the private party had no assets or insufficient assets in the
jurisdiction of the winning state, the question would be whether
the award could be readily enforced in the courts of the private
party's home state, short of re-litigating the claim. Or the
private party's assets might lie neither in its own country nor in
the host state, but in a third country. To achieve a balance as
between the contracting state which might lose and the contracting
state which might win, it would be necessary, Mr. Broches thought, to
make sure that the awards of a tribunal set up under this convention
would be enforceable in all member states. Article VIII suggested
a possible approach, which might or might not prove adequate. Perhaps
it would be necessary to provide for an undertaking to give effect to
such awards. This in turn might call for local legislation, as where
existing law did not offer the desired remedy. In that case either the
convention should impose an obligation on member states to change their
laws to enable them to undertake the obligation, or it might be
provided that a host government might refuse to sign an arbitration
agreement with an investor under whose national law an award in favor
of the host government could not be enforced. The whole question of
the extent to which the local laws offered the balance which Mr. Krishna
Moorthi quite rightly sought must be examined.

38. Mr. Krishna Moorthi said he took it that it was a merit of the
proposal that it would tend to reassure foreign investors about condi-
tions for investment in such countries as subscribed to the convention.
Countries in acceding to such a document in part or in whole gave up
some of their sovereignty. They had to present to their parliaments
a document which made plain what action might be taken under it. It
was therefore necessary that the charter spell out all the reservations,
delineate the powers very clearly, and state explicitly that national
laws and courts would continue to be paramount. This was not a situa-
tion in which flexibility was desirable. He added that it was his
personal desire that the agreed document be acceptable without reserva-
tion, rather than having, for example, eight sections accepted in one
country, four in another, part of one in a third, so that the foreign
investor would be doubtful where he stood in any of the countries. With
this objective in mind he had made his point that the convention should
spell out the minimum of action for the Center, which should be the
maximum to be expected of any member state.

39. The Chairman noted that Messrs. Garland, Illanes and Donner had
asked to speak, and said that if it was acceptable to them, they would be
called upon at the next meeting. He proposed that the next meeting be
held on Thursday, December 27th. At that time, discussion could be
continued on Articles II and III.

40. The meeting was adjourned at 12:16 p.m.
1. There were present: omitted

2. Mr. Garland said that the Governments he represented had given preliminary consideration to the questions raised by the draft convention; they had not reached any final conclusions. He had given comments on a number of technical points to the General Counsel.

3. On the first section, particularly in relation to the definition of the nature of a dispute, Mr. Garland said his countries were in general sympathy with the point of view expressed by Mr. Krishna Moorthi. However, they were also impressed by the views expressed by Mr. Broches. Perhaps reconciliation of the differing positions might be achieved by inserting a limitation in a preamble, which would have the practical effect of limiting the scope of the convention to industrial disputes; this might be preferable to a definition of "industrial dispute" in the body of the convention.

4. Mr. Garland thought that the first two lines of Section 5 of Article II were susceptible of broad interpretation; they might alarm some states and encourage acceptances with stipulations or reservations, as permitted by Section 6. For this reason, he wondered whether it might not be well to consider somewhat tighter wording as a substitute for the words "in respect of a dispute." The difficulty was that disputes tended to have repercussions and secondary effects which spread over a fairly wide area. In practice, even given that a definition would be implicit in the original undertaking, it might be hard to confine the definition to an area which would be satisfactory from the point of view of states considering accession.

5. Mr. Broches replied that he would consider how to give the right flavor to the draft convention, to take account of the points made by Mr. Krishna Moorthi and Mr. Garland, while avoiding, if possible, a narrow definition of "dispute" in Section 1. On Section 5, which restricted the normal right of diplomatic protection, he agreed that there might be a case for tightening the language, since apparently the existing language could be understood as covering more than he had intended to cover. He would consider how to redraft it.

6. Mr. Illanes said he could express only a personal opinion, since he had not yet received the views of his countries. While he had no objection to the general proposal for Bank sponsorship of arbitration and conciliation machinery, he had a serious objection on the matter of jurisdiction. Normally, disputes between a government and a foreign investor were dealt with first in the national courts. He thought it very unlikely that legislatures, especially in Latin America, would be willing to give a general authorization to submit these disputes to arbitration. It was true that arbitration was provided for under certain investment guarantees, but as he understood it, the parties to the arbitral proceedings would be the "host" government and the foreign government which, having paid the investor’s claim, would be subrogated to his rights. Thus it would be a case of arbitration between two sovereign governments. He recalled that at the last meeting of the Committee, it had been said that the convention would
be applied only to special cases. He appreciated that it would be difficult to express this limitation in the convention in a manner which would effectively take account of all the situations that might arise. Perhaps consideration might be given to redrafting Article II along the following lines: "The provisions of this Article shall apply for the settlement of any existing or future disputes between a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State who has the right to present a claim according to international law and/or to any accord or written consent to have access to arbitration or conciliation pursuant to the provision of this Convention." Under this language, when a dispute arose between a government and a foreign investor, the foreign investor would, as usual, have to go first to the national court. Only thereafter, if the investor considered that there had been a denial of justice, could be seek diplomatic protection. Mr. Illanes recognized that this would not achieve all that might be hoped for, but where many problems of constitutional and international law were involved, it was necessary to advance step by step.

7. Mr. Broches replied that he agreed that in many cases the national legislature would not be willing to give the executive broad and general authority to arbitrate. However, the draft document did not contemplate that that type of authorisation would be given, and the absence of a blanket authorization would not defeat the purposes of the convention. On Mr. Illanes' other point, Mr. Broches commented that it would be advantageous to remove some disputes from the intergovernmental level and to provide a direct method of settlement between the private party and the government, thus reducing recourse to diplomatic intervention. As for Mr. Illanes' suggestion on Article II, Section 1, Mr. Broches said he would study it. He commented that it was not narrower than the language of the draft, since it would give a claimant a right, under certain conditions, to submit a claim independent of the will of the state against which the proceedings were brought. In that respect, Mr. Illanes' proposal went further than the purely voluntary and consensual provision of the draft.

8. Mr. Donner said that his government was in principle in sympathy with the objective of the draft and, in general, with its wording, although it had not yet considered all the details. His comments would therefore be of a preliminary character. As Article I made plain, the convention was intended to promote the resolution of disputes between contracting states and nationals of other contracting states, rather than disputes between states. His government accepted this objective. However, in the case, for example, where a state had given an investment guarantee and, having paid its national's claim under the guarantee, had succeeded to the rights of that national, he thought it should be made clear that the successor government might be a party to an arbitration proceeding, although the other party would also be a state. The German government was reviewing the language of Article II to determine whether it was consistent with the language of the investment guarantee agreements concluded between Germany and other countries.

9. Mr. Donner associated himself with the comments on Section 5 of Article II made by Mr. Garland. It should be made clear that diplomatic protection might be given and that it would not be at variance with the convention where it had not been specifically excluded or where a particular undertaking had made express provision for it. He noted that Section 1 of Article II contemplated that an undertaking might refer to diplomatic protection or might at least not exclude it. Diplomatic protection should be excluded in only two cases: where the parties had previously agreed to
submit disputes to arbitration, and where, after a dispute had in fact arisen, the parties agreed in a special undertaking to submit that particular dispute to arbitration. He had submitted a proposed amendment to this effect to the General Counsel.

10. Mr. Donner said that his government would wish it to be made clear that the convention would not preclude a state from submitting to arbitration questions concerning the interpretation of an investment treaty, where the treaty itself made provision for arbitration of such questions.

11. Mr. Donner asked whether Bank staff had been in communication with the staff of the OECD concerning the work being done there on conciliation and arbitration machinery. He added that his government considered that the technical legal experts of the various potential contracting states should soon start their work.

12. Mr. Broches replied that a government which had paid an insured national under an investment guarantee and was thereupon subrogated to the rights of that investor could make use of the facilities of the Center. The government in that case would have no greater rights than the private party could have claimed itself. Concerning Mr. Donner's point about the possibility of conflict with bilateral treaties for arbitration of disputes, Mr. Broches said that provisions which would make clear that there was no intention to abrogate bilateral treaties in similar fields would have to be incorporated in the draft convention. He did not think this would raise any problems. In the situations Mr. Donner had in mind, the government would be asserting its own rights rather than the rights of a national.

13. Mr. Broches said that the amendment Mr. Donner had given him, relating to Section 5, would be considered in conjunction with comments of other Directors.

14. Concerning the work being done in the OECD on a draft convention for the protection of private foreign property, Mr. Broches said he had not yet been informed that the draft had been released for publication. As soon as he received that word, and the text, copies of the draft would be distributed to the Directors. Mr. Bullitt said that he had not had word of the release either. Mr. Broches added that, as the Directors had been told, a copy of the Bank working paper had been sent to the Secretariat of the OECD; no comments had yet been received.

15. Mr. Broches agreed that there was need for discussion of the draft convention by technical legal experts. It was a question of timing. Since the Directors were discussing general principles underlying some of the document's provisions, it was too soon to bring legal experts together. Perhaps the next stage should be to draft a "principal points" paper, as was done for the IDA charter, to focus discussion on the issues, without any particular text, and then in the third stage, a more technical discussion of the text.

16. Mr. Bullitt asked whether there was any thought that the Bank and OECD draft conventions should be considered together, with the two ultimately being consolidated. Mr. Broches replied that was not the intention. He had merely thought it might be helpful to compare the two documents, which differed in scope.
17. Miss Brun said that the initial favorable attitude of the Nordic governments to the proposal had been confirmed by review of the draft convention. Those governments did, however, emphasize that the proposal should be considered along with the DAC scheme. If the latter were presented as an alternative, it might be preferable. It was also desirable to coordinate examination of the Bank draft with the work being done in the OECD and with the experience of the Permanent Court in the Hague.

18. Miss Brun thought it an important question how far the undertakings of member states extended in respect of their own nationals involved in disputes. The draft convention entailed an obligation to enforce the provisions of the convention vis-à-vis the nationals within the territory of member states. Since in most states accession to an international convention did not ipso facto render the provisions of the convention applicable within the territory of the acceding state, Miss Brun thought it necessary to study more in detail the relationship between the convention and existing national legislation.

19. Miss Brun noted that the draft established equality between the parties as far as concerned the procedures leading up to an arbitral award, but was less effective in doing so in regard to recognition and execution of such awards. The governments she represented attached great significance to insuring a more adequate measure of equality in this respect. Perhaps there might be incorporated in the draft's provision clearly committing the member states to recognize and execute an award.

20. Concerning the organization of future work, Miss Brun commented that the practical significance of the convention would depend to a large extent on the formulation of the rules contemplated by Article III, Section 8. She suggested that those rules might be drafted concurrently with further deliberations on the convention itself. Moreover, since the Committee's discussions had indicated that many complex legal and technical problems would arise, perhaps the draft might be turned over to a group of legal experts for further study when the Board had concluded its current reading. The Nordic countries, particularly Denmark and Sweden, had expressed their readiness to make competent experts available for such a detailed examination.

21. Miss Brun noted that the provision of Article II, Section 6, that nothing in the convention should obligate any member state to undertake conciliation or arbitration in any particular case had been described as stating the obvious. Nevertheless at least one of the governments she represented felt strongly that the provision should be retained.

22. Mr. Brochee said that most of the comments he had made in reply to other speakers covered Miss Brun's statement as well. He agreed that it was necessary to reconsider Article VIII.

23. Mr. Suzuki noted that the document under discussion was in the form of a treaty. He wondered whether consideration had been given to a different approach: a resolution of the Bank Board of Governors, to be adhered to by a specified number of countries.

24. Mr. Suzuki commented that the draft convention had no preamble, and wondered whether it would be well to adopt one, in which the spirit of the convention might be expressed.
25. Mr. Suzuki associated himself with those Directors who had commented that the scope of the convention was too broad; some limitation or definition of "dispute" should be incorporated. He also agreed that Section 6(c) of Article II was too broadly drafted and might imperil the effectiveness of the convention.

26. Mr. Suzuki noted that it was contemplated that Article VIII would refer to the obligations assumed under the United Nations Convention of 1958 as a measure of recognition to be given to arbitral awards. Since that convention had not been ratified by all countries, Mr. Suzuki wondered whether some inequality might not be the consequence of such a provision.

27. Mr. Broches replied that the convention could not be brought into effect by a resolution of the Board of Governors. The Board of Governors could create machinery for conciliation and arbitration, but it could not lay down the rules contemplated by Article II of the convention. For this and to give effect to a number of other provisions of the convention, it was necessary that governments enter into an agreement.

28. Mr. Broches thought that a preamble could be very useful in giving the flavor of the convention and perhaps taking care of other points raised by the Directors; it had been omitted from the draft under discussion because the draft was really a working paper.

29. Mr. Broches agreed with Mr. Suzuki's comment on Article VIII.

30. Mr. Krishna Moored asked Mr. Broches to clarify the comment made in reply to Mr. Donner. Mr. Broches said that where there was an undertaking to have recourse to the facilities of the Center, this would be in lieu of other remedies unless otherwise stated. Where an investor and a "host" government had agreed to have recourse to arbitration and the investor received compensation from his own government under an insurance scheme, the government which paid the claim could take the investor's place under the convention. The government would have no greater rights than the investor had—that is, the right to go to arbitration, not the right to have recourse to international diplomatic protection. A government which had entered into a bilateral agreement to arbitrate intergovernmental disputes would not be precluded by the convention from recourse to that agreement. The draft convention dealt with disagreements between private parties and governments; it would not interfere at all with the operation of any other treaties between member states.

31. In response to a question by Mr. van Campenhout, Mr. Broches said that the definition of the word "nationals" would include the nationality not only of individuals but of companies.

32. Mr. van Campenhout also asked whether the term "Contracting States" would cover public entities and political entities such as states in a federation, provinces or municipalities.

33. Mr. van Campenhout wondered whether it would be well to make explicit the intention to permit conciliation and arbitration to be combined, that is, that an unsuccessful conciliation effort could be followed by arbitration.

34. Mr. van Campenhout asked whether Section 5 of Article II was intended to rule out the possibility of diplomatic protection where the dispute
itself involved the application of a treaty, bilateral or multilateral, to which the two contracting states were parties.

35. In reply to Mr. van Campenhout, Mr. Broches said he thought the term "contracting states" should be limited to sovereign states. To go further would cause enormous difficulties, constitutional and otherwise. He recognized that this conclusion would imply a more limited scope for the convention, but it was not intended to confer a sweeping jurisdiction. To Mr. van Campenhout's query concerning diplomatic protection, Mr. Broches replied that in the situations posed, be thought the national state should not have any rights, except perhaps the right to submit information or file a brief. The decision in the dispute would govern only the rights of the particular investor. Even if the investor's government considered that the treaty had been misapplied by the arbitrate, it could not change the decision in that case. Should the two governments concerned have a general agreement to arbitrate abstract questions of interpretation of a treaty, they could of course do so; similarly, the outcome of any such arbitration would not affect the decision in the case to which the investor was a party. Thus there was no inconsistency. Moreover, Mr. Broches thought there was much to be said for requiring an investor to abide by his election to have a right of direct access to the host government and the national government to do likewise.

36. Mr. van Campenhout said he thought further consideration should be given to including the components of a federated state within the definition of "contracting states." There might be no provision for recourse to a federal court. He agreed with Mr. Broches that public entities should be excluded.

37. Mr. Bullitt said the United States strongly supported the principles embodied in the draft convention. He could not yet make specific comments with respect to its language. He hoped that consideration of those principles would not be delayed pending consideration of other institutions and principles in the OECD and elsewhere. He had in mind particularly the possibility of a multilateral investment guarantee institution and the convention for the protection of private property.

38. Mr. Bullitt said the United States was concerned, as other governments were, as to whether the types of disputes that could come before the Center should be defined. It did not yet have a firm view on this question. It did agree with the principles stated in Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Article II. He wondered, as other Directors had, whether reservations should be permitted with respect to Sections 2 and 3 of Article II, which were the heart of the convention. The United States was giving further consideration to this question.

39. Mr. Bullitt said it had been suggested to him that the reference to "diplomatic protection" in Section 5 of Article II might be changed to "diplomatic representation." He also inquired whether the prohibition in Section 5 would apply where the parties to a dispute included not only the individual and the contracting state which had agreed to arbitrate but also a third party. Would the latter be estopped from seeking diplomatic protection?

40. Mr. Bullitt added that he hoped that in the near future a revised draft of the convention would be prepared in the light of Directors' comments.
41. Mr. Broches said he would like to consider which would be more help-
ful, a new draft or a narrative paper on some of the more important issue-
that had been raised. Perhaps both were necessary.

42. Mr. Reilly said he supported the idea of a Center in association with
the Bank. The points of detail which he would have raised had already been
covered.

43. Mr. Chen said he had given Mr. Broches a lengthy memorandum last
September embodying his government's technical comments. His government
supported the proposal in principle.

44. Mr. Aragonez thought that the scope of the convention should be made
more precise and definite, to make clear that it related to investment
disputes. He had raised a number of points last March; many of these had
been taken into account. Further consideration might be given to the
problems which would arise if an award had to be implemented in a third
country which was not a party to the convention. He thought the most seri-
ous and delicate problem was the determination of the nationality of the
individual parties: would this be the responsibility of the Center or
would it be a matter of the internal law of the country?

45. Mr. Broches replied that there would be a definition of nationality
in the convention. The arbitral tribunal would decide all questions of its
competence, including the nationality of the parties. Normally this would
be done by reference to the law which governed that nationality, that is
the national law claimed by the private individual or corporation.

46. Mr. Larre said his government was not very much in favor of concilia-
tion or arbitration. There was enough machinery in operation or in prepar-
ation which could meet the needs without the Bank entering the field. For
example, as the working paper noted, the Bureau of the Hague Court was al-
ready authorized to make its offices and staff available for conciliation
or arbitration proceedings between a state and a party other than a state.
He appreciated that some 25 members of the Bank were not parties to the
Hague Convention. But if a new convention were to be put forward, it would
have to be signed and ratified by many more than 25 members of the Bank.
He thought it might be simpler merely to leave matters to the Hague Court.
His government's principal objections to Bank sponsorship of new machinery
were that it would not add to the Bank's prestige to take part in a solution of
disputes between its members, and that it was undesirable for the
Bank to engage in an activity so far removed from the business of making
loans. Mr. Larre added that he expected to see the machinery established,
nonetheless, but he hoped it could be entirely independent of the Bank and
its members, particularly with respect to meeting its costs. Mr. Broches
commented that the matter of Bank relationship to the Center was dealt with
in Article III, and that he would postpone his reply until that Article was
on the agenda.

47. Mr. Machado said that the governments he represented had expressed
great interest in the idea that the Bank might establish machinery for the
settlement of investment disputes. However, when he sent them the draft
which had been prepared following the preliminary discussion in the Board,
he had not received a single favorable comment; one country immediately
replied that it was not interested. It had occurred to him that perhaps
the responses would have been more enthusiastic had the proposal for con-
conciliation been divorced from the proposal for arbitration. He thought no
country would object to conciliation, and he noted that it was in this area,
rather than in arbitration that the Bank had been so successful. It would
not require a new international convention to establish international
machinery, associated with or independent of the Bank, to assist govern-
ments in settling investment disputes. He appreciated that this would not
be an ideal solution, but it might be more practical. There would be no
point in a new convention accepted by only five or six states, probably
the usual creditor states and no underdeveloped countries. He thought the
reason for the attitude of the underdeveloped countries was that their ex-
perience with international arbitration had not been very encouraging.
Recently some of the countries which he represented had put into their
constitutions provisions making it practically impossible to submit a dis-
pute to international arbitration: for example, by requiring authorization
by special legislation approved by 2/3rds of each House. The reluctance of
the underdeveloped countries to agree in advance to compulsory international
arbitration was a fact which must be recognized.

48. The Chairman asked Mr. Machado why he spoke of "compulsory arbitration." A
contracting state need not use the machinery unless it wanted to. There
was nothing "compulsory" about it. If a state agreed with an investor that
it would arbitrate, it had to do so, but it was not required to agree.
Mr. Machado said he had not interpreted the document that way. In his
judgment, none of the countries that he represented would accept the con-
vention if they knew that the consequence would be that any foreign in-
vestor in the future might, in effect, sue them outside of the national
courts in connection with a dispute arising in the future. Mr. Broches and
the Chairman repeated that that was not the meaning of the con-
vention. It merely provided that an undertaking to go to arbitration under the rules of
the Center must be honored. Mr. Machado replied that the problem was that
governments were sometimes faced with a situation in which they could not
change commitments undertaken by previous governments. He thought it
would be very difficult to persuade the countries he represented of the
merits of the proposal, and he thought that the establishment of a conci-
liation center alone, which would be objectionable, would lead to the
settlement of a large percentage of past, present and future disputes.
Conciliation enabled a government to save face. Sometimes a government was
convinced of the merit of the foreign investor's claim, but was politically
unable to act upon that conviction. The intervention of a neutral, impartial conciliator, whose opinion was unbiased, was tremendously ef-
fective in helping to persuade parliaments that the claim must be set-
tled.

49. Mr. Garland asked the Chairman whether he thought in the light of his
experience that Mr. Machado's suggestion was acceptable. The Chairman
replied that undoubtedly the Center could be used for conciliation as well
as arbitration, but that he thought machinery for both was necessary. He
had recommended it because he was very disturbed at the reluctance of pri-
ivate investment to go into underdeveloped countries. This situation was
not improving; it was getting worse, and substantially worse in Latin
America. He added that he believed that association with the Bank was es-

dential to the success of the proposal. Mr. Machado said that if the
machinery were limited to a conciliation center, he was in favor of the
Bank's establishing it.

50. Mr. Larre said he was impressed by what Mr. Machado had said about the
attitude of the countries he represented. There would be no reason to ex-
tablish the Center if only the industrialized countries favored it. He wondered whether the Bank should not canvas its members to see which of them would like to join and which would be reluctant. The Chairman replied that the management had been trying to canvass the reaction of the members through the Board. If it were the case that the capital-importing countries had no interest in the proposal, it should be dropped. He added that he thought it would be most unfortunate if this proved to be their attitude.

51. Mr. Krishna Moorthi gave his personal support to what Mr. Machado had said. He thought a conciliation center would attract a great deal of support which a double-barreled institution, for both conciliation and arbitration, might not.

52. Mr. Larre said it seemed to him two courses of action were now available. One would be to call in legal advisors and prepare a new draft, which would be sent to states for signature. Alternatively, inquiry could be made of the Bank's members, without reference to a document, whether they were at all interested in establishing a conciliation and arbitration center; whether they would prefer a conciliation center alone; or whether they would prefer merely an arbitration center. Once this had been established the drafting could be left to legal advisors. He had referred earlier to the fact that 25 members of the Bank were not parties to the Hague Convention. It was important to be sure that no greater number would decline to accept the new convention. The Chairman said he did not know how many members favored the proposal. He thought it was up to the Executive Directors to ask the countries they represented whether the discussion should be continued.

53. Mr. Machado said that as he read Section 6(c) of Article II, a state could accept the application of the conciliation provisions but not the provisions relating to arbitration. If this were possible, he suggested that the proposal might be made more attractive by providing that every member of the Bank would have access to the conciliation center and, on an ad hoc basis, could have recourse to the arbitration machinery if conciliation did not work. The contracting state and the investor could also refer their dispute to arbitration on an ad hoc basis. This might be a more political approach. Mr. Broches replied that Mr. Machado was still under a misunderstanding. The convention merely specified the procedures which would apply once it was decided to go to arbitration or conciliation. There was no question of any government having to make a statement when it ratified the convention or at that time to exclude the application of portions of the convention: signature and ratification did not call any obligations into being. As the Chairman had said, the machinery would be there if parties to a dispute wanted to use it. A state might conclude that it was willing to try conciliation, but not arbitration; it might sign agreements or make ad hoc determinations on that basis. As for the comment that the Bank's success had been in conciliation, Mr. Broches pointed out that the Bank had quite properly always refused to act as arbitrator, since it was not a judicial or quasi-judicial body. Perhaps the Bank would have been equally successful in that role had it been attempted. As a practical matter, the proposal before the Directors could certainly be confined to conciliation. It would be for the management and the Directors to decide whether, in that event, new machinery or any kind of agreement would be justified. Mr. Broches added that it would be difficult for the Bank to sponsor conciliation facilities against a background of an expressed intention by countries that they did not wish to be bound by any agreement.
That, he thought, was the real difficulty, and that was why the Bank was trying to find out whether there was in fact any objection by members to accepting the principle that once a contract to go to conciliation or arbitration had been signed, a binding obligation to do so was created. If countries were unwilling to accept that principle, it would be very difficult for the Bank to sponsor any arrangements in this area.

54. Mr. Reilly commented that it was perhaps over-optimistic to think that at this stage many countries would willingly wish to bind themselves. He thought countries would accept the convention or use the facilities when they saw the advantage of doing so. Countries which signed the convention and which were willing to agree with investors that they would submit disputes—defined, perhaps, within certain limits—to arbitration might find that they were more acceptable to investors and that they gained thereby. It might well take quite a while before a large number of countries adhered to the convention.

55. Mr. van Campenhout said that a number of the countries he represented had shown interest in the proposal; the Part I countries were at least not negative. They would certainly not be interested unless Part II countries were. He thought countries would more readily make up their minds if a draft which was not too technical were presented to them with a full explanation of its provisions. He doubted that a final answer as to a country's interest would be forthcoming until it had some idea of how the machinery would work. He thought the Board discussion had been useful in providing answers to Directors' questions and correcting some misunderstandings. His own view was that it would be a mistake to rule out arbitration machinery. It was useful for Part II countries to have that machinery available as long as they were not compelled to use it. As had been said, the only compulsion lay in being required to respect the award, and that, in Mr. van Campenhout's view, was a minimum obligation. He thought it worth continuing to clarify the issues and to collect comments; then another approach should be made to the countries to see whether they wished the Board to go further or whether they preferred a different procedure or whether, perhaps, the proposal should be dropped.

56. Mr. Garland said that Mr. van Campenhout had said more or less what he had in mind. It was important to complete the round of discussions to get a first revised draft which could be presented to governments. He did not think that if Directors went back to their governments in the present state of the discussion, they would be given a clear answer. Countries wanted something more specific. Following discussions of most of the Articles, a revised draft might be submitted to governments for a general reaction. Then if possible the next stage might be discussion by legal experts directly appointed by the governments, rather than a second round of discussions in the Board.

57. Mr. Broches said he thought there was need for a summary of what had come out of the Board discussions and clarification of some issues which had been raised. His own preference was for the next step to be a paper which would set in perspective the various questions that had been raised, rather than a revised draft. The differences in views which had been expressed would necessitate a very complex draft with many alternatives. A paper discussing the issues would, he thought, be more helpful. The Chairman endorsed Mr. Broches' suggestion, as did Mr. Machado. The Chairman added that even that ought not to be done if there were not sufficient in-
terest on the part of countries; that was a question for the Board to de-
cide.

58. Mr. Machado said it was essential to present the proposal in the sim-
plest and most appealing form, in particular giving emphasis to the fact
that a country was not required to agree in advance and in general to use
the machinery. He noted that it was not always a question of a foreign
investor having a claim against a government. Sometimes the government
needed redress. He thought it should be possible to present a more at-
tractive package to those countries that were most in need of the machinery
and whose participation was essential if the plan were to be workable at
all.

59. The Chairman said that the General Counsel would prepare a paper dis-
scussing the main issues. Another meeting would be called when the paper
was ready. Meantime Directors might contact their countries to see if
there was sentiment for continuing the discussions.

60. The meeting adjourned at 12:53 p.m.

SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES

At the meeting of the Committee of the Whole held on
December 27, 1962, the President announced that a paper would
be prepared by the General Counsel setting forth in narrative
form some of the principal aspects of the proposals contained
in the Working Paper (R62-1(SD), dated June 5, 1962). This
paper is circulated herewith and will be considered at a meeting
to be announced.

SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES

An analysis of the Bank's tentative proposals and
of the principal issues raised thereby

Introduction

1. By way of introduction to this paper it may be useful to record the
history to date of the Bank's study of the desirability and practicability
of establishing suitable mechanisms for the settlement of investment disputes through conciliation and/or arbitration.

2. This study was first called for by the President of the Bank in his address to the Board of Governors at its Annual Meeting in Vienna in September 1961. At its 1962 Annual Meeting in Washington the Board of Governors formally requested the Executive Directors to undertake the study.

3. A general statement of the problem and of possible approaches to a solution was submitted to the Executive Directors on December 28, 1961 (R 61-128). This document was discussed by the Executive Directors at their meetings on January 9, 1962 and March 13, 1962. Summaries of the discussion at those meetings were circulated as Sec M 62-17 dated January 19, 1962, and Sec M 62-28, dated April 10, 1962. In accordance with requests made at those meetings for a more detailed description of the proposals the General Counsel prepared a Working Paper in the form of a Draft Convention (R 62-1(SD), dated June 5, 1962). This document was an elaboration of the earlier general statement (R 61-128, dated December 28, 1961), taking into account the views expressed thereon by Executive Directors. The Working Paper was discussed by the Executive Directors, sitting as a Committee of the Whole, on December 18 and 27, 1962. Summaries of the discussion at those meetings were circulated as SID/62-1, dated December 28, 1962, and SID/62-2 dated January 7, 1963.

4. The purpose of the present paper is to provide a basis for further discussion of basic issues, prior to continued consideration of technical details and specific language. To that end, this paper presents an analysis of the proposals as they have evolved as a result of the discussions on the Working Paper as well as of the principal issues raised by these proposals.
It attempts to state these proposals and these issues in non-technical terms to the extent that the subject matter permits.

Motivation and Background of the Bank's Proposals

5. In presenting proposals for study and consideration the Bank is motivated by the urgent need of promoting the flow of private investment to areas in need of capital. That private capital is not now moving to these areas in sufficient volume is not in dispute. Nor is there room for doubt that one of the most important impediments to the flow of private capital is the fear of investors that their investment will be exposed to political risks, such as outright expropriation without adequate compensation, governmental interference short of expropriation which substantially deprives the investor of the control or the benefits of his investment, and non-observance by the host government of contractual undertakings in reliance on which the investment was made.

6. There are presently under discussion three possible approaches to an amelioration of the problem of the "unfavorable investment climate".

7. The most direct approach is taken in the Draft Convention on the Protection of Private Foreign Property prepared in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the text of which was circulated with SID/63-1 of February 7, 1963. This Convention would lay down certain minimum rules for the protection of foreign property and would give foreign investors (and their national governments) the right to proceed before an international tribunal against a host government which had allegedly violated the rules laid down by the convention. An entirely different approach is represented by the proposals for a multilateral investment insurance system. These proposals do not aim directly at an improvement of the investment climate but rather seek to protect investors against the risks inherent in an unfavorable investment climate.

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6 Not reproduced, see OECD Doc. 15637, dated December 1962, revised and restated as OECD Doc. 2808, dated November 1967.
8. The Bank's approach to the problem is more modest than the other two efforts. While they aim at improving the investment climate, the proposals submitted to the Executive Directors neither contemplate rules for the treatment of foreign property nor compulsory adjudication of disputes. They would make available to foreign investors and host governments facilities for conciliation or arbitration of disputes between them. Use of these facilities would be entirely voluntary. No government and no investor would ever be under an obligation to go to conciliation or arbitration without having consented thereto. But once having consented they would be bound to carry out their undertaking and, in the case of arbitration, to abide by the award. Another distinctive feature of the Bank's proposals is their emphasis on mutuality. They contemplate that the initiative for conciliation or arbitration proceedings might come from a government as well as from an investor and they are concerned with the protection of the interests of one as well as the other. Furthermore, they proceed on the assumption that if a government has consented to arbitrate a dispute with a private investor, the investor should then be deemed to have waived the right to seek the protection of his own government and his government would not be entitled to take up his case. These and other matters would be governed by the provisions of an intergovernmental agreement (the Convention). But, and this cannot be sufficiently stressed, none of these provisions would apply except where a government and a foreign investor had voluntarily agreed to use the facilities for conciliation or arbitration, as the case may be, established by the Convention. And the parties to the Convention would not by the fact of their signature of or adherence to the Convention undertake any obligation to make use of these facilities in any specific case.

9. Finally, the proposals are not to be regarded as an expression of the view that international conciliation or arbitration should be regarded as the
normal or preferred method of settlement of disputes between governments and
foreign investors. Such disputes should normally and preferably be settled
through such mechanisms as are provided by local law. There may be situations,
however, in which this method of settlement would not be satisfactory. Experi-
ence has shown that prospective investors do not always have sufficient
confidence in the investment climate to be willing to rely wholly on local
remedies, and as a practical matter require additional assurances to attract
them. Or there may be circumstances in which special procedures are recognized
to be appropriate because of the technical character of the investment
agreement or because the agreement establishes a special legal regime either
in derogation of existing general law or in the absence of general law.
Examples are the many oil concession agreements, including agreements recent-
ly concluded, containing provisions for international conciliation and arbi-
tration, and the investment agreements between Ghana and the Valco group. In
all of these situations it may be desirable for the government and the private
investor to agree in advance to submit disputes which might arise out of
agreements entered into between them to international conciliation or arbi-
tration. In addition, situations may occur in which, after a dispute has
arisen between a government and a foreign investor, the parties could agree
ad hoc to have recourse to such procedures. The purpose of the proposals and
of the proposed Convention would not be to extend these procedures indis-
criminately to all foreign investments, but to facilitate such procedures,
and make them more effective, in those cases in which they may be regarded
as appropriate and desirable by the parties involved.

Principal Features of the Proposals

10. The proposals contemplate that interested governments would conclude
a convention which would (A) establish facilities or mechanisms for the
settlement by means of conciliation or arbitration of disputes between a
government and an individual or corporate national of another government, (B) define the conditions on which governments and foreign nationals may have access to such machinery, (C) lay down certain basic rules for the conduct of conciliation and arbitration proceedings and provide for the establishment of detailed rules of procedure and (D) establish certain rules of law which would (i) assure the effectiveness of conciliation and arbitration proceedings and (ii) define the relationship of such proceedings to other remedies. The principal features of these proposals will be discussed below under these headings.

11. (a) The facilities would consist of a Secretariat which would act as a registry in connection with conciliation and arbitration proceedings, of panels of conciliators and arbitrators from which parties might (but need not) select members for a particular conciliation commission or arbitral tribunal, and of a Council, composed of representatives of the States which are parties to the Convention, which would be concerned with the appointment of the head of the Secretariat and with the promulgation of model rules of procedure which would apply to conciliation and arbitration proceedings unless the parties to such proceedings otherwise agreed. The Council would also be concerned with such administrative matters as fixing or approving fees and costs in connection with the use of the services of the Secretariat.

12. The machinery described in the foregoing paragraph might be designated a Conciliation and Arbitration Center, as was done in the Working Paper, or it might be called a Secretariat for Conciliation and Arbitration as was suggested by one of the Executive Directors as possibly more properly descriptive of what has been proposed. Whatever its name, it is clear that it would have an administrative task only, and that it would not itself engage in conciliation or arbitration.
13. An important feature of the proposals is that the Center (as it will be called for convenience) would be linked in some manner to the Bank. To some degree this is a matter of administrative expediency (such as the advantages of the provision of office and secretarial services, of combining meetings of the Council with meetings of the Board of Governors of the Bank and possibly of a contribution by the Bank to the expenses of the Center). But to a much larger degree it is a question of clothing the Center with the prestige and reputation for impartiality of the Bank. In this respect the link would be concretely evidenced only by the appointment of the Secretary-General on the nomination of the President of the Bank, by the right of the President to designate some members to the panels of conciliators and arbitrators and by the designation in the Convention of the President as the authority who would, unless otherwise agreed by the parties to a dispute, appoint conciliators or arbitrators (as the case may be) in case of failure by the parties to make such appointments. The actual influence of the Bank on proceedings under the auspices of the Center would be nil. However, the fact that the Center would be created under the sponsorship of the Bank would tend to make it an especially acceptable forum for private investors and governments willing to have recourse to international methods of settlement of disputes.

14. (B) The Convention would define the conditions on which governments and foreign nationals may have access to the services of the Center. There would be three basic conditions. In the first place, the facilities of the Center would be available only to governments which are parties to the Convention and to their nationals. Secondly, any proceedings under the auspices of the Center would require the consent of the parties to such proceedings. This consent may be given either at the time when proceedings are instituted, that is to say after a dispute has arisen, or may have been ex-
pressed in advance, for instance in a contract the parties to which agree to have recourse to conciliation or arbitration under the auspices of the Center for the settlement of disputes arising out of the contract. Thirdly, the services of the Center would be available only for proceedings between a government on the one hand and a foreign national on the other. These services would therefore not be available in connection with disputes between private individuals, between a government and one of its own nationals or between governments, except that where a government had paid a claim of one of its own nationals against a foreign government and had thereby been subrogated in the rights of that national, the subrogated government might avail itself of the facilities of the Center, provided, of course, that the other government consented thereto.

15. (C) The Convention would lay down certain basic rules for the conduct of conciliation and arbitration proceedings. These rules would be primarily intended to prevent frustration of a conciliation or arbitration agreement as a result of gaps in the agreement between the parties or through the action or inaction of one of the parties. For example, parties may have agreed to have resort to conciliation under the auspices of the Center, but may not have provided for a method for the designation of conciliators. The Convention would fill that gap by prescribing a method for their designation. Another example would be a case in which parties agreed to have arbitration under the auspices of the Center and further agreed that each side would appoint one arbitrator and that they would jointly appoint a third arbitrator, and in which one of the parties fails to appoint its arbitrator or the parties fail to agree on the third arbitrator. The Convention would prevent frustration of the arbitration agreement by providing a method for the appointment of the arbitral tribunal in such a case.

16. There would be other rules in the Convention designed to prevent or
solve conflicts between the parties after an arbitral tribunal had been constituted. There might arise disagreement between the parties as to the scope of their consent to the arbitration proceedings and one of the parties might claim that the arbitral tribunal was not competent to deal with the dispute submitted to it, because it was outside the scope of what that party had consented to submit to arbitration. The Convention would lay down the rules that the arbitral tribunal would be the judge of its own competence. If its competence was denied by one of the parties, it would first rule on that question and if it found that it was competent it would then proceed to consider the merits of the case. Another rule would concern the law to be applied by the arbitral tribunal. The Convention would leave that primarily to the agreement of the parties, but would give the arbitral tribunal the power to determine the applicable law if the parties had left the matter open.

17. The Convention would also contain, or provide for the adoption of, rules of procedure governing the mechanics of conciliation and arbitration proceedings. It would probably be convenient and in the interest of flexibility to have most of these rules established not in the Convention itself, but by decision of the Administrative Council. They would not in general be concerned with matters of great importance and they could in any event be set aside if the parties so agreed.

18. (D) Finally, the Convention would establish certain rules of law which would apply when, and only when, parties had consented to make use of the services of the Center for purposes of conciliation or arbitration. These rules could be summarized by the maxim pacta sunt servanda, that is, parties should abide by their agreements. Thus, the Convention would provide in substance that when a government and a foreign national make an agreement to avail themselves of the services of the Center, that agreement would be
binding on both parties. If the parties had agreed to use the services of the Center for arbitration as the sole means of settling their dispute, the government party should not be permitted to refer the private party to the government's national courts, and the private party should not be permitted to seek the protection of its own government and that government would not be entitled to give such protection, the reason for both of these rules being, once again, that parties should abide by the agreements they freely make. Finally, and as a further consequence of this principle, parties would have to abide by the decision of an arbitral tribunal whose decision they had sought and the Convention would provide that such awards would be enforceable in the territories of the countries adhering to the Convention.

Principal Issues Raised by the Proposals

19. Why is it necessary to conclude a Convention? The question has been raised whether, granted that the creation of conciliation and arbitration machinery is a desirable objective, the Bank's objective could not be achieved by means of a resolution of the Board of Governors or of the Executive Directors. The answer is that the Bank's objective goes beyond the creation of mere machinery which could indeed be set up by a Bank decision, but which would not by itself constitute a significant step in the direction of the removal of impediments to the flow of international investment. The establishment of machinery especially designed or intended for use in connection with the settlement of investment disputes may make it easier for governments and private investors to agree to conciliation or arbitration of disputes between them. But it would not contribute to the creation of a climate of mutual confidence, such as would be fostered by the recognition and adoption in an international convention of the basic rules, already referred to in this paper, for the protection of the legitimate interests of governments and
foreign investors alike. (a) Foreign investors who, in connection with an
investment agreement or otherwise, would wish to conclude a conciliation or
arbitration agreement with the host government may fear that even if the
government concludes such an agreement with them, it may later repudiate the
agreement on the claim that it has a sovereign right to do so. The Convention
would establish that such agreements are valid international obligations.
(b) Governments which are asked to enter into arbitration agreements and who
might be willing on the merits of a given case to agree to international,
rather than national, procedures for dispute settlement may fear that not-
withstanding their acceptance of such international procedures they might
still be subject to diplomatic or other governmental representations or
claims by the national government of the foreign investor. The Convention
would remove that fear by in effect excluding such representation or claims
where an arbitration agreement was in effect and was being carried out by the
host government. (c) Having entered into an agreement for conciliation or
arbitration both parties would wish to be assured that the agreement could not
be frustrated by the unilateral act of one of the parties and that, in the
case of arbitration, the award would be complied with. The Convention would
contain rules designed to give these assurances.

20. Granted the desirability of the conclusion of a Convention, is it
not likely that this will be a slow process and that initially only a small
number of countries will adhere? The answer to these questions is probably
yes, but unless there were a general unwillingness on the part of capital
importing countries to adhere, the likelihood of slow progress would not be
a sound argument against the idea of the Convention. Its objectives would in
no event be achieved overnight. What is urgent is that a beginning be made,
leaving the further development to future experience. Some countries are
quicker than others to accept new ideas, and this applies to capital exporting
as well as to capital importing countries, and there are strong national and
regional differences in attitudes to international conciliation and even more so to international arbitration. The latter is traditionally being looked upon with more favor and less distrust in Europe, Africa and Asia than in the Americas. Universal adoption of the Convention is neither to be expected nor to be regarded as a test of its usefulness.

21. Assuming that only a fairly small number of States adhered to the Convention initially, would it be desirable to permit access to the machinery of the Center to non-contracting States and to nationals of other non-contracting States on an ad hoc basis? It might be desirable to do so, provided the parties made a declaration to the Center that they would abide by the provisions of the Convention with respect to the specific proceeding in respect of which the services of the Center were sought.

22. Although adherence to the Convention does not impose any legal obligation on any party thereto to agree to conciliation or arbitration under the auspices of the Center, would such adherence not expose governments to pressures by investors to agree to such conciliation or arbitration on a wide scale? To the extent that the Convention would ensure the effectiveness of conciliation and arbitration procedures, investors might well show an increased interest in having recourse thereto. But such international methods of settlement of disputes should be reserved for special situations as indicated earlier in this paper. Adherence to the Convention would constitute a recognition that there may be circumstances in which recourse to international methods for the settlement of disputes between governments and foreign investors may be appropriate. Experience indicates that governments decide on the basis of an evaluation of their enlightened self-interest how far they wish to go in offering incentives to foreign investors. This applies to such matters as tax exemptions and transfer guarantees as well as to special arrangements for the settlement of disputes.
23. Should there be a definition of the type of dispute for which the facilities of the Center would be available? There is a general understanding, which could be recorded in a Preamble to the Convention, that the machinery created by the Convention and the rules laid down in the Convention are designed to deal primarily with investment disputes. It is also generally understood that the scope of the Convention should be limited to legal disputes as distinguished from political or commercial disputes, and this could also be suitably expressed in a Preamble. Once this intention is expressed, there seems to be no need to go further and give a precise definition of the disputes for which the services of the Center would be available. To give a precise definition of investment dispute would be extremely difficult. More seriously, it might lead to undesirable jurisdictional controversies in cases where parties have agreed to submit a dispute to conciliation or arbitration under the auspices of the Center, and one of the parties later refuses to carry out the agreement claiming that the dispute is of a kind outside the defined scope of the Convention. If the Convention established compulsory arbitration or conciliation, there would clearly be need for defining the scope of the obligation. But the Convention does not by itself establish any obligation except to abide by agreements freely made. It has been argued, however, that since the very existence of the Convention implies a danger of pressure being exercised on host governments by investors to have recourse to the services of the Center, the scope of activity of the Center should be closely defined in the Convention so as at least to limit the range of situation within which this pressure could be exercised. Even assuming that such a danger exists at all, and this may well be questioned, the Preamble would serve to limit this "danger" to the field of investment disputes.

24. Since conciliation is more widely acceptable than arbitration, would it not be desirable to limit the Convention to conciliation? It has been
argued that to include arbitration would mean that many governments might not sign the Convention at all or might sign it subject to reservations. Presumably, a government which is opposed in principle and under all circumstances to international arbitration of disputes between governments and foreign investors would not sign the Convention. As was noted earlier, it is neither likely nor necessary that there be universal adherence to the Convention. But if a government does not take that extreme position and is willing to sign the Convention there is no need to make a reservation as to the provisions dealing with arbitration, since these provisions would not be applicable to it in any event unless it agreed in a specific case to arbitration under the auspices of the Center.

25. Is it reasonable to provide that if a government and a foreign investor conclude an arbitration agreement, the investor need not exhaust local administrative and judicial remedies before going to arbitration? The general rule of international law is that, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, before a government may lodge an international claim against another government on account of an injury to one of its nationals, that national must have exhausted his local remedies. The Working Paper contains a provision which has been understood by some Executive Directors as changing that rule. The Working Paper provides that if a government agrees to have recourse to arbitration that agreement will entitle the investor to start arbitration proceedings without first going through local courts or administrative channels, unless the agreement provides otherwise. Thus the provision in the Working Paper leaves the question of local remedies up to the parties, but it lays down a rule of interpretation to the effect that an arbitration agreement will be regarded as dispensing with the need to exhaust local remedies unless it otherwise provides. In the absence of such a rule, a question might arise in each case as to the intention of the parties. The rule of interpretation set forth in the Working Paper would seem to be in accordance with the most likely
intention of the parties in cases where they have entered into an agreement containing an arbitration clause. The situation would be different if a government made a unilateral declaration, in an investment promotion statute or otherwise, by which it gave aggrieved investors the right to have recourse against it before an arbitral tribunal under the auspices of the Center. In such a case the government might be willing to waive the local remedies requirement, or it might regard the arbitration procedure as an appellate procedure to be resorted to only after the exhaustion of local remedies. There would be nothing unreasonable in the second position, and all that would be necessary under the Convention would be for the government to state the local remedies requirement in its unilateral declaration.

A. Broches
General Counsel
occasions contain some interesting details of the form in which this machinery
might take and of the provisions of the intergovernmental agreement. They
strike me on the whole as most sensible, but I will not argue that they are
the only ones possible.

At the next meeting of the Committee of the Whole on May 28th, we
will be concerned only with the broad outline of the proposals discussed
in Document SID/63-2, and I would hope that we can reach some agreement on
these points and make a report to the Board of Governors. Subsequently,
I shall want to discuss with you the timetable and the procedure for work-
ing out the details and the draft convention.

SID/63-8 (June 5, 1963)
Memorandum of the meeting of the Committee of the Whole, May 28, 1963, not an approved record.
Discussion of the merits of establishing conciliation and arbitration facilities. Instructions to the General
Counsel to prepare a preliminary Draft Convention

1. There were present: omitted

2. Opening the discussion Mr. Woods reiterated his belief that sponsor-
ship by the Bank of machinery for settlement of investment disputes with a
view to creating an atmosphere conducive to foreign investment had great
merit and deserved the support of both the capital importing and capital
exporting nations. He would like to proceed with a program of constructi-
ve study and investigation of the subject in an attempt to realize a workable
international agreement. He proposed that General Counsel should prepare
by July a first preliminary draft of such an agreement. That document might
be discussed in September informally and not for the purpose of taking any
decision. The draft, amended as appropriate, might then be sent to member
countries as a staff document and not as one approved by the Board of
Executive Directors. It was then proposed to organize between, say,
November 1963 and February 1964 four regional meetings of legal experts
from member countries which might be held at the headquarters of the four
Regional Commissions of the United Nations, i.e. in Santiago; Addis ababa;
Bangkok and Geneva; for the purpose of explaining the proposals and
receiving the benefit of their comments. The result of these meetings,
which would be purely consultative, would be reported to the Committee of
the Whole which could then decide how to proceed.

3. Mr. Woods then proposed that members of the committee indicate in the
first instance whether they agreed that the idea of establishing such con-
ciliation and arbitration facilities as were described in paragraph 8 of
Memorandum SID 63-2 of February 18, 1963 had merit and deserved further
exploration. An affirmative answer to that question or a general sense of
the meeting that the answer was in the affirmative, would give the Bank
authority to pursue its efforts. As to the separate question of whether an
international agreement on the subject was feasible, that would depend on
the content of the agreement, and in this connection he would like to have
the Committee's views on proposals in paragraphs 11 through 18 of the
Memorandum referred to.

4. Mr. Khelil having referred briefly to criticisms of the Working Paper
submitted to the Executive Directors on June 5, 1962, said that the analysis
by General Counsel in Memorandum SID 63-2 of February 18, 1963 had served
to answer all the objections and apprehensions expressed. Most of the
countries he represented had been impressed by the views expressed in that
memorandum and were prepared to go along with them. They shared the opinion
that the establishment of machinery under the auspices of the Bank and
designed to settle investment disputes through conciliation and arbitration
could not but promote the flow of private capital to the developing countries
and add to incentives they had already provided to encourage private invest-
ment in their territories. He heartily welcomed any means which could
favour the flow of private capital and improve the investment climate. Since
the countries he represented were determined and willing to honour their
obligations in carrying out in good faith their agreements, they did not
fear to make use of the available facilities for conciliation or arbitration
provided that they had voluntarily agreed to do so.

5. Mr. Illanes referred to recognition and legislative regulation in Latin
American countries of the rights of foreign private investors, without
distinction as to nationality and with a view to promoting foreign investment,
but pointed out that settlement of investment disputes with a private party
was not covered by such legislation. While existing treaty provisions and
State practice differed from country to country, as a rule those countries
were not willing to accept the type of arbitration envisaged because they
felt that, in view of the constitutional guarantees provided, a private
citizen or corporation must first exhaust all recourse to the local Courts
of the country concerned. He felt that the proposals of General Counsel
approached the problems involved with understanding and realism. Signatories
would be free to decide in advance whether or not in a given instance they
would undertake to have recourse to conciliation or arbitration, and the real
purpose of the Convention was to give a true international character to under-
takings by the parties concerned. He was in favour of the Bank's objectives
but would like to comment on the methods to be used in achieving them.

6. He questioned whether it was as yet possible to formulate basic and
binding rules in a Convention. In order to save time at this stage he
thought that, unless the Bank could undertake the exploratory action mentioned
by Mr. Woods without delay and obtain quick results, the Bank should first
establish a Secretariat with the structure already elaborated. In order to
avoid any gap in the agreement between the parties, the Secretariat could
draft some basic principles, and agreement between the parties with reference
thereto would imply their adoption. It was important to establish a pattern
and create prestige which, he was sure, would result in the near future in
unanimous assent to incorporating the experience thus gained into a Convention.
He personally was very much in sympathy with the efforts of the Chairman
and the Management of the Bank to promote through this means greater foreign
investment in the developing countries.

7. Mr. Bullitt fully supported the proposal to establish by governmental
agreement institutional facilities for the settlement of investment disputes
between governments and private parties through arbitration and conciliation,
under the sponsorship of the Bank along the principles described in paragraph

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3 of the attachment to document SID 63-2. Such an agreement would, he believed, result in a substantial increase in the flow of private capital and associated technical skills to the developing countries. The Bank's staff should proceed without further delay to draft an agreement which could then be considered by the Board and submitted to governments which would then be in a much better position to consider and decide upon any specific problems.

9. Mr. Oellerer welcomed the creation of a mechanism in the form proposed for settlement of investment disputes as being a suitable instrument to stimulate the flow of private capital to developing countries. In Austria it was felt, however, that competition with the plans of OECD should be avoided, and he suggested that there should be an exchange of information between the Bank and that organization.

9. Mr. Mejia, while expressing his appreciation of the document SID 63-2, thought that to say that "political risks" such as expropriation were important impediments to the flow of foreign capital (paragraph 5) and then to limit the scope of the Convention to "legal disputes as distinguished from political or commercial disputes" (paragraph 23) was inconsistent and that such limitation might detract from the efficacy of the Convention. In this connection he recalled instances where governments, particularly for political reasons, had referred disputes to arbitration: the cases of Colombia and Parsons and Whittemore, of Egypt and the Suez Canal Company, and of India and Pakistan regarding the waters of the Indus. He was, moreover, not entirely convinced that the proposals as formulated contained adequate safeguards against pressure on Contracting States to have recourse to conciliation or arbitration under the Convention, and thus to avoid recourse to local courts. The fact that obligations under the Convention would be voluntarily assumed did not offset this criticism.

10. On the principal issue, Mr. Mejia declared himself in favour of establishing a mechanism for conciliation and arbitration which would be available to member States. He agreed with Mr. Illanes, however, that for the time being that mechanism should be constituted within the Bank as one of its services, with a small Secretariat in charge of contacts between parties to a dispute which declared themselves willing to abide by such rules as might be drawn up with respect to the specific proceedings in which the services of the Center were sought. He felt it would be premature to submit at the present time a Convention on the subject for approval of the governments he represented.

11. In reply to Mr. Mejia, Mr. Woods pointed out that the Suez Canal Company dispute with which he was familiar was almost wholly economic and not political. He would note Mr. Mejia's judgment on how the countries he represented would react if a Convention should now be submitted to their legislatures. However, on the program he had outlined it would be at least a year before the Executive Directors met to consider, on the basis of the views of various countries canvassed, what decision should be taken.

12. Mr. Chen reiterated his government's support in principle for the proposal to establish a conciliation and arbitration Center for the settlement of investment disputes between member governments and private parties, and that he had already transmitted to General Counsel observations made by his government on some of the articles in Working Paper R 62-1(SD). He would invite attention only to one salient point in that memorandum viz: in the opinion of his government the parties to the dispute should not abandon the principle

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that all local remedies must be exhausted before resort to the Center for settlement. There were other observations which he would make later in the meeting. He agreed with the program outlined by the Chairman noting especially the desirability of holding regional meetings of legal experts which would contribute to a clearer understanding of the legal issues involved.

13. Mr. Woods thought that if, even after a draft had been worked out, there were certain points that continued to be unacceptable to certain countries which would not in the first instance go along with a Convention - if that course was finally decided upon - there would still have been a gain, as he was confident that there would be considerable initial support for such Convention and other countries might adopt it eventually, as circumstances arose in which they found it desirable to have recourse to the facilities provided thereby.

14. Mr. Ghosh said his Government recognized the importance of creating favourable conditions under which foreign private capital and technical skills could be put into the service of developing countries. On the subject of the proposed Center he would like to repeat that the idea of a Center could not be dissociated from the principles on which such a Center would work, from the procedures which it would employ and from the methods by which it would discover its facts and make its decisions in any particular dispute. In that connection, if the Center were to encourage independence of local remedies, that should be so stated as not to militate against national law and national Courts as institutions of first recourse before resort to the Center. Again, with the setting up of such a Center, the developing countries might be put under pressure to accede to the Convention, so that the right to decide ad hoc whether to bring a particular case to the Center might be merely theoretical. There was also the problem of relationship of the Center to the Bank and its sister institutions which required careful formulation in order to show that acceptance will not be an extra-legal factor in the working of the Center.

15. Before he could decide upon the desirability of setting up a Center he would like to have a fully worked out draft covering not merely the articles of agreement of such a Center, but also details of its working. He reserved his position and would have to withhold comment on the desirability of such a Center until the draft undertaken by the staff was completed and made available to him.

16. Mr. van Vuuren said that the countries he represented had indicated that while the proposed facilities might not be very meaningful as far as the safeguarding of private capital investment in those countries was concerned, they felt those facilities might serve a useful purpose in a wider consideration of useful flow of development capital. They would, therefore, not discourage adoption of a Convention by States that saw advantage in it, neither would they necessarily refrain from participation in the Convention were it to receive substantial support.

17. Mr. Suzuki while expressing himself in favour of the Convention, said he would take up later such specific problems as the relationship between the proposed machinery and other international organizations.

18. Mr. Mirza said that to the extent that the idea of establishing the conciliation and arbitration machinery was intended to encourage or to create conditions of confidence for the foreign investor, it was acceptable in
principle to all but one of the countries he represented. That country did not think the Center necessary because, in its view, resort to local courts would suffice. However, certain apprehensions had to be taken into account. While there was on one side the fear of the foreign investor, there was the apprehension of the under-developed or capital-importing country on the other. A balance had to be drawn between the two, and he would comment on the matter again at a later stage.

19. Mr. Hudon thought that in its broadest form the idea of establishing a Center was worth exploring.

20. Mr. Reilly said the U.K. fully supported the basic idea expressed in paragraph 8 of Memorandum SID 63-2.\footnote{Doc. 35}

21. Mr. Machado said that, as the views of countries he represented had not been communicated to him, he would express his personal view as a Director of the Bank. He was in favour of establishing adequate and modern machinery and procedures to settle the inevitable disputes that arose out of international investment, and thought there was unanimous agreement on that issue. The existing machinery of The Hague Tribunal was too complicated and did not cover the point. However, he believed that the institution created should be independent of the Bank, as adjudication of disputes called for skills and techniques which the staff of the Bank might not always be able to provide.

22. He was so much in favour of the idea that he would like to establish that institution forthwith, as the Economic Development Institute had been established, and without the delay which an international convention would involve. The machinery would be useful immediately and, after a time, by reason of its impartiality and fair adjudication of disputes it would have such reputation and prestige as would enable it to work by itself even without a Convention. However, if a Convention was needed, he would accept the idea and would even try to persuade the countries he represented to that view. He was very much in favour of the suggestion that after proper study and preparation of a draft, regional conference of jurists be held to explain the issues involved and obtain comment on the proposals, as well as to try to secure the support of countries that might eventually avail themselves of the services of the Center. He very much appreciated the special emphasis placed by General Counsel on the principle that no government and no investor would ever be under obligation to go to conciliation or arbitration without having consented thereto, and that by adherence to the Convention a country would not be obliged to make use of the facilities available thereunder in any specific case in the absence of an undertaking to that effect.

23. Mr. Woods expressed interest in Mr. Machado's proposal to set up forthwith a Center independent of the Bank. Addressing himself to the possibility that the machinery might be set up prior to the establishment of a Convention, he thought that the preliminary discussions should be between the legal staff of the Bank and legal experts from member countries. When set up, the Center would initially have its offices in the Bank and be manned by the Bank, although at a future date there would be a separate staff. The Bank would, at any rate until the Center's earnings were sufficient, finance its activities; the Center would, so to speak, be under the Bank's umbrella; the views of Mr. Machado and Mr. Illanes on the point would be given serious consideration.
24. Mr. Lieftinck speaking on behalf of the majority of countries he represented gave full support to the proposal in general terms. He considered it highly desirable to establish new institutional facilities for the settlement of investment disputes through conciliation and arbitration. While he was very much in favour of the Center being sponsored by the Bank, he agreed with Mr. Machado that it should be an independent institution.

25. Mr. Waitzenegger said that the problem of settlement of investment disputes had not yet been solved and that the existing institutions would not be able to solve it in a satisfactory manner, at any rate on a consideration of its present procedures. While his government was in sympathy with the general objective of the present proposals in order to create a better investment climate, and agreed that there was merit in continuing to study the matter, it had some doubts regarding the proper way and proper place to handle the question of investment disputes. He wondered whether the goal of the Bank would not better be achieved by creation of machinery similar to that proposed, but without adoption of a Convention. He agreed with Mr. Machado and Mr. Lieftinck that, while the Center might be sponsored by the Bank, it should remain a separate institution. He also felt that recent trends in countries, e.g. Ghana, indicated by adoption of legislation for protection of foreign property which provided for arbitration procedures involving the Bank, might support arguments against the need to adopt a Convention. In any event the Bank should not ignore the OECD Convention which could overlap, to some extent, the work of the Center.

26. Mr. Donner said his government had long believed in the usefulness and necessity of efforts to improve the climate for international investment and was of the opinion that the institution envisaged by the Bank would be conducive to achieving that purpose. It was in favour of the proposals set forth in paragraph 3 of the memorandum, as well as of the scheme for giving effect to them suggested by the Bank's staff. In taking this view, however, his government had made the basic assumption that the procedures established would provide a real and genuine incentive to improving the investment climate. They believed that a Convention would best serve that end. Further, he agreed with Mr. Oellerer and Mr. Waitzenegger that the Bank's efforts should not be in competition with other proposed or existing international arrangements in this field. In that connection the OECD Convention had been mentioned, and he would also like to invite attention to bilateral agreements between governments for improving the investment climate, which should not be interfered with.

27. Miss Brun favoured, in principle, the idea of a Center for arbitration and conciliation, but had a few reservations on certain legal details which she had earlier expressed. She particularly appreciated the suggestion of having the draft later considered by legal experts. That was a very important step for which two of the governments she represented had earlier expressed their support.

28. Mr. Woods recalled that under the program he had suggested legal experts of all or substantially all 85 member countries would consider the proposals at the four regional meetings. General Counsel would then, after taking into consideration the views expressed, prepare a version of the text which would be approaching finality for consideration by the Executive Directors or a group of them. The Directors would at that time be invited to bring to Washington their own legal experts who would review the document for the second time before it was submitted to governments.

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11 See OECD Doc. 15637, dated December 1962, revised and reissued as OECD Doc. 23081, dated November 1967
12 See Docs. 43 to 122, pertaining to the work of the Legal Committee
29. Mr. Gutiérrez Jano while he had not yet received precise information from the countries he represented, could say that they basically supported the points expressed in paragraph 8 of the Working Paper. There were new factors in the present approach which gave his countries great confidence in the success of the proposals. Study by the legal advisers of governments and discussion at regional conferences would make possible an approach based on the specific problems of geographic areas of the world. It was, of course, important to try to maintain permanent coordination of the activities of the Bank with those of international organizations like OECD with a view to avoiding duplication of effort. He favoured the view that the Center should be independent of the Bank whose specialized field of activity should not be interfered with.

30. Mr. Woods expressed his appreciation for the comments made on the general question of the desirability of creating the facilities envisaged, as well as on specific issues such as how a Center might be set up, e.g., by a Convention or by Board action, and its relationship to the Bank. He thought that while the second round of comments which was to have been concerned with such specific issues as those referred to might now to some extent have been obviated, the discussion might proceed along those lines after General Counsel had commented on the views expressed thus far.

31. Mr. Broches said that the basic question discussed could be divided into three parts: 1) establishment of the facilities, 2) relationship of the facilities to the Bank, and 3) use of the Convention method. As to establishment of facilities for the settlement of investment disputes it was contemplated that those facilities would be available in addition to recognized normal methods of settlement, viz: through national legal processes whether judicial or administrative. They were not intended to supersede those processes unless in specific instances, when departure from the normal rules was thought by the parties concerned to be appropriate, direct recourse was consented to. While there appeared to be a general consensus that such facilities were desirable, Mr. Ghosh, and to some extent Mr. Mejia, thought that the very fact of establishing those facilities would bring with it danger of infringement of national sovereignty and of the supremacy of national laws and institutions. He did not think that the facilities at present envisaged warranted that apprehension but every effort would be made in the next document to make it quite clear that no such infringement need result.

32. As to the relationship of the facilities to the Bank, it was quite clear that while the Center might be sponsored by the Bank, which might, in addition, provide administrative staff and possibly finance it, the only persons whose activities would be of real significance in a dispute, i.e., the conciliators and arbitrators, would be completely divorced from the Bank's operations. Nevertheless the small minority of Directors who were apprehensive over mere creation of the facilities felt that relationship to the Bank might subject parties using them to extra-legal pressures, and thus serve to increase the dangers they foresaw. He was convinced that such apprehension was groundless. Although the Bank had always in general and in principle upheld the importance of private investment and of appropriate and reasonable treatment of private investors it had never taken up a one-sided and partisan attitude in disregard of the interest of host governments.

33. As to the use of the Convention mechanism to establish the facilities, he personally believed that that was the right approach. The clearest
opposition to it came from those Directors representing Latin American
countries where the Convention would be viewed as a departure from rigid
concepts of national sovereignty which they would be reluctant to make. He
felt that the regional meeting in Latin America would provide an indication
of the extent to which such views were firmly held. If there were to be a
clear difference in attitude between Latin America and the rest of the world,
there would be a problem which would require working out along with any other
problems which might arise.

34. Some Directors were apprehensive that the Bank's activities in this
field might weaken or conflict with the enterprise now being undertaken by
OECD. This would not be the case as the OECD Draft Convention on the
Protection of Foreign Property took on entirely different approach to the
problem, setting out substantive rules of behaviour for the enforcement of
which was prescribed a system of compulsory recourse to arbitration. OECD
was aware of the working papers produced, and to the extent possible its
Secretariat had been kept informed of the Bank's work. He did not feel that
the Bank's Convention would conflict with that of OECD or lessen the latter's
chances of adoption.

35. Dr. Donner's point regarding avoidance of interference with existing
bilateral agreements on foreign investment would be met in the next draft.
As to questions raised by some Directors regarding exhaustion of local
remedies, he wished to make it clear that the Convention as at present
envisioned would in no way affect the position that each country could decide
for itself whether in a specific case it wished to postpone access to the
facilities established until after local remedies had been exhausted.

36. Mr. Woods, winding up the discussion on general questions, said that
with one exception the consensus was that establishment of the facilities
was desirable. Even the exception noted was not in opposition to the idea,
but in the nature of a reservation. He would, therefore, proceed with the
program outlined in his opening remarks. The first preliminary draft should
be ready for distribution by mid-July and there would be time to consider
it from then on until mid-September when the Committee of the Whole would
again discuss the matter.

37. Mr. Woods then asked for comments of specific issues connected with
the subject under discussion, adding that if any further points occurred to
Directors after the meeting they might be passed directly to General Counsel.

38. In answer to a remark by Mr. Mejia that he understood the arguments
against adoption of a Convention had been rejected, Mr. Woods and Mr. Broches
pointed out that while the decision was to prepare a text in the form of a
Convention as a basis of discussion, no decision had been taken or would be
taken on its submission to governments as a Convention until after the Bank
had had the benefit of the views expressed at the regional meetings.

39. Mr. Mejia urged that the machinery established should be clearly
identified with the Bank upon whose prestige the success of the institution
depended. Mr. Broches, agreeing that such connection was essential, empha-
sized that it would be limited to administrative matters and would not
extend to arbitration and conciliation activities which would be undertaken
solely by persons selected by the parties to a dispute or by the Bank.

40. Mr. Woods said that while he had earlier used the expression "under

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the umbrella" of the Bank the question of an exact relationship had yet to be decided upon. Referring to the recent Ghanaian investment law under which the Bank might have authority to appoint an arbitrator, he observed that since Ghana owed the Bank substantial sums of money he could imagine that a private entrepreneur who wanted an independent judgment might prefer to have someone other than the Bank make that appointment, and thus place the Bank in a difficult position. In this connection he recalled the point made by Mr. Machado and others that, while the facilities to be established might be associated with the Bank, they should be separate and not identified with the Bank as a creditor institution.

41. Mr. Mejia further stressed the need for contact with other organizations and institutions engaged in work with similar objectives, with a view to securing their cooperation and avoiding interference with the Bank's purposes. In particular contact should be maintained with Latin American organizations such as the working committee of the Pan American Union which was now preparing a draft Inter-American Convention on the protection of foreign property adoption of which might appear preferable to the countries concerned. The Juridical Committee of Rio de Janeiro was another influential institution which gave unqualified support to the jurisdiction of local Courts and was against conciliation and arbitration. Mr. Woods hoped that Mr. Mejia would be able to assist in maintaining a good working relationship with the institutions he had mentioned.

42. Mr. Broches mentioned that the Bank had had a number of contacts with the staff of the Pan American Union with whom there had been an exchange of working documents. The Pan American Union's work on conciliation and arbitration, which was still in an early stage, was part of a study of means to improve flow of private capital to Latin American countries undertaken in the context of the Alliance for Progress. Mr. Woods thought it would be best to make a list of all institutions with even a peripheral interest in the subject so that, when the first preliminary draft was ready, they could be informed of the Bank's work.

43. Mr. Mejia thought that the establishment of the elaborate institutional structure described in paragraph 11 of Memorandum SID 63-2 "by means of a Convention might arouse apprehensions among certain States which were already critical of the number of international organizations coming into being. He referred in that connection, and by way of example, to the Administrative Council contemplated in the Working Paper. Mr. Broches pointed out that there had as yet been no general discussion of Article III of the Working Paper (A 62-1(SD) of June 5, 1962)." Mr. Lieftinck had at the meeting of December 1962 expressed views similar to those of Mr. Mejia and had cautioned against making the Center appear too elaborate. In fact, however, the "Council" contemplated in the draft would be either the Executive Directors or the Board of Governors doubling in function. The criticisms made would be borne in mind when describing the machinery in the next Paper. Mr. Woods thought an entire session of the Committee should be devoted to discussing Article III.

44. In response to Mr. Woods' enquiry regarding further points, Mr. Khalil said he had been instructed by his countries to press consideration of this matter and would like to comment on the Memorandum. His first point related to paragraph 14 which made subrogation of a State to the rights of the private party to a dispute conditional upon the consent of the State party to that dispute. As he understood it, subrogation was full substitution in the
rights and obligations of a party, and one of the rights of a subrogated
government was that of making use of the facilities of the Center without
the consent of the other government party to the dispute. He wondered
whether it would be practical to include as a condition for recourse to the
facilities the consent of the State party to the dispute.

45. Mr. Broches said that the Memorandum was possibly not sufficiently
clear on this point. He agreed that the subrogated government should in
that case be able to stand in the shoes of a private investor, and if the
private investor had a right to submit the dispute to the facilities of the
Center, his government should, on subrogation have that right without
further consent. Thus, where a government had given an investment guarantee
such as those given by the United States, Japanese and German governments,
and where the investor suffered a loss on an investment with regard to which
he had an agreement with the host government which included the right to
submit disputes to the Center, then, if his own government made good his
pecuniary loss, that government would be substituted completely in all the
rights and obligations of the investor even without the consent of the
State party to the dispute.

46. Mr. Ichelil's second point related to the necessity of having a
Convention. He had been particularly impressed by two of the arguments of
General Counsel on page 11 of the Memorandum: under (a), to the effect that
the Convention would establish that the agreements referred to were valid
international obligations, and under (c), explained that the Convention
would give assurances that an agreement could not be frustrated by the
unilateral act of a party and, in the case of an agreement to arbitrate,
that an award would be complied with.

47. Mr. Ichelil's third point related to the question raised in paragraph
21 on page 12 of the Memorandum. "Assuming that only a fairly small
number of States adhered to the Convention initially, would it be desirable
to permit access to the machinery of the Center to non-Contracting States
and to nationals of other non-Contracting States on an ad hoc basis?" In
reply General Counsel had indicated it might be desirable to do so. While
he (Mr. Ichelil) understood that the universality of the Convention was
neither required nor necessary, he thought every effort should be made to
have the Convention adhered to by as many countries as possible. To allow
recourse to the Center without adherence to the Convention would not only
slow the rate of accession to it, but might tend to discourage countries
from acceding as they would be able to utilize the Center even without
doing so.

48. Mr. Bullitt associated himself with Mr. Ichelil's comments.

49. Mr. Woods noted that two points of view had been expressed. The
mechanism could merely be set up and made available to those who wished
to make use of it, and over a period of, say, 10 years precedents and
procedures would emerge as by-products of the work of the conciliators
and arbitrators. He did not subscribe to that view. On the other hand,
every effort might be made to publicize the rules of conciliation and
arbitration of the facilities available at the Center among the 85 members.
Those rules might be open to ad hoc acceptance or be embodied in a
Convention. No decision had been taken on that question, or on whether
the facilities established under the Convention should be open to non-
signatories.
50. Mr. Bullitt thought that if a country which had not adhered to the Convention wished to make use of the facilities under the circumstances described in paragraph 21 of the Memorandum there should be no objection in principle to that country's adhering to the Convention. He wondered, however, whether it was necessary to provide in the Convention either that it would be open to non-signatories or that it would not.

51. Mr. Broches, agreeing with Mr. Bullitt, thought that in practice a Government which had decided to use the facilities of the Center with reference to a particular dispute would have to go to Parliament or Congress as they would have to do if they were accepting the Convention generally. It might therefore seek authority to accept the Convention, it being understood, however, that parliamentary approval would have to be sought if another dispute were to be submitted to the Center.

52. Mr. Khelil was not satisfied on the question of definition of the type of dispute for which the facilities of the Center would be available. While he recognized the difficulty of defining the scope of the Center, he was not satisfied with the limits prescribed in paragraph 23 of the Memorandum. While he understood that the Convention should be limited to legal disputes as distinguished from political or commercial disputes, he thought it would be very difficult to draw the line between the political and legal aspects of a dispute and care should be taken in defining the scope of the Center. He did not share Mr. Mejia's view that there was a contradiction between paragraph 5 and paragraph 23 of the Memorandum.

53. Mr. Broches agreed that there was no contradiction between the two paragraphs quoted. A dispute might have political origins or motivations and still be legal in character. Referring to the point raised by Mr. Khelil, he had noted that nearly all the Directors, while they agreed it would be difficult to formulate a definition, felt that a definition should nevertheless be attempted. That would be done either by a precise definition or by some other means of indicating more clearly what types of disputes the Center would deal with.

54. Mr. Khelil raised another point which related to the question whether an arbitration agreement would, unless otherwise provided therein, be regarded as dispensing with the need to exhaust local remedies. He did not share the apprehension expressed by Mr. Chen, Mr. Ghosh and Mr. Hirza that if the rule as reflected in paragraph 25 on page 15 of the Memorandum were accepted, there would be a derogation from the principle of international law that, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, before a government may lodge an international claim on account of an injury to one of its nationals that national must have exhausted his local remedies. He thought, however, that if the rule were stated in a different way viz: that the private investor had first to exhaust all local remedies before having recourse to the Center unless that requirement was expressly excluded in the agreement, it might serve to answer those apprehensions.

55. Mr.oods preferred the way in which General Counsel had formulated the rule. If the government felt that its Courts should be used to the fullest extent, it was open to it to withhold consent to recourse to the Center.

56. Mr. Broches emphasized that no rigid rule of substance had been
stated in paragraph 25 of the Memorandum. The parties, principally the host government, had to decide whether they were willing to permit recourse to the facilities of the Center immediately and in lieu of local remedies, or whether those facilities were to be used only as an appellate Court. In his proposal he had sought to avoid certain questions of interpretation which might arise. Thus, if an investment agreement provided that all differences arising with regard to the interpretation or application of that agreement should be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the rules of the Convention, a question could arise as to whether the intention was to have immediate recourse to the facilities of the Center, or to use them as a court of appeal. He thought the rule as formulated reflected the usual way in which a dispute would come before the Center, and seemed to be most in accordance with the normal intentions of parties which had undertaken, without qualification or provision for prior resort to other remedies, to have recourse to the facilities. The only exceptional case might arise where a government, by statute or proclamation, undertook unilaterally to place disputes before the Center. In that case the intention might well be to have recourse to the Center only if all other means to settlement, including local remedies, had failed.

57. Mr. Khelil said that, while he fully understood Mr. Broches' position, his suggestion had sought to answer those Directors who had expressed the fear that local Courts and local remedies would be sacrificed to international jurisdiction. Mr. Mejia pointed out that governments were unwilling to accept international jurisdiction except in cases of a denial of justice.

58. Mr. Woods and Mr. Broches agreed that this was a matter which might be talked over and, if that were acceptable, stated in another way. It was, in any event, a question of presentation rather than of substance.

59. Mr. Illanes agreed with Mr. Mejia. He recalled that the Pan American Union had accepted the general rule that arbitration came after exhaustion of local remedies, and that recourse to international tribunals could be made only when there had been a denial of justice arising from discrimination on grounds of nationality. To do otherwise might cast doubts on the judgment of local Courts. He thought that the International Law Association had also accepted the principle that recourse should first be made to the national Courts and then, where there was a complaint about their decision, to arbitration. The draft elaborated by the Bank gave him the impression that the general rule was to be arbitration before recourse to local Courts.

60. Mr. Lieftinck feared that, if the procedure outlined by Mr. Woods in his introductory statement were to be followed, and bearing in mind that adherence to a Convention may take considerable time, particularly if its entry into force was made conditional on adherence by a substantial number of countries, a satisfactory means of resolving investment disputes might not be available until after four or five years. For that reason he would suggest setting up in the course of the next year, the "Secretariat" or "Center", and announcing that it was available for the settlement of investment disputes through conciliation and arbitration on the basis of ad hoc procedures to be agreed upon by the parties to the dispute and the Secretariat. The Secretariat should then try to standardize these ad hoc procedures as much as possible while making allowance for some flexibility, for the first five years. Meanwhile an attempt could be made to elaborate a Convention which then would formalize the standard procedures. That
program would, he thought, have the advantage of providing a solution much earlier than otherwise would be the case, and the experience gained during that period by the Secretariat as well as by parties to disputes before the Center would create the confidence required for securing adherence to the Convention at a later date. This was merely a suggestion, and perhaps had deficiencies or was even completely unworkable. It might have some merit, however, if the time taken to achieve a Convention was considered.

61. Mr. Woods did not share Mr. Lieftinck's view regarding the period of time involved. More information upon which to base a judgment with respect to the viewpoint he had just been exploring would be available after the fourth meeting of the regional conference planned, which would be not later than February of next year. However, if Mr. Lieftinck were correct in his estimate of the delay, his suggestion would warrant consideration.

62. Mr. Bullitt felt that if a start were made now on the basis of Mr. Lieftinck's suggestion it might well be found that a Convention would never be achieved and that the facilities offered by the Bank would become a substitute for a Convention. A better assessment of the position could be made after the consultation process suggested, and if it appeared that there would be a substantial delay in achieving the Convention, Mr. Lieftinck's suggestion ought seriously to be considered.

63. Mr. Woods and Mr. Broches thought the consultations might be completed before February.

64. Mr. Mejia supported Mr. Lieftinck's suggestion.

65. Mr. Woods proposed that during a further informal discussion of the Committee of the Whole consideration be given to Article III of the draft text with particular reference to the institutional structure of the Center. That meeting would be Mr. Broches' responsibility.

66. It was agreed that the Committee of the Whole commence discussion on Article III immediately after the meeting of the Executive Directors scheduled for Tuesday, June 4.

67. In reply to Mr. Bullitt, Mr. Broches said that, as was done on previous occasions, a summary of these proceedings would be made available as early as possible.

68. The meeting adjourned at 12.25 o'clock p.m.
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SID/63-10 (June 13, 1963)
Memorandum of the meeting of the Committee of the Whole, June 4, 1963, not an approved record.
Discussion of the organizational structure of the Centre, and of the link between the Centre and the Bank

1. There were present: omitted

2. Mr. Woods said that as consideration was now to be given to legal questions relating to the structure of the Center for the settlement of investment disputes he would ask Mr. Broches to lead the discussion.

3. Mr. Broches, opening the discussion, recalled that it had been decided at the meeting of the Committee of the Whole on May 28 that a first preliminary draft text in the form of a Convention be prepared by early July. Since Article III of the Working Paper, document R 62-1 (SD), which dealt with the organizational structure of the proposed Center would form an important part of that draft, he would like to have the benefit of the comments of the Executive Directors on that article. The content of Article III would be important regardless of whether a Convention or Board action was the means of achieving the objectives agreed upon, as the administrative machinery now provided for in that article would in any event be necessary. He would suggest, therefore, that the discussion of the content of the Article proceed without any reference to the means of its ultimate adoption.

4. Mr. Broches invited attention to the documents relevant to the discussion viz: 1) the text of Article III itself, as set out in pages 6 and following of the Working Paper, document R 62-1 (SD); 2) paragraph 13 of the memorandum in document SID 63-2; which indicated the advantages of investing the Center with the image of the Bank and its prestige and reputation for impartiality, while emphasizing that the Bank would have no influence on proceedings under the auspices of the Center; and 3) document d 62-3 (SD) which contained details of the link with the Bank, provided for in the text, tabulated for convenient reference. He suggested that the discussion might start with comments on the general question of the desirability of some link between the proposed machinery and the Bank, and be followed by consideration of the provisions of article III.

5. Mr. van Campenhout, while he did not disagree with the reasons given in paragraph 13 of the Memorandum for establishing a link with the Bank, thought that prestige and reputation for impartiality were not attributes of the Bank exclusively, but also of other institutions like the International Court of Justice. He, therefore, felt that it would put the matter in the right perspective if a more specific justification were provided for such a link which would emphasize the Bank's particular purpose of fostering development.

6. Mr. Krishna Moorthi said that in accordance with the statement of his alternate at the meeting of the Committee of the Whole he would reserve judgment on the desirability of links between the Center and the Bank until such time as he had more information on what those links were to be, and how they would function in practice.

7. Mr. Machado reiterated his view that the Center should be set up by
a Convention, or forthwith by administrative action within the Bank. He
found some inconsistency between certain provisions on the structure of the
Center as provided for in Article III viz: while the seat of the Center was
to be at the headquarters of the Bank, while meetings of the Administrative
Council were to be held in conjunction with meetings of the Board of
Governors, and the President of the Bank would be ex officio President of
the Center, it was not provided, as had been done in the cases of IDA and
IFC, that the members of the Administrative Council would be members of the
Board of Governors of the Bank. It was thus open to Contracting States
to appoint to the Administrative Council those who were not Governors,
and this would not be in accordance with an intention to establish a close
link between the Bank and the Center.

8. However, he was against the intimate association between the two
institutions provided for in Article III. While it was essential for
the success of the Center that its sponsorship by the Bank be made known,
and while the Bank might give it guidance and, perhaps, financial support
in its early years, he believed that if the Center were to have judicial
functions, it should be kept absolutely separate from the Bank, whose
officials exercised functions related to the economic problems of Contract-
ing States. Nor did he share the view that the seat of the Center should
necessarily be at the headquarters of the Bank. It should be within the
competence of the Administrative Council to decide whether the seat of the
Center should initially be at the headquarters of the Bank and whether it
would be advisable to remove it elsewhere at some future date.

9. Mr. Broches hoped that it might be possible to confine the discussion
at this stage to the general desirability of a link with the Bank and that
specific details of that link could be considered later.

10. Mr. Garland associated himself with the remarks of Mr. Krishna Moorthi
and reserved the right to take a position at a later stage. He suggested,
however, that the discussion proceed on the assumption that the Center would
be situated in the Bank.

11. Mr. Mejia elaborating the views he had earlier expressed in favour of
creating, without a Convention, a small Secretariat to facilitate concilia-
tion and arbitration, said he was in favour of establishing such machinery
totally within the Bank as a service to member States. He recalled that
he had supported Mr. Lieftinck's proposal to establish such a service at
least initially and with a view to concluding a Convention at a later stage.
He did not think that the Secretariat's volume of work would be very great,
and this had served to convince him that the mechanism should in its early
stages be a simple one. When Article III was discussed he would express
in greater detail how machinery within the Bank could be used in the manner
he envisaged.

12. Mr. Broches pointed out that two somewhat different approaches had
so far been suggested. Mr. Mejia envisaged integration of the machinery
with the Bank, while Mr. Machado wanted to safeguard the independence of
the machinery, although he did not object to certain institutional links
between it and the Bank. It might be best to pass to a detailed considera-
tion of Article III as, apart from a possible objection in principle to any
link at all, the question turned on the nature of the link to be established.
As Mr. Lieftinck had earlier offered his comments on that matter, he might
wish to refresh the recollection of the Directors regarding the points made
on that occasion.
13. Mr. Lieftinck thought it might be useful if he were to indicate very briefly the main suggestions he had made on Article III. In his opinion, while the Center or Secretariat could usefully have its seat at the headquarters of the Bank, that should not be made mandatory in the Convention or other constituent instrument, but rather be provided for in by-laws so as to allow for more flexibility. He also felt that the Center itself should not have a President, but only a Secretary-General. The Administrative Council, however, should have a President, and he would agree that the President of the Bank be ex officio President of the Council. He had no objection to the President's nominating the Secretary-General who would be appointed by the Council as was proposed under Article III.

14. He had some hesitation on the question of the compatibility or otherwise of the post of Secretary-General with that of a member of the staff of the Bank. He would, for the present, say only that he had no objection to the Secretary-General's being selected from the staff of the Bank and remaining on the pay roll of the Bank so long as the Center or Secretariat was not yet fully established. That might have the advantage of giving the Secretary-General more security. He was in favour of the wording of paragraph 2 of section 11 which was to the effect that the office of Secretary-General or Deputy Secretary-General should be "incompatible with the exercise of any political function, and with any employment or occupation other than employment by the Bank or by the Permanent Court of Arbitration........"

15. Mr. Broches then briefly reviewed the provisions of Article III. As to section 1 he thought it would be very desirable, if the Center was set up by international agreement, that it should have full juridical personality in order to enable it to do even such simple things as rent quarters and enter into contracts. If, in the alternative, it was set up within the Bank by administrative means, the Center would be part of the Bank and provision for its juridical personality would not be necessary.

16. Section 2 consisted of three parts, the first of which stated that the seat of the Center should be at the headquarters of the Bank, the second, that the Center might make arrangements with the Bank for use of the Bank's offices, services and facilities, and the third, that the Center might make arrangements with the Administrative Council of the Permanent Court of Arbitration for use of the Courts organization and facilities. He recalled that while Mr. Lieftinck and Mr. Machado had had no objection to the seat of the Center being initially at the headquarters of the Bank, they felt that should not be regarded as decided for all time.

17. Mr. van Campenhout was for leaving paragraph 2 as it stood while adding a proviso to the effect that the Administrative Council or other representative body could decide to remove the Center to another location.

18. Mr. Krishna Moorthi agreed with Mr. Lieftinck. While it might be convenient to have the Center initially at the headquarters of the Bank there might be some advantage in moving the Center at a later stage to some other convenient part of the world so that the institution could have the sponsorship and overall guidance of the Bank, without being actually accommodated on its premises.

19. Mr. Hudon said he favoured a close link with the Bank. With particular reference to paragraph 1 of section 2, he had two comments. In the first place he wondered whether it was customary in documents of this kind to
 specify the location of the headquarters of the institution, and secondly, he was not sure whether establishment of the seat of the Center in the text was any more inflexible than a provision to that effect in the by-laws. He assumed that under the Convention as it now stood the by-laws would have to be amended by the administrative Council.

20. Mr. Broches agreed that the by-laws would be open to amendment by the Administrative Council. Replying to the questions raised by Mr. Hudon, he said that it was customary, except when it was intended to leave the matter open, to specify location of the headquarters' seat in the constituent instrument. If that instrument were a Convention it could not be amended by an organ created by it - such as an Administrative Council - unless that organ was specifically authorized to do so in the instrument. Thus if it was felt that there should be flexibility in the matter, the location of the seat of the Center might not be specified in the constituent instrument on the understanding that it would be determined by the Administrative Council, or it might be so specified, but with the proviso that the Administrative Council could change the location.

21. In reply to Mr. Hudon's questions whether the location of the seat of the Center could not be changed through whatever mechanism would be provided for amending the Convention, Mr. Broches pointed out that there would still be the problem that in the absence of a provision such as was contained in the Bank's Articles of Agreement, by which amendments become effective upon the qualified majority vote of the principal organ, no State would be bound by any amendments unless it ratified them. If flexibility was desired, he thought the most satisfactory way of providing for it would be to leave paragraph 1 of section 2 of the Working Paper as it stood with the addition of a proviso that the Administrative Council might, by a simple or qualified majority, decide on another location for the seat of the Center.

22. Mr. Waitzenegger said he was strongly in favour of flexibility in this instance.

23. Mr. Donner did not see the advantage of having the Center away from the Bank, and did not agree that flexibility was needed on this point. Speaking strictly in a personal capacity for the present, he preferred a closer rather than a looser connection with the Bank. He agreed with the proposition in paragraph 13 on page 7 of the Memorandum that the success of the Center would, to a great extent, depend upon the prestige and reputation for impartiality of the Bank and, therefore, believed that the seat of the Center should be at the Bank's headquarters, as well as that it should use the Bank's offices, administrative services and other facilities.

24. Mr. Hirza was in favour of a close link with the Bank. If the Center was to maintain an institutional link with the Bank, he did not think it practical that it should be away from the Bank's headquarters at any stage. He was, therefore, in favour of the present provision in the Working Paper.

25. Mr. Reilly thought that the advantages of maintaining a link referred to in paragraph 13 of the Memorandum, and also the point made by Mr. van Campenhout that the purpose of the Center was connected with the Bank's role of fostering economic development, indicated that, from a psychological point of view, much would be lost if the Center were not at the Bank and accepted as being connected with it.

26. Mr. Chen also favoured a close link with the Bank for the reasons which had already been stated.
27. Mr. Garland thought that the Center could initially be located at the Bank. While it was likely that no one would want to move it later on, that possibility might still be provided for in the text.

28. Mr. Brosch said that his personal view - which was shared by Mr. Woods - was that the location of the seat of the Center at the headquarters of the Bank would have practical, and possibly psychological advantages which would far outweigh the somewhat vague risks which some speakers had referred to. No one was against initial location of the Center at the Bank's headquarters, and he agreed with Mr. Garland that once it was established there, it would probably remain. However, it would give countries more confidence to know that this was not a decision for all time, removal at a later stage might be provided for.

29. Mr. van Campenhout was for flexibility in this matter for purely practical reasons. While he thought that, at the present time, the best place for the seat of the Center was the Bank's headquarters, he could foresee the possibility that it might at some time be desirable for reasons which might even be of a purely administrative nature, to move it elsewhere. If no provision was made for flexibility, any change would have to be made through the machinery provided for amendment of the Convention, and would be subject to parliamentary approval by each country. He did not think that the physical location of the Center at the Bank's headquarters or elsewhere would be indicative of a greater or lesser link with the Bank, and felt that those in favour of more rigidity in this respect tended to exaggerate the significance of the issue.

30. Mr. Krishna Moorthi expressed an initial preference for a certain amount of flexibility which would permit the Center to move elsewhere in the future. To him, the main advantage of the Center's location at the headquarters of the Bank was that of its being able to use the Bank's office space, staff, library and administrative services. On the other hand, account should be taken of reservations which countries might have regarding close association between an "executive" type organization like the Bank, and a "juridical" type body like the Center. His feelings on the matter were somewhat vague as he was still not certain of the precise character of the Center as envisaged, nor of the nature of its nexus with the Bank. For instance it had been said that the Center might make arrangements with the Bank for use of the Bank's offices, and other services and facilities. Would the term "other services" include provision of information by the Economic Staff of the Bank? While Mr. Brosch denied that that would be the case, it should be taken into account that the text as it stood was open to that interpretation. He also had some misgivings on the question whether all the material that came before the Center would be presented by a representative of a party, as in judicial proceedings, thus making it available in open court. He, therefore, felt that, while the Center could be under the sponsorship and overall guidance of the Bank, the parties who came before it might feel a little more reassured if what was in fact to be a semi-judicial institution would be completely separate from the Bank and work on more or less judicial lines.

31. In reply, Mr. Brosch emphasized that the Center was an administrative organ and not a judicial one, although quasi-judicial proceedings would be held under its auspices. In particular, the intention of paragraph 2 of section 2 was to enable use of the Bank's administrative services and facilities. That would be made quite clear in the new text.
32. Mr. Waitzynegger said that, while he had expressed himself in favour of flexibility, that did not indicate that he was opposed to a close link with the Bank. He supported the views of Mr. van Campenhout which called for flexibility in view of the difficulty of amending international arrangements.

33. Mr. Cooke said that the word "sponsorship" in paragraph 13 of the Memorandum affected both paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 of section 2, and was of great significance in determining the relationship of the Center to the Bank. While the Bank might wish to maintain some degree of flexibility in the initial stages of organizing the Center he thought the Center would itself decide upon some of the issues now under discussion.

34. Mr. Mejia said that Mr. Krishna Moorthi had talked about the judicial functions of the Center and he thought that it was very important when discussing the organization of the Center to know exactly what functions it was to have i.e. whether they would be judicial or merely administrative. In his view, the functions of the Center were to be strictly administrative, while the arbitrators or conciliators chosen by the parties would decide upon the dispute. Thus, the Center would merely facilitate a choice of arbitrators or conciliators.

35. Mr. Broches agreed that the Center was to be an administrative body. That was why, apart from the importance of psychological aspects of a link with the Bank, it had been suggested that the Center should avail itself of the administrative services of the Bank.

36. He agreed with Mr. Mejia that the Center would assist parties to choose arbitrators or conciliators. Another problem which would arise in practice would be the choice of the venue of an arbitration. Unless the parties were clearly agreed on some other locale, it would be natural, for administrative reasons, to hold proceedings at the headquarters of the Bank. If, however, the parties wanted to hold them elsewhere, it would be open to them to do so. None of these functions would, of course, make the Center a judicial organ in any sense.

37. Mr. Mejia thought that it was important to indicate clearly that what was being set up was administrative machinery, and that the Bank was in no way to be involved in the judicial facilities provided under the auspices of the Center. As it had been agreed that that was the case, he favoured integration of the Center as an administrative body with the Bank.

38. Mr. Machado while agreeing that the seat of the Center was important thought that the nature of its functions should be discussed. It had been said that the Secretariat was to be an administrative organ with no judicial functions. But if a dispute was referred to a panel of arbitrators chosen under the auspices of the Secretariat, it would seem as though the Center were acting in a judicial capacity. A decision by the arbitral tribunal would be a judicial decision, and provision would be made for its enforcement in the territories of the countries concerned. It would be difficult, therefore, to separate the Center itself from the judicial functions of a tribunal acting under its auspices.

39. In reply to Mr. Machado, Mr. Broches emphasized that there would never be a question of arbitration or conciliation by the Center, but rather under the auspices of the Center. "Under the auspices" here meant the
provision of housekeeping facilities, and services in connection with the designation of conciliators and arbitrators. He thought that that was quite clear from the text, and that there was nothing in the Working Paper from which it could be inferred that the Center would perform any judicial function. Judicial functions would only be performed by an arbitral tribunal whose members had been chosen by the parties, or by the President of the Administrative Council, if the parties so desired or by some outside authority such as the President of the International Court of Justice or the President of the International Chamber of Commerce. That fact could not give a judicial colour to the functions of the Center itself which were purely administrative.

40. Mr. Donner raised a point of procedure. It had been intended to discuss the machinery of the Center as a whole but this did not seem to have been adhered to. Any person's position regarding a specific provision in the text was, he believed, determined by his overall views. Thus far, only Mr. Lieftinck's views were known in detail. As to the other Directors some, including himself, believed that the success of the Center and of the enterprise as a whole, depended upon a link with the Bank. The institution should, so to speak, stay "in the wake" of the Bank. Those who took that position did not find any difficulty regarding location of the seat of the institution or concerning whether the Center should have a President, the extent of his powers etc. Others thought that it was precisely the closeness of the new institution to the Bank which should be avoided, because the Bank with its lending functions might exert some influence upon those who would consider using the facilities of the Center. That perfectly logical position had been taken by Mr. Krishna Moorthi. It was necessary, however, in such a case to take other positions, for instance, as to the location of the seat of the Center and the authority of its various officials.

41. There was a third possible position which, while favouring a close link with the Bank, viewed the Center as one of a group of similar organizations now in existence such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and preferred a flexible approach, bearing in mind that the Center might have to work in close collaboration with those Organizations. He thought it would be interesting to ascertain what basic approaches there were among the Directors, assuming that establishment of such a Center was intended, prior to discussing their views on specific provisions.

42. Mr. Broches agreed that undoubtedly one's views on specific provisions were influenced by one's general views on the whole subject. On the other hand, he thought that a discussion of specific points, such as had taken place, had the advantage of disclosing and sometimes clarifying differences of opinion and possible misunderstandings. For instance, discussion of the seat of the Center had indicated that there had apparently been some difference between the ways in which some Directors had understood the nature and functions of the Center. He thought it would be worthwhile to see whether agreement could be reached regarding the precise nature of the Center since that would influence the views of the Directors on specific issues. Thereafter, the Directors could be invited to give a preview of their detailed views as Mr. Lieftinck had done earlier.

43. Mr. Garland was not certain regarding the function of the discussion. Presumably it was to inform the staff of the views of Directors on particular issues of policy. Would it be possible for a member of the staff to contact each Director individually and to clarify to some extent the issues involved, so that the Directors could be presented with a few issues as to policy for
discussion at a full meeting? He understood that the whole matter was also to be discussed with representatives of the governments concerned, and that actual questions of drafting would be left to a committee of legal experts.

44. Replying to Mr. Garland, Mr. Broches said he thought the function of the meeting was not only to inform the staff but also to enable the Directors to inform each other of their views. He agreed that the matter should be referred to the legal experts of members as early as practicable. On the other hand, he felt that the present discussion was most helpful to the staff and that it would, in addition, facilitate future discussions in the Committee of the Whole and in the Board.

45. Mr. Krishna Moorthi and Mr. Machado agreed with Mr. Broches. Mr. Machado thought there was no real substitute for open discussion among the Directors. In reporting upon the issues discussed to the countries they represented, the Directors would now be able to recall the various comments which had been made and to explain the reasons for acceptance or rejection of particular proposals.

46. Mr. van Campenhout proposed that at the next meeting Directors concentrate on the functions of the Administrative Council and the Secretariat as at present conceived, with a view to obtaining a concrete idea of how they would work. He further suggested that at the next meeting General Counsel should by way of introduction give a verbal exposé of these matters.

47. The meeting adjourned at 12:45 p.m. o'clock until 10:30 o'clock a.m. on Thursday, June 6, 1963.
sections of Article III. The Directors might, therefore, address themselves to as many sections or principal points of Article III as they felt was desirable, bearing in mind that the present discussion was informal and not intended to secure the Directors' agreement to particular provisions.

4. In his view the functions of the Center were not judicial or quasi-judicial, but administrative. As contemplated in the documents under discussion the Center would consist of three parts viz: 1) a Secretary-General and possibly staff, 2) an Administrative Council with a President or Chairman, and 3) panels of conciliators and arbitrators. The task of the Secretary-General was essentially that of providing the administrative services which might be necessary in connection with proceedings under the auspices of the Center, while the Administrative Council and its President would be charged with drawing up such regulations as might be necessary for the proper working of the Center, and with drafting detailed rules of procedure which parties to proceedings might accept in lieu of other rules. It should be clearly understood, however, that the parties would always be free to adopt their own rules of procedure.

5. In contrast to the Secretary-General and the President and Members of the Administrative Council, the panels were not animate beings. They were pieces of paper, lists of names. From among those names the parties would select conciliators or arbitrators who would then perform functions not on behalf of the Center but on behalf of the parties, in accordance with rules agreed upon between them. They would be paid by the parties, and could not be regarded in any sense as part of the Center. They would function under the auspices of the Center but would not be officials of the Center. It was clear, therefore, that the Center itself would not engage in arbitration or conciliation, and the discussion should proceed on that basis.

6. He would like to indicate some points on which Directors might wish to comment, and in that connection would refer to document R 62-3 (SD) of December 14, 1962; entitled "Outline of Provisions of Working Paper Relevant to Relationship of the Center to the Bank". That document had three subdivisions viz: A, General; B, Powers and Functions of the President of the Bank as ex officio President of the Center and the Administrative Council; and C, the Powers and Functions of the Secretary-General. Under the first heading were listed some general aspects of the nexus between the Center and the Bank. Of these, the first point had been discussed at some length at the meeting of June 4; viz: that the seat of the Center would be at the headquarters of the Bank. Next was provision for the possibility of arrangements for use by the Center of the Bank's services and facilities, and here he would like it clearly understood that the reference was to administrative services and facilities. The third instance of a link was that the President of the Bank would ex officio be President of the Center and of the Administrative Council. It was also proposed that membership of the Administrative Council might consist of the Governors of the Bank and that the annual meeting of the Council would be held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the Bank's Board of Governors. Furthermore, employment by the Bank would not be incompatible with the functions of the Secretary-General. Finally, the possibility that the Bank might pay all or part of the costs of the Center was noted but left open for the time being.

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1 Doc. 12
2 Doc. 18
7. In considering to what extent those arrangements might infringe upon what might be regarded as the desirable degree of independence in the operation of the Center, reference should be made to headings B and G. Under B were listed the powers and functions of the President of the Bank in his capacity as President of the Center or of the Council, whichever term might be eventually accepted. In the first place he could receive powers delegated to him by the Administrative Council, and would have the right to call meetings or obtain a vote of the Council. The Administrative Council's powers were limited to the establishment of rules of procedure, and the appointment of the Secretary-General. One very important aspect of the President's functions was the right and the obligation to nominate a candidate for Secretary-General. That established the Bank's influence in the appointment of the Secretary-General. It should be noted, however, that the President did not appoint him but was the designated nominating authority.

8. It then became relevant to determine the importance of the role of the Secretary-General, and in that connection reference was made to heading C of the document. The Secretary-General was the principal Administrative Officer. He might be instructed by the President, when appropriate, to consult with parties and to assist him in choosing arbitrators or conciliators when that task had been entrusted to the President. He would fix the fees and expenses of the Center which might be charged to the parties within such limits as were set by the Administrative Council. He might also be consulted regarding the fees and expenses of conciliators and arbitrators as well as the place of proceedings when they were to take place outside Washington or The Hague - assuming that The Hague would be an agreed alternative locale. It seemed clear, therefore, that neither the Secretary-General nor the President would have any influence on the substance of proceedings before the Center, and that their main task would be to facilitate the initiation and proper running of these proceedings. It should also be noted that the President of the Bank would have the residual authority to appoint arbitrators or conciliators if the parties failed to agree on their selection, and if the parties had not chosen some third party or outside authority to make such appointments. Finally as a relatively minor point, if a single conciliator's or arbitrator's suitability were challenged by one of the parties, the President of the Bank as President of the Center would rule on the matter.

9. The foregoing brief review would, he thought, give a general picture of the degree of relationship between the Bank and the proposed Center, and it did not appear that there was anything in those provisions that would infringe the independence of the only persons whose functions were of judicial significance viz. the conciliators and arbitrators. He would like to emphasize again that the duties of the Secretary-General were purely administrative. That did not mean, however, that he would be an unimportant official, because informally he would probably be consulted frequently by parties as to the desirability of using the facilities of the Center. He might also be consulted as an unofficial and impartial expert by the two parties together before they formally submitted a dispute to conciliation or arbitration under the auspices of the Center. Unless there was a dissent regarding his rendering of the facts and the interpretation that the Center itself did not engage in conciliation or arbitration and was no more than a mechanism at the disposal of the parties, he thought it would be useful if the Directors would give their views on the way in which that conception of the Council had been reflected in document H 62-1 (SD).
without going into detail, but possibly using as a guide the outline in document R 62-3 (SD):

10. Mr. Krishna Moorthi said that Mr. Broches had substantiated that the arbitral tribunals and conciliation commissions convened by the parties to a dispute under the auspices of the Center would work independently of the Center, and that the Center as such would be only an administrative body not charged with the actual functions of arbitration and conciliation. He agreed entirely with that view, which had been reflected in paragraph 12 on page 6 of General Counsel's Memorandum of February 18, 1963, and did not seem to need any further argument. At the previous meeting there had been an attempt to reach a common understanding as to whether the institution which it was sought to create would be solely an administrative body, or possess judicial functions as well. While that discussion might have very little practical importance, it was necessary for member countries to understand the true character of the Center, which would need to be discussed in national legislatures in due course, and from that point of view he had some remarks to make.

11. He would like to invite attention to the fact that the draft text in the Working Paper took the form of a draft convention. Thus while Mr. Broches' introductory analysis had been excellent so far as it went it was also necessary to recognize that the means of setting up the Center was to be a Convention.

12. Mr. Broches intervened to point out that it should not be assumed in the present discussion of Article III that there would be a Convention. He recalled that the arguments for and against a Convention had been discussed at an earlier meeting. For the present, the Committee was dealing merely with the question whether the type of machinery envisaged would be acceptable, on the assumption that the Bank would establish it either by resolution or by Convention. It might even be assumed for the purpose of the present discussion that the machinery would be established by administrative act i.e. by a resolution of the Executive Directors or of the Board of Governors.

13. Mr. Krishna Moorthi said that in the light of Mr. Broches' statement that the mode of implementing the proposals was still open, he would not refer to that aspect of the matter. However, he would like to comment on section 8 of Article III which seemed to make the Center more than mere machinery in that it required the Administrative Council to "adopt such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers as may be necessary or useful for the operation of the Center and the achievement of the purposes" of the Convention or other arrangement pursuant to which the Center was to be established. In his view, the "purposes" referred to were connected with ensuring that conciliation or arbitration proceeded according to certain recognized principles, and he wondered whether all the rules for implementing those purposes would be of an administrative character.

14. Mr. Broches said there would be in the first place purely administrative rules, and secondly rules of procedure. No rules of substance were contemplated, and no rules of any character would be binding on the parties without their consent, except internal rules of the Center, which would be concerned with such matters as emoluments of the Secretary-General and other administrative arrangements.
15. Rules of procedure would deal in detail with the way in which proceedings would be organized, e.g., limits of time, and procedures for presenting evidence and holding hearings. Those rules would, however, be optional in the sense that the parties could substitute their own rules for the rules of the Center. In that connection he referred to section 3 of Article V and section 4 of Article VI which were to the effect that conciliation and arbitration proceedings would be held in accordance with rules adopted by the Administrative Council unless the parties otherwise agreed. There was, therefore, no intention to introduce an element of compulsion.

16. Mr. Krishna Moorthi said that if it could be understood that the final draft would not carry with it an implied commitment to the idea of a Convention, and that nothing therein would authorize the Administrative Council or the Center to do any act—directly or through delegation of their powers—except those of a purely mechanical and administrative nature, which would bind the parties to a dispute, he could recognize that the machinery to be created was merely administrative.

17. Sir Mejia said that Mr. Broches had clearly explained that the machinery it was intended to create was administrative and for the purpose of facilitating conciliation and arbitration. It was a Secretariat which would deal with a request of parties to a dispute for the services of the Center. It would assist them to prepare and submit their case in accordance with the rules of the Center, supply them with lists of conciliators and arbitrators, and possibly inform them of the final decision. As had been pointed out, judicial functions would only be performed by the conciliators and arbitrators.

18. With regard to conciliation, the conciliators or the parties would be free to adopt any procedures, and a recommendation by the conciliators would not bind the parties. With regard to arbitration it was for the parties involved to indicate the law that the arbitrators should apply. In the absence of agreement on the matter, and unless they were authorized to decide ex aequo et bne, the arbitrators would have to choose the national or international law to be applied. The decision of the majority would be binding on all parties. It was the parties themselves and not the Center that would have to execute the decision of the tribunal. In addition, it had been noted that the Center’s aim was not to replace or compete with the Permanent Court of Arbitration. On the contrary, it fully recognized that Court and would seek its cooperation.

19. With regard to the principal issue considered, and bearing in mind the discussion thereon, he felt there was no need to create an institution independent of the Bank in order to achieve the objectives envisaged. The Center had only administrative functions which could be carried out with full efficiency within the Bank as one of the numerous services that that institution had already established for the benefit of its member countries. All that was needed was to establish a small Secretariat whose personnel would be employees of the Bank. The Secretariat would arrange contacts between interested parties and the conciliators and arbitrators. The Bank had all the necessary facilities to perform that simple task. It had a President, who could be assigned certain functions as had been done in the draft Convention; and Executive Directors who could appoint the Secretary as well as authorize all necessary expenditure for the functioning of his office. The Bank could also make available such
physical facilities as office space. Finally it had a Board of Governors
which would designate conciliators and arbitrators to the panels. All
judicial functions would be outside the control of the Secretariat itself,
and once the conciliators and arbitrators had been appointed, they and
the parties to the dispute would by themselves work toward a settlement.

20. Mr. Machado thought that Mr. Broches' opening statement cleared
a good many doubts that he had had as to the real nature of the proposed
institution. As long as the new institution - whether it was established
by Convention as suggested in the Working Paper, or by administrative
action as was suggested by Mr. Mejia - was purely of an administrative
class and would not involve the Bank in actual settlement of disputes
or rendering of decisions in disputes between States and the nationals
of other States, he could accept the substance of Article III.

21. There was one point which he would like clarified viz: the authority
of the Administrative Council to delegate any of its powers, except that
of appointing the Secretary-General, to the President. One of the functions
of the Administrative Council was the adoption of rules of procedure for
conciliation and arbitration to be applied in the absence of specific
agreement thereon in a particular case, and he wondered whether that
function could be delegated to the President who would then be able not
only to enact but also to modify or change the rules of procedure. It was
important to maintain uniform standard rules of procedure which could be
applied if accepted by the parties. He did not see the need to provide
for delegation of that particular function to the President, as the
Administrative Council would be equipped to make such changes in the
standard rules as might be necessary without delay. He would like
Mr. Broches to comment on that question.

22. Mr. Broches agreed that, as the draft stood, the Council could
delate its power to make rules. While he was reasonably sure that the
President would not seek authority to draft rules of procedure, he saw
nothing against providing in the draft that the rules of procedure should
be approved by the Administrative Council.

23. He would also like to confirm Mr. Machado's characterization of
the standard rules of procedure as being operative only in the absence
of specific agreement between the parties to apply other rules, and in
this connection would refer to section 8 of Article V (Conciliation Rules)
and section 4 of Article VI (Arbitration Rules). That the Administrative
Council had been conceived as an organ with purely administrative functions
was borne out by the comment on page nine of the Working Paper which set
out the reasons in support of the proposal that a one-member-one-vote
formula should apply to voting in the Council. It had been emphasized
there that the Council had no judicial function. It could not elect the
panels of conciliators and arbitrators. While it did appoint the Secretary-
General, it had been shown that that official had no judicial powers
whatever. It seemed clear, therefore, that the designation "administrative"
truly reflected the character of the Council's functions.

24. Mr. Waizzenegger supported the suggestion that the proposed
institution be called a "Secretariat" instead of a "Center". He agreed
with Mr. Mejia that the machinery to be established should be small. That
would be difficult if, as was now envisaged, there were to be an Administra-
tive Council, a Secretary-General and a staff. In addition to the argument
put forward by Mr. Hejia, he would like to point out that in the 50 years of the existence of the Permanent Court of Arbitration only some 30 cases had been brought before it, and it would be impossible to estimate the number of cases which would be submitted to the Center sponsored by the Bank. According to his information the Court had a staff of six persons and was thus very small. Its budget was 100,000 Florins.

25. Mr. Broches confirmed that it was intended to keep the cost of the Center to a minimum, and that that was one reason for keeping it fairly close to the Bank. He pointed out that the Permanent Court of Arbitration could operate at such a low cost because the Secretary-General was not paid a full salary. He was a retired official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. He was the only professional on the staff, and office space was provided at the Peace Palace. With reference to minimizing the cost of the Center, it might, for instance, be decided initially not to appoint a Secretary-General from outside the Bank, or not to have a person work full-time in that capacity. He was not sure, however, how either the Board or Mr. Woods would react to such a proposal. On another view, to have a full-time Secretary-General might give a certain standing to the institution, and enable him to perform his functions more effectively.

26. Mr. Broches then invited comment on the provision in the Working Paper (paragraph 3 of section 2 of Article III) for the possibility of administrative arrangements with the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The reason for such provision was that the Administrative Council of that Court, which consisted of the diplomatic representatives of the signatories accredited to The Hague had, even before the war, authorized the Secretary-General to make available the offices and administrative facilities of the Court in connection with proceedings between a signatory State and a private party. There had been only one case in which use was made of that authorization. More recently, in an attempt to see whether more business could be attracted and whether a useful forum could be provided for the type of disputes that were at present being discussed, the Administrative Council approved a set of rules which had been worked out by the Bureau with the assistance of consultants and offered optional rules for conciliation and arbitration to parties which wanted to accept them. He was not aware of any proceedings that had been held pursuant to those rules.

27. In view of the existence of the Court which was equipped to perform functions similar to those of the proposed Center, and in order to meet any objections against proliferation of facilities which could result in duplication of effort, the Working Paper had provided tentatively and permissively for cooperation with that Court. Such an arrangement would also give the Center an additional set of offices in which to hold proceedings. Apart from the views of Mr. Lieftinck when he spoke at the meeting in December 1962, he had heard no other reactions to that idea, and he would welcome an informal exchange of views as to whether it was acceptable.

28. Mr. Donner expressed interest in Mr. Hejia's idea and thought that so far there had been no argument which showed that the arbitration and conciliation procedures envisaged would be less effective if the machinery were created within the Bank by administrative action. Thus far his government considered that the provisions of the draft convention in the Working Paper offered a reasonable basis for achieving objectives with
which it was in general agreement, and he knew of no opposition to any of the basic rules and principles of the organizational or administrative steps proposed. However, there would have to be further discussion of the issues involved.

29. Commenting on the various sections of Article III, Mr. Donner said that, on the assumption that the Center would be established as contemplated in the Working Paper, he could support the proposal in section 1 that the Center should have juridical personality. He thought the name of the institution, whether it was called "Center" or "Office" or "Bureau", seemed to be of little importance. With regard to paragraph 1 of section 2, he reiterated the view he had expressed earlier viz. that he preferred a closer rather than a looser connection between the Center and the Bank, and that the Center have its seat at the headquarters of the Bank, as that would give emphasis to the connection between the two institutions. His preference for such a close connection also resulted in an affirmative and positive attitude to paragraph 2 of section 2 which empowered the Center to make arrangements with the Bank for the use of the Bank's offices, services and facilities wherever and whenever that seemed practical. While he had no specific comment on paragraph 3 of section 2 which permitted arrangements with the Administrative Council of the Permanent Court of Arbitration for the use of the organization and facilities of that Court within the scope of the Hague Treaties of 1899 and 1907, he would like to have details of the kind of arrangements envisaged. He also felt provision should be made for establishment of working relationships with other institutions with similar objectives, such as that which would eventually be created pursuant to the OECD Convention. To prescribe a close relationship with one particular body might interfere with the development of relationships with such other institutions in the future.

30. He had no specific comment on the sections dealing with the organizational structure of the Center viz: sections 4-17. As to whether the functions of the Center as envisaged were purely administrative, he had always felt that that had been intended. He wondered, however, whether the President of the Bank should accept the position that the draft assigned to him viz. the principal to whom the Secretariat was subordinated. He had not yet reached any conclusion on that point.

31. With regard to section 7 on the membership of the Administrative Council, he personally did not believe that membership should be dependent exclusively on membership of the Bank. Furthermore, for reasons which had been explained by Mr. Broches in his statement on the administrative nature of the Council, the rule of one-vote per member of the Administrative Council provided for in paragraph 1 of section 9 would be acceptable. As to the role of the President - and he said this without prejudice to his previous remarks on that subject - he thought the President should have the right to designate persons to serve on panels of conciliators and arbitrators as provided in paragraph 3 of section 13 and paragraph 3 of section 14.

32. He also found acceptable the provision in paragraph 2 of section 11 that the office of Secretary-General or Deputy Secretary-General should be incompatible with the exercise of any political function and with any employment or occupation other than employment by the Bank. As to the further provision in that paragraph that the Secretary-General or Deputy Secretary-General might concurrently be an officer of the Permanent Court

*See OECD Doc. 15697, dated December 1962, revised and reissued as OECD Doc. 23081, dated November 1967*
of Arbitration, and the thought expressed by Mr. Lieftinck that it might be preferable for the Secretary-General to be a joint employee of the Bank and of the Permanent Court, he would like to reserve his position. His reasons for doing so were those he had previously expressed against rigid provision for relationship with one specific body. He believed that that matter should be left open and a premature decision avoided. He also reserved his position regarding the idea expressed in section 18 that the Bank might be called upon to help finance the cost of the Center. While he felt that the Center should, as far as possible, aim at covering its costs out of fees and other charges for the use of its facilities, he realized that it was very likely that such fees and charges might not be sufficient for that purpose, particularly during the initial period of its existence. He was himself inclined to believe that the Bank, as sponsor of the Center should help to meet the costs of its operation, but the matter had thus far not been considered in detail by his government.

33. Mr. Donner said that the foregoing general remarks were intended to indicate areas in which his government had had questions, and to enable the staff to consider them. He would like to discuss the matter with General Counsel at a later stage. As he had to leave the meeting temporarily, Mr. Abramowski would continue his statement on his behalf.

34. Mr. Abramowski referred to the problems which might arise as a result of contradictory decisions relating to the same subject-matter rendered by different tribunals. He visualized the existence in the future of several organs which would perform judicial functions in the field under discussion, e.g. bodies set up pursuant to bilateral investment protection treaties or under the OECD Convention, the Bank's Conciliation and Arbitration Center, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. A dispute might be submitted to more than one such body, and a different decision might be rendered by each. He thought the Working Paper contained some provision which might cover the point viz: that which stipulated that submission of a dispute to the Center would be in lieu of any other remedy. His government had not, however, formed any opinion as yet on the question.

35. Mr. Broches said he would like to defer his comments on the remarks of Messrs. Donner and Abramowski until the former had returned to the meeting.

36. Mr. Garland recalled that the comments he had received from the countries he represented relating to a few technical points had already been passed to General Counsel. He would like, however, to raise some points with policy implications. It was most important that the proposed Center should be organized so as to avoid duplication and overlapping, and maintain cooperative and friendly relations with other administrative bodies. His authorities had shown particular interest in paragraph 3 of section 2 which allowed for cooperation with the Permanent Court of Arbitration. He felt that that provision should be utilized as fully and as actively as possible and would like to support strongly its inclusion in the text. He hoped that every opportunity would be explored for dovetailing activities of the proposed Center with those of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and for utilizing its facilities and coordinating with it in every way.

37. As to section 7 his countries did not see any very great advantage in confining membership of the Center to members of the Bank. The alternative suggestion in the comment on page 8 of the Working Paper to
provide that each Governor and Alternate Governor appointed by a member
of the Bank which was also a Contracting State should ex officio be Represent-
ative and Alternate Representative of the State in question, seemed to be
an acceptable idea. He agreed with the staff's proposals in section 9,
and expressed a preference for the one-member-one-vote formula. As to
section 10, he supported the views of Mr. Waitzenegger in favour of main-
taining and economical and minimal administrative structure. He thought
a part-time Bank officer could be Secretary-General.

38. As to the main issue of the discussion, namely, whether the link
between the Center and the Bank should be a close one or a loose one, he
thought that for reasons of economy, and with a view to gradual develop-
ment as opportunities for expansion offered, there should at any rate
initially be a fairly close relationship between the Center and the Bank.
If the Center was started on that basis, it would probably continue on
that basis, because the advantages of a close connection with the Bank
seemed to be so evident. However, while he felt quite certain that it
would be best to start with a close relationship, future developments
were uncertain, and he thought it would be wise to provide for the
possibility of loosening the relationship later on.

39. For instance the panels might at some stage seek greater independence
for the Center or, on the other hand, the Bank might find political difficul-
ty in continuing the relationship. The Center had no power to refuse
to adjudicate on disputes, except perhaps, on the ground they were too
small or frivolous. If access to the Center was to be unrestricted once
the prescribed conditions were satisfied, the Center might probably have
to deal with some cases which might have political repercussions on the
Bank. It seemed possible, therefore, that the Bank might find it more
convenient, as experience developed, to maintain a somewhat more distant
relationship to the Center than was originally contemplated. A certain
amount of flexibility should be allowed for and that flexibility could
probably be achieved simply through administrative arrangements and with-
out specific provision in the constituent instruments save on the site of
the Center. He suggested, therefore, that at the start the principle
of a close association should be accepted, and provision made for the
Center to be situated at the headquarters of the Bank. It would, however,
be useful to have a saving clause. Perhaps there were other provisions
that should be considered from the point of view of ensuring flexibility.

40. As to section 18 he thought there was general agreement that the
Center should be financially self-supporting but wished to emphasize that
principle. With reference to section 22, and in particular, to paragraph
3 of that section, he thought its provisions involved some very difficult
issues of taxation principles and procedures which ought to be taken up
with the tax authorities.

41. Mr. Broches said he would like at this stage to comment on the
questions raised earlier by Mr. Donner who had now returned to the meeting.
With regard to the question whether establishment of the machinery by
administrative procedure would be as effective as its establishment by a
Convention, he would like to refer to the categorical statements on that
point contained in the memorandum of February 18, 1963, as well as those
made at the meeting of the Committee of the Whole on May 28. Both
Mr. Woods and he had indicated their strong preference for the Convention
approach, and had given reasons why they thought that that was by far the
more effective one. The reason why those views had not been repeated at the present meeting was because the Committee was now dealing with the merits or demerits of the machinery as such, and irrespective of whether it would be set up by a Convention or by administrative means.

42. Mr. Donner pointed out that he had not addressed himself to the issue of implementation by a Convention or by administrative arrangement, but had only raised the question whether the Center should be separate from the Bank, or whether those functions could be performed as well by the Center if it was an integral part of the Bank.

43. Mr. Broches thought the difference between the two approaches might not be great. If it were decided not to follow the Convention method, it would be necessary to examine by what administrative technique the Center should be created. Even if it were to be set up as a service within the Bank, certain administrative and other rules of operation would be needed, and he thought those rules would closely resemble the content of the Working Paper, except that the term "Administrative Council" might not appear. Instead, terms like "Executive Directors" or "Board of Governors" might be used. Thus, there would be minor changes of nomenclature, but no basic changes. Incidentally, if the Center were an integral part of the Bank, the question whether the services of the Center should be financed by the Bank would be resolved.

44. Mr. Donner enquired whether there would be any technical or legal objection to setting up the Center by a Convention and yet maintaining it as a unit within the Bank. Mr. Broches in reply, said that while technically it would not be impossible to do so, he would consider it undesirable. Mr. Donner reserved his position on the matter as the idea was new to him and he would like to consider it.

45. Mr. Broches recalled that the other point raised by Mr. Donner on which he would like to comment, was the question of the combination of functions of the Secretary-General of the Center with those of the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and he thought that that should be considered in the light of the general position of the Court. The name "Permanent Court of Arbitration" was to some extent a misnomer, as that institution was not a Court, and neither was it permanent. It was an entity similar to the proposed Center. It had an Administrative Council, lists of arbitrators, as well as a Secretary-General and a small staff. The arrangements that might be made with the Permanent Court would be of a simple nature. They would be administrative arrangements for the use of its staff, facilities, offices, and services, such as translation services if such were available, keeping of records of proceedings, acting as a post-office for communications in cases where parties found it convenient to meet at The Hague rather than in Washington or elsewhere.

46. In this connection he would like to make a distinction between the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which was in the nature of procedural machinery and any entity which might be set up under the OECD Convention. That Convention would establish substantive rules, and its own machinery to ensure enforcement of and compliance with those rules. That would be an entirely different type of institution, and he found it difficult to see how a piece of purely administrative machinery like the proposed Center could cooperate with an institution that was required to enforce or settle disputes concerning substantive rights and obligations set forth in a
Convention. He thought, however, that the provision for cooperation with the Court could be extended by addition of a general clause providing for cooperation - in the field of administrative facilities - with any other institution that might commend itself to the Administrative Council.

47. On the question of economy of staff, which was rightly stressed by a number of Directors, Mr. Broches realized that to speak of a Secretary-General and of one or more Deputy Secretaries-General sounded rather formidable. He had tried to explain in the comment to section 10, that Deputies might be needed to assist the Secretary-General in performing certain formal functions required of his office, e.g. to answer letters, to send out notices or to make a finding that a certain time had expired. Even if it was decided to appoint a full-time Secretary-General the functions of his deputies might be performed by Bank officials like himself or Mr. Mendels who might, for instance, merely be called upon to sign documents in the absence of the Secretary-General. It was not contemplated that there would be a full-time or even a part-time Deputy Secretary-General except in the event of some very unusual development in which the Center became extremely busy. Referring to the concern expressed by Mr. Abramowski regarding contradictory decisions, he thought it would be possible to provide against the possibility that the same dispute would be submitted to more than one tribunal. On the other hand he thought the possibility of contradictory decisions in cases arising between different parties, but based on similar facts, was inherent in any system of ad hoc arbitration. The only way to avoid, or at least limit that danger - or to put it in a positive way, to promote uniformity of decisions - would be to have a standing tribunal, and that was clearly impractical in the present context. That was the distinction between the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The International Court was a standing tribunal. The Permanent Court of Arbitration was a panel of arbitrators, and many cases that had been litigated under the auspices of the Permanent Court had been decided by tribunals which were not even composed of those whose names appeared on the panels, because (as in the case of the Center) the parties had the right to go outside the panels if they so desired.

48. Mr. Lieftinck said he would like to make a few comments on the main topic of the day's discussion, the relationship between the Center or Secretariat and the Bank, and in particular on the intervention of Mr. Mejia who had introduced a new suggestion of identifying the Center with the Bank in practically every respect. The underlying idea of the draft Convention was expressed in paragraph 6 on page 2 of the note by General Counsel in document SecH 62-17 of January 19, 1962 which referred inter alia to the need to relieve the Bank of some of the extra-curricular burdens it was from time to time asked to assume and to transfer those burdens to an organization somewhat removed from, although linked to, the Bank. Mr. Mejia had suggested that it be fully linked with the Bank and not removed from it. He had taken the opposite view, being in favour of removing the Center even more from the Bank than had been contemplated in the Working Paper. He thought that the Secretary-General - who, he felt, was the Center - should perform his functions in great independence - independently even of the Bank - not so much because of his administrative functions, in the performance of which there was not much likelihood of direct Bank influence, but because in the pre-judicial phase of many cases he would act as an adviser or counsellor to the parties. The Secretary-General should, therefore, not be an officer of the Bank or be
identified with its interests. He should be completely independent and not in any way be biased by certain biases which the Bank may cherish.

49. As had already been pointed out by Mr. Garland, the Bank could exercise discretion in accepting cases or rejecting them, while the Center, whether linked closely or loosely with the Bank, had to accept practically all the cases submitted to it. It might thus have to deal with cases which might involve the Bank's interests and which might, therefore, be embarrassing to the Bank, e.g. a conflict between a government and a private enterprise to which the Bank had made a credit available. In such a case, if the Secretary-General were a Bank official, it might be felt that any advice offered to parties by him could be coloured by the Bank's interests; or the nature of the conflict might be such that it would be in the interests of all concerned that the Bank itself take no part even in pre-judicial procedures. In all frankness, the Bank had a certain bias in favour of private enterprise. While that could change, it in fact existed today. The Secretary-General would be dealing with conflicts between States and private enterprises, and it would, therefore, be best if the Secretariat could be independent of the Bank.

50. With that end in view he had made several suggestions aimed at loosening the link which, as at present conceived, he thought to be too close. He agreed with Mr. Garland that it might be useful in the initial phase of setting up the Center and putting it into operation, to give it the support of the authority and reputation of the Bank. But such a relationship should not be maintained indefinitely, and the constituent instrument should not include mandatory unchangeable provisions, or provisions which were unchangeable without repetition of the whole procedure of ratification which would not allow, or make it difficult for, the Center to be given a status less close to the Bank than existed during the initial phase. He had, therefore, suggested, for instance that the seat of the Center should not necessarily be in the offices of the Bank or in Washington, and that the President of the Bank should not be the President of the Center as such, but rather President or Chairman of the Administrative Council. In his capacity of Chairman or President of the Council he would act "in Council" being subject to such checks as it might impose, and would, therefore, have to take into consideration to a greater extent the views of the entire Council, and not act merely as an individual. He would thus be identified more with the Center than with the interests of the Bank. To make the President of the Bank President of the Center as such, would be to give him full executive authority even over the Secretary-General. He was not in favour of that, and felt that the Secretary-General should be independent even of the President of the Bank.

51. As he had said earlier, he could accept - though with some hesitation - the provision for appointment of the Secretary-General on the nomination of the President of the Administrative Council, in which event the Council would have the final say. He also felt some hesitancy on the question whether the Secretary-General should be a staff member of the Bank. In any event he would not like to make that mandatory, and it was not mandatory in the present draft. He also doubted whether it would be desirable for him to perform functions in the Bank and the functions of Secretary-General concurrently.

52. For the reasons he had given he was in favour of providing in the Statutes and in the Rules to be established, for a possible loosening of the link in the future, rather than of accepting the suggestion of
Mr. Mejia to identify the Secretariat and the Bank. As to the possibility that sooner or later there should be very close cooperation between the Secretary-General and the Permanent Court of Arbitration, it was known that his own country, the Netherlands, was very much in favor even of having a joint Secretariat. He would not, however, press the matter at this stage, but merely urge that it be left open whether that might not be a desirable development in the future.

53. Mr. Broches said he understood the specific suggestions made by Mr. Lieftinck very well although there was room for differences of opinion on certain matters of detail. On the other hand there were other aspects of Mr. Lieftinck's statement which he found it difficult to appreciate. Mr. Lieftinck had emphasized that flexibility was desirable and the most specific point made was in connection with the position of the President of the Bank as President of the Center and/or President of the Administrative Council. The draft had provided that the President of the Bank would be President of the Center for the sake of "neatness", rather than with any particular thoughts as to what powers he would have in that capacity. Certainly it had never been contemplated that the Secretary-General would be a servant of the President of the Center. There was no objection to meeting Mr. Lieftinck's point by eliminating the position of President of the Center and making the President of the Bank President of the Administrative Council rather than of the Center. This would not involve any change of substance.

54. As to Mr. Lieftinck's concept of the President as a person who would always act "in council" even in the performance of functions specifically assigned to him, he thought that that would be quite impracticable. The President's specific functions had been outlined in document R 62-3(SD) and the most important one would be the designation of arbitrators or conciliators in cases where parties could not themselves agree on their designation and had authorized him to do so. He could not see how the President could exercise that function "in council" unless quite apart from practical difficulties such as the delays involved in consideration by the Council, that was essentially a personal act. In previous instances where the President of the Bank had had to designate individuals for a particular function, the Board had always been glad not to get involved in judging the qualifications of the President's nominee in a given case, and he thought the same would be true of the Administrative Council. Moreover, experience had shown that the President of the Bank had been sought after time and time again to make designations because of his high prestige and lack of bias, without regard to the particular person who happened to occupy that post.

55. He found it difficult to appreciate that part of Mr. Lieftinck's statement which referred to the bias of the Bank in favor of private enterprise. He accepted the proposition that the Bank might have a view of the importance of private enterprise in relation to economic development which differed or might differ from the views held in some of the member countries. The management of the Bank might consider the role of private enterprise more important than some members did. But there had never been a suggestion that there was bias on the part of the Bank in individual situations such as could give rise to the view that the Bank had shifted from the general proposition that private enterprise was useful, to the untenable conclusion that private enterprise was always right when it was in dispute with a government. There was a number of private
investors who might have held that view but had been shown that while
the Bank believed in the importance of private enterprise it did not a
accept that each time private enterprise did not get what it wanted it
was necessarily right, or that the government in question was necessarily
wrong. It should also be noted that there had been more cases in which
governments had enquired whether the President of the Bank would be
willing to designate an arbitrator or conciliator than there had been
cases in which the initiative was taken by private enterprise. He
would, therefore, like to deny any suggestion that the Bank's views on
private enterprise as an element in economic development would endanger
the impartiality of the Bank in case of conflict between specific private
terprises and specific governments.

56. Mr. Garland thought that it was not so much a question of whether
the Bank was in fact biased but whether it was thought to be biased,
and it was through such general world opinion that political difficulties
would arise in regard to the Bank's role.

57. Mr. Broches pointed out that that was contrary to the Bank's
experience. Governments in specific cases had not thought the Bank
biased and it should not be assumed that governments in general would
take that view.

58. Mr. Chen was inclined to agree with Mr. Mejia that there should
be a closer link between the Center and the Bank, established during
the initial phase of its operation, and that the Center should be pro-
vided as a sort of additional service by the Bank. As had been pointed
out by Mr. Broches in his comments on section 2 of Article III, it was
impossible to predict the volume of business that would come before the
Center, and he thought, therefore, that economy and flexibility should
be the guide-lines of the Center during its initial phase. As far as
economy was concerned, he agreed with Mr. Waitzenegger and Mr. Garland
that there should be an attempt to economize at the beginning by having
a part-time staff of as few personnel as possible. On the question of
flexibility and the apprehension of Mr. Lieftinck and a few other
colleagues, when the volume of business increased perhaps beyond the
competence of the Bank to manage the Center, it might be necessary to
reorganize the Center to provide that the Center occupy a position
more remote from the Bank. That would come only in time, and after
trial and error.

59. He fully supported Mr. Garland's view that arrangements should
be made with the Permanent Court of Arbitration as was provided for
in paragraph 3 of section 2, not only for reasons of economy but also
in order to utilize the experience of the Court which had had a long
history and maintained personnel trained to deal with cases of this
kind.

60. As to whether the Bank would be influenced by bias in favour of
private enterprise, he fully shared the views expressed by Mr. Broches.
The fact that Ghana had even provided in its legislation that in certain
disputes the parties might request appointment of an arbitrator through
the agency of the Bank, was indicative of the confidence that countries
had in the Bank.

61. Mr. Mirza fully supported the position taken by Mr. Broches as
far as the organization of the Center was concerned. He noted that the
Center itself would be a purely administrative body without any judicial function whatsoever, and did not think a permanent link between the Bank and the Center was at all likely to prejudice the proceedings under the auspices of the Center. The Center would gain strength and prestige because of its connection with the Bank.

62. He agreed with Mr. Lieftinck, however, that the powers of the President and of the Administrative Council should be defined. It might, for instance, be possible to distinguish certain functions which would be performed by the President, and those of the Secretary-General and of the Administrative Council. Since the Governors would not constantly be available to guide the President, a group similar to the Bank's Executive Directors might also come into existence. As to the cost of the Center he could not subscribe wholly to the view taken by Mr. Donner, and thought it would make it rather difficult for countries to come to the Center if the costs were to be prohibitive. The overhead cost of the Center should, in his view, be borne by the Bank and the fees of the conciliators and arbitrators should be shared equally between the parties, thus making their burden easier. He had other observations on matters of detail, and those he would make at a later stage.

63. Mr. Hudori said his remarks would be made in accordance with what he thought had been agreed by the Directors at a previous meeting, on the assumption that there would be a Convention, and would prefer not to comment at this stage on alternative proposals such as those put forward by Mr. Kejeira. As to section 1 of Article III he preferred the term "Center" which, if not an accurate description, had a little more appeal than "Secretariat". As to paragraph 1 of section 2 of that Article, he was in favour of a close link with the Bank and thought the most obvious way of establishing a link in the eyes of the world was having the headquarters of the Bank and the Center at the same place. Unless there was some clear object in maintaining flexibility in that respect or there was another place where the Center might logically be located after it had been established, he was against leaving the matter open. It seemed to him that the only alternative place at which the Center could logically be located in due course would be with similar institutions at The Hague. If that was a real possibility then reference should be made to that specific possibility instead of leaving the question open. He felt, however, that any amendment of the present text to take account of that possibility would necessitate amending other sections of the Article. Before he took a position on the issue he would like to see what these amendments would be, and how they would affect the relationship between the Bank and the Center. One obvious question that arose was whether or not the Governors of the Bank should act as members of the Administrative Council.

64. As to paragraph 3 of section 2 he agreed in principle with its content although he would like to know what specific arrangements with the Permanent Court of Arbitration were contemplated before he took a definite position. In addition to the advantages that had been mentioned before of having a link with the Bank, he felt that such a link would be important because the Bank was a well-known institution with which most member countries dealt almost on a daily basis. It was also well known to investors. It was more approachable than, say, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which had a formidable name and whose functions were not clearly understood by many people.
65. On the role of President he had been impressed by the statement of Mr. Lieftinck, and would take his remarks into account before taking a position on that issue. As to the Administrative Council, he thought that after one or two years the Administrative Council would not have a great deal to do. To appoint Ministers or very senior officials to it and involve them in considerable extra travel seemed to him to be quite unpracticable. That problem could be overcome by making the Governors of the Bank members of the Council. That raised the further question that if countries that were not members of the Bank joined the Center it might be difficult to fit them into the Annual Meeting save by ad hoc arrangements. On section 8, he agreed with the general tenor of the comments made to the effect that it seemed to give very wide powers to the Administrative Council, and that there was possibly some need to define its power to delegate authority to the President. The voting procedure in paragraph 4 of section 9 would be quite acceptable to him. On the question of overhead costs of the Center, his personal view was that those costs should not be financed by the Bank but that they should be assessed on member countries. The actual costs of the proceedings should be borne by the partis to the dispute. On sections 20, 21 and 22 he would merely point out for the present that those involved fairly complex legal problems and tax problems and that the best place to discuss them would be at the regional meetings which would be attended by legal experts. He would like, however, to reserve his position completely regarding those sections.

66. Mr. van Campenhout recalled that, as far as the seat of the Center was concerned, he had been in favour of specifying its location, while giving authority to the Administrative Council to change it should such action be necessary to take account of future developments. With regard to the relationship between the Center and the Bank, he shared the view of Mr. Garland and Mr. Lieftinck that the Convention should provide for flexibility. He had two main reasons for his view. In the first place this was a new experiment and flexibility should be maintained to allow changes to be made in the light of experience by means of a simple procedure and not through amending of the Convention. Secondly, as a tactical matter a flexible relationship with the Bank might make the Convention more acceptable to some governments and administrations which might object to the Bank having a close link with a Center under whose auspices judicial decisions were made. He thought the views of the Bank on, or its attitude to, private business, at present or in the future, were irrelevant as the Bank itself would exercise no judicial function.

67. The reason for having a link between the Center and the Bank was that at present countries came to the Bank for assistance in solving their difficulties. He was impressed, however, by Mr. Lieftinck's remarks on the relationship between the President of the Bank and the Secretary-General of the Center, and realized that it could affect the role of the Secretary-General as an adviser or perhaps a "conciliator" outside the proceedings. As Mr. Lieftinck had pointed out there might certainly be cases in which the Bank, and in particular IFC, might have an interest in the subject-matter of a dispute. Thus, there might be cases in which a private enterprise in which IFC had a share might find itself in difficulties with a government. His attention had been drawn to that problem for the first time, and he had not yet arrived at a solution. He wondered whether the right solution might be to provide that the President of the Bank should ex officio be chairman of the Administrative Council, and that any delegation of powers to him, should
be to the Chairman as such, who would also have authority to assist parties to a dispute. To provide merely that the President of the Bank would be Chairman of the Administrative Council might, in the light of past experience of requests made to the President, weaken the appeal of the Center. The Secretary-General should be President of the Center, or the latter office might be eliminated altogether.

68. As to the Administrative Council he did not think it would be wise to insist that the Council be identified with the Board of Governors. In the first place, it created too strong a link with the Bank, and a permanent one with no flexibility. Secondly, it was to be hoped that States not members of the Bank might adhere to this Convention, and thirdly it seemed to him that countries might feel that it was their prerogative to decide who would represent them in the Administrative Council. Though some countries would in practice appoint their Governors as representatives, others might feel it was not proper for a Governor of a central bank or Minister of Finance to deal with these matters in view of their own internal commitments. Therefore, he felt strongly that flexibility should be maintained in respect of the composition of the Council. He was not in favour of the Bank paying the cost of the Center. As a compromise it could be provided that the Bank would pay the salary of any member of the staff who worked for the Center and would charge no rent for its use of the Bank’s offices. As a minor point he would prefer that the arbitrators and conciliators should have full diplomatic immunity.

69. Mr. Broches, replying to Mr. van Campenhout, pointed out that the provisions on privileges and immunities had been copied from the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, as it was usually possible to approach governments on the basis that they might grant again concessions they had granted before. He had, in response to Mr. Machado, agreed that some restrictions should be placed upon the Council’s powers to delegate its functions. After hearing Mr. Lieftinck he had come to appreciate that it was important to clarify the position of the Secretary-General as well as that of the Chairman of the Administrative Council and what functions the latter would perform ex officio.

70. The meeting adjourned at 12:47 o’clock p.m. until 10:30 o’clock a.m. on Tuesday, June 11.

SID/63-12 (June 21, 1963)
Memorandum of the meeting of the Committee of the Whole, June 11, 1963, not an approved record. Continuation of the discussion started in Document 18

1. There were present: omitted

2. Mr. Broches observed that Mr. Mejia’s name was next on the list of those who had, at the previous informal meeting, expressed a desire to speak on Article III of the draft text in document R 62-1 (SD).
3. Mr. Mejia recalled that one of the reasons given by Mr. Lieftinck in favour of establishment by the Bank of a Center for arbitration and conciliation was that that might relieve the Bank of having to assume extra-curricular burdens in response to requests that it act as conciliator or arbitrator. Establishment of a Center separate from the Bank was not, however, the only way to serve that purpose. Creation of the appropriate administrative facilities within the Bank as a service to members would achieve the same result. While he was not sure what would be the outcome of the present discussion, he would like to propose that there should be submitted to the annual meeting of the Board of Governors a resolution which would authorize the Management to establish an office on the lines he had described, and the Executive Directors to approve the administrative rules which would govern its use. Those rules would closely resemble the rules now contained in the draft Convention. The Center could be in operation by the end of the year. At a later stage, if it was thought proper to do so, a Convention might be submitted for the approval of member countries.

4. Mr. Broches replying to Mr. Mejia's question regarding the outcome of the present discussion, said that the initial result would be a new draft, on the basis of which it could be seen to what extent points of view had been reconciled or were still far apart. On Mr. Mejia's specific proposal regarding a resolution of the Board of Governors at the forthcoming Annual Meeting, he would like to refer to Mr. Woods' statement that it was not yet time to come to a decision and that whatever the final outcome of the present discussions, investigation of the views of member countries should continue. Thus the Convention approach as well as other alternatives would have to be explored further in the regional meetings before a recommendation could be made to this Committee and eventually to the Executive Directors of the Bank. In any event it would not be possible to resolve all questions of principle within the next two months. Replying to a question from Mr. Mendels, Mr. Broches agreed that it would, however, be possible to report to the Board of Governors in September upon the progress made, and at a later stage Mr. Woods would probably wish to discuss the nature of that report with the Directors.

5. Mr. Donner observed that while discussing matters of detail, it had emerged that there were still divergent views on matters of principle. In his opinion, the Center was to be created with a view to utilizing the prestige the Bank had acquired in the financial community and among Governments in order to provide a new forum for settling international investment disputes. Machinery for settlement of such disputes was at present available, e.g. in the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, but for various reasons, institutional and otherwise, that Court had failed to attract parties to disputes. To argue that the Bank's prestige might be impaired if it was too closely connected with the arbitration and conciliation procedures would run contrary to the very idea upon which the proposal was based. The same was true of the argument that the Bank might not be considered impartial, and that it was biased toward private enterprise. If that were true - and he did not personally believe it - the Bank would have nothing new to offer that would prove especially attractive to parties to a dispute. In order to proceed it had to be assumed that the Bank had prestige of a particular kind in the financial field which no other organization could command, that parties to a dispute (including those which might not otherwise have considered submitting their dispute to existing conciliation and arbitration facilities) might
be willing to accept the new procedures, and that connection with the Bank would create an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence that equitable solutions could be reached. He thought it was that aspect of the matter which would distinguish the Bank's facilities from others in the field, and arouse the interest of governments. He for one was very much in favour of utilizing the Bank's prestige to the full, and would be opposed to any efforts to weaken in any significant degree the proposals as they now stood.

6. While he himself thought there was merit in the Bank's proposals, he realized that there were differences of opinion among the Directors, and that the officials of the various governments had not yet had the opportunity of considering the matter. He felt, therefore, that in the circumstances it would be best for there to be an interim report on the subject to the Board of Governors, and that the staff in the meantime should try to ascertain the views of governments through the regional conferences proposed by Mr. Woods and Mr. Broches. After considering the staff's report on those conferences, the Board of Governors could take whatever action seemed necessary.

7. Mr. Broches agreed broadly with Mr. Donner. Every effort would be made to arrive at a consensus which, while accommodating to the maximum extent divergent views, would still retain the basic elements of the proposals as they now stood.

8. Mr. Brignone indicated that his government had not yet reacted formally to the proposals. However, he agreed fully with the personal views expressed by Mr. Illanes. It had been emphasized that the institution to be created would profit from the prestige of the Bank and its reputation for technical competence and impartiality and that the Bank would provide that institution only with administrative facilities, while not sharing in the responsibility for its actions. The two ideas seemed to him to be contradictory. There were two possibilities: either the Bank could be closely connected with the Center and give it its full support, or it could assist in the establishment of the Center and then sever every link with it and let it develop on its own. As to the former possibility, he foresaw that the Center might develop its own jurisprudence and doctrines which might be viewed as being biased in favour of the Bank's own policies and principles, such as recognition of the role of private enterprise as a factor in economic development. That would be undesirable as the Bank should always remain in that respect above suspicion.

9. He, therefore, thought that the conciliation and arbitration facilities should be entirely separate from the Bank and not identified with it in any way. In his opinion, there were two approaches to the problem which might be acceptable viz: that proposed by Mr. Lieftinck and others that the Center should be established outside the Bank and be as independent as possible, and that proposed by Mr. Illanes and Mr. Mejia that there be no Center as such, no formal organization, but merely a panel of competent conciliators and arbitrators that the Bank could make available to the parties to a dispute. He was in favour of the latter proposal because the decisions rendered would be those of the arbitrators or conciliators alone, and no traditions or doctrine could be evolved or be attributed to a particular entity. However, if the proposal to create the Center prevailed, he would prefer it that the Center be as independent as possible from the Bank.
10. Mr. Broches said he did not share the views of Mr. Brignone for reasons he had explained at length in previous meetings. He would like to point out, however, that the Center could not develop doctrine because it would not itself engage in conciliation or arbitration, and there would seem to be a little danger that particular decisions of ad hoc Conciliation Commissions or Arbitral Tribunals would be thought to be coloured by the influence of the Bank. He had, however, noted Mr. Brignone's view that apart from any other considerations, the Center or facility should have no link with the Bank.

11. Mr. Suzuki said that his government had not yet reached a definite opinion regarding the proposals under discussion. He then referred to various instances in which the Japanese government had had recourse to conciliation and arbitration on an ad hoc basis, including one in which the assistance of the President of the Bank was sought. He noted that while his government had not always been in agreement with the outcome of those proceedings, it believed in the usefulness of conciliation and arbitration and it fully recognized and appreciated the prestige of the Bank. His government was aware of the need for measures to secure the settlement of investment disputes, but was not certain as to precisely what relationship should exist between the proposed Center and the Bank. In general, his government felt that, at any rate initially, some relationship should be maintained. As to the need for a Convention, he felt that if arbitration was to be one of the modes of settlement contemplated, a Convention would be necessary.

12. Mr. Broches said that in view of the very considerable experience of the Japanese government recounted by Mr. Suzuki, he was especially glad to hear him affirm its continuing belief in those procedures for the settlement of disputes, and his observations regarding the prestige of the Bank.

13. Mr. Khelil thought that the Directors had generally been in favour of a link between the Bank and the Center. He thought the reasons for establishment of such a link were first that, since the Bank was sponsoring the idea, it was natural that as the parent organization, it should maintain a relationship with the Center at least in its initial stages; secondly, given the prestige of the Bank any link the Center might have with it could only be advantageous; thirdly, since the Bank might finance part of the cost of the Center and make available its facilities, to make the Center independent of the Bank would almost be impracticable. Although, for the reasons given, he thought that a purely administrative link would have to be maintained between the two institutions, he fully supported the views expressed by Mr. Lieftinck at the previous meeting with respect to independence of the Center from the Bank. As had been said, the Bank or its affiliates might themselves be involved in disputes which might be submitted to the Center. Any conciliation or arbitral decision on those disputes might be interpreted by one of the parties as a partial decision dictated by the interests that the Bank or its affiliates had in the country in question, or with the private investor involved. Even if the purely administrative role of the Secretariat were to be emphasized it might not prevent countries or their nationals from associating the Center with the Bank - particularly if they failed in their case - so that the prestige of the Bank might be adversely affected.

14. While he thought it would be advisable to dissociate the Bank as much as possible from the activities of the Center, that might not be easy
to accomplish. In that connection the suggestions of Mr. Lieftinck were worthy of further study by General Counsel with a view to working out a formula which would preserve the independence of the Secretary-General from the Bank and its President, and maintain a sort of equilibrium of power between the two men. If the present draft could be interpreted as giving the President of the Bank, as ex officio President of the Center, power at the expense of the Secretary-General, it could not make for the independence of the Center from the Bank or the independence of the Secretary-General from the President. That independence was essential in order to maintain the reputation of the Bank and its cordial relationship with member countries.

15. Mr. Broches recalled that he had associated himself with Mr. Lieftinck's specific suggestion that the Secretary-General be placed in a more independent position so as not to create the impression that he would be a mere servant of the President of the Bank. That was what had always been intended, although apparently the way in which the draft read made possible a different interpretation.

16. Miss Brun said that as she had received only a few instructions from the governments she represented, she would express only her personal views. She thought that the Center should be linked with the Bank. It was a product of the Bank, and the Bank was recognized as the authority behind provision of the facilities for settling disputes. The Center should, however, also take advantage of cooperating with the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The experience gained by that Court would be of great value to the Center.

17. She agreed that the President of the Bank should also be President of the Center as had been provided in section 4 of Article III. As to section 7, she would prefer the Governors of the Bank to be the members of the Administrative Council of the Center. The Council would have only limited functions, and it would be a convenient way to obtain representation of member countries at the Center. That raised the connected problem of whether access to the Center should be limited to members of the Bank. She thought it would be in the general interest that the assistance of the Center be available in any dispute, and that admission to the Center should be open to countries other than members of the Bank. She would, however, like to know the legal aspects of the different solutions of this problem, and requested the guidance of Mr. Broches in the matter.

18. Nothing in the draft had thus far indicated a role for the Bank's Executive Directors, and she felt that they might be authorized to handle some of the day-to-day business of the Center as they did in the case of the Bank. As to the one-member-one-vote formula prescribed in paragraph 4 of section 9, she would like to reserve her position until later in the discussions. She agreed with the opinion expressed in the comment on paragraph 2 of section 11 that the offices of the Secretary-General and of his Deputy might not be on a full-time basis and thought that it would be wise to make provision for combining those posts with, say, posts in the Bank. That would be particularly useful if, as in her view, the seat of the Center were to be the headquarters of the Bank. Combining of posts with those of the Permanent Court of Arbitration might be useful in case the arbitrators or conciliators were to meet in The Hague. As to sections 13 and 14 on designation of the panels, it was the view of one of the governments she represented that the President, in designating conciliators
and arbitrators, should take into account the likelihood of designation by new members who might participate in the Center. As to section 18 she agreed with the views expressed by some Directors that the overhead cost of the Center should be borne by the Bank, while the parties to a dispute should pay the costs involved in handling a specific case. That problem would also have to be studied in the light of the possibility that the Center might be used by States not members of the Bank with a view to providing for their contribution toward the overhead costs of the Center.

19. Mr. Broches replying to Miss Brun's question regarding access to the Center by States not members of the Bank and the effect that that might have on the composition of the Administrative Council, said he thought there were very great practical advantages in having the Administrative Council consist of the members of the Board of Governors, as, for example, being able to hold annual meetings at the same time without additional representation. On the other hand, some reservations had been expressed, for instance by Mr. van Campenhout, who felt that governments might not think that the persons acting as Governors of the Bank would be the most suitable to serve on the Administrative Council. He thought a solution could be found by providing that the Governor for each country would also represent that country on the Administrative Council, unless the country concerned reserved the right to appoint another person and did in fact do so.

20. The accession of non-members of the Bank to the Convention establishing the Center - if there was to be a Convention - would not, in his opinion, necessarily create great difficulties because even if the Administrative Council were to consist of the members of the Board of Governors acting ex officio, non-members of the Bank could be given the right to designate their representatives ad hoc. He did see some difficulties, however, with the suggestion that the Executive Directors might fulfil certain functions regarding the Center. In that case problems would arise if membership of the Center were not limited to members of the Bank, because he did not think that the Executive Directors would want to meet with representatives of non-members present. In addition, the one-member-one-vote formula proposed for the Administrative Council, on which Miss Brun had reserved her position, would be very difficult to apply to the Executive directors, which was a much smaller body.

21. Mr. Machado recalled the observations of Mr. Donner who had given the Bank's prestige as the real reason why there was need to establish a new institution while the Permanent Court of Arbitration was in existence. In answer to that he would like to point out that The Hague Convention establishing the Court had been primarily designed with a view to settling disputes between States, and that in any event only some of the members of the Bank were at this time signatories of the Convention. Thus the factor of non-universality alone made the Court an unsuitable agency for the solution of the problems now under consideration viz: international investment disputes. Furthermore, it had been his experience while trying to utilize the Court in settling some investment problems of the countries he represented, that its procedures were very cumbersome. It would be more useful to create an institution within or associated with or affiliated with the Bank which would prove attractive to its members all of whom were in some way interested in questions relating to international investment.
22. Several speakers had expressed preoccupation with the effect on the prestige or the popularity of the Bank of a possible impression that the Bank, through its connection with the Center, influenced the latter's decisions. It was inevitable that any decision that failed to give complete satisfaction to both parties would be unpopular. That fact should not, however, impede the creation of the Center which represented an essential step toward overcoming some of the obstacles in the way of international investment today. There was now a general consensus of opinion as to the merits of the idea, and the principal difference expressed related to the means by which the institution would be created. There were two schools of thought viz: those who felt that the machinery should be created without any delay and begin functioning as part of the services of the Bank, and others who advocated the advantages of creating the institution by means of an international Convention. There was no question but that an international Convention would have many advantages if it could be worked out within a reasonable time, and if a sufficient number of states would ratify it so as to bring it into operation. He thought those views were not very far apart, and proposed a compromise through an interim agreement between members to establish the Center until such time as a sufficient number of ratifications of the Convention had been deposited. Thus, while the machinery would become immediately available, it would have an independent existence only after the Convention entered into force. There was a precedent for such a procedure in GATT which operated very successfully despite the fact that the Havana Treaty had never been ratified by all the members.

23. Mr. Broches observed that Mr. Woods and he had indicated that that might be one of the possible outcomes of the present discussions.

24. Mr. Reilly commented on one of the points made by Mr. Khelil. As he understood it, the Center did not make decisions but merely provided machinery whereby persons selected by the parties could act as conciliators and arbitrators. It was, therefore, the Conciliation Commissions and the Arbitral Tribunals that made the decisions and he did not see how any blame for them could attach to the Center or to the Bank. He also pointed out that what the Bank was attempting was really nothing new. An arbitration clause was generally included in any concessionary contract. It had been recognized that those clauses varied considerably and often a country was not certain how a dispute would eventually be handled. The Bank was attempting to set up procedures with which parties could become familiar and which might be incorporated by reference in any agreement.

25. What was more novel was the idea of establishing the procedures by means of a Convention, and even then all that was being attempted was a codification of the existing international law on the subject, a statement of rules relating to the appointment of conciliators and arbitrators and the functioning of the machinery, so that parties could know beforehand the extent of their commitment in the matter. The Convention method also had the advantage of spreading respect for the law and recourse to it in disputes in which it was often forgotten.

26. Mr. Broches agreed that arbitration clauses were the rule rather than the exception in concessionary contracts. On the question of the Center's relationship to the Bank, he emphasized that some link between the two institutions was basic to the whole idea. The nature of that link was, however, open to discussion.
27. Mr. Lieftinck said he would like to clarify his position regarding the various matters discussed, with a view to avoiding any possible mis-
understandings. First, in suggesting that it would be useful to explore the possibility of setting up the machinery of the Center and the panels before adopting a Convention, he had not intended it in any way to be understood that he had altered his view that the Convention method was the most desirable. In his opinion there was nothing against working simultaneously on the establishment of the machinery and the adoption of the Convention. It was possible that the Convention might come into being in a much shorter period than he anticipated; if not, the Center could operate as soon as possible even though with less formal legal foundations than a Convention.

28. On the link between the Center and the Bank his remarks might have been interpreted to mean that he would like to have the Center completely outside the Bank. That was not what he had meant. He had indicated a preference for a somewhat looser relationship between the Bank and the Center than was now contemplated in the proposals discussed, and while it was a matter of judgment how far that link should go, he was definitely not in favour of avoiding such a link altogether. He felt that Mr. Donner had to some extent exaggerated the importance of the link as well as the significance to the Center of the Bank's prestige. Mr. Suzuki had made it clear that it was not the Bank that had assisted in conciliation and arbitration in the past, but its President acting in his personal capacity. It was the prestige of the President rather than that of the Bank - though the two were closely connected - that should play an important role.

29. Nor could he agree with Mr. Donner that there existed machinery adequate for the settlement of the type of dispute discussed. The Bank's Center would be specifically designed to facilitate the settlement of international investment disputes, not only those relating to concessions to which Mr. Reilly had referred, but also other types of economic and financial disputes. He thought that by creating the Center the Bank would render a great service to the world community in bringing about a more favourable atmosphere for foreign investment in less developed countries.

30. Regarding his reasons for advocating a looser rather than a closer link with the Bank, he wished to make it clear that he had in no way expressed doubts as to the impartiality of the Center in disputes between governments and private enterprise. He had merely said that it might sometimes be embarrassing for the Bank if the link between it and the Center were too close, and had given as an example a dispute between a government and a foreign investor with whom IFC was participating jointly. He had also mentioned the Bank's preference for recognition of private enterprise as a factor in economic development. There might be cases in which the Bank or its President had taken a position based on that view, e.g. in communicating to a Government the opinion that it might be unwise to nationalize a foreign private business, or even suggesting the denationalization of an enterprise which had been nationalized. Where such advice was not followed and the country concerned was slow to pay compensation or unwilling to do so, the Bank might very well apply its policy of not lending to that country until it had settled, or had shown itself willing to settle the claim in a reasonable manner. In view of the possibility that such a dispute might come before the Center, it would be best that the Secretary-General should not be placed in a position subordinate to the President, not because of any judicial function the Bank might perform - which it did not - but because of the Bank's involve-
ment in the pre-judicial phases of the dispute. From a psychological point of view, therefore, the link should be such as would be acceptable to as many parties as possible.

31. Mr. Donner commenting on Mr. Lieftinck's observation that he had to some extent exaggerated the significance of the prestige of the Bank as such, acknowledged that in the past the President of the Bank had been requested to act in his personal and not in his official capacity in settling disputes. However, he thought the prestige of the President derived essentially from his official position as such. As the Bank had not been and would not be equipped to perform the extra-curricular functions that had been requested of its President, it had been proposed to establish an institution which, backed by the Bank's prestige, would perform those functions.

32. Mr. Garland had observed that the Center, unlike the Bank, would not be able to choose its cases, and that some decisions by the Center, through their effect on an unsuccessful party, might diminish the prestige of the Bank in the estimation of that party. That did not cause him concern. In the first place, the decision or recommendation would be that of the arbitrators or conciliators appointed by the parties, and not that of the Bank or of the Center. Secondly, the possible ill-considered reaction of an unsuccessful party could not, in his view, affect the Bank's prestige. Nor should account be taken of any wrong impression which might exist that the Bank itself would be, in the narrow sense, biased in favour of private enterprise in a specific dispute, and attempt to use its influence in that direction.

33. As to the Permanent Court of Arbitration he still believed that that was a forum to which parties to disputes of the type discussed could have recourse. While he realized that only some of the Bank's members were signatories of the Convention, he saw no reason why parties could not submit their disputes to the Court on the basis of ad hoc agreement. On the other hand he realized that the facilities offered by the Court had not proved attractive to parties. The Center proposed by the Bank offered a new forum of greater appeal, and would introduce an element of legal security into the international financial atmosphere, and thus do much to achieve the Bank's ultimate goal, viz: to promote the flow of private capital to areas in need of it.

34. On the link between the Center and the Bank, he agreed with Mr. Lieftinck that the matter required careful consideration in the light of the tactical means for securing wide acceptance of the Center, as well as of the requirements for its proper functioning. He did not think, however, that provision by the Bank to the Center of administrative facilities and services would in any way discourage its use by those who would otherwise have had recourse to it. As to the organizational structure of the Center he had not yet reached a conclusion on whether the Administrative Council should be composed of the Governors of the Bank.

35. Mr. Broches observed that it had been intended that the Center should profit from the Bank's high reputation for impartiality and technical competence, while at the same time guarding against the likelihood that in some specific cases the link with the Bank would work in the wrong direction. He was confident that it would be possible, so to speak, to have the best of both worlds, and that his efforts to do so would be reflected in the next draft.
36. Mr. Lieftinck referring to the composition of the Administrative Council said he did not think the functions of that administrative and advisory body should or could be performed by the Bank's Board of Governors, not only for the reasons given by Mr. van Campenhout, but also because he thought its size made it unsuitable to perform in a satisfactory manner the functions assigned to it - unless it was intended to be a mere rubber stamp. He envisaged the Administrative Council as being composed of a limited number of members like, for instance, the Security Council or Economic and Social Council of the United Nations which were composed of members selected from time to time from the General Assembly. The Center's Council should be composed of 15-25 participating countries selected in rotation. That would make it a workable body which could convene perhaps more frequently than once a year if so required.

37. Mr. Broches explained that he had patterned the Center's Administrative Council after the Administrative Council of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The Court's Council performed such purely administrative functions as approval of the budget, appointment of the Secretary-General and approval of rules of procedure such as those which had recently been worked out for application in litigation between private parties and States. He did not foresee a larger role for such a body which should not, in any event, become a policy making institution.

38. Mr. Machado pointed out that acceptance of Mr. Lieftinck's proposal to limit the size of the Administrative Council would cause a serious electoral problem, in that only a few of the Bank's members would then be represented on the Council. The matter would be further complicated by the desire of the capital-exporting and capital-importing countries respectively to obtain appropriate representation. The functions of the Administrative Council would merely consist of 1) appointment of the Secretary-General; 2) adoption of standard rules of procedure and by-laws of the Center; and 3) approval of the budget and dealing with administrative and organizational problems, and he saw many advantages in the proposal that the Administrative Council should be composed of the Governors of the Bank. The problems referred to by Mr. van Campenhout could be resolved by permitting a Governor freely to appoint an Alternate to act for him on the Council if he did not wish to undertake that function himself. If his suggestion to establish the Center pending ratification of the Convention was accepted, the Board of Governors could take over the functions of the Administrative Council, and quick progress could be achieved.

39. Mr. Broches, concluding the meeting, said that every effort would be made to have the staff notes of the proceedings distributed as early as possible. It was planned that the next draft text would be ready early in July, and Mr. Woods had suggested that it be discussed at a meeting in September. The discussion of Article III had proved most useful for the staff and had provided guidance on the policy considerations which lay behind the matters of administrative detail in the text.

40. The meeting adjourned at 12:33 o'clock p.m.
1. The question of the settlement of investment disputes was discussed at a series of informal meetings of the Executive Directors, sitting as a Committee of the Whole, during December 1962 and May and June 1963. Staff notes of the discussions at these meetings have been circulated as documents SID/62-1 (December 28, 1962), SID/62-2 (January 7, 1963), SID/63-8 (June 5, 1963), SID/63-10 (June 13, 1963), SID 63-11 (June 19, 1963) and SID/63-12 (June 21, 1963). The "Working Paper in the form of a Draft Convention for the Resolution of Disputes between States and Nationals of other States," document R 62-1(SD), and a memorandum by General Counsel (SID/63-2, February 15/18, 1963) served as the basis for discussion at those meetings which dealt
principally with the subjects covered by Articles I, II and III of the Working Paper.

2. This annotated version of the First Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and the Nationals of other States replaces the Working Paper referred to above. To facilitate comparison of the provisions of the First Preliminary Draft with those set forth in the Working Paper, marginal notes have been included indicating the corresponding provisions of the Working Paper.


- 1 -

PREAMBLE

The Contracting States

1. CONSIDERING the need for international cooperation for economic development, and the role of foreign investment therein;

2. BEARING IN MIND the possibility that disputes may arise from time to time in connection with such investment between Contracting States and the nationals of other Contracting States, and the need for settlement thereof in a spirit of mutual confidence, with due respect for the principle of equal rights of States in the exercise of their sovereignty in accordance with international law;

3. RECOGNIZING that while such disputes would usually be subject to national legal processes (without prejudice to the right of any State to espouse a claim of one of its nationals in accordance
with international law), other methods of settlement of such disputes may be appropriate in certain cases;

4. ATTACHING PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE to the establishment of facilities for international conciliation or arbitration to which Contracting States and the nationals of other Contracting States may submit such disputes if they so desire;

5. RECOGNIZING an undertaking to submit such disputes to conciliation or to arbitration through such facilities as may be established as a legal obligation to be carried out in good faith, which requires in particular that due consideration be given to any recommendation of conciliators, and that any arbitral award be complied with; and

6. DECLARING that no Contracting State shall by the mere fact of its acceptance of this Convention be required to have recourse to conciliation or arbitration in any particular case, in the absence of a specific undertaking to that effect,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

Comment

1. The Preamble contains a general statement of the aims and purposes of the Convention, and is, in addition, intended to be declaratory of the fundamental norms upon which the specific rules of the Convention are based. Paragraph 1 places the Convention in the context of the need for promoting economic development while paragraph 2 assures respect for the legitimate exercise of national sovereignty. The purpose for which conciliation and arbitration machinery is set up is limited in paragraph 2 to the settlement of investment disputes between Contracting States and the nationals of other Contracting States.

2. Paragraph 3 makes it clear that the procedures set forth in the Convention are in no way intended generally to supersede national legal processes or the existing rights of States under international law, but suggests that other methods of settlement of the disputes covered may be appropriate in certain cases. Paragraphs 4 and 6 emphasize that recourse to the Center is purely optional.
3. Finally, paragraph 5 recognizes as binding the obligations deriving from an undertaking to submit investment disputes to conciliation and arbitration under the auspices of the Center and represents an adaptation of a generally accepted principle of international arbitration to the effect that "recourse to arbitration implies an engagement to submit in good faith to the award" (Article 37 of the Hague Convention of 1907).

ARTICLE I

The International Conciliation and Arbitration Center

Establishment and Organization

Sec. 1 Section 1. There is hereby established the International Conciliation and Arbitration Center (hereinafter called the Center). The Center shall have full juridical personality.

Sec. 2(1) Section 2. (1) The seat of the Center shall be at the headquarters of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (hereinafter called the Bank).

Sec. 2(2) (2) The Center may make arrangements with the Bank for the use of the Bank's offices and administrative services and facilities.

Sec. 2(3) (3) The Center may make similar arrangements with the Permanent Court of Arbitration and with such other public international institutions as the Administrative Council of the Center may from time to time designate by a two-thirds majority of the votes of all members.

Sec. 3 Section 3. The Center shall have an Administrative Council, a Secretariat, a Panel of Conciliators and a Panel of Arbitrators (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Panels).
1. It is envisaged that the Center would be sponsored by the Bank, which might, in addition, provide it with purely administrative or "housekeeping" facilities and staff. By thus linking it to the Bank the Center would be invested with the image of the Bank and its prestige and reputation for impartiality. On the other hand, the Bank would have no influence whatever on the proceedings under the auspices of the Center. These proceedings would be the sole responsibility of conciliators and arbitrators appointed by the parties to a particular dispute or by an authority of their choice.

2. Section 2(1) states that the seat of the Center shall be at the headquarters of the Bank. Several Executive Directors felt that some provision should be made for the possibility of moving the seat of the Center to some other location should circumstances so demand in the future, and in the light of those views the present text grants the power to do so to the Administrative Council in Section 6(vi) of this Article.

3. As it would, in its initial stages, be impossible to predict the volume of business that would be brought to the Center, its machinery must be characterized by flexibility and economy. This is sought to be achieved in part through provision for use of the Bank's facilities. In this connection reference is also made to Sections 4(2), 5 and 7(2) of this Article.

4. To the extent practicable, there would be cooperation with the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Under Article 47 of The Hague Convention of 1907 and decisions of the Administrative Council of the Court, the Bureau of that Court is authorized to make its offices and staff available for conciliation and arbitration proceedings between a State and a party other than a State, provided the State concerned is a party to the Convention. (Some 25 members of the Bank are not parties to that Convention.) The arrangements contemplated by Section 2(3) are of a simple administrative nature, e.g. for the use of the Court's staff, facilities, offices and services such as translation, the keeping of records, as well as channelling of communications in cases where parties found it convenient to meet at The Hague rather than in Washington or elsewhere. (See also Section 9(2) of this Article).

5. Section 2(3) of Article III of the Working Paper which corresponds to Section 2(3) of this Article provided only for arrangements with the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The present text takes into account the views expressed by several Executive Directors who felt that the possibility should be opened for similar arrangements with other public international institutions which might in the future establish machinery for the settlement of investment disputes.
6. The structure of the Center is conceived on the simplest lines and consists of a) an Administrative Council (with the exception provided for in Section 4, the members of the Bank's Board of Governors would double in function), b) a small Secretariat (personnel of the Bank's staff doubling in function) headed by a Secretary-General, and c) the Panels.

Art.III

Sec. 7

Section 4. (1) The Administrative Council shall be composed of one representative and one alternate representative of each Contracting State. No alternate may vote except in the absence of his principal.

New

(2) In the absence of a contrary designation, each governor and alternate governor of the Bank appointed by a Contracting State shall be ex officio the representative and alternate representative of that State.

New, incorporating elements from Secs. 4 and 5

Section 5. The President of the Bank shall be ex officio Chairman of the Administrative Council (hereinafter called the Chairman) but shall have no vote except a deciding vote in case of an equal division. During any absence or inability to act of the President of the Bank, and during any vacancy in the office of President of the Bank, the person who shall be the chief of the operating staff of the Bank shall act as Chairman.

New, incorporating elements from Sec. 5

Note: Provision on delegation by Council of its powers deleted

Art. III

Section 6. In addition to the powers granted to it by other provisions of this Convention, the Administrative Council shall have the following powers.

(i) To adopt such administrative rules and regulations, including financial regulations, as may be necessary or useful for the operation of the Center.

(ii) To approve the terms of service of the Secretary-General and of any Deputy Secretary-General.
(iii) To approve the annual budget of the Center.

(iv) To approve an annual report of the operation of the Center.

(v) To adopt Conciliation Rules and Arbitration Rules not inconsistent with any provision of this Convention by a two-thirds majority of the votes of all members.

(vi) To move the seat of the Center from the headquarters of the Bank by a two-thirds majority of the votes of all members.

Comment

7. The Executive Directors expressed general support for the view that access to the facilities of the Center should not be limited to members of the Bank, so that the Administrative Council will be composed of representatives of members as well as non-members. While Section 4(2) assumes that Contracting States members of the Bank would usually wish to designate their Governors and Alternate Governors to represent them on the Administrative Council, it provides that a State which might feel it more appropriate to designate another person or persons in that capacity may do so.

8. Section 5 declares that the President of the Bank will ex officio be Chairman of the Administrative Council. The present text does not contain the equivalent of Section 4 of Article III of the Working Paper which provided that the President of the Bank, in addition to being Chairman of the Administrative Council, would be "President of the Center." Some Executive Directors saw no need for the office of "President of the Center" and feared that the latter provision might be interpreted as placing the Secretary-General in a subordinate position. The present text makes it clear that it is envisaged that, in regard to the Center, the President of the Bank would act as Chairman of the Council and only with its advice and consent. Cases in which he would be called upon to exercise a discretionary power such as that of designating persons to the Panel of Conciliators (Section 11(3)) or to the Panel of Arbitrators (Section 12(3)) or in appointing a member of a Conciliation Commission (Section 3 of Article III) or of an Arbitral Tribunal (Section 3 of Article IV) would, of course, be exceptions to that rule.

9. The view was expressed that Section 8 of Article III of the Working Paper which authorized the Council to delegate
its powers (with one exception) to the President, was too wide. In the light of that view, that Section has been deleted. It was also thought desirable to enumerate the powers of the Administrative Council, and this has been done in Section 6. The Administrative Council, as its name implies, will have purely administrative functions and the only rules which it may adopt with binding effect are those of an administrative nature envisaged in paragraph (i) of Section 6. The Conciliation and arbitration rules to be adopted pursuant to paragraph (v) of that Section could be made binding on the parties to a dispute only with their consent (see Section 4 of Article III and Section 5 of Article IV.)

Sec. 7. (1) The Administrative Council shall hold an annual meeting and such other meetings as may be provided for by the Administrative Council or called by the Chairman. The Administrative Council may by regulation establish a procedure whereby the Chairman may obtain a vote of the Administrative Council on a specific question without calling a meeting of the Administrative Council.

Sec. 7(2) (2) The annual meeting of the Administrative Council shall be held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the Bank.

Sec. 7(3) (3) A quorum for any meeting of the Administrative Council shall be a majority of the members.

Sec. 7(4), modified (4) Each member of the Administrative Council shall cast one vote and, except as otherwise provided, all matters before the Council shall be decided by a majority of the votes cast.

Art. III

Sec. 9(5) (5) Members of the Administrative Council and the Chairman shall serve as such without compensation from the Center.

Comment

10. The question of voting rights has been considered in the context of the functions of the Administrative Council. If the Council was to have dealt with important substantive or policy matters, it is possible that on certain issues
there would have been a clear split between the capital-exporting and capital-importing countries. Thus, if the Council was to have elected the Panels, or if the Secretary-General — who is appointed by the Council — was to have been a quasi-judicial rather than an administrative official, the question of voting power might well have been of considerable significance. On that hypothesis, if each member of the Council had one vote and if all members of the Bank became parties to the Convention, the capital-importing countries would have had control over those matters. On the other hand, if the weighted voting system of the Bank were applied in the Council, the capital-exporting countries would have gained control. In order to avoid either alternative, a system might have been devised whereby a majority vote in the Council would require the vote of a majority of the members representing a majority of the voting power determined in accordance with the Bank formula.

11. Whatever the merits of that double test, it does not appear to be appropriate in the present context, since the Panels would be composed of persons designated by the respective Contracting States (and, in addition, some persons designated by the Chairman) and the Secretary-General would have no judicial or quasi-judicial powers. Nor does it appear that there are any other matters within the competence of the Council that could lead to major controversies between the capital-exporting and the capital-importing countries as groups. The present text, therefore, retains in Section 7 (h) the simple one-member-one-vote formula adopted in Section 9(h) of Article III of the Working Paper.

The Secretariat

Sec. 10  
Section 8. The Secretariat shall consist of a Secretary-General, one or more Deputy Secretaries-General and staff.

art. III

Sec. 11  
Section 9. (1) The Secretary-General and Deputy Secretaries-General shall be appointed by the Administrative Council upon the nomination of the Chairman.

Sec.11(2)  
(2) The office of Secretary-General or Deputy Secretary-General shall be incompatible with the exercise of any political function, and with any employment or occupation other than employment by the Bank or by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, except as the Administrative Council, with the concurrence of the Chairman, may otherwise decide.
Sec. 12(1)

Section 10(1) The Secretary-General shall be the principal officer of the Center and shall be responsible for its administration, including the appointment of staff, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and the rules and regulations adopted thereunder by the Administrative Council.

Sec. 12(2)

(2) During any absence or inability to act of the Secretary-General, and during any vacancy of the office of Secretary-General, the Deputy Secretary-General shall act as Secretary-General.

If there shall be more than one Deputy Secretary-General, the Secretary-General shall determine in what order they shall act as Secretary-General.

Comment

12. As indicated in Section 10(1) the Secretary-General would be the principal administrative officer of the Center. While he would have no influence whatever on the outcome of proceedings under the auspices of the Center he could, however, in practice perform a valuable task in promoting use of the Center's facilities and by giving informal assistance and advice to parties in connection with such proceedings. In addition he would be instructed by the Chairman to consult with parties in order to assist the Chairman in choosing conciliators (Art.III, Sec.3) and arbitrators (Art.IV, Sec.3) when that task had been entrusted to the Chairman. He would fix, within such limits as were set by the Administrative Council, the fees and expenses of the Center which might be charged to the parties (Art.VI, Sec.2), and might also be consulted regarding the fees and expenses of conciliators and arbitrators (Art.VI, Sec.3), as well as the place of proceedings when they were to take place outside Washington or The Hague (Art.VII, Sec.2). The proper performance of these various functions would seem to require that the office of Secretary-General be one of complete independence-independence of Contracting States as well as of the Administrative Council - hence the general rule in Section 9(2) that that office "shall be incompatible with the exercise of any political function, and with any employment or occupation,...".

13. If it could be expected with reasonable certainty that activities under the Convention would be such as to
provide a full-time occupation for a Secretary-General and one Deputy, it would be desirable to provide that they, or at least the Secretary-General himself, may not hold any other office or engage in any other occupation or activity. Since no such certainty exists, the text permits a degree of flexibility which would allow the Administrative Council and the Chairman, as nominating authority, to make exceptions to the rule and, in addition, specifically excludes from incompatibility concurrent employment by the Bank or by the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

14. As the Secretary-General in addition to his other functions would have to perform certain purely formal functions such as dealing with routine correspondence, dispatching notices, or making a finding that a certain period of time prescribed under the Convention had expired, it seemed desirable to provide for at least one Deputy who could assume those functions when necessary.

The Panels

Sec. 13(1) Section 11. (1) The Panel of Conciliators shall consist of qualified persons, designated as hereafter provided, who are willing to serve as members of the Panel.

Sec. 13(2) (2) Each Contracting State shall designate not more than [six] persons to serve on the Panel, who may, but need not, be its own nationals.

Art. III

Sec. 13(3) (3) The Chairman shall have the right to designate up to [twelve] persons to serve on the Panel.

Section 14(1) Section 12. (1) The Panel of Arbitrators shall consist of qualified persons, designated as hereafter provided, who are willing to serve as members of the Panel.

Sec. 14(2) (2) Each Contracting State shall designate not more than [six] persons to serve on the Panel, who may, but need not, be its own nationals.
Sec. 14(3) TENTATIVE NUMBER SUGGESTED

(3) The Chairman shall have the right to designate up to [twelve] persons to serve on the Panel.

Sec. 15

Section 13. (1) Panel members shall serve for four years.

(2) In case of death or resignation of a member of either Panel, the Contracting State or the Chairman, as the case may be, which or who has designated the member, shall have the right to designate another person to serve for the balance of that member’s term.

Sec. 16

Section 14. (1) The same person may be designated to serve on both Panels.

(2) If a person is designated to serve on a Panel by more than one Contracting State, or by one or more Contracting States and the Chairman, he shall be deemed to have been designated by the authority which first designated him.

(3) All designations shall be notified to the Secretary-General and any designation shall take effect from the date when the notification is received.

Sec. 17

Section 15. (1) The Contracting States shall pay due regard to the importance of designating to the Panels persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance and, to that end, shall, before designation, seek such advice as they may deem appropriate from their highest courts of justice, schools of law, bar associations and such commercial, industrial and financial organizations as shall be considered representative of the professions they embrace.

(2) The Chairman shall, in designating members to the Panels, pay due regard to the importance of assuring the representation on the Panels of the principal legal systems of the world and of the
Comment

15. In view of the optional and flexible character of the Convention as a whole, and of access to the Center in particular, the Panels have limited significance. Parties to proceedings under the auspices of the Center are entirely free to agree to use conciliators and arbitrators who have not been designated to the Panels. On the other hand, as will be seen from Articles III and IV of the text, unless the parties otherwise agree, conciliators and arbitrators are to be selected by them, or by the Chairman when called upon to do so, from the respective Panels.

16. The composition of the Panels could be determined in a variety of ways. One method would be to have the Contracting States elect a certain number of Panel members from among candidates nominated by each Contracting State. While this method would have certain advantages, particularly in encouraging States to nominate candidates of high quality, it has the disadvantage of necessitating a somewhat complicated voting procedure in order to assure a balanced composition of the Panels as between candidates nominated by the capital-exporting and capital-importing countries respectively. In this connection reference is made to the comment to Section 7 of this Article.

art. III

17. The method adopted in the present text largely follows the system of The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, in leaving the composition of the Panels primarily to the Contracting States. The Panels are to consist not only of legal experts, but also of experts in other fields. They would be composed of a certain number of experts designated by each Contracting State while it is provided in addition, that the Chairman would have the right to designate a specified number of panel members in addition to those designated by the Contracting States, the numbers indicated in square brackets being intended merely as bases for discussion. It might be desirable for the Chairman to exercise his right of designation after the States had made their designations, and with a view to achieving balanced representation on the Panels not only of different legal systems but also of different forms of economic activity.

18. With regard to cases of multiple designation referred to in Section 14(2), the Administrative Rules of the Center would, in implementation of that provision, indicate how prior designation is to be determined.

Financing the Cost of the Center

Section 16. To the extent that the cost of the Center cannot be met out of fees and other charges for the use of its facilities, or out of other receipts, it shall be borne by the Contracting States which
are members of the Bank in proportion to their respective subscrip-
tions to the capital stock of the Bank, and by Contracting States
which are not members of the Bank, in accordance with rules adopted
by the Administrative Council.

Comment

19. Section 16 has reference to the "overhead" cost of main-
taining the Center, and not to the cost of proceedings under
its auspices - the latter being borne by the parties as
provided in Article VI. As some Contracting States might not
be members of the Bank, it is provided that the Administrative
Rules of the Center would specify the contribution of non-
member States. The words "or out of other receipts" have been
included in order to take account of the possibility that the
Bank might finance the cost of the Center. Reference is also
made to the comment to Article VI.

Art. III

Privileges and Immunities

Sec. 17

Section 17. The Center shall be immune from all legal process.

Sec. 18

Section 18. (1) The Chairman, the members of the Administrative
Council, and the officers and employees of the Secretariat

(i) shall be immune from legal process with respect to
acts performed by them in their official capacity;

(ii) not being local nationals shall be accorded the same
immunities from immigration restrictions, alien registration require-
ments and national service obligations, the same facilities as
regards exchange restrictions and the same treatment in respect of
travelling facilities as are accorded by Contracting States to the
representatives, officials and employees of comparable rank of
other Contracting States.

(2) Paragraph (1) (ii) of this Section shall also apply
to persons acting as conciliators or arbitrators in proceedings pursuant
to this Convention, and to persons appearing as parties, representatives
of parties, agents, counsel, experts or witnesses in such proceedings,
but only in connection with their travel to and from the seat of the Center or other location where the proceedings are held and their stay at such location for the purpose of such proceedings.

Section 19. (1) The archives of the Center shall be inviolable.

(2) The official communications of the Center shall be accorded by each Contracting State the same treatment as is accorded to the official communications of other Contracting States.

Section 20. (1) The Center, its assets, property and income, and its operations and transactions authorized by this Convention, shall be immune from all taxation and customs duties. The Center shall also be immune from liability for the collection or payment of any taxes or customs duties.

(2) No tax shall be levied on or in respect of salaries or emoluments paid by the Center to the Chairman, members of the administrative Council or officials or employees of the Secretariat who are not local citizens, local subjects or other local nationals.

(3) No tax shall be levied on or in respect of honoraria, fees or other income received by persons acting as conciliators or arbitrators in proceedings pursuant to this Convention for their services in such proceedings, if the sole jurisdictional basis for such tax shall be the location of the Center or the place where such proceedings are conducted or the place where such income is paid.

Comment

20. These provisions are in general patterned after the privileges and immunities of the Bretton Woods institutions and their affiliates. Section 19(2) is desirable to ensure the proper functioning of proceedings under the auspices of the Center. It will be noted that Section 20(3) does not confer a tax exemption, but merely seeks to avoid taxation.
based solely on the location of the Center, the place where proceedings are held, or the place of payment. Similar restrictions on taxation of interest paid on the Bank's bonds are found in Article VII, Section 9(c), of the Bank's Articles of Agreement.

ARTICLE II

Jurisdiction of the Center

Section 1. The jurisdiction of the Center shall be limited to proceedings for conciliation and arbitration with respect to any existing or future investment dispute of a legal character between a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State (or that State when subrogated in the rights of its national) and shall be based on the consent of the parties thereto.

Section 2. The consent of any party to a dispute to the jurisdiction of the Center may be evidenced by

(i) a prior written undertaking of such party which provides that there shall be recourse, pursuant to the terms of this Convention, to conciliation or arbitration (hereinafter referred to as an undertaking);

(ii) submission of a dispute by such party to the Center; or

(iii) acceptance by such party of jurisdiction in respect of a dispute submitted to the Center by another party.

Section 3. (1) Any Conciliation Commission and any Arbitral Tribunal constituted pursuant to this Convention shall be the judge of its own competence.

(2) Any claim of a party to a dispute that the Commission or the Tribunal lacks competence on the ground that

(i) there is no dispute;

(ii) the dispute is not within the scope of the undertaking;
(iii) the undertaking is invalid; or

(iv) a party to the dispute is not a national of a Contracting State,

shall be dealt with by the Commission or Tribunal, as the case may be, as a preliminary question.

(3) In any proceedings in connection with paragraph (2) (iv), a written affirmation of nationality signed by or on behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State whose nationality is claimed by the party, shall be conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein.

Comment

1. Section 1 of this Article deals with the scope of the facilities available under the auspices of the Center in relation to (a) the type of proceedings, (b) the category of dispute, (c) the parties to the dispute and (d) the consensual nature of jurisdiction.

Type of Proceedings

2. Proceedings under the auspices of the Center are limited to conciliation and arbitration. Section 1 also permits the parties to a dispute, if they so agree, to have recourse to both procedures consecutively.

Category of Disputes

3. No detailed definition of the category of disputes in respect of which the facilities of the Center would be available has been included in the Convention. Instead, the general understanding reflected in the Preamble, the use of the term “investment dispute”, and the requirement that the dispute be of a legal character as distinct from political, economic or purely commercial disputes, were thought adequate to limit the scope of the Convention in this regard. Within those limits Contracting States would be free to determine in advance in each particular case what disputes they would submit to the Center. To include a more precise definition would tend to open the door to frequent disagreements as to the applicability of the Convention to a particular undertaking, thus undermining the primary objective of this Article viz., to give confidence that undertakings to have recourse to conciliation or arbitration will be carried out.
4. It may be noted that the present text prescribes no lower limit for the value of the subject-matter of a dispute as was done in Section 1(3) of Article IV of the Working Paper. It may be recognized that the parties would in practice be best qualified to decide whether, having regard to pertinent facts and circumstances including the value of the subject-matter, a dispute is one which ought to be submitted to the Center. The subject-matter of a dispute might be of insignificant pecuniary value, but might involve important questions of principle, thus justifying the bringing of a test case. In other instances the pecuniary value might not be readily ascertainable, as where a host government fails to implement a provision in an investment agreement conferring immunity from immigration restrictions on foreign personnel, or might not be ascertainable at all, as where an investor fails to implement an agreement with a host government to train local personnel.

The Parties to the Dispute

5. Section 1 indicates that the facilities of the Center would be available only in disputes between a Contracting State on the one hand and a national of another Contracting State on the other, with a view to ensuring reciprocal performance or obligations which arise out of the application of the Convention. The facilities would thus not be available in a dispute involving a non-contracting State or a national of such State. Also excluded from jurisdiction are disputes (a) between private individuals, (b) between Governments (except where a Government had satisfied the claim of its national, e.g., under a scheme of investment insurance, and was thereby subrogated in the rights of that national in a dispute before the Center) and (c) between a Contracting State and one of its own nationals (unless that person possessed concurrently the nationality of another State which was a party to the Convention; see Article X, 2).

Consensual Nature of Jurisdiction

6. To the extent that the provisions of Article II constitute a development, rather than a mere codification of existing international law, it is to be expected that States would not wish its provisions to apply automatically to undertakings given in the past, nor to all undertakings to be given in the future. Section 2(1), therefore, limits the application of the Convention to cases where the parties have specifically undertaken to have recourse "pursuant to the terms of this Convention".

7. Section 1 in fine declares that the facilities can only be utilized if the parties to the dispute have consented to have recourse to the Center, while Section 2 specifies the manner in which consent may be given, i.e., by a prior undertaking in writing, or by ad hoc acceptance of jurisdiction. No particular form is prescribed for the prior written undertaking, which may be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral.
3. When entering into any undertaking pursuant to Section 2 a party would be free to include such limitations as may seem to it appropriate on the scope of the particular undertaking, provided that they are not inconsistent with its obligations deriving from the Convention as a whole. As this privilege is self-evident it was thought superfluous to provide for it expressly as was done in Section 6(c) of Article II of the Working Paper; moreover, as was pointed out by several Executive Directors, the latter provision went too far in permitting a party to contract out of its obligations under the Convention.

**Determination of Competence**

7. The power of an arbitral tribunal to determine its jurisdiction is well established in international law. Section 3(1) confers that power alike on conciliation commissions and arbitral tribunals constituted pursuant to the Convention, thus providing a safeguard against unilateral determination by a party or a commission's or tribunal's jurisdiction which may frustrate the proceedings.

**Preliminary Questions**

10. Section 3(2) lists four classes of objection to jurisdiction and declares that they shall be dealt with by the commission or tribunal as preliminary questions to be disposed of before entering upon the merits of the case.

11. This text differs from that of the Working Paper in that the latter provided in Section 2 of Article IV that preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of a conciliation commission would be submitted to arbitration under the Convention as though the parties had specifically consented to that procedure. The present text proposes an alternative procedure which takes into account that the parties may have, in choosing the method of conciliation, wished to avoid at any stage a quasi-judicial procedure, like that of arbitration, which would lead to a binding decision. Thus, objections to conciliation on the grounds enumerated, while they would not prevent constitution of a commission or commencement of conciliation proceedings would be the subject of a preliminary non-binding recommendation to the parties. In the case of arbitration proceedings, however, similar objections would, as was equally contemplated in Section 3 of Article IV of the Working Paper, be the subject of a preliminary binding ruling by the tribunal.

**Nationality**

12. Section 4 of Article IV of the Working Paper prescribed a special procedure for dealing with preliminary questions as to nationality. These questions were not submitted to the Conciliation Commission or Arbitral Tribunal, but were left to be decided in the last instance by the International Court of Justice.
13. On reflection this procedure seemed unduly cumbersome and there appeared to be no compelling reason why the determination of nationality could not be left primarily to the State whose nationality is claimed and, if that State does not make such a determination, to the Conciliation Commission or Arbitral Tribunal. Accordingly, the text treats objections to jurisdiction based on nationality in the same manner as other preliminary questions, with the proviso that a written affirmation of nationality signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State whose nationality is claimed and issued for the purpose of a proceeding pursuant to the Convention, shall be conclusive. Where the affirmation referred to is not introduced, other evidence of nationality satisfactory to the commission or tribunal must be produced. Reference is also made to the definitions of "National of a Contracting State" and of "National of another Contracting State" in Article X.

ARTICLE III

Art. V

Conciliation

Request for Conciliation

Sec. 1 Section 1. Any dispute within the jurisdiction of the Center may be the subject of a request for conciliation by a Conciliation Commission (hereinafter called the Commission).

Constitution of the Commission

Sec. 2 Section 2. The Commission shall consist of a sole conciliator or several conciliators appointed as the parties may have agreed. Unless otherwise agreed, the Commission shall consist of three conciliators, one appointed by each party and the third appointed by agreement of the parties, all appointees to be selected from the Panel of Conciliators.

Sec. 3 Section 3. (1) If the Commission shall not have been constituted within three months after the request referred to in Section 1, the Chairman shall, at the request of either party, appoint the conciliator or conciliators not appointed pursuant to Section 2. Before making any such appointment, the Chairman shall instruct the
Secretary-General to consult with the parties and to report to him any information or views which may assist him in making the appointment.

(2) In making any appointment under this section the Chairman shall select the appointee from the Panel of Conciliators.

Comment

1. The composition of the Commission, its precise terms of reference and the procedure applicable in proceedings before it are matters for agreement between the parties concerned. It is only in the absence of such agreement that the provisions of this Article thereon would become operative.

2. As to the role of the Chairman as appointing authority under Section 3, reference is made to the comment on Sections 2 and 3 of Article IV.

Powers and Functions of the Commission

Sec.4(1), modified incorporating substance of Sec.6

Section 4. Except as the parties and the Commission shall otherwise agree, the Commission shall conduct the conciliation proceedings in accordance with the Conciliation Rules adopted under this Convention and in effect on the date on which the consent to conciliation became effective.

New

Section 5. (1) It shall be the duty of the Commission to clarify the points in dispute between the parties and to endeavour to bring about an agreement between them upon mutually acceptable terms.

Sec.4(2) with draft-in: change

(2) The Commission may at any stage of the proceedings and from time to time recommend terms of settlement to the parties. If the parties shall reach agreement, the Commission shall draw up a report noting the submission of the dispute and recording that the parties have reached agreement. Except as the parties shall otherwise agree, the report shall not contain the terms of settlement accepted by the parties.
sec. 5
with draft-
ing change

(3) If at any time it appears to the Commission that there
is no likelihood of agreement between the parties, the Commission may
declare the proceedings closed. The Commission shall in that event
draw up a report noting the submission of the dispute and recording
the failure of the parties to reach agreement. Unless the parties
otherwise agree, the report shall not contain the terms of settlement.
if any, recommended to the parties by the Commission.

Comment

3. Section 5(1) describes the duties of the Commission, and
is based upon generally accepted concepts of the conciliation
function. (See Article 15(1) of the General Act for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 1928; Article
The Commission is specifically empowered to make recommenda-
tions to the parties at any stage of the proceedings. In
order to avoid any interpretation to the effect that after
a recommendation made in the course of proceedings and before
their termination, the Commission was functus officio, the
words "and from time to time" have been inserted in the first
sentence of Section 5(2).

Obligations of the Parties

Section 6. The parties shall give the Commission their full
cooperation in order to enable the Commission to carry out its task.
The recommendations of the Commission shall not be binding on the
parties who shall, however, give them their most serious consideration.

Section 7. Neither party to a conciliation proceeding shall be
entitled in any later proceeding concerning the same dispute, whether
before arbitrators or in a court of law or otherwise, to invoke or
rely on any views expressed or statements or admissions or offers
of settlement made by the other party in the conciliation pro-
ceedings, or the recommendations, if any, made by the Commission
therein.
4. Section 6, in accordance with principle, declares that recommendations of the Commission shall not be binding. Nevertheless, as a corollary of the fundamental principle of good faith the parties accept the obligation to cooperate fully with the Commission and to give to its recommendations their most serious consideration.

5. Section 7 is intended to encourage the parties to seek agreement rather than maintain fixed positions out of the fear that a conciliatory attitude might prejudice their position in a later proceeding if the conciliation effort were to fail.

ARTICLE IV

Arbitration

Request for Arbitration

Sec. 1 Section 1. Any dispute within the jurisdiction of the Center may be the subject of a request for arbitration by an Arbitral Tribunal (hereinafter called the Tribunal)

Constitution of the Tribunal

Sec. 2, modified Section 2. (1) The Tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator or several arbitrators appointed as the parties may have agreed.

(2) Where the parties have not so agreed, the Tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators who shall not be nationals of a State party to the dispute, or of a State whose national is a party to the dispute. Each party shall appoint one arbitrator and the third arbitrator shall be appointed by agreement of the parties. The arbitrators so appointed shall be selected from the Panel of Arbitrators.

Sec. 3 modified Section 3. If the Tribunal shall not have been constituted within three months after the request referred to in Section 1, the Chairman shall, at the request of either party, appoint the arbitrator
or arbitrators not appointed pursuant to Section 2. The arbitrator
or arbitrators so appointed shall not be nationals of a State party
to the dispute, or of a State whose national is a party to the
dispute, and shall be selected from the Panel of arbitrators. Before
making any such appointment, the Chairman shall instruct the Secretary-
general to consult with the parties and to report to him any infor-
mation or views which may assist him in making the appointment.

Art. VI

Comment

1. The composition of the Tribunal, its terms of reference, and the procedure applicable in proceedings before it are, as in the case of conciliation, matters for agreement between the parties concerned, and the provisions of this Article thereon would become operative only in the absence of such agreement (Sections 2 and 5). Section 2(2) adopts what is perhaps the most usual method for the constitution of an arbitral tribunal viz., each party appoints an arbitrator, and a third is appointed by agreement of the parties. However, that Section introduces a significant innovation by specifying that none of the arbitrators shall be nationals of the State party to the dispute, or of the State whose national is a party to the dispute, thus seeking to minimize as far as possible the danger, inherent in conventional systems, of appointment of partisan arbitrators. This new principle applies also to appointments of arbitrators made by the Chairman under Section 3 of this Article.

2. It is a necessary concomitant of the binding character of an undertaking to have recourse to arbitration that adequate provision should be made to prevent frustration of that undertaking by an unwilling party. That is the purpose of the appointment procedure laid down in Section 3. As in the case of conciliation (see Section 3 of Article III),

1/ One writer has said:

"It is a grave mistake to construct a tribunal out of two national members and one neutral member. Few men are capable of holding the balance between two contending national commissioners. If the governments do not object to the possibility of decision by compromise rather than by adjudication, they should provide for two national commissioners with an umpire in case of disagreement. Otherwise they should provide either for one, or better still three, neutral commissioners."
the Chairman is appointing authority unless the parties have otherwise agreed. Beyond the requirement that the appointee must be selected from a Panel, and the restriction as to his nationality, the Chairman is left free in his choice of a conciliator or arbitrator. It may be noted that the Chairman would exercise his power of appointment even if he were of the same nationality as one of the parties. The basic consideration underlying these provisions is that the appointing authority is a person who, because of his office, may be conclusively presumed to be capable of showing impartiality in the selection of conciliators or arbitrators under all circumstances. Under the Bank's Loan Regulations an unrestricted power of appointment is conferred upon the President of the International Court of Justice and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Art. VI

Powers and Functions of the Tribunal

Sec. 5

Section 4. (1) In the absence of agreement between the parties concerning the law to be applied, and unless the parties shall have given the Tribunal the power to decide ex aequo et bono, the Tribunal shall decide the dispute submitted to it in accordance with such rules of law, whether national or international, as it shall determine to be applicable.

(2) The Tribunal may not bring in a finding of non liquet on the ground of the silence or obscurity of the law to be applied.

Sec. 6

Section 5. Except as the parties otherwise agree, any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the arbitration rules adopted under this Convention and in effect on the date when the consent to arbitration became effective. If any question of procedure arises which is not covered by the applicable arbitration rules, the arbitral Tribunal shall decide that question.

Sec. 8

Section 6. All questions before the Tribunal shall be decided by majority vote.

Sec. 9(1), modified

Section 7. (1) An award signed by a majority of the Tribunal shall constitute the award of the Tribunal. The award shall be in writing and shall state the reasons upon which it is based.
(2) The award shall immediately be communicated to the parties.

Sec. 9(2). (1) Whenever one of the parties does not appear before the Tribunal, or fails to defend its case, the other party may call upon the Tribunal to decide in favor of its claim.

(2) In such case, the Tribunal may render an award if it is satisfied that it has jurisdiction and that the claim appears to be well-founded in fact and in law.

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Sec. 7, modified

Section 9. Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall have the power to hear and determine incidental or additional claims or counter-claims arising directly out of the subject-matter of the dispute.

Sec. 6

Section 10. Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall have the power to prescribe, at the request of either party, any provisional measures necessary for the protection of the rights of the parties.

Comment

3. Section 5(1) leaves the determination of the law to be applied in a particular case to the parties, and if they cannot agree thereon, to the tribunal. The parties may also give the tribunal the power to decide ex aequo et bono, that is, in accordance with what is just and equitable in the circumstances, rather than by application of rules of law. Section 5(2) states that the tribunal will not be excused from rendering an award on the ground that the law is not sufficiently clear.

4. The power conferred on the tribunal by Section 3 to render an award upon the default of one party is a corollary of the binding character of the undertaking to have recourse to arbitration and is possessed by arbitration tribunals provided for in the Bank's Loan Regulations Nos. 3 and 4, Sections 7.03(h) and 7.04(h), respectively. (See also Article 53 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.) Before an award can be rendered under this Section, however, the tribunal must be satisfied not only that it has jurisdiction.
but also that the claim on the merits appears to be well-founded.

5. Unless the parties to a dispute agree to restrict its competence to certain principal claims, the tribunal will have the power to determine incidental and additional claims as well as counter-claims, provided that they arise directly out of the subject-matter of the dispute. In addition, unless the parties specifically preclude it from doing so, the tribunal would have the power to prescribe provisional measures designed to preserve the status quo between the parties pending its final decision on the merits.

Art. VI

Section 13. (1) Either party may apply to the Chairman for a declaration that the award is invalid on one or more of the following grounds.

(a) that the Tribunal has exceeded its powers;
(b) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal; or
(c) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure, including failure to state the reasons for the award.

(2) On receipt of that application the Chairman shall forthwith appoint from the Panel of Arbitrators a Committee of three persons, not being members of the Tribunal which rendered the award, which shall, by majority decision declare the validity or otherwise of the award or any part thereof on any of the grounds set forth in the preceding paragraph.

(3) In cases covered by subparagraphs (a) and (c) of paragraph (1), application must be made within sixty days of the rendering of the award, and in cases covered by subparagraph (b) of paragraph (1), within six months.

(4) The Committee shall have the power to stay enforcement of the award pending its decision and to recommend any provisional
measures necessary for the protection of the rights of the parties.

(5) If the award is declared invalid the dispute shall be submitted to a new tribunal constituted by agreement between the parties or, failing such agreement, in the manner provided in Sections 3 and 4 of this Article.

Interpretation, Revision and Annulment of the Award

Section 11. (1) Any dispute between the parties as to the meaning and scope of the award may, at the request of either party made within [three] months after the date of the award, be submitted to the Tribunal which rendered the award. Such a request shall stay the enforcement of the award pending the decision of the Tribunal.

(2) If for any reason it is impossible to submit the dispute to the Tribunal which rendered the award, a new Tribunal shall be constituted in accordance with the terms of the agreement, if any, between the parties regarding the constitution of the Tribunal which rendered the award, and otherwise pursuant to the provisions of this article.

Section 12. (1) An application for revision of the award may be made by either party on the ground of the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to have a decisive influence on the award, provided that when the award was rendered that fact was unknown to the Tribunal and to the party requesting revision and that such ignorance was not due to the negligence of the party requesting revision.

(2) The application for revision must be made within [six] months of the discovery of the new fact and in any case within [ten] years of the rendering of the award.

(3) The application shall, if possible, be submitted to the Tribunal which rendered the award. If this shall not be possible,
a new Tribunal shall be constituted in accordance with the terms of the agreement, if any, between the parties regarding the constitution of the Tribunal which rendered the award, and otherwise pursuant to the provisions of this Article. The Tribunal to which the application is made may stay the enforcement of the award pending its decision.

Enforcement of the Award

Section 14. The award shall be final and binding on the parties. Each party shall abide by and comply with the award immediately, unless the Tribunal shall have allowed a time limit for the carrying out of the award or any part thereof, or the enforcement of the award shall have been stayed pursuant to Sections 11, 12 or 13 of this Article.

Section 15. Each Contracting State shall recognize an award of the Tribunal as binding and enforce it within its territories as if it were a final judgment of the courts of that State.

Comment

6. It was recognized in the Preamble as a corollary of the principle that an undertaking must be implemented in good faith, that the award of a tribunal must be complied with. As a general rule the award of the tribunal is final, and there is no provision for appeal. However, where there has been some violation of the fundamental principles of law governing the tribunal's proceedings such as are listed in Section 13, the aggrieved party may apply to the Chairman for a declaration that the award is invalid. Under that Section the chairman is required to refer the matter to a Committee of three persons - none of them members of the tribunal that rendered the award - for a decision upon the validity or otherwise of the award. It may be noted that this is not a procedure by way of appeal requiring consideration of the merits of the case, but one that merely calls for an affirmative or negative ruling based upon one or other of the three grounds listed in Section 13(1). The text also provides for interpretation and revision of the award (Sections 11 and 12).

7. The award is binding on the parties to the dispute who
are required to implement it forthwith. However, implementa-
tion of the award may be delayed in certain prescribed
circumstances, viz.,

1) where the tribunal has, in rendering the award,
expressly allowed a time limit for carrying it out
(Section 14);

2) upon stay of enforcement by the tribunal consequent
upon

(a) a request for interpretation of the award
(Section 11(1)); or
(b) an application for revision of the award
(Section 12(3)); and

3) upon stay of enforcement by the Committee appointed
pursuant to Section 13 pending its decision upon the
validity of the award (Section 13(l)).

8. Section 15 requires each Contracting State, whether or not
it or its national was a party to the proceedings, to recognize
awards of tribunals pursuant to the Convention as binding and
to enforce them as though they were final judgments of its own
courts, irrespective of the treatment under its law of other
arbitral awards.

Relationship of Arbitration to other Remedies

Section 16. An undertaking to have recourse to arbitration shall,
unless otherwise stated therein, be deemed to be an undertaking to
have recourse to arbitration in lieu of any other remedy.

Comment

9. Section 16 states a rule of interpretation rather than
of substance. The Section leaves a party free to stipulate
that notwithstanding its undertaking to submit a dispute to
arbitration, it reserves the right to have recourse to courts
of law. Similarly, Section 16 leaves it open to a State to
stipulate that its undertaking to have recourse to arbitration
is subject to the condition that the foreign investor first
exhaust his remedies in the State's national courts or adminis-
trative agencies. Section 16 merely provides that in the
absence of such stipulations an undertaking to have recourse
to arbitration will be regarded as excluding any other remedy.

10. To illustrate the foregoing by an example: An investment
agreement between a State and a foreign investor provides
without qualification that "any controversy arising between
the parties concerning the interpretation or application of
this agreement shall be submitted to arbitration in accordance
with the provisions of the Convention [etc.]. A dispute arises
with respect to the tax exemption provisions of the investment
agreement. If either the foreign investor or the State were
to bring this dispute before the Tax Court of the State
rather than submit it to the Center, the other party could
object, in which event the Tax Court would have to dismiss
the claim. If the investor were to bring the dispute
before the Center, the State could not object on the ground
that the investor had not exhausted his remedies in the
Tax Court.

11. The Section was extensively discussed by the Executive
Directors and some Directors expressed the view that investors
should not have access to the Center until they had exhausted
their local remedies. As stated above, Section 16 would leave
States entirely free so to stipulate in their agreements with
foreign investors. But if a State included an unqualified arbi-
tration clause in an agreement with a foreign investor, it
would seem to run counter to normal rules of interpretation
to read into this clause a requirement of the prior exhaustion
of local remedies. All that Section 16 does is to give effect
to the expressed intention of the parties.

Section 17. (1) No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection
or bring an international claim in respect of a dispute which one of
its nationals and another Contracting State shall have undertaken to
submit, or shall have submitted to arbitration pursuant to this
Convention, except on the ground that the other Contracting State
has failed to perform its obligations under this Convention with
respect to that dispute.

(2) Nothing in this Section shall affect the right of
a Contracting State to bring an international claim against another
Contracting State where such right accrues through breach of any
other international agreement arising out of the facts of such
dispute between a national of the Contracting State and the other
Contracting State, without prejudice, however, to the finality
and binding character of the award in that dispute as between the
parties thereto.

Comment

12. Unlike Section 16, which gives merely a rule of inter-
pretation, Section 17 lays down a rule of substantive law. It should be noted that this Section constitutes a significant innovation.

13. The proposed Convention would recognize the right of an investor, within specified limits, to proceed in his own name against a foreign State before an arbitral tribunal constituted pursuant to the Convention instead of seeking the diplomatic protection of his State or having that State bring an international claim. It would seem to be a natural concomitant of the recognition of the investor's right of direct access to an international jurisdiction, to exclude action by his national State in cases in which such direct access has been availed of by, or is available to, the investor, whether as plaintiff or defendant, under the Convention. Since the exclusion of the national State rests on the premise that the other Contracting State party to the dispute will abide by the provisions of the Convention, the rule of exclusion is subject to an exception in the event that that premise fails away. In such a case rights of providing diplomatic protection and of bringing an international claim remain unaffected.

14. Section 17(2) preserves the right of the national State of the investor to bring an international claim where the same facts give rise to a dispute covered by the Convention as well as to a breach of some other international agreement between the States concerned. That Section does, however, maintain the finality and binding character of an award rendered by a tribunal under the Convention as regards the parties to which it relates. For example, the dispute covered by the Convention may involve a claim for damages for an alleged breach of an investment agreement and the facts alleged may at the same time constitute a breach of a bilateral agreement between the host State and the investor's national State. Where the investor under the Convention brings the dispute before the Center and is unsuccessful, his national State would be free to have recourse to such procedures as may have been provided in the bilateral agreement. The outcome of the proceedings between the two States under the bilateral agreement would not, however, affect the award rendered by the tribunal constituted under the Convention. Thus, even though the investor's national State may prevail in the proceedings, the investor could not benefit thereby.

ARTICLE V

Art. VII Replacement and Disqualification of Conciliators and Arbitrators

Sec. 5 with drafting change

Section 1. After a Conciliation Commission or an Arbitral Tribunal has been constituted and proceedings have begun, its composition shall remain unchanged; provided, however, that if a conciliator
or arbitrator shall die or become incapacitated, or shall have resigned, the resulting vacancy shall be filled by the method used for the original appointment, except that if a conciliator or arbitrator appointed by a party shall have resigned without the consent of the Commission or Tribunal of which he was a member, or consequent upon a decision to disqualify him pursuant to Section 2(2) of this article, the resulting vacancy shall be filled by the Chairman.

Section 2. (1) (a) A party may propose the disqualification of a conciliator or arbitrator appointed pursuant to Article III, Section 2, or Article IV, Section 3, respectively, on account of any fact whether antecedent or subsequent to the constitution of the Commission or Tribunal.

(b) A party may propose the disqualification of a conciliator or arbitrator appointed by the Chairman pursuant to Article III, Section 3, or Article IV, Section 4, on account of a fact arising subsequent to the constitution of the Commission or Tribunal. It may propose disqualification of such conciliator or arbitrator on account of a fact which arose prior to the constitution of the Commission or Tribunal only if it can show that the appointment was made without knowledge of that fact or as a result of fraud.

(2) The decision on any proposed disqualification shall be taken by the other members of the Commission or Tribunal as the case may be, provided that where those members are equally divided as to the decision, or in the case of a single conciliator or arbitrator, the Chairman shall take that decision. If it is
decided that the proposal is well-founded the conciliator or arbitrator to whom the decision relates shall resign, and the resulting vacancy shall be filled in the manner provided for in Section 1 of this Article.

Comment

1. Section 1 incorporates what has been called the "principle of immutability" and is intended to preclude the replacement of conciliators and arbitrators by the parties during proceedings with a view to influencing the outcome of those proceedings, as well as their resignation under pressure.

2. Section 2, which relates to disqualification of a conciliator or an arbitrator, is of wider scope than Section 6 of Article VII of the Working Paper. Section 2(1)(a) deals with conciliators and arbitrators appointed by the parties, and is to the effect that a party may at any time propose their disqualification. Such proposal may be based upon any fact, such as general unfitness, personal prejudice, misconduct or interest in the subject-matter, and regardless of whether that fact arose before or after constitution of the Commission or Tribunal.

3. While, under Section 2(1)(b), a party may at any time propose the disqualification of a conciliator or arbitrator appointed by the Chairman, as a rule such proposal must be founded upon facts which arose after constitution of the Commission or Tribunal, as the Chairman must be deemed to have passed conclusively on the qualifications of his nominee. A proposal to disqualify under this section may be founded on a fact which existed prior to the constitution of the Commission or Tribunal only if it can be shown that the Chairman made the appointment in question without knowledge of that fact, or was induced to do so as a result of fraud.

**ARTICLE VII**

**Art.VII**

**apportionment of Costs of Proceedings**

**Sec. 1**

Section 1. Except as otherwise agreed by the parties, each party to a conciliation or arbitration proceeding shall bear its own expenses, and any fees and expenses of the Center and of conciliators and arbitrators shall be divided between and borne equally by the
Sec. 2

Provided, however, that if a Conciliation Commission or Arbitral Tribunal determines that a party has instituted the proceedings frivolously or in bad faith, it may assess any part or all of such fees and expenses against that party.

Sec. 3

The fees and expenses of the Center to be charged to the parties shall be fixed by the Secretary-General within the limits approved from time to time by the Administrative Council.

Section 3. The fees and expenses of conciliators and arbitrators shall, in the absence of agreement between them and the parties, be fixed by the Commission or Tribunal concerned after consultation with the Secretary-General.

Comment

This Article contemplates that the parties may be called upon to make certain payments to the Center for the use of its services. "Fees" would constitute a contribution to the "overhead" of the Center, whereas "expenses" would refer to the out-of-pocket costs or other clearly identifiable costs incurred by the Center in connection with a proceeding, such as hiring of translators and interpreters, engagement of additional secretarial or clerical staff and the like. Conflicting views were expressed by Executive Directors as to the desirability of letting the parties to a proceeding bear the costs of the Center (as distinguished from the fees and expenses of conciliators and arbitrators.) It is to be noted that the text leaves the matter to be decided by the Administrative Council. However, if costs are charged to the parties, they will be borne equally by them, except in the case of frivolous or nala fide institution of proceedings.

ARTICLE VII

Place of Proceedings

Section 1. Conciliation and arbitration proceedings shall be held either at the seat of the Center or, if permitted under any arrangements made pursuant to Article I, Section 2(3), at the
Section 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1, proceedings may be held elsewhere, if the parties so agree and if the Conciliation Commission or Arbitral Tribunal, as the case may be, so approves after consultation with the Secretary-General.

Comment

Section 1 is based on the assumption that the Contracting States would favor close cooperation between the Center and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. (See also in this connection Sections 2(3) and 9(2) of Article I).

ARTICLE VIII

Interpretation

Any question or dispute arising between Contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall be referred to the International Court of Justice, unless the States concerned agree to another mode of settlement.

Comment

The text of this article follows in general the pattern of similar clauses in the constituent instruments of international organizations within the United Nations family. While it leaves the parties free to decide upon the mode of settlement of questions or disputes regarding interpretation of the Convention, it provides for adjudication by the International Court of Justice in the event of their being unable to agree.
ARTICLE IX

Amendment

Section 1. Any Contracting State may propose amendment of this Convention. The text of such proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Chairman of the Administrative Council not less than [three] months prior to the next succeeding annual meeting of the Council and shall forthwith be transmitted by him to all Contracting States.

Section 2. Amendments shall be adopted by a majority of [four-fifths] of the members of the Council. [Twelve] months after its adoption each amendment shall come into force for all Contracting States.

Comment

In the absence of a provision for amendment, the Convention could only be changed by a new international agreement. In order to avoid this difficulty the text proposes an amendment procedure. The Administrative Council is designated as the authority competent to decide upon proposals for amendment. Such proposals are required to be transmitted to it through the Chairman well in advance of its annual meeting so as to enable members to consult with the authorities within Contracting States and take their views into account during a discussion of the issues involved. The support of a substantial majority - four-fifths is tentatively suggested - of the members of the Council would be required for adoption of a proposed amendment, which would come into effect for all the members after a period of say 12 months after such adoption. No provision is made regarding States which oppose the amendment after its adoption. It would, however, always be open to a State to denounce the Convention under Section 5 of Article XI. The period specified for effectiveness of the denunciation could be made to conform to the period required for effectiveness of the amendment adopted, thus permitting a State which wished to denounce the treaty to do so immediately following adoption of the amendment and thereby avoid becoming subject to the Convention as amended.
ARTICLE X

Definitions

1. "National of a Contracting State" means a person natural or juridical possessing the nationality of any Contracting State on the effective date of any undertaking within the meaning of Section 2 of Article II, and includes (a) any company which under the domestic law of that State is its national, and (b) any company in which the nationals of that State have a controlling interest. "Company" includes any association of natural or juridical persons, whether or not such association is recognized by the domestic law of the Contracting State concerned as having juridical personality.

2. "National of another Contracting State" means any national of a Contracting State other than the State party to the dispute, notwithstanding that such person may possess concurrently the nationality of a State not party to this Convention or of the State party to the dispute.

[Other definitions may be added if necessary]

Comment

1. The definitions have been broadly drawn. "Nationals" include both natural and juridical persons as well as associations of such persons. It will be noted that the term "national" is not restricted to privately owned companies, thus permitting a wholly or partially government-owned company to be a party to proceedings brought by or against a foreign State.

2. Under the definition of "National of a Contracting State" a company may be a national of a given State either because it has that nationality under the State's domestic law, or because it is controlled by nationals of that State.

3. The question of dual nationality is dealt with in this sense, that a person is recognized as a "national of another Contracting State", if he has the nationality of that State even though he may at the same time be a national of the
State party to the dispute or of a State which is not a party to the Convention.

4. Nationality is determined as of the date when the undertaking to have recourse to conciliation or arbitration becomes effective.

**ARTICLE XI**

**Final Provisions**

[Final provisions have been inserted in the present draft tentatively and to provide bases of discussion as well as some indication of formal legal items with which it will be necessary to deal. In general, they follow the pattern set by multilateral agreements in the past.]

**Entry into Force**

Section 1. This Convention shall be open for signature on behalf of States members of the Bank and all other sovereign States.

Section 2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification or acceptance by the signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. The instruments of ratification or acceptance shall be deposited with the Bank and shall declare that the State concerned has taken all steps necessary to enable it to carry out all of its obligations under this Convention.

Section 3. This Convention shall enter into force when it has been ratified or accepted by [ ] or the States listed in Part I of Schedule A of the Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association, and [ ] other States.

**Comment**

1. By Section 2 ratification or acceptance must be accompanied by a declaration that the "State concerned has taken all steps necessary to enable it to carry out all of its obligations under this Convention", a requirement also found in the Articles of Agreement of the Bank and its affiliates. When
a State ratifies, therefore, other States would be entitled to rely on the implicit assurance of that State that adequate facilities exist—whether created by legislative or other means—to give full effect within its territories to the provisions of the Convention. Thus, for instance, it would be assumed that the obligations of private parties deriving from undertakings to have recourse to arbitration pursuant to the Convention would be fully enforceable against them under the local law, and that the award of an arbitral tribunal could be enforced as if it were a final judgment of a local court of competent jurisdiction.

2. In recognition of the fact that the utility of this Convention would best be realized through participation of appropriate numbers of both capital-exporting and capital-importing countries, Section 3 of this Article proposes that the effectiveness of the Convention be predicated upon its ratification or acceptance by a specified number in each of those categories tentatively defined by reference to Schedule A of the Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association.

Territorial Application

Section 4. By its signature of this Convention, each State accepts it both on its own behalf and in respect of all territories for whose international relations such State is responsible except those which are excluded by such State by written notice to the Bank.

Comment

3. By this Section a signatory State agrees to the application of the Convention in respect of all territories for whose international relations such State is responsible, e.g. dependent or protected States. It would, however, be open to a signatory to exclude such application, if it so desires, by written notice to the Bank at the time of signature or at any time thereafter. This Section is in substance identical with Section 3 of Article XI of the Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association.

Denunciation

Section 5. (1) Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by notice to the Bank.

(2) The denunciation shall take effect [twelve] months after receipt by the Bank of such notice; provided that the obligations
of the State concerned arising out of undertakings given prior to the date of such notice shall remain in full force and effect.

Comment

4. In keeping with a practice followed in several multi-lateral agreements, the right of a State under general international law to denounce the Convention is recognized in Section 5. However, Section 5(2) provides for lapse of a period of time - tentatively fixed at 12 months - before such denunciation could become effective. The general obligations of the denouncing State under the Convention would remain intact during that period, while its obligations arising out of undertakings given prior to the date of such notice are declared to remain in full force and effect regardless of the denunciation. In this connection reference is also made to the comment to Article IX (Amendment).

Inauguration of the Center

Section 6. After this Convention has entered into force, the President of the Bank shall convene the inaugural meeting of the Administrative Council.

Registration

Section 7. The Bank is authorized to register this Convention with the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and the Regulations thereunder adopted by the General Assembly.

Comment

5. This Section which authorizes registration of the Convention by the Bank, as depository, with the United Nations, is in substance identical with Section 5 of Article XI of the Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association.

DONE at , in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which has indicated by its signature below its agreement.
to act as depository of this Convention, to register this Convention with the Secretariat of the United Nations and to notify all signatory States of the date on which this Convention shall have entered into force.

Comment

6. The concluding formula adopted is in substance identical with that contained in the Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association.

SID/63-16 (September 20, 1963)
Memorandum of the discussion by the Executive Directors, September 10, 1963, not an approved record.
Discussion of the First Preliminary Draft Convention

1. There were present: omitted

2. Mr. Woods said that the purpose of the meeting was to receive comments on the First Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Document SID/63-15. Discussions would again be informal and not for the purpose of taking any decisions. The text of the Draft Convention would be further amended where appropriate in the light of the discussion, and the amended text would be circulated to member governments to serve as working document for the regional consultative meetings of legal experts. He recalled that he had announced at the meeting on May 28 that consideration was being given to organizing these meetings at the headquarters of the Regional Commissions of the United Nations. Since then that program had been discussed with the United Nations Secretariat, which had offered its full cooperation, as had the Executive Secretaries of the four Commissions. It had been made clear to them that these would be Bank meetings, and that the Commissions would not be responsible or assume any sponsorship for the proposals to be discussed. It had also been indicated to them that the Bank would expect to assume the expenses which the Commissions would incur in making available their administrative facilities.

3. The Executive Secretary of ECLA, while he had explained that the facilities of his Commission would not be adequate, expressed his willingness to assist in making arrangements for holding the Western Hemisphere meeting at an hotel in Santiago. While no date had as yet been fixed for that meeting, the first week of February 1964 had been proposed. With regard to the other three regions, the scheduled program was as follows: Africa - Addis Ababa,
December 16-21, 1963; Europe - Geneva, February 17-22, 1964; Asia -
Bangkok, April 27-May 2, 1964. Although details of the meetings
had not yet been worked out, he would like to mention some of the
main points. The Bank would issue invitations only to its member
countries, to countries that had applied for membership, and to
Switzerland with which the Bank maintained a special relationship.
As to the distribution of these countries among the four meetings,
he had in mind the following: (a) countries that were members of
a Regional Commission would normally be invited to the meeting held
at the headquarters of that Commission; (b) countries that were
members of more than one Regional Commission (e.g., the United States,
Britain and France) would be invited to the meeting held in the
region to which they primarily belonged; and (c) in the case of
countries that did not belong to any Regional Commission or did not
actively participate in the work of such Commission, the Bank would
agree with each country upon the meeting to which it would be invited.
While the Bank would not impose a limit on the size of delegations,
it would be suggested that two delegates per country would be the
desirable number. It would also be made clear that, while the
delegates would be legal experts and would not bind their govern-
ments, it would be helpful if they were familiar with government
policy in this general field.

4. The substantive side of the meetings would be conducted by
Mr. Broches with the assistance of a few members of his staff. The
administrative side would be handled by the staffs of the Commissions,
although interpreters and translators would probably have to be
imported as was usual on such occasions. While an estimate of the
costs and a proposed budget item would be presented in due course,
he would for the present take up only one item of expense which had
to be settled before invitations were issued viz., the question of
payment of travel and subsistence expenses of the legal experts.
He proposed that the Bank reimburse member countries for transporta-
tion costs of not more than two experts and make a flat contribution
of $150 per person towards their subsistence costs. On the basis
of maximum attendance it was estimated that that would involve a
cost to the Bank of around $125,000 for the four meetings. The
expenses involved in attending the ever increasing number of inter-
national meetings constituted a heavy burden, especially for the
smaller countries, and since it was most important that the meetings
should be well attended, he felt that the Bank would be justified in
assuming those costs. He planned to announce the regional meetings
in his speech to the Governors, and official invitations should be
dispatched at that time.

5. Mr. Bullitt thought that the Chairman had proposed an
excellent and reasonable schedule and that his proposal for paying
the travel expenses and living allowances of two delegates from
each country was a very helpful one.

6. Mr. Machado thought that in assuming the travel and subsis-
tence cost of delegates as proposed the Bank could render a great
service. That would be a well justified expense, particularly in
view of the desirability of securing good attendance at the meetings.
He supported the proposal that invitations be confined to countries
in each region which were members of the Bank or had applied for
membership as those would probably be the only countries with an interest in the matter.

7. Mr. Mejia emphasized the importance of making it clear, as Mr. Woods had done, that these were essentially Bank meetings, and that the facilities of the United Nations or of its Regional Commissions would be made available merely as assistance to the Bank.

8. Mr. Oellerer requested clarification of certain provisions of the text of the Draft Convention, viz., responsibility for "overhead" costs of the Center and expenses connected with a proceeding, and the enforcement of arbitral awards made by tribunals constituted under the Convention. As for the first, he had three specific questions: (1) Was it possible to estimate the "overhead" cost of the Center which, by Section 16 of Article I was to be borne by Contracting States? (2) How would the rule in that section that expenditures of the Center shall be borne "in proportion to [the Contracting States'] respective subscriptions to the capital stock of the Bank" operate if, say, only 20 members representing a total of 30% of the capital stock adhered to the Convention? (3) As the rule in Article VI that a party to a dispute would bear its own expenses, and charges for use of the facilities of the Center would be borne equally by the parties might present a problem for smaller countries, would it be possible instead to incorporate a rule whereby all such expenses and charges could be assessed against the unsuccessful party? As to enforcement of awards, Mr. Oellerer asked whether it was certain that all awards under the Convention would be enforceable in all Contracting States, particularly awards made against a government.

9. Mr. Broches, replying to Mr. Oellerer's question regarding the "overhead" cost of the Center said it would not be possible at the present time to estimate the cost of the Center, as that figure would, in part, depend on the amount of business the Center would do. As for the initial or starting-up costs, those could be quite low if, for instance, it was decided to begin by having a part-time Secretary-General and, as was envisaged, the administrative staff of the Center were to be provided by the Bank. At the maximum there would be a full-time Secretary-General and possibly one or two clerical or secretarial employees.

10. Mr. Woods pointed out that when the time came for a final decision it would be essential to have an estimate of the expenditure involved. For the present, however, the project was in an exploratory stage and he would prefer to leave the question of the cost of the Center until the time of taking a final decision - perhaps in the third quarter of 1964.

11. Mr. Broches, replying to the second question raised by Mr. Oellerer, said that the proportionate contributions by Contracting States - assuming that all were members of the Bank - would be based on their capital subscriptions. If, however, only members of the Bank representing 30% of the capital were to join, and would be the ones who for a fiscal year would bear these expenses, then the cost of the Center would be distributed among them in proportion to their share in that 30%. Mr. Oellerer's third question related to
Article VI of the Draft Convention in which was stated the general rule that the charges for the use of the Center's facilities as well as the fees and expenses of members of a commission or tribunal were to be borne equally by the parties. It had been left open to what extent the parties would be charged for use of the Center, but if such charges were made they would be borne equally by the parties. While he was aware that in court procedures the court costs were generally assessed against the unsuccessful party, and that in some countries even lawyers' fees of the successful party were charged to the unsuccessful party, he thought it was more customary in arbitration - which was not only a less formal but also a friendlier proceeding - to provide for equal sharing of costs. The Draft itself, however, provided for one exception viz., in cases of proceedings instituted by a party frivolously or in bad faith the tribunal could assess all or any part of the expenses, fees or other charges against that party. While it was, of course, possible for the parties to agree on a different division of costs, it seemed that, as a general rule, equal division of costs was most consonant with the whole character of the Draft.

12. The question of enforcement of awards had not been covered specifically in the Working Paper, R 62-1(SD), which had hitherto been the basis of discussion. He had pointed out in earlier discussions that it would be desirable to have a very clear provision on that matter and such a provision was now included as Section 15 of Article IV which required that each Contracting State recognize an award of a tribunal as binding and enforce it within its territories as if that award were a final judgment of the courts of that State. That was quite a step forward in the recognition of international arbitral awards when compared with the general law in most countries. As to whether forced execution following upon an award could be obtained against a government, that would depend on the force of a final judgment in the country in which enforcement was sought. In general it would not be possible to enforce a judgment against the State in the sense of seizing its property and selling it in forced execution. But this did not seem to present a major problem. The problem had been that there was doubt as to whether States would accept an award as valid and binding. There were hardly any cases in which there had been difficulty in obtaining compliance with an award once its binding character was clearly established. One such exceptional case in the international field was the Corfu Channel Case (Britain v. Albania).

13. Mr. Garland asked whether the costs of solicitors employed by one party would come within the definition of costs chargeable to that party alone.

14. Mr. Broches said that solicitors fees and, where necessary, travel costs would be part of a party's own expenses which under Section 1 of Article VI would be borne by that party alone.

15. Mr. Bullitt asked whether it was contemplated that the text of the Draft Convention, which still appeared as a restricted document, would at some point be made available for general circula-
It was, of course, available to all member governments of the Bank, but he wondered if it might not be made available to some of the other international organizations as well as to some interested private organizations.

16. Mr. Broches said that when a document was marked "Restricted" it meant that it should not be released to the press, to the public or to anyone except persons to whom the Bank chose to release it. In fact, the United Nations, OECD and the Organization of American States had copies of the Draft. The Bank had not given it to any private organizations although some governments, in the course of their consideration of the proposals, might have done so. He would be in favor of continuing to leave it to the discretion of governments whether to give it to certain persons whose advice they sought, until such time as the Bank actually released the document for general circulation.

17. Mr. Woods thought it might be advisable to declassify the document when the Directors as a group had no further comment to make, but felt that a discussion of the matter could be postponed. If the document were declassified it would be made clear, however, that the Directors themselves were not "approving" the Draft. They would merely be saying that they understood what the document contained, and that if the staff wished to pursue the matter in the manner proposed they could do so.

18. Replying to a question from Mr. Bullitt as to whether the document for the regional meetings would eventually be issued (with suitable indication that publication was prohibited) in printed or mimeographed form, Mr. Broches said that that would depend on the related question of the extent of the distribution contemplated. As long as it was intended to retain the official posture that it was not a document for general distribution, he thought it should continue to be issued in mimeographed form. Such documents were generally dealt with more discreetly than printed documents.

19. Mr. Donner pointed out that since many governments had not yet taken a position regarding the Draft Convention, he could imagine that some of them might feel opposed to giving too much publicity to the document or, at any rate, to the document in a form that could give rise to the assumption that it had already reached a stage farther advanced than was actually the case. On the other hand there were many persons in his country who were interested in the Draft, and he had felt free to give copies of it to them.

20. Mr. Garland was also against wide publicity at this stage. If copies of the document were made available, it should be left to the Governments concerned to distribute them within their own territories as they saw fit.

21. Mr. Hudon felt that, as this was basically a document for discussion among governments, it should be left to them to distribute it to parties which had an interest in it. He was not in favor of having it printed and making it generally available.
22. Mr. Mejia was in favor of a broad public discussion of the document, and therefore, of its wide distribution.

23. Mr. Rajan agreed with Mr. Hudon. He was against wide publicity at this stage of a document primarily intended for consideration by member states. If any government wanted to give it to any particular person or group, there would be no objection to it doing so.

24. Mr. Broches said that he appreciated the need for a broad discussion of the Draft. On the other hand the regional meetings were intended to elicit comments of a technical nature which would in turn undoubtedly lead to changes in the text. He recalled that the OECD Convention had never been published in the newspapers, while in speeches it had been referred to as being under consideration by governments. While that institution and the governments concerned had given it to selected persons they felt they could trust, the document was treated with great discretion until the point where it was officially printed and distributed.

25. Mr. Woods asked that further thought be given to the question of when to declassify the document, as well as to the form in which it should be issued at the present stage. The meeting should now proceed to a discussion of the substance of the document.

26. Mr. Machado thought that, in view of the fact that the first of the regional meetings would take place in less than three months, the Directors should circulate the Draft among their governments so as to stir up interest and elicit comment, so that delegates to the regional meetings could come with certain viewpoints from their governments.

27. As to the substance of the document he would first like to express his admiration and compliment Mr. Broches on a magnificent piece of constructive work in which he had tried to reconcile views which were often widely divergent. He felt that, as a whole, the document was approaching the point where the Directors could get their governments to support it. In Latin America where a traditional dislike for arbitration would have to be overcome, the present document would find more sympathy than had the earlier version of the text. He had one specific comment, and that related to Section 3 of Article XI (page 43) of the Convention. That section was to the effect that the Convention would enter into force when it had been ratified or accepted by a specific number of States listed in Part I of Schedule A of the Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association, and a specific number of other States.

28. While he realized that the intention was to find a practical way of bringing into being an institution which would have the support of both capital-importing and capital-exporting countries, he would prefer to delete reference to that classification of states which had been accepted for various reasons when the Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association were drafted. Such a classification would not be favored by countries which cherished the principle of equality of sovereign states. The original IDA classification might change in time, and he would

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like to point out that some Part II countries were now beginning to invest in other Part II countries. He would himself prefer a provision on entry into force which would merely require ratification or acceptance by a fixed number of states without further qualification.

29. Mr. Broches pointed out that the intention had been, far from that of discriminating against the Part II countries, to give them an assurance that the institution would not be brought into being unless it had some support among both groups of states. Such a provision could be of considerable importance also to the capital-exporting countries which would not want an institution to come into being if there were no capital-importing countries that were willing to adhere. The proposed provision had been precise in specifying the minimal requirement of interest by both groups which would bring the institution into being. It was not intended to be discriminatory and he had not realized that it might be politically offensive. He would, however, think about an alternative provision regarding the Convention's entry into force.

30. Mr. Woods said he had sympathy for Mr. Machado's point of view. Classification of countries into Part I and Part II was related to IDA and had been introduced there for a clear and obvious reason. It ought not, however, to become part of the general philosophy of the Bank.

31. Mr. Bullitt, referring to Mr. Broches' remarks, said he was not sure whether the Part I countries would not want this Convention to come into effect unless it was adhered to by a substantial number of Part II countries. However, he had doubts as to the importance of that distinction in the first instance.

32. Mr. Broches agreed that further thought should be given to providing merely for ratification or acceptance by a specified minimum number of countries without reference to any classification of those countries.

33. Mr. Woods felt that that would be the best course, the actual number being left open for the time being.

34. Mr. Donner enquired why, under Section 2(3) of Article I, it was made simpler for the Center to make arrangements with the Permanent Court of Arbitration than with other "public international institutions" which had first to be designated by a majority of two-thirds of all members of the Council. The requirement of a two-third majority, generally reserved for unusual decisions like that of moving the seat of the Center (Section 6(vi) of Article I), seemed to give a particularly negative aspect to the possibility of arrangements with those other institutions.

35. Mr. Broches, replying to Mr. Donner, recalled that the previous version of the text had provided only for arrangements with the Permanent Court. At the suggestion of Mr. Donner and some other Directors, provision had been made for arrangements with other institutions of a similar character which might come into being. It was doubtful whether there would in fact be institutions of a
similar character in the field of investment, and as a link with an as yet unknown organization was a matter for serious consideration, it required, in common with other such matters (like the re-location of the Center), that a decision be taken by a special majority. Specific reference to the Permanent Court had given rise to the need to mention "other public international institutions" so as not to exclude the possibility of similar arrangements with the latter in the future. Those arrangements would be of a simple nature covering the use of a building and possibly staff and a library. As far as Europe was concerned, it would be sufficient to make arrangements for the use of one institution i.e. the Permanent Court. Should an institution of a similar character be created in say, Asia, Africa or Latin America, it might prove to be desirable to ensure the availability of facilities in those areas through the arrangements contemplated. Apart from that aspect of the matter there was no particular merit in working together with other institutions. The Center would merely be an administrative framework, and would not itself engage in conciliation or arbitration nor would it pursue a policy of any kind which might need to be coordinated with policies of other institutions.

36. Replying to a question from Mr. Donner as to why it had not been considered desirable to facilitate arrangements with the institution which might come into being under the OECD Convention, Mr. Broches pointed out that it would be inappropriate for the Center to be linked with that institution because, if it came into being, it would be an institution of a character entirely different from that of the Center. It would be a policing organization for the enforcement of certain substantive rules, whereas the Center would merely perform administrative functions and make its facilities available to parties to a dispute at their request. From an administrative point of view there would be no need for such a link with an institution located in Europe since arrangements could be made for the use of the facilities of the Permanent Court.

37. Mr. Reilly associated himself with Mr. Machado's expression of admiration for the Draft Convention and for the very clear commentary. He would like to suggest, however, that the provisions of Section 17(2) of Article IV might be drafted more clearly. While the comment made its meaning plain the text itself might bear some revision.

38. Mr. Woods said that the text of the Convention would be further revised in the light of the discussion and that the revised text would be circulated to member governments to serve as the working document for the regional consultative meetings. In particular, the text of Section 17(2) of Article IV would be redrafted, and the requirement or ratification by specific members of Part I and Part II countries (Section 3 of Article XI) would be substituted by some other procedure. Consideration would also be given to the question of declassification and distribution of the Draft Convention. Directors who had further comments or suggestions might find it convenient to get in touch with Mr. Broches personally.
39. Mr. Bogoev said that the Government of the Netherlands was, in general, in full agreement with the proposals in the document which, in its opinion, was a very good one. A few remarks of a technical nature had already been passed on to Mr. Broches. He had not yet received any comments on the document from the other countries he represented.

40. Mr. Khosropur, referring to the power conferred on the Administrative Council in Section 6(v) of Article I to adopt conciliation and arbitration rules, enquired whether consideration had been given to providing for consultation with the Panels whose members would, in practice, apply those rules.

41. Mr. Broches, replying to Mr. Khosropur, pointed out that the size of the Panels would make this difficult. In any event, there was no lack of sources to which reference could be made when formulating the rules, e.g. the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, the model rules of the International Law Commission. Other institutions with experience in the field would, of course, be consulted.

42. Mr. Rajan recalled that, as had been indicated by his predecessor, the Government of India had some reservations with regard to an agreement of the kind proposed. While India had entered into many agreements with foreign investors - many of them containing clauses providing for reference, in the event of a dispute, to the President of the International Chamber of Commerce, or similar body - no dispute had so far arisen. He would, however, take the opportunity to make a comment of a technical nature. With reference to paragraph 3 of the Comment to Article II (page 17) he would like to suggest that it might be desirable to incorporate the ideas expressed therein concerning definition of the type of dispute within the scope of the Convention in the Articles themselves. While he could agree with those ideas, he felt that they should be given greater emphasis through introduction into the text of the Convention.

43. Mr. Broches said he would like to see whether it would be possible to meet Mr. Rajan's point.

44. Mr. Donner said that the comments he expected from his authorities had not yet reached him, but that he would discuss these comments with Mr. Broches.

45. The meeting adjourned at 12:25 o'clock p.m.
But there is one source in particular of which much more use can be made; I am speaking of the energies, the talents and the capital that exist in the private sectors of both the developed and underdeveloped countries. We have an obligation to do all we can to create the conditions which will unlock this resource.

One proposal which we have been actively exploring with this objective in mind is the plan to establish facilities, under the umbrella of the Bank, for the conciliation and arbitration of international investment disputes. The Executive Directors, together with the staff, have had this matter under study following the request made of them by this Board of Governors at last year’s Annual Meeting. The proposal has now been given the form of a draft convention. Over the next six months or so, this draft will be discussed at a series of conferences of legal experts of our member countries, to be held, through the courtesy of the four regional Economic Commissions of the United Nations, in Addis Ababa, Bangkok, Geneva and Santiago. I have high hopes that in 1964 the Executive Directors will be able to present to this Board concrete conclusions and recommendations on this matter.

My enthusiasm for the proposal to establish a conciliation and arbitration center is simply a reflection of my interest in exploring all possible ways in which the Bank can help to widen and deepen the flow of private capital to the developing countries. It is not the business of the Bank, nor of its President, to tell the developing nations within the Bank’s membership that they must accept private capital from abroad as a partner in their development efforts or what kind of price it is reasonable for them to pay in order to achieve such a partnership. Those are issues which our members, as sovereign nations, must decide for themselves. Whatever decisions they make, the Bank, as a non-political international organization, must and does accept without reservation. For my part, however, I believe that, to a great extent, the attitudes of many of the less developed countries toward foreign private investment are based on the outdated past rather than on present facts. And I am convinced that those of our members who adopt as their national policy a welcome for international investment—and that means, to mince no words about it, giving foreign investors a fair opportunity to make attractive profits—will achieve their development objectives more rapidly than those who do not. For a country which is known to be hospitable to private investment will have access over the years to a much larger and more stable pool of capital than its neighbor which relies solely on government-to-government aid. It will have access, too, to a much larger pool of industrial personnel—managerial, administrative and technical—and to a much larger mass of scientific and technological information than it could possibly acquire in any other way. Most important of all, its economy will be stimulated and invigorated by the many different contacts, at many different levels, which a hospitable investment climate will make possible between enterprises and individuals within its own borders and those within the borders of the industrialized countries. None of these advantages is likely to be fully available to any nation whose government, however well motivated and however well administered, decides to relegate the private sector to a subordinate role.
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

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Preliminary Draft of a
CONVENTION
on the
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES
BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS
OF OTHER STATES

WORKING PAPER FOR
CONSULTATIVE MEETINGS OF LEGAL EXPERTS DESIGNATED BY GOVERNMENTS

Addis Ababa, December 1963
Santiago, February 1964

Geneva, February 1964
Bangkok, April 1964

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

At the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, held in Washington, D. C., in September 1962, the Governors requested the Executive Directors of the Bank to consider the desirability and practicability of establishing institutional facilities, sponsored by the Bank, for the settlement through conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between States and nationals of other States and, if they concluded that such action was desirable, to draft an agreement providing for such facilities for submission to Governments.

During the past year the Executive Directors have studied this subject on the basis of working documents prepared by the staff of the Bank. After a series of informal discussions the Executive Directors have agreed that the Bank should at this stage convene regional consultative meetings of legal experts designated by Governments, in Addis Ababa, Bangkok, Geneva and Santiago. After these meetings, the Executive Directors will resume their study with a view to reaching definite conclusions.

The attached Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States constitutes the Working Paper for the consultative meetings. This document reflects the discussions of the proposals by the Bank's Executive Directors but has not been approved by them.
CONVENTION
on the
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES
BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS
OF OTHER STATES

PREAMBLE

The Contracting States

1. CONSIDERING the need for international cooperation for economic development, and the role of international investment therein;

2. BEARING IN MIND the possibility that from time to time disputes may arise in connection with such investment between Contracting States and the nationals of other Contracting States, and the desirability that such disputes be settled in a spirit of mutual confidence, with due respect for the principle of equal rights of States in the exercise of their sovereignty in accordance with international law;

3. RECOGNIZING that while such disputes would usually be subject to national legal processes (without prejudice to the right of any State to espouse a claim of one of its nationals in accordance with international law), international methods of settlement may be appropriate in certain cases;

4. ATTACHING PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE to the establishment of facilities for international conciliation or arbitration to which Contracting States and the nationals of other Contracting States may submit such disputes if they so desire;

5. RECOGNIZING an undertaking to submit such disputes to conciliation or to arbitration through such facilities as
a legal obligation to be carried out in good faith, which
requires in particular that due consideration be given to
any recommendation of conciliators, and that any arbitral
award be complied with; and

6. DECLARING that no Contracting State shall by the
mere fact of its ratification or acceptance of this Conven-
tion be required to have recourse to conciliation or arbitra-
tion in any particular case, in the absence of a specific
undertaking to that effect,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

Comment

1. The Preamble contains a general statement of the
aims and purposes of the Convention, and is, in addition,
intended to be declaratory of the fundamental norms upon
which the specific rules of the Convention are based. Para-
graph 1 places the Convention in the context of the need for
promoting economic development while paragraph 2 assures
respect for the proper exercise of national sovereignty.
The purpose for which conciliation and arbitration machin-
ery is set up is limited in paragraph 2 to the settlement of
investment disputes between Contracting States and the
nationals of other Contracting States.

2. Paragraph 3 makes it clear that the procedures set
forth in the Convention are in no way intended generally to
supersede national legal processes or the existing rights
of States under international law, but suggests that other
methods of settlement of the disputes covered may be appro-
priate in certain cases. Paragraphs 4 and 6 emphasize that
recourse to the Center is purely optional.

3. Finally, paragraph 5 recognizes as binding the obli-
gations deriving from an undertaking to submit investment
disputes to conciliation and arbitration under the auspices
of the Center and represents an adaptation of a generally
accepted principle of international arbitration to the effect
that "recourse to arbitration implies an engagement to
submit in good faith to the award" (Article 37 of the Hague
Convention of 1907).
ARTICLE I

International Conciliation and Arbitration Center

Establishment and Organization

Section 1. There is hereby established the International Conciliation and Arbitration Center (hereinafter called the Center). The Center shall have full juridical personality.

Section 2. (1) The seat of the Center shall be at the headquarters of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (hereinafter called the Bank).

(2) The Center may make arrangements with the Bank for the use of the Bank's offices and administrative services and facilities.

(3) The Center may make similar arrangements with the Permanent Court of Arbitration and with such other public international institutions as the Administrative Council of the Center may from time to time designate by a two-thirds majority of the votes of all members.

Section 3. The Center shall have an Administrative Council, a Secretariat, a Panel of Conciliators and a Panel of Arbitrators (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Panels).

Comment

1. It is envisaged that the Center would be sponsored by the Bank, which might, in addition, provide it with purely administrative or 'housekeeping' facilities and staff. By thus linking it to the Bank the Center would be invested with the image of the Bank and its prestige and reputation for impartiality. On the other hand, the Bank would have no role to play, and could not exercise any influence whatever on the proceedings under the auspices of the Center. These proceedings would be the sole responsibility of conciliators and arbitrators appointed by the parties to a particular dispute or by an authority of their choice.
2. Section 2(1) states that the seat of the Center shall be at the headquarters of the Bank. Section 6(vi) of this article, however, empowers the Administrative Council to move the seat of the Center to some other location should circumstances so demand in the future.

3. As it would, in its initial stages, be impossible to predict the volume of business that would be brought to the Center, its machinery must be characterized by flexibility and economy. This is sought to be achieved in part through provision for use of the Bank's facilities. In this connection reference is also made to Sections 4(2), 5 and 7(2) of this article.

4. To the extent practicable, there would be cooperation with the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Under Article 47 of the Hague Convention of 1907 and decisions of the Administrative Council of the Court, the Bureau of that Court is authorized to make its offices and staff available for conciliation and arbitration proceedings between a State and a party other than a State, provided the State concerned is a party to the Convention. (Not all members of the Bank are parties to that Convention.) The arrangements contemplated by Section 2(3) are of a simple administrative nature, e.g. for the use of the Court's staff, facilities, offices and services such as translation, the keeping of records, as well as channelling of communications in cases where parties found it convenient to meet at The Hague rather than in Washington or elsewhere. (See also Section 9(2) of this article). The section also opens the possibility for similar arrangements with other public international institutions which might in the future establish machinery for the settlement of investment disputes.

5. The structure of the Center is conceived on the simplest lines and consists of a) an Administrative Council (except as provided in Section 4, the members of the Bank's Board of Governors would double in function), b) a small Secretariat (personnel of the Bank's staff doubling in function) headed by a Secretary-General, and c) the Panels.
The Administrative Council

Section 4. (1) The Administrative Council shall be composed of one representative and one alternate representative of each Contracting State. No alternate may vote except in the absence of his principal.

(2) In the absence of a contrary designation, each governor and alternate governor of the Bank appointed by a Contracting State shall be ex officio the representative and alternate representative of that State.

Section 5. The President of the Bank shall be ex officio Chairman of the Administrative Council (hereinafter called the Chairman) but shall have no vote except a deciding vote in case of an equal division. During the President's absence or inability to act and during any vacancy in the office of President of the Bank, the person who shall be the chief of the operating staff of the Bank shall act as Chairman.

Section 6. In addition to the powers granted to it by other provisions of this Convention, the Administrative Council shall have the following powers:

(i) To adopt such administrative rules and regulations, including financial regulations, as may be necessary or useful for the operation of the Center.

(ii) To approve the terms of service of the Secretary-General and of any Deputy Secretary-General.

(iii) To approve the annual budget of the Center.

(iv) To approve an annual report of the operation of the Center.

(v) To adopt Conciliation Rules and Arbitration Rules not inconsistent with any provision of this Convention by a two-thirds majority of the votes of all members.
Art. I, Sect. 7

(vi) To move the seat of the Center from the headquarters of the Bank by a two-thirds majority of the votes of all members.

Comment

6. The Convention would be open to all States whether or not members of the Bank, each State being represented on the Administrative Council. While Section 4(2) assumes that Contracting States members of the Bank would usually wish to designate their Governors and Alternate Governors to represent them on the Administrative Council, it provides that a member State which might feel it more appropriate to designate another person or persons in that capacity may do so.

7. The Administrative Council, as its name implies, will have purely administrative functions and the only rules which it may adopt with binding effect are those of an administrative nature envisaged in paragraph (i) of Section 6. The Conciliation and Arbitration Rules to be adopted pursuant to paragraph (v) of that section would become binding on the parties to a dispute only with their consent (see Section 4 of Article III and Section 5 of Article IV).

Section 7. (1) The Administrative Council shall hold an annual meeting and such other meetings as may be provided for by the Administrative Council or called by the Chairman. The Administrative Council may by regulation establish a procedure whereby the Chairman may obtain a vote of the Administrative Council on a specific question without calling a meeting of the Administrative Council.

(2) The annual meeting of the Administrative Council shall be held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the Bank.

(3) A quorum for any meeting of the Administrative Council shall be a majority of the members.
Art. I, Sect. 7

(4) Each member of the Administrative Council shall cast one vote and, except as otherwise provided, all matters before the Council shall be decided by a majority of the votes cast.

(5) Members of the Administrative Council and the Chairman shall serve as such without compensation from the Center.

Comment

8. The question of voting rights has been considered in the context of the functions of the Administrative Council. If the Council were to have dealt with important substantive or policy matters, it is possible that on certain issues there would have been a division between the capital-exporting and capital-importing countries. Thus, if the Council were to have elected the Panels, or if the Secretary-General—who is appointed by the Council—were to have been a quasi-judicial rather than an administrative official, the question of voting power might well have been of considerable significance. On that hypothesis, if each member of the council had one vote and if all members of the Bank became parties to the Convention, the capital-importing countries would have had control over those matters. On the other hand, if the weighted voting system of the Bank were applied in the Council, the capital-exporting countries would have gained control. To avoid both consequences, a system might have been devised requiring matters to be decided by the vote of a majority of the members representing a majority of the voting power determined in accordance with the Bank formula.

9. Whatever the merits of that double test, it does not appear to be appropriate in the present context, since the Contracting States (and the Chairman) would designate the members of the Panels, and the Secretary-General would have no judicial or quasi-judicial powers. Nor does it appear that there are any matters within the competence of the Council that could lead to major divisions between the capital-exporting and the capital-importing countries as
Art. I, Sects. 8-10

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groups. The text, therefore, proposes in Section 7(4) a simple one-member-one-vote formula.

The Secretariat

Section 8. The Secretariat shall consist of a Secretary-General, one or more Deputy Secretaries-General and staff.

Section 9. (1) The Secretary-General and Deputy Secretaries-General shall be appointed by the Administrative Council upon the nomination of the Chairman.

(2) The office of Secretary-General or Deputy Secretary-General shall be incompatible with the exercise of any political function, and with any employment or occupation other than employment by the Bank or by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, except as the Administrative Council, with the concurrence of the Chairman, may otherwise decide.

Section 10. (1) The Secretary-General shall be the principal officer of the Center and shall be responsible for its administration, including the appointment of staff, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and the rules and regulations adopted thereunder by the Administrative Council.

(2) During any absence or inability to act of the Secretary-General, and during any vacancy of the office of Secretary-General, the Deputy Secretary-General shall act as Secretary-General. If there shall be more than one Deputy Secretary-General, the Secretary-General shall determine in what order they shall act as Secretary-General.

Comment

10. As indicated in Section 10(1) the Secretary-General would be the principal administrative officer of the Center. While he would have no influence whatever on the outcome of proceedings under the auspices of the Center he could,
however, in practice perform a valuable task in promoting use of the Center’s facilities and by giving informal assistance and advice to parties in connection with such proceedings. In addition it is contemplated that he would be asked by the Chairman to consult with parties in order to assist the Chairman in choosing conciliators (Art. III, Sec. 3) and arbitrators (Art. IV, Sec. 3). He would fix, within such limits as were set by the Administrative Council, charges payable by the parties for the use of the facilities of the Center (Art. VI, Sec. 2), and might also be consulted regarding the fees and expenses of conciliators and arbitrators (Art. VI, Sec. 3), as well as the location of any proceedings to take place outside Washington or The Hague (Art. VII, Sec. 2). The proper performance of these various functions would seem to require that the office of Secretary-General be one of complete independence—independence of Contracting States as well as of the Administrative Council—hence the general rule in Section 9(2) that that office “shall be incompatible with the exercise of any political function, and with any [other] employment or occupation . . . .”

11. If it could be expected with reasonable certainty that activities under the Convention would be such as to provide a full-time occupation for a Secretary-General and one Deputy, it would be desirable to provide that they, or at least the Secretary-General himself, should not hold any other office or engage in any other occupation or activity. Since no such certainty exists, the text permits a degree of flexibility which would allow the Administrative Council and the Chairman, as nominating authority, to make exceptions to the rule and, in addition, specifically excludes from incompatibility concurrent employment by the Bank or by the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

12. As the Secretary-General in addition to his other functions would have to perform certain purely formal functions such as dealing with routine correspondence, dispatching notices, or making a finding that a certain period
of time prescribed under the Convention had expired, it seemed desirable to provide for at least one Deputy who could assume those functions when necessary.

The Panels

Section 11. (1) The Panel of Conciliators shall consist of qualified persons, designated as hereafter provided, who are willing to serve as members of the Panel.

(2) Each Contracting State shall designate not more than [six] persons to serve on the Panel, who may, but need not, be its own nationals.

(3) The Chairman shall have the right to designate up to [twelve] persons to serve on the Panel.

Section 12. (1) The Panel of Arbitrators shall consist of qualified persons, designated as hereafter provided, who are willing to serve as members of the Panel.

(2) Each Contracting State shall designate not more than [six] persons to serve on the Panel, who may, but need not, be its own nationals.

(3) The Chairman shall have the right to designate up to [twelve] persons to serve on the Panel.

Section 13. (1) Panel members shall serve for four years.

(2) In case of death or resignation of a member of either Panel, the Contracting State or the Chairman, as the case may be, which or who had designated the member, shall have the right to designate another person to serve for the balance of that member's term.

Section 14. (1) Designation to serve on one Panel shall not preclude designation to serve on the other.

(2) If a person is designated to serve on a Panel by more than one Contracting State, or by one or
more Contracting States and the Chairman, he shall be deemed to have been designated by the authority which first designated him.

(3) All designations shall be notified to the Secretary-General and shall take effect from the date on which the notification is received.

Section 15. (1) The Contracting States shall pay due regard to the importance of designating persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance. To that end, they shall seek such advice as they may deem appropriate from their highest courts of justice, schools of law, bar associations and such commercial, industrial and financial organizations as shall be considered representative of the professions they embrace.

(2) The Chairman shall, in designating members to the Panels, pay due regard to the importance of assuring representation on the Panels of the principal legal systems of the world and of the main forms of economic activity.

Comment

13. In view of the optional and flexible character of the Convention as a whole, and of access to the Center in particular, the Panels have limited significance. Parties to proceedings under the auspices of the Center are entirely free to agree to use conciliators and arbitrators who have not been designated to the Panels. On the other hand, as will be seen from Articles III and IV of the text, unless the parties otherwise agree, conciliators and arbitrators are to be selected by them, or by the Chairman when called upon to do so, from the respective Panels.

14. The composition of the Panels could be determined in a variety of ways. One method would be to have the Contracting States elect a certain number of Panel members from among candidates nominated by each Contracting
State. While this method would have certain advantages, particularly in encouraging States to nominate candidates of high quality, it has the disadvantage of necessitating a somewhat complicated voting procedure in order to assure a balanced composition of the Panels as between candidates nominated by the capital-exporting and capital-importing countries respectively. In this connection reference is made to the comment to Section 7 of this article.

15. The method adopted in the present text largely follows the system of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, in leaving the composition of the Panels primarily to the Contracting States. The Panels are to consist not only of legal experts, but also of experts in other fields. They would be composed of a certain number of experts designated by each Contracting State while it is provided in addition, that the Chairman would have the right to designate a specified number of panel members in addition to those designated by the Contracting States. It might be desirable for the Chairman to exercise his right of designation after the States had made their designations, and with a view to achieving balanced representation on the Panels not only of different legal systems but also of different forms of economic activity.

16. With regard to cases of multiple designation referred to in Section 14(2), the Administrative Rules of the Center would, in implementation of that provision, indicate how prior designation is to be determined.

Financing the Center

Section 16. To the extent that expenditure of the Center cannot be met out of charges for the use of its facilities, or out of other receipts, it shall be borne by the Contracting States which are members of the Bank in proportion to their respective subscriptions to the capital stock of the Bank, and by Contracting States which are not members of the Bank in accordance with rules adopted by the Administrative Council.
Comment

17. As some Contracting States might not be members of the Bank, it is provided that the Administrative Rules of the Center would specify the contribution of non-member States. The words "or out of other receipts" have been included in order to take account of the possibility that the Bank might finance the cost of the Center. Reference is also made to the comment to Article VI.

Privileges and Immunities

Section 17. The Center shall be immune from all legal process.

Section 18. (1) The Chairman, the members of the Administrative Council, and the officers and employees of the Secretariat

(i) shall be immune from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity;

(ii) not being local nationals shall be accorded the same immunities from immigration restrictions, alien registration requirements and national service obligations, the same facilities as regards exchange restrictions and the same treatment in respect of travelling facilities as are accorded by Contracting States to the representatives, officials and employees of comparable rank of other Contracting States.

(2) Paragraph (1)(ii) of this Section shall also apply to persons acting as conciliators or arbitrators in proceedings pursuant to this Convention, and to persons appearing as parties, representatives of parties, agents, counsel, experts or witnesses in such proceedings, but only in connection with their travel to and from the seat of the Center or other location where the proceedings are held and their stay at such location for the purpose of such proceedings.
Section 19. (1) The archives of the Center shall be inviolable.

(2) The official communications of the Center shall be accorded by each Contracting State the same treatment as is accorded to the official communications of other Contracting States.

Section 20. (1) The Center, its assets, property and income, and its operations and transactions authorized by this Convention shall be immune from all taxation and customs duties. The Center shall also be immune from liability for the collection or payment of any taxes or customs duties.

(2) No tax shall be levied on or in respect of salaries or emoluments paid by the Center to the Chairman, members of the Administrative Council or officials or employees of the Secretariat who are not local citizens, local subjects or other local nationals.

(3) No tax shall be levied on or in respect of honoraria, fees or other income received by persons acting as conciliators or arbitrators in proceedings pursuant to this Convention for their services in such proceedings, if the sole jurisdictional basis for such tax shall be the location of the Center or the place where such proceedings are conducted or the place where such income is paid.

Comment

18. These provisions are in general patterned after the privileges and immunities of the Bank, except that the Center has been given full immunity from legal process, whereas the Bank in view of the nature of its dealings with capital markets, enjoys only limited immunity in that respect. Section 18(2) is desirable to ensure the proper functioning of proceedings under the auspices of the Center. It will be noted that Section 20(3) does not confer a tax exemption, but merely seeks to avoid taxation based solely on the location of the Center, the place where proceedings are held, or
the place of payment. Similar restrictions on taxation of interest paid on the Bank's bonds are found in Article VII, Section 9(c), of the Bank's Articles of Agreement.
ARTICLE II

Jurisdiction of the Center

Section 1. The jurisdiction of the Center shall be limited to proceedings for conciliation and arbitration with respect to any existing or future investment dispute of a legal character between a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State (or that State when subrogated in the rights of its national) and shall be based on the consent of the parties thereto.

Section 2. Consent to the jurisdiction of the Center by any party to a dispute may be evidenced by

(i) a prior written undertaking by such party to have recourse pursuant to the terms of this Convention, to conciliation or arbitration;

(ii) ad hoc submission of a dispute by such party to the Center; or

(iii) acceptance by such party of jurisdiction in respect of a dispute submitted to the Center by another party.

Section 3. (1) Any Conciliation Commission and any Arbitral Tribunal constituted pursuant to this Convention shall be the judge of its own competence.

(2) Any claim of a party to a dispute that the Commission or the Tribunal lacks competence on the ground that

(i) there is no dispute;

(ii) there is no valid consent to jurisdiction;

(iii) the dispute is not within the scope of the consent; or

(iv) a party to the dispute is not a national of a Contracting State,

shall be dealt with by the Commission or Tribunal, as the case may be, as a preliminary question.
Art. II, Sects. 1-3

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(3) In any proceedings in connection with paragraph (3) of this Section, a written affirmation of nationality signed by or on behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State whose nationality is claimed by the party and issued for the purpose of those proceedings shall be conclusive proof of the facts stated therein.

Comment

1. The term "jurisdiction" is used in Section 1 and in the title of Article II in its broadest sense to denote the scope of the facilities made available by the Center. The terminology used follows the precedent of the Hague Convention of 1907 which speaks of the "jurisdiction of the Permanent Court" (see for example Article 47 of the Convention) even though that Court, like the proposed Center does not itself exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

2. Section 1 of this article deals with the scope of the facilities available under the auspices of the Center in relation to (a) the type of proceedings, (b) the category of dispute, (c) the parties to the dispute and (d) the consensual nature of jurisdiction.

Type of Proceedings

3. Proceedings under the auspices of the Center are limited to conciliation and arbitration. Section 1 also permits the parties to a dispute, if they so agree, to have recourse to both procedures consecutively.

Category of Disputes

4. No detailed definition of the category of disputes in respect of which the facilities of the Center would be available has been included in the Convention. Instead, the general understanding reflected in the Preamble, the use of the term "investment dispute", and the requirement that the dispute be of a legal character as distinct from political, economic or purely commercial disputes, were thought adequate to limit the scope of the Convention in
this regard. Within those limits Contracting States would be free to determine in each particular case what disputes they would submit to the Center. To include a more precise definition would tend to open the door to frequent disagreements as to the applicability of the Convention to a particular undertaking, thus undermining the primary objective of this article viz., to give confidence that undertakings to have recourse to conciliation or arbitration will be carried out.

5. Consideration was given to fixing a lower limit for the value of the subject-matter of a dispute. It was, however, recognized that the parties would in practice be best qualified to decide whether, having regard to pertinent facts and circumstances including the value of the subject-matter, a dispute is one which ought to be submitted to the Center. The subject-matter of a dispute might be of insignificant pecuniary value, but might involve important questions of principle, thus justifying the bringing of a test case. In other instances the pecuniary value might not be readily ascertainable, as where a host government fails to implement a provision in an investment agreement conferring immunity from immigration restrictions on foreign personnel, or might not be ascertainable at all, as where an investor fails to implement an agreement with a host government to train local personnel.

The Parties to the Dispute

6. Section 1 indicates that the facilities of the Center would be available only in disputes between a Contracting State on the one hand and a national of another Contracting State on the other, with a view to ensuring reciprocal performance of obligations which arise out of the application of the Convention. The facilities would thus not be available in a dispute involving a non-contracting State or a national of such State. Also excluded from jurisdiction are disputes (a) between private individuals, (b) between
Governments (except where a Government had satisfied the claim of its national, e.g. under a scheme of investment insurance, and was thereby subrogated in the rights of that national in a dispute before the Center) and (c) between a Contracting State and one of its own nationals (unless that person possessed concurrently the nationality of another State which was a party to the Convention; see Article X, 2).

Consensual Nature of Jurisdiction

7. To the extent that the provisions of Article II constitute a development, rather than a mere codification of existing international law, it is to be expected that States would not wish its provisions to apply automatically to undertakings given in the past, nor to all undertakings to be given in the future. Section 2(i), therefore, limits the application of the Convention to cases where the parties have specifically undertaken to have recourse "pursuant to the terms of this Convention".

8. Section 1 *in fine* declares that the facilities can only be utilized if the parties to the dispute have consented to have recourse to the Center, while Section 2 specifies the manner in which consent may be given, i.e. by a prior undertaking in writing, or by *ad hoc* acceptance of jurisdiction. No particular form is prescribed for the prior written undertaking, which may be unilateral e.g. by enactment of legislation, bilateral or multilateral.

9. When entering into any undertaking pursuant to Section 2 a party would, of course, be free to include such limitations on the scope of the particular undertaking as may seem to it appropriate provided that those limitations were not inconsistent with its obligations deriving from the Convention as a whole.

Determination of Competence

10. The power of an arbitral tribunal to determine its competence is well established in international law. Section
3(1) confers that power alike on conciliation commissions and arbitral tribunals constituted pursuant to the Convention, thus providing a safeguard against frustration of proceedings through unilateral determination of competence by a party.

Preliminary Questions

11. Section 3(2) lists four classes of objection to competence and declares that they shall be dealt with by the commission or tribunal as preliminary questions to be disposed of before entering upon the merits of the case. Thus, objections to conciliation on the grounds enumerated, while they would not prevent constitution of a commission or commencement of conciliation proceedings would be the subject of a preliminary non-binding recommendation to the parties. In the case of arbitration proceedings similar objections would, however, be the subject of a preliminary binding ruling by the tribunal.

Nationality

12. While preliminary questions based on nationality would be subject to the procedure prescribed for dealing with preliminary questions generally, Section 3(3) contains an additional rule relating to determination of nationality in a given case. This rule is based on the view that, in the circumstances envisaged, a question of a claim of nationality by a party ought in the first instance to be determined by the State whose nationality is claimed, the question being dealt with by the commission or tribunal only where that State failed to do so. Accordingly, it is provided that the written affirmation of nationality by a Minister of Foreign Affairs, or official of corresponding rank responsible for the conduct of that State's external affairs, issued for the purpose of the particular proceedings, shall be conclusive proof of the facts stated therein. The affirmation would relate to that party's nationality on the date on which he consented to the jurisdiction of the Center. (In this connection reference is made to the definition of "National of a Contracting State" and of "National of
Art. II, Sects. 1-3

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another Contracting State" in Article X.) Where such affirmation is not introduced, other evidence of nationality satisfactory to the commission or tribunal must be produced.
ARTICLE III
Conciliation

Request for Conciliation

Section 1. Any dispute within the jurisdiction of the Center may be the subject of a request for conciliation by a Conciliation Commission (hereinafter called the Commission). The request may be made by either party to the dispute, shall be addressed to the Secretary-General in writing, and shall state that the other party has consented to the jurisdiction of the Center.

Constitution of the Commission

Section 2. (1) The Commission shall consist of a sole conciliator or several conciliators appointed as the parties shall agree.

(2) Where the parties have not so agreed, the Commission shall consist of three conciliators, one appointed by each party and the third appointed by agreement of the parties, all appointees to be selected from the Panel of Conciliators.

Section 3. (1) If the Commission shall not have been constituted within three months after the request referred to in Section 1, the Chairman shall, at the request of either party, appoint the conciliator or conciliators not appointed pursuant to Section 2. Before making any such appointment, the Chairman shall instruct the Secretary-General to consult with the parties and to report to him any information or views which might assist him in making the appointment.

(2) In making any appointment under this Section the Chairman shall select the appointee from the Panel of Conciliators.

Comment

1. The composition of the Commission, its precise terms of reference and the procedure applicable in proceedings
before it are matters for agreement between the parties concerned. It is only in the absence of such agreement that the provisions of this article thereon would become operative.

2. In recognition of differences between the conciliation and arbitration process, Section 2(2), in contrast to the corresponding provision on appointment of arbitrators (see Section 2(2) of Article IV), does not preclude appointment of a conciliator on the ground that he is a national of a state party to the dispute, or of the State whose national is a party to the dispute.

3. As to the role of the Chairman as appointing authority under Section 3, reference is made to the comment on Sections 2 and 3 of Article IV.

Powers and Functions of the Commission

Section 4. Except as the parties and the Commission shall otherwise agree, the Commission shall conduct the conciliation proceedings in accordance with the Conciliation Rules adopted under this Convention and in effect on the date on which the consent to conciliation became effective.

Section 5. (1) It shall be the duty of the Commission to clarify the points in dispute between the parties and to endeavor to bring about agreement between them upon mutually acceptable terms. To that end, the Commission may at any stage of the proceedings and from time to time recommend terms of settlement to the parties.

(2) If the parties reach agreement, the Commission shall draw up a report noting the submission of the dispute, and recording that the parties have reached agreement. If, at any time, it appears to the Commission that there is no likelihood of agreement between the parties it may declare the proceedings closed, and shall, in that event, draw up a report noting the submission of the dispute and recording the failure of the parties to reach agreement. If one party fails to appear or participate in the proceedings, the Commission shall so state in its report.
Art. III, Sects. 6-7

(3) Except as the parties shall otherwise agree, the reports referred to in paragraph (2) shall not contain terms of settlement recommended to or accepted by the parties.

Comment

4. Section 5(1) describes the duties of the Commission, and is based upon generally accepted concepts of the conciliation function. (See Article 15(1) of the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 1928; Article XXII of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, 1948.) The Commission is specifically empowered to make recommendations to the parties at any stage of the proceedings. In order to avoid any interpretation to the effect that after a recommendation made in the course of proceedings and before their termination, the Commission was functus officio, the words “and from time to time” have been inserted in the second sentence of Section 5(1).

Obligations of the Parties

Section 6. The parties shall give the Commission their full cooperation in order to enable the Commission to carry out its functions and shall give their most serious consideration to its recommendations. Except as the parties to the dispute shall otherwise agree, the recommendations of the Commission shall not be binding upon them.

Section 7. Neither party to a conciliation proceeding shall be entitled in any later proceeding concerning the same dispute, whether before arbitrators or in a court of law or otherwise, to invoke or rely on any views expressed or statements or admissions or offers of settlement made by the other party in the conciliation proceedings, or the recommendations, if any, made by the Commission therein.
Art. III, Sects. 6-7

Comment

5. Section 6, in accordance with principle, declares that recommendations of the Commission shall not be binding, while leaving it open to the parties to agree to be bound by them. The requirement that the parties cooperate with the Commission and give serious consideration to its recommendations is a corollary of the fundamental principle of good faith.

6. Section 7 is intended to encourage the parties to seek agreement rather than maintain fixed positions out of the fear that a conciliatory attitude might prejudice their position in a possible later proceeding.
ARTICLE IV

Arbitration

Request for Arbitration

Section 1. Any dispute within the jurisdiction of the Center may be the subject of a request for arbitration by an Arbitral Tribunal (hereinafter called the Tribunal). The request may be made by either party to the dispute, shall be addressed to the Secretary-General in writing, and shall state that the other party has consented to the jurisdiction of the Center.

Constitution of the Tribunal

Section 2. (1) The Tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator or several arbitrators appointed as the parties shall agree. Where the parties have not so agreed, the Tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators, one arbitrator appointed by each party and the third appointed by agreement of the parties.

(2) The arbitrators so appointed shall be selected from the Panel of Arbitrators. None of the arbitrators shall be a national of a State party to the dispute or of a State whose national is a party to the dispute, or shall have acted as a conciliator in the same dispute.

Section 3. If the Tribunal shall not have been constituted within three months after the request referred to in Section 1, the Chairman shall, at the request of either party, appoint the arbitrator or arbitrators not appointed pursuant to Section 2. The provisions of paragraph 2 of Section 2 of this Article shall apply to the appointment of arbitrators by the Chairman. Before making any such appointment, the Chairman shall instruct the Secretary-General to consult with the parties and to report to him any information or views which might assist him in making the appointment.
Comment

1. The composition of the Tribunal, its terms of reference, and the procedure applicable in proceedings before it are, as in the case of conciliation, matters for agreement between the parties concerned, and the provisions of this article thereon would become operative only in the absence of such agreement (Sections 2 and 5). Section 2(1) adopts what is perhaps the most usual method for the constitution of an arbitral tribunal viz., each party appoints an arbitrator, and a third is appointed by agreement of the parties. However, Section 2(2) introduces a significant innovation by specifying that none of the arbitrators shall be nationals of the State party to the dispute, or of the State whose national is a party to the dispute, thus seeking to minimize as far as possible the danger, inherent in conventional systems, of appointment of partisan arbitrators. This new principle applies also to appointments of arbitrators made by the Chairman under Section 3 of this article.

2. It is a necessary concomitant of the binding character of an undertaking to have recourse to arbitration that adequate provision should be made to prevent frustration of that undertaking by an unwilling party. That is the purpose of the appointment procedure laid down in Section 3. As in the case of conciliation (see Section 3 of Article III), the Chairman is appointing authority unless the parties have otherwise agreed. It may be noted that the Chairman would exercise his power of appointment even if he were of the same nationality as one of the parties. The basic consideration underlying these provi-

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1 One writer has said:

"It is a grave mistake to construct a tribunal out of two national members and one neutral member. Few men are capable of holding the balance between two contending national commissioners. If the governments do not object to the possibility of decision by compromise rather than by adjudication, they should provide for two national commissioners with an umpire in case of disagreement. Otherwise they should provide either for one, or better still three, neutral commissioners." A. H. Feller, The Mexican Claims Commissions, 1923-1934 (New York, 1935) at p. 317.
sions is that the appointing authority is a person who, because of his office, may be conclusively presumed to be capable of acting impartially in the selection of conciliators or arbitrators under all circumstances. It may be noted that under the Bank's Loan Regulations' an unrestricted power of appointment is conferred upon the President of the International Court of Justice and the Secretary-General of the United Nations regardless of their nationality.

Powers and Functions of the Tribunal

Section 4. (1) In the absence of agreement between the parties concerning the law to be applied, and unless the parties shall have given the Tribunal the power to decide *ex aequo et bono*, the Tribunal shall decide the dispute submitted to it in accordance with such rules of law, whether national or international, as it shall determine to be applicable.

(2) The Tribunal may not bring in a finding of *non liquet* on the ground of the silence or obscurity of the law to be applied.

Section 5. Except as the parties otherwise agree, any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the Arbitration Rules adopted under this Convention and in effect on the date when the consent to arbitration became effective. If any question of procedure arises which is not covered by the applicable arbitration rules, the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide that question.

Section 6. All questions before the Tribunal shall be decided by majority vote.

Section 7. (1) An award signed by a majority of the Tribunal shall constitute the award of the Tribunal. The award shall be in writing and shall state the reasons upon which it is based.

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*See Loan Regulations No. 3 and No. 4, dated February 15, 1961 (amended February 9, 1967), respectively Sections 7.03(c) and 7.04(c)*
(2) The award shall immediately be communicated to the parties.

Section 8. (1) Whenever one of the parties does not appear before the Tribunal, or fails to defend its case, the other party may call upon the Tribunal to decide in favor of its claim.

(2) In such case, the Tribunal may render an award if it is satisfied that it has jurisdiction and that the claim appears to be well-founded in fact and in law.

Section 9. Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall have the power to hear and determine incidental or additional claims or counter-claims arising directly out of the subject-matter of the dispute.

Section 10. Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall have the power to prescribe, at the request of either party, any provisional measures necessary for the protection of the rights of the parties.

Comment

3. Section 4(1) leaves the determination of the law to be applied in a particular case to the parties, and if they cannot agree thereon, to the Tribunal. The parties may also give the Tribunal the power to decide ex aequo et bono, that is, in accordance with what is just and equitable in the circumstances, rather than by application of rules of law. Section 4(2) states that the Tribunal will not be excused from rendering an award on the ground that the law is not sufficiently clear.

4. The power conferred on the Tribunal by Section 8 to render an award upon the default of one party is a corollary of the binding character of the undertaking to have recourse to arbitration and is possessed by arbitration tribunals provided for in the Bank's Loan Regulations Nos. 3 and 4, Sections 7.03(h) and 7.04(h), respectively. (See also Article 53 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.) Before an award can be rendered under
this section, however, the Tribunal must be satisfied not only that it has jurisdiction but also that the claim on the merits appears to be well-founded.

5. Unless the parties to a dispute agree to restrict its competence to certain principal claims, the Tribunal will have the power to determine incidental and additional claims as well as counter-claims, provided that they arise directly out of the subject-matter of the dispute. In addition, unless the parties specifically preclude it from doing so, the Tribunal would have the power to prescribe provisional measures designed to preserve the status quo between the parties pending its final decision on the merits.

Interpretation, Revision and Annulment of the Award

Section 11. (1) Any dispute between the parties as to the meaning and scope of the award may, at the request of either party made within [three] months after the date of the award, be submitted to the Tribunal which rendered the award. Such a request shall stay the enforcement of the award pending the decision of the Tribunal.

(2) If for any reason it is impossible to submit the dispute to the Tribunal which rendered the award, a new Tribunal shall be constituted in accordance with the terms of the agreement, if any, between the parties regarding the constitution of the Tribunal which rendered the award, and otherwise pursuant to the provisions of this Article.

Section 12. (1) An application for revision of the award may be made by either party on the ground of the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to have a decisive influence on the award, provided that when the award was rendered that fact was unknown to the Tribunal and to the party requesting revision and that such ignorance was not due to the negligence of the party requesting revision.

(2) The application for revision must be made within [six] months of the discovery of the new fact and in any case within [ten] years of the rendering of the award.
Art. IV, Sect. 13

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(3) The application shall, if possible, be submitted to the Tribunal which rendered the award. If this shall not be possible, a new Tribunal shall be constituted in accordance with the terms of the agreement, if any, between the parties regarding the constitution of the Tribunal which rendered the award, and otherwise pursuant to the provisions of this Article. The Tribunal to which the application is made may stay the enforcement of the award pending its decision.

Section 13. (1) The validity of an award may be challenged by either party on one or more of the following grounds:

(a) that the Tribunal has exceeded its powers;

(b) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal; or

(c) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure, including failure to state the reasons for the award.

(2) An application pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section shall be made in writing to the Chairman who shall forthwith appoint from the Panel of Arbitrators an ad hoc Committee of three persons which shall be competent to declare the nullity of the award or any part thereof on any of the grounds set forth in the preceding paragraph. None of the members of the Committee shall have been a member of the Tribunal which rendered the award, shall be a national of the State party to the dispute or of the State whose national is a party to the dispute, or shall have acted as a conciliator in the same dispute.

(3) The provisions of Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Article shall apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings before the Committee.

(4) In cases covered by sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of paragraph (1), application must be made within sixty days of the rendering of the award, and in cases
covered by sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph (1), within six months.

(5) The Committee shall have the power to stay enforcement of the award pending its decision and to recommend any provisional measures necessary for the protection of the rights of the parties.

(6) If the award is declared invalid the dispute shall, at the request of either party, be submitted to a new tribunal constituted by agreement between the parties or, failing such agreement in the manner specified in Sections 2 and 3 of this Article.

Enforcement of the Award

Section 14. The award shall be final and binding on the parties. Each party shall abide by and comply with the award immediately, unless the Tribunal shall have allowed a time limit for the carrying out of the award or any part thereof, or the enforcement of the award shall have been stayed pursuant to Sections 11, 12 or 13 of this Article.

Section 15. Each Contracting State shall recognize an award of the Tribunal as binding and enforce it within its territories as if it were a final judgment of the courts of that State.

Comment

6. It was recognized in the Preamble as a corollary of the principle that an undertaking must be implemented in good faith, that the award of a Tribunal must be complied with. As a general rule the award of the Tribunal is final, and there is no provision for appeal. Sections 11 and 12, however, provide for interpretation and revision of the award, respectively. In addition, where there has been some violation of the fundamental principles of law governing the Tribunal's proceedings such as are listed in Section 13, the aggrieved party may apply to the Chairman for a declaration that the award is invalid. Under that section the Chairman is required to refer the matter to a Committee
of three persons which shall he competent to declare the nullity of the award. It may be noted that this is not a procedure by way of appeal requiring consideration of the merits of the case, but one that merely calls for an affirmative or negative ruling based upon one or other of the three grounds listed in Section 13(1).

7. The award is binding on the parties to the dispute who are required to implement it forthwith. However, implementation of the award may be delayed in certain prescribed circumstances, viz.,

1) where the Tribunal has, in rendering the award, expressly allowed a time limit for carrying it out (Section 14);

2) upon stay of enforcement by the Tribunal consequent upon
   (a) a request for interpretation of the award (Section 11(1)); or
   (b) an application for revision of the award (Section 12(3)); and

3) upon stay of enforcement by the Committee appointed pursuant to Section 13 pending its decision upon the validity of the award (Section 13(5)).

8. Section 15 requires each Contracting State, whether or not it or its national was a party to the proceedings, to recognize awards of tribunals pursuant to the Convention as binding and to enforce them as though they were final judgments of its own courts, irrespective of the treatment under its law of other arbitral awards.

Relationship of Arbitration to other Remedies

Section 16. Consent to have recourse to arbitration pursuant to this Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, be deemed consent to have recourse to such proceedings in lieu of any other remedy.
9. Section 16 states a rule of interpretation rather than of substance. The section leaves a party free to stipulate that notwithstanding its undertaking to submit a dispute to arbitration, it reserves the right to have recourse to courts of law. Similarly, Section 16 leaves it open to a State to stipulate that its consent to have recourse to arbitration is subject to the condition that the foreign investor first exhaust his remedies in the State's national courts or administrative agencies. Section 16 merely provides that in the absence of any such stipulations consent to have recourse to arbitration will be regarded as excluding any other remedy.

10. To illustrate the foregoing by an example: An investment agreement between a State and a foreign investor provides without qualification that "any controversy arising between the parties concerning the interpretation or application of this agreement shall be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the Convention [etc.]". A dispute arises with respect to the tax exemption provisions of the investment agreement. If either the foreign investor or the State were to bring this dispute before the Tax Court of the State rather than submit it to the Center, the other party could object, in which event the Tax Court would have to dismiss the claim. If the investor were to bring the dispute before the Center, the State could not object on the ground that the investor had not exhausted his remedies in the Tax Court.

11. As stated in paragraph 9 of the Comment to this section, States are free to qualify their consent to have recourse to arbitration, as by inclusion of a stipulation in an undertaking that local remedies must be exhausted. However, if a State were to include an unqualified arbitration clause in an agreement with a foreign investor, it would seem to run counter to normal rules of interpretation to read into that clause a requirement of the prior exhaustion of local remedies. All that Section 16 does is to assure that effect will be given to the expressed intention of the parties.
Section 17. (1) No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection or bring an international claim in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another Contracting State shall have consented to submit, or shall have submitted to arbitration pursuant to this Convention, except on the ground that the other Contracting State has failed to perform its obligations under this Convention with respect to that dispute.

(2) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as precluding a Contracting State from founding an international claim against another Contracting State upon the facts of a dispute which one of these Contracting States and a national of the other shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration pursuant to this Convention, where those facts also give rise to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of an agreement between the States concerned; without prejudice, however, to the finality and binding character of any arbitral award rendered pursuant to this Convention as between the parties to the arbitral proceedings.

Comment

12. Unlike Section 16, which gives merely a rule of interpretation, Section 17 lays down a rule of substantive law. It should be noted that this section constitutes a significant innovation.

13. The proposed Convention would recognize the right of an investor, within specified limits, to proceed in his own name against a foreign State before an arbitral tribunal constituted pursuant to the Convention instead of seeking the diplomatic protection of his State or having that State bring an international claim. It would seem to be a reasonable concomitant of the recognition of the investor's right of direct access to an international jurisdiction, to exclude action by his national State in cases in which such direct
access has been availed of by, or is available to, the investor, whether as plaintiff or defendant, under the Convention. Since the exclusion of the national State rests on the premise that the other Contracting State party to the dispute will abide by the provisions of the Convention, the rule of exclusion is subject to an exception in the event that that premise falls away. In such a case rights of providing diplomatic protection and of bring an international claim remain unaffected.

14. Section 17(2) preserves the right of the national State of the investor to bring an international claim where the same facts give rise not only to a dispute covered by the Convention but also to a breach of some other international agreement between the States concerned. That section does, however, maintain the finality and binding character of an award rendered by a tribunal under the Convention as regards the parties to which it relates. For example, the dispute covered by the Convention may involve a claim for damages for an alleged breach of an investment agreement and the facts alleged may at the same time constitute a breach of a bilateral agreement between the host State and the investor’s national State. Whether the investor, in an action before the Center, is successful or unsuccessful, his national State would be free to have recourse to such procedures as may have been provided in the bilateral agreement. The outcome of the proceedings between the two States under the bilateral agreement would not, however, affect the award rendered by the tribunal constituted under the Convention. Thus, if the investor had been unsuccessful before the Center, even though his national State may prevail in the proceedings under the bilateral agreement, the investor could not benefit thereby.
ARTICLE V
Replacement and Disqualification of Conciliators and Arbitrators

Section 1. After a Conciliation Commission or an Arbitral Tribunal has been constituted and proceedings have begun, its composition shall remain unchanged; provided, however, that if a conciliator or arbitrator should die, become incapacitated, or resign, the resulting vacancy shall be filled by the method used for the original appointment, except that if a conciliator or arbitrator appointed by a party shall have resigned without the consent of the Commission or Tribunal of which he was a member, or consequent upon a decision to disqualify him pursuant to Section 2(2) of this Article, the resulting vacancy shall be filled by the Chairman.

Section 2. (1) (a) A party may propose the disqualification of a conciliator or arbitrator appointed pursuant to Article III, Section 2, or Article IV, Section 2, respectively, on account of any fact whether antecedent or subsequent to the constitution of the Commission or Tribunal.

(b) A party may propose the disqualification of a conciliator or arbitrator appointed by the Chairman pursuant to Article III, Section 3, or Article IV, Section 3, on account of any fact arising subsequent to the constitution of the Commission or Tribunal. It may propose disqualification of such conciliator or arbitrator on account of any fact which arose prior to the constitution of the Commission or Tribunal only if it can show that the appointment was made without knowledge of that fact or as a result of fraud.

(2) The decision on any proposed disqualification shall be taken by the other members of the Commission or Tribunal as the case may be, provided that where those members are equally divided, or in the case of a proposed disqualification of a single conciliator or arbitra-
Art. V, Sects. 1-2

tor, the Chairman shall take that decision. If it is decided that the proposal is well-founded, the conciliator or arbitrator to whom the decision relates shall resign, and the resulting vacancy shall be filled in the manner provided for in Section 1 of this Article.

Comment

1. Section 1 incorporates what has been called the "principle of immutability" and is intended to preclude the replacement of conciliators and arbitrators by the parties during proceedings with a view to influencing the outcome of those proceedings, as well as their resignation under pressure.

2. Section 2 relates to disqualification of a conciliator or an arbitrator. Section 2(1)(a) covers the case of a conciliator or an arbitrator appointed by a party to the dispute, and is to the effect that a party may at any time propose their disqualification. Such proposal may be based upon any fact, such as general unfitness, personal prejudice, misconduct or interest in the subject-matter, and regardless of whether that fact arose before or after constitution of the Commission or Tribunal.

3. While, under Section 2(1)(b), a party may at any time propose the disqualification of a conciliator or arbitrator appointed by the Chairman, as a rule such proposal must be founded upon facts which arose after constitution of the Commission or Tribunal as the Chairman must be deemed to have passed conclusively on the qualifications of his nominee. A proposal to disqualify under this section may be founded on a fact which existed prior to the constitution of the Commission or Tribunal only if it can be shown that the Chairman made the appointment in question without knowledge of that fact, or was induced to do so as a result of fraud.
ARTICLE VI
Apportionment of Costs of Proceedings

Section 1. Except as the parties shall otherwise agree,

(a) each party to a conciliation or arbitration proceeding shall bear its own expenses in connection therewith, and

(b) charges payable for the use of the facilities of the Center, as well as the fees and expenses of members of the Commission or Tribunal as the case may be, shall be borne equally by the parties;

provided, however, that if a Commission or Tribunal determines that a party has instituted proceedings frivolously or in bad faith, it may assess any part or all of such expenses, fees and charges against that party.

Section 2. The charges payable by the parties for the use of the facilities of the Center shall be fixed by the Secretary-General within the limits approved from time to time by the Administrative Council.

Section 3. The fees and expenses of conciliators and arbitrators shall, in the absence of agreement between them and the parties, be fixed by the Commission or Tribunal concerned after consultation with the Secretary-General.

Comment

This article contemplates that the parties may be called upon to make certain payments to the Center for the use of its services. It is intended that "charges" should cover the out-of-pocket costs or other clearly identifiable costs incurred by the Center in connection with a proceeding, such as hiring of translators and interpreters, engagement of additional secretarial or clerical staff and the like.
ARTICLE VII

Place of Proceedings

Section 1. Conciliation and arbitration proceedings shall be held either at the seat of the Center or, pursuant to any arrangements made under Article I, Section 2(3), at the seat of the Permanent Court of Arbitration or other public international institution, as the parties may agree. If the parties do not so agree the Secretary-General shall, after consultation with the parties and with the Conciliation Commission or the Arbitral Tribunal, as the case may be, determine the place of the proceedings.

Section 2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1, proceedings may be held elsewhere, if the parties so agree and if the Conciliation Commission or Arbitral Tribunal, as the case may be, so approves after consultation with the Secretary-General.
ARTICLE VIII

Interpretation

Any question or dispute arising between Contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall be referred to the International Court of Justice, unless the States concerned agree to another mode of settlement.

Comment

The text of this article follows in general the pattern of similar clauses in the constituent instruments of international organizations within the United Nations family. While it leaves the Contracting States free to decide upon the mode of settlement of questions or disputes regarding interpretation of the Convention, it provides for adjudication by the International Court of Justice in the event of their being unable to agree on the mode of settlement.
ARTICLE IX
Amendment

Section 1. Any Contracting State may propose amendment of this Convention. The text of such proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Chairman of the Administrative Council not less than [three] months prior to the meeting of the Council at which such amendment is to be considered and shall forthwith be transmitted by him to all Contracting States.

Section 2. Amendments shall be adopted by a majority of [four-fifths] of the members of the Council. [Twelve] months after its adoption each amendment shall become effective for all Contracting States; provided, however, that such amendment shall not affect the rights and obligations of any Contracting State or of any national of a Contracting State under this Convention with respect to or arising out of proceedings for conciliation or arbitration pursuant to consent to the jurisdiction of the Center given prior to the effective date of the amendment.

Comment

In the absence of a provision for amendment, the Convention could only be changed by a new international agreement. In order to avoid this difficulty the text tentatively suggests inclusion of an amendment procedure. The Administrative Council is designated as the authority competent to decide upon proposals for amendment. Such proposals are required to be transmitted to it through the Chairman well in advance of the meeting of the Council at which such amendment is to be considered so as to enable members to consult with the authorities within Contracting States and take their views into account during a discussion of the issues involved. The support of a substantial majority—four-fifths is tentatively suggested—of the members of the Council would be required for adoption of a proposed amendment, which would come into effect for all the mem-
bers after a period of say 12 months after such adoption. No provision is made regarding States which oppose the amendment after its adoption. It would, however, always be open to a State to declare its withdrawal from the Convention under Section 5 of Article XI. The period specified for effectiveness of the denunciation could be made to conform to the period required for effectiveness of the amendment adopted, thus permitting a State which wished to denounce the treaty to do so immediately following adoption of the amendment and thereby avoid becoming subject to the Convention as amended. The proviso in Section 2 ensures that amendments will not have retroactive effect.
ARTICLE X
Definitions

1. "National of a Contracting State" means a person natural or juridical possessing the nationality of any Contracting State on the date on which that person's consent to the jurisdiction of the Center pursuant to Section 2 of Article II became effective, and includes (a) any company which under the domestic law of that State is its national, and (h) any company in which the nationals of that State have a controlling interest. "Company" includes any association of natural or juridical persons, whether or not such association is recognized by the domestic law of the Contracting State concerned as having juridical personality.

2. "National of another Contracting State" means any national of a Contracting State other than the State party to the dispute, notwithstanding that such person may possess concurrently the nationality of a State not party to this Convention or of the State party to the dispute.

[Other definitions may be added if necessary]

Comment

1. The definitions have been broadly drawn. "Nationals" include both natural and juridical persons as well as associations of such persons. It will be noted that the term "national" is not restricted to privately-owned companies, thus permitting a wholly or partially government-owned company to be a party to proceedings brought by or against a foreign State.

2. Under the definition of "National of a Contracting State" a company may be a national of a given State either because it has that nationality under the State's domestic law, or because it is controlled by nationals of that State.
Art. X

3. The question of dual nationality is dealt with in this sense, that a person is recognized as a "national of another Contracting State", if he has the nationality of that State even though he may at the same time be a national of the State party to the dispute or of a State which is not a party to the Convention.

4. Nationality is determined as of the date when consent to have recourse to conciliation or arbitration became effective.
Art. XI, Sects. 1-3

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ARTICLE XI

Final Provisions

[Final provisions have been inserted in the present draft tentatively and to provide some indication of formal legal items with which it will be necessary to deal. In general, they follow the pattern set by multilateral agreements in the past.]

Entry into Force

Section 1. This Convention shall be open for signature on behalf of States members of the Bank and all other sovereign States.

Section 2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification or acceptance by the signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. The instruments of ratification or acceptance shall be deposited with the Bank and shall declare that the State concerned has taken all steps necessary to enable it to carry out all of its obligations under this Convention.

Section 3. This Convention shall enter into force when it has been ratified or accepted by [……………] States.

Comment

1. By Section 2 ratification or acceptance (either of which must be preceded by signature) is to be accompanied by a declaration that the "State concerned has taken all steps necessary to enable it to carry out all of its obligations under this Convention", a requirement also found in the Articles of Agreement of the Bank and its affiliates. When a State ratifies, therefore, other States would be entitled to rely on the implicit assurance of that State that adequate facilities exist—whether created by legislative or other means—to give full effect within its territories to the provisions of the Convention. Thus, for instance, it would
be assumed that the obligations of private parties deriving from undertakings to have recourse to arbitration pursuant to the Convention would be fully enforceable against them under the local law, and that the award of an arbitral tribunal could be enforced as if it were a final judgment of a local court of competent jurisdiction.

Territorial Application

Section 4. By its signature of this Convention, each State accepts it both on its own behalf and in respect of all territories for whose international relations such State is responsible except those which are excluded by such State by written notice to the Bank.

Comment

2. By this section a signatory State agrees to the application of the Convention in respect of all territories for whose international relations such State is responsible, e.g. dependent or protected States. It would, however, be open to a State to exclude such application, if it so desires, by written notice to the Bank at the time of signature or at any time thereafter. This section is in substance identical with Section 3 of Article XI of the Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association.

Denunciation

Section 5. (1) Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by written notice to the Bank.

(2) The denunciation shall take effect [twelve] months after receipt by the Bank of such notice; provided that the obligations of the State concerned arising out of undertakings given prior to the date of such notice shall remain in full force and effect.
Comment

3. In keeping with a practice followed in several multilateral agreements, the right of a State under general international law to denounce the Convention is recognized in Section 5. However, Section 5(2) provides for lapse of a period of time—tentatively fixed at 12 months—before such denunciation could become effective. The general obligations of the denouncing State under the Convention would remain intact during that period, while its obligations arising out of undertakings given prior to the date of such notice are declared to remain in full force and effect regardless of the denunciation. In this connection reference is also made to the comment to Article IX (Amendment).

Inauguration of the Center

Section 6. Promptly upon the entry into force of this Convention, the President of the Bank shall convene the inaugural meeting of the Administrative Council.

Registration

Section 7. The Bank is authorized to register this Convention with the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and the Regulations thereunder adopted by the General Assembly.

Comment

4. This section which authorizes registration of the Convention by the Bank, as depository, with the United Nations, is in substance identical with Section 5 of Article XI of the Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association.

DONE at ......................, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, which has indicated by its signature below its agreement to act as depository of this Convention, to register this Convention with the Secretariat of the United Nations and to notify all signatory States of the date on which this Convention shall have entered into force.

Comment

5. The concluding formula adopted is in substance identical with that contained in the Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association.
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES

CONSULTATIVE MEETING OF LEGAL EXPERTS

Addis Ababa, December 16-20, 1963

SUMMARY RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

April 30, 1964

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Chairman: A. BROCHES, General Counsel, IBRD

BURUNDI

Mr. N.Z. NICAYENZI

CAMEROON

Mr. P.T. MPANJO

Mr. Soter TSANGA

CENTRAL AFRICAN

REPUBLIC

Mr. J. BIGAY

Mr. F. GISCARD D'ESTAING

CHAD

Mr. E. YOSSANENGAR

Mr. F. GISCARD D'ESTAING

CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)

Mr. E. MAYINGUIDI

Mr. B.B. BOUITI

CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)

Mr. S. LAURENT

Ministry of Justice

DAHOMEY

Mr. S. KPOGNON

Mr. C. JOHNSON

Directeur, Finances Extérieures
ETIOPIA
Mr. M. LEMMA
Mr. A. COBAGZY
Mr. Mohamed Abdul RAHMAN
Acting Governor of the State Bank of Ethiopia
Director General in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry

GHANA
Mr. N.M.C. DODOO
Mr. C.C.Y. ONNY
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Justice

GUINEA
Mr. Diallo Alpha ABDOUNAYE
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IVORY COAST
Mr. J.B. AMETHIER
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Mr. Ahmed Ben LAMIN
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State Counsel
Private Secretary to the Attorney General

RWANDA
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Sous-Directeur à l'Agence de Dakar de la Banque Centrale des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest
Counseiller Technique du Ministre des Finances

SIERRA LEONE
Mr. B. MACAULAY
Attorney General

SOMALIA
Mr. Said Mohamed ALI
Mr. Abdul Rahaman GULAID
NOTE

This document contains a summary record of the proceedings of the consultative meeting of legal experts held at Addis Ababa on the proposals contained in the Working Paper entitled "Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Settlement of Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States" (Doc. COM/AF/1)1.

Suggestions made by the experts for changes in drafting, for improvement of the English and French texts, and for conforming one text more closely to the other, were noted by the Secretariat but have not been included in this record.

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1 This summary record was sent to the delegates for clearance in provisional form and reflects their comments.
2 Doc. 24
Statement by Mr. Gardiner

The CHAIRMAN invited Mr. Gardiner to take the floor.

Mr. GARDINER (Executive Secretary, Economic Commission for Africa), after welcoming the Chairman and the delegates to Addis Ababa, commented on the growing realization of the power represented by properly channelled private investment as a means of promoting economic development. The importance of capital investment obtained from sources other than public funds called for the creation of a legal regime which, while fully respecting the rights of sovereign States in conformity with the recognized principles of international law, would protect the rights of investors and provide an appropriate forum for the settlement of disputes between them.

Attempts had been made to afford foreign investors the necessary protection by means of national legislation and bilateral agreements, and the same careful consideration had recently been given to various possible multilateral schemes. The preliminary draft Convention before the present meeting reflected discussions on those and other relevant questions held by the Executive Directors of the World Bank.

Africa was naturally interested in all such endeavors. The promotion of public and private investment in Africa in projects or programs designed to improve economic development and social progress figured prominently in the Charter of the African Development Bank. Nor had the legal protection of African investments escaped the attention of the Foreign Ministers who had met in Khartoum last August to approve the Charter. The African Bank was due to initiate its activities in the near future and he felt sure that it would then follow very closely the progress of the draft Convention at present under consideration by the Directors of the World Bank.

The CHAIRMAN welcomed the delegates on behalf of the President of the World Bank and thanked the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa for his words of greeting and for the facilities made available by the Commission. The fact that the World Bank was holding this meeting in the Headquarters of the Economic Commission for Africa was evidence of the good relations and spirit of cooperation existing between the Commission and the Bank in their efforts to promote the economic and social development and well-being of African countries. The Bank was especially pleased that it had been able to be of some help in the preparatory work for the establishment of an African Development Bank.

The meeting had been convened to discuss informally with legal experts designated by African governments a preliminary draft of a convention on the settlement of investment disputes. It was gratifying to see the large attendance and to note that governments had sent such eminent representatives.

It was very fitting that the first of four regional meetings to be held by the Bank should take place in Africa. African countries had an
urgent need to encourage the international flow of capital and skills and had shown a willingness to create an atmosphere conducive to financial and economic cooperation.

The fact that the World Bank had taken the initiative in promoting an international agreement in a field which might not be regarded as falling directly within its sphere of activity was due to the fact that the Bank was not merely a financing mechanism but, above all, a development institution. While its activities did consist in large part in the provision of finance, much of its energy and resources were devoted to technical assistance and advice directed toward the promotion of conditions conducive to rapid economic growth, to creation of a favorable investment climate in the broadest sense of the term. To that end, sound technical and administrative foundations were essential, but no less indispensable was the firm establishment of the Rule of Law.

International investment was universally recognized as a factor of crucial importance in the economic development of the less developed parts of the world and had become one of the major features of the partnership between the richer and poorer nations; its promotion was a matter of urgent concern to capital-importing and capital-exporting countries alike. That was particularly true of private foreign investment which, if wisely conducted, could make great contributions to the development of the economies of the recipient countries.

Unfortunately, private capital was not moving in sufficient volume to areas in need of capital, one of the most serious impediments to its flow being the fear of investors that their investment would be exposed to political risks such as outright expropriation, government interference and non-observance by the host government of contractual undertakings on the basis of which the investment had been made.

The Bank had therefore been led to wonder whether, in view of its reputation for integrity and its position of impartiality, it could not help in removing that obstacle to private investment. It had on a number of occasions been approached by governments and foreign investors who had sought its assistance in settling investment disputes and had been encouraged to bend its efforts in that direction by such events as the enactment by Ghana of foreign investment legislation which contemplated the settlement of certain investment disputes "through the agency of" the World Bank. Similarly, Morocco and a group of French investors had entrusted to the President of the Bank the appointment of the President of an arbitral tribunal to settle disputes that might arise under a series of long-term contracts.

The Bank had concluded that the most promising approach would be to attack the problem of the unfavorable investment climate by creating international machinery which would be available on a voluntary basis for the conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes. Some might think it desirable to go beyond that and attempt to reach a substantive definition of the status of foreign property. There was need for a meaningful understanding between capital-exporting and capital-importing nations on those matters. The draft on Protection of Foreign Property, prepared in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, might constitute a useful starting point for discussions.

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1 See OECD Doc. 13627, dated December 1962, revised and reissued as OECD Doc. 23081, dated November 1967
between those two groups of countries. At the same time, however, there was need to pursue a parallel effort of more limited scope, represented by the Bank's proposals.

The Convention would make available institutional facilities and procedures to which States and foreign investors could have recourse on a voluntary basis for the settlement of investment disputes between them. In the opinion of the Bank those facilities and procedures were better suited to disputes between a State on the one hand and a foreign investor on the other than those offered by other existing or proposed institutions. Taken by themselves, however, they could be put into effect by administrative action by the Bank and would not require the conclusion of any inter-governmental agreement.

Such institutional facilities were nevertheless, in his opinion, secondary to other parts of the proposal, which it was necessary to embody in a Convention.

Those parts comprised, firstly, recognition of the principle that a non-State party, an investor, might have direct access, in his own name and without requiring the espousal of his cause by his national government, to a State party before an international forum. States, in signing the Convention would admit that principle, but only the principle. No signatory State would be compelled to resort to the facilities provided by the Convention, or to agree to do so, and no foreign investor could in fact initiate proceedings against a signatory State unless that State and the investor had specifically so agreed. However, once they had so agreed, both parties would be irrevocably bound to carry out their undertaking and the Convention established rules designed to prevent the frustration of the undertaking and to insure its implementation.

Secondly, while the Convention implied a recognition that local courts were not necessarily the final forum for the settlement of disputes between a State and a foreign investor, it did not imply that local remedies could not play a major role. When parties consented to arbitration, they would be free to stipulate either that local remedies might be pursued in lieu of arbitration, or that local remedies must first be exhausted before the dispute could be submitted for arbitration under the Convention. If the parties to a dispute had not made either stipulation, then and only then, did the Convention provide that arbitration would be in lieu of local remedies.

A third and more important feature of the Convention followed from the fact that in traditional international law a wrong done to a national of one State for which another State was internationally responsible was actionable not by the injured national, but by his State. In practice that principle had been superseded in a number of cases in which provision had been made for the settlement of investment disputes by direct conciliation or arbitration between the host State and the foreign investor. The internationally binding character of such arrangements had not, however, been universally recognised hitherto, and the Convention was designed to fill that gap.

Every international agreement signified the acceptance in one form or another of a limitation of national sovereignty. The proposed Conven-
tion was intended to give internationally binding effect to the limitation of sovereignty inherent in an agreement by a State pursuant to the Convention to submit a dispute with a foreign investor to arbitration. As a corollary of the principle of allowing an investor direct and effective access to a foreign State without the intervention of his national State it was proposed - and this was an important innovation - that an investor's national State would no longer be able to espouse a claim of its national. In this way it was sought to ensure that States would not be faced with having to deal with a multiplicity of claims and claimants. The Convention would therefore offer a means of settling directly, on the legal plane, investment disputes between the State and the foreign investor and insulate such disputes from the realm of politics and diplomacy.

Fourthly, awards of arbitral tribunals rendered pursuant to the Convention would be recognized by, and enforceable in all Contracting States as if they were final judgments of their national Courts, regardless whether the State in which enforcement was sought was or was not a party to the dispute in question. In that connection he wished to make it clear that where, as in most countries, the law of State Immunity from execution would prevent enforcement against a State as opposed to execution against a private party, the Convention would leave that law unaffected. All the Convention would do would be to place an arbitral award rendered pursuant to it on the same footing as a final judgment of the national Courts. If such judgment could be enforced under the domestic law in question, so could the award; if that judgment could not be so enforced, neither could the award.

Fifthly, it should be borne in mind that the Convention did not lay down standards for the treatment by States of the property of aliens, nor did it prescribe standards for the conduct of foreign investors in their relations with host States. Accordingly, the Convention would not be concerned with the merits of investment disputes but with the procedure for settling them.

While the Bank believed that private investment had a valuable contribution to make to economic development, it was neither a blind partisan of the cause of the private investor, nor did it wish to impose its views on others. He did not expect or think it desirable that all disputes between foreign investors and host States should necessarily be dealt with by the facilities established under the Convention, nor was it intended to supersede national jurisdiction generally. It should, however, be stressed that there might be instances when recourse to an international forum would be in the interests of the host State as well as in those of the investor.

Two further points needed emphasis. The first was that the Convention was designed to deal with claims by host States against investors, as well as with claims by investors against host States; the second, that the Convention dealt with conciliation as well as with arbitration. As to the latter, it might well be found when the Convention came into operation, that conciliation activities under the auspices of the Center proved more important than arbitral proceedings.

In conclusion he pointed out that the Convention left States and investors free to establish their mutual relations on whatever basis they deemed proper. Its true significance lay in the fact that it ensured that
if the parties agreed to have recourse to an international forum, their agreement would be given full effect. This would create an element of confidence which would, in turn, contribute to a healthier investment climate.

The session was suspended at 3:40 p.m. and resumed at 4:05 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN invited representatives to make general remarks on the preliminary draft of a Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States.

Mr. LEMMA (Ethiopia) said that in principle Ethiopia favored the establishment of an International Conciliation and Arbitration Center. Ethiopian courts were empowered to hear cases against Government Ministries and Departments, but however independent the courts, the investor would always regard them as the instrument of the State. On the other hand, States might be reluctant to take action against investors because of the unfavorable impression such action might make on others. The proposed Center would therefore be of value in improving relations between investors and Governments. The draft Convention had been well prepared and avoided interference with the legal system of States. The question of the attitudes to be adopted by host Governments and investors had not previously received the attention it deserved. The investor should accept the fact that to a certain extent he was a member of the country in which he was called upon to work and that he had to play the role of a good citizen. On the other hand, the host Government should recognize that foreign capital was essential and grant the investor the same support and protection it accorded its own citizens. His country welcomed the principles embodied in the draft Convention.

Mr. MOUSTAFA (United Arab Republic) reminded representatives that the principle of settling differences by conciliation and arbitration was not new. It was embodied in Articles 3 and 19 of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Convention on the execution of foreign arbitral awards which entered into force on June 7, 1959. The United Arab Republic would wish before discussing the draft of the proposed Convention to see the establishment of international conciliation and arbitration institutions becoming a means of settling disputes between States peacefully. The meeting was composed of peace loving countries and it was difficult to imagine any one of them opposing the principle of conciliation and arbitration for the settlement of disputes which might arise between them under private or public law. It was safe to assume, therefore, that the draft Convention would receive the approval, in principle at least, of all the countries present at the meeting.

Representatives had come to the regional consultative meeting to express their opinions on the draft Convention. It would be useful, once all opinions expressed at the four regional meetings had been collected, to consider the final version of the draft at a general meeting attended by legal experts appointed by member governments to sign the agreement. A way should also be found of enabling representatives at each regional meeting to be kept informed of the opinions expressed at the other regional meetings.

His delegation requested the Chairman to place at the disposal of
members documents on similar conventions on conciliation and arbitration. It should be observed that the draft followed certain provisions, particularly insofar as the juridical personality and immunity of the Center was concerned, of the Convention on the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The meeting would have to decide whether to discuss the manner in which the draft was arranged and bring it into line with international conventions, or leave that matter until agreement on the Convention as a whole had been reached.

Mr. ABDOUAYE (Guinea) said that economic development could not be achieved without capital and that the developing countries would not obtain capital unless they provided adequate guarantees. Investment Codes had been promulgated by many countries, but capital required more solid guarantees. There was therefore an urgent need for an international agreement such as that proposed by the Bank. His country supported the principles contained in the proposed Convention.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) said his country welcomed the preliminary draft and hoped that it would not be long before a final text was approved and entered into force. As the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa had said, the aim was to strike a balance between the interests of investors and those of developing countries. Insofar as the draft Convention was concerned, his delegation would raise one or two points of substance and suggest some improvements in the drafting. The question of drafting could not be left aside as sometimes a point of substance was concealed in what at first sight appeared a mere drafting matter. In the opinion of his Government the document represented an attempt not only to restore the confidence of the investor but also to codify certain principles of customary law and to engage in the progressive development of international law, and he warmly recommended it.

Mr. BIGAY (Central African Republic) said that his Government attached great importance to the matter under discussion since his country was one of those which needed foreign capital. The preliminary draft had been well prepared, but he agreed with the representative of Nigeria that some discussion on the question of drafting was necessary. Insofar as the substance of the draft was concerned, his delegation would ask for more precise information on the powers of the arbitrators (would they, for instance, be able to undertake enquiries and investigate the situation in countries involved in disputes?), on the rendering of an award in cases where the three arbitrators differed, and on the question of the means of enforcement.

Mr. GACHEM (Tunisia) said that international investments were of very great interest for all developing countries. All the African delegates attending the present meeting represented developing countries and all of them would certainly support every effort made by the World Bank to alleviate investors' fears - fears which he felt were often exaggerated. He doubted whether the provision on the international plane of procedures similar to those included in all bilateral agreements would be enough to promote private investment to the extent that was desired. In his opinion, private investors feared not only the possibility of arbitrary action by a host State but also the risk of becoming involved in litigation with that State. He suggested that it was desirable to create, under the aegis of the Bank, a guarantee fund which should be financed by a levy on all investments obtained, and used to compensate
investors for losses they might suffer, the sums paid out to them being recovered from the host State in question.

Mr. KPOGNON (Dahomey) said that his country welcomed private investment. States should devise ways of giving investors every possible assurance that disputes between them would be settled in a mutually satisfactory manner. The World Bank's proposal constituted a supplementary assurance on settlement of such disputes on the international level. He congratulated the World Bank on the voluntary nature of the mechanism proposed in the draft Convention. At the same time he asked whether the flexibility of that mechanism was not perhaps a little too great. He would like to have a clear distinction made between conciliation and arbitration. A settlement reached by conciliation was not, like an arbitral award, definitive and binding. Conciliation should therefore be regarded as a first recourse and arbitration as a second. He suggested also that it might be desirable, in connection with the enforcement of arbitral awards, to rely somehow on the vision of the United Nations Charter dealing with the obligation to carry out decisions of the International Court of Justice.

The draft Convention sought to introduce an important innovation, in proposing to make the private investor directly subject to international jurisdiction, for international law had hitherto been applicable only to nations. He wondered how far it would be possible to give practical effect to that innovation. He suggested that the individual in such cases should be granted diplomatic protection of a special kind, enlarging the traditional diplomatic protection. He proposed that the Administrative Council should be empowered to see that the members of the arbitral tribunal were technically competent. With regard to the form and substance of the articles of the Agreement, he felt that the two were inseparable and should therefore be examined together.

Mr. ONNY (Ghana) said that his Government, with a view to promoting the flow of private capital into his country, had enacted legislation to protect the investor, and thereby allay his possible fears. Ghana found the principles embodied in the Convention generally acceptable and welcomed the idea of the establishment, under the auspices of the World Bank, of a center for the settlement of disputes between investors and host States by conciliation or arbitration.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) said that Cameroon had also enacted legislation to protect the foreign investor. He congratulated the World Bank on its attempt to conciliate the unconcilliable, since on the one hand it had to persuade the host States to impose voluntary limits on the exercise of their sovereign rights, which they naturally would not wish to do, and on the other hand it had to encourage investors, who were afraid of the manner in which the countries in which they were investing would exercise their sovereign rights, to invest in them regardless of their fears. He reserved his position with regard to the substance of the draft Convention except on one point which had not been mentioned until then. Disputes in the field of investment could be of two different kinds, firstly, they could arise in connection with the acquisition by a State of the private property of aliens by nationalization or expropriation and, secondly, once the question of the justice or otherwise of such acquisition has been decided, over the question of possible indemnity. Those problems and the procedure to be adopted
in settling them would have to be dealt with if full satisfaction were to be given to potential foreign investors. He supported the suggestion made by the representative of Dahomey that a special kind of diplomatic protection should be given to the individual when he became subject to international jurisdiction.

Mr. BOUTITI (Congo, Brazzaville) said that the draft Convention was a valuable basis for discussion and reserved his position.

Mr. RATSIRAHONANA (Malagasy Republic) said that the Malagasy legal code contained provisions for arbitration in the case of disputes over investments and the implementation of those provisions would be facilitated by the adoption of the draft Convention. He, therefore, supported the basic principles embodied in the Convention but reserved his position on certain questions of form and possibly also of substance.

Mr. MACAULAY (Sierra Leone) said that as a gathering of lawyers, their task was to create the machinery for the settlement of disputes that could arise over questions of private investments in foreign countries, and not to discuss the merits of possible disputes. He also felt that the World Bank's proposals should take into account existing machinery for the settlement of disputes by arbitration and conciliation with a view to securing the widest support for the Convention.

The CHAIRMAN said that in drafting the proposals now before the meeting the Bank had in fact taken into account existing international arrangements for the settlement of disputes. He was convinced that the proposals neither duplicated nor were in conflict with those arrangements.

Mr. BENANI (Morocco) said that the basic principles embodied in the draft Convention were already included in Moroccan legislation. He felt that the proposed juridical status of the Center was too vague and asked whether it was intended that the Center should be dependent on the World Bank, or an autonomous institution created by the private investors and Contracting States concerned under the aegis of the World Bank, or a new independent international body. He would like a true balance to be established between the respective responsibilities of private investors and Contracting States. He pointed out that private investors regardless of the agreements they might reach with Contracting States would still remain generally subject to the legislation of their own country, whereas Contracting States were fully committed by their undertakings. Since States would be required to make a voluntary sacrifice of certain of their sovereign rights, he asked whether the World Bank could not be more closely connected with the Center. He supported the Tunisian proposal for the establishment of an international investment guarantee fund.

Mr. MANKOUBI (Togo) supported the suggestion made by the representative of Dahomey that conciliation and arbitration should be regarded as two stages in the process of reaching a settlement.

Mr. BROWN (Tanganyika) stressed that it was necessary to attract foreign investment without prejudice to national sovereignty. He was in favor of any measures calculated to make foreign investment more of a joint international concern and bring it more directly under international control.
Mr. ALI (Somalia) pointed out that the settlement of disputes in the field of investment was an important factor in promoting the social and economic development of the new nations. He could, therefore, support the principles embodied in the draft Convention.

Mr. Ben LAMIN (Libya) said that his country had paid special attention to the question of arbitration in connection with the petroleum industry, and that he would be glad to cooperate in any discussion aimed at promoting mutual understanding and friendly relations.

Mr. FOALEM (Niger and OAMCE) said that experience had shown the OAMCE States the value of providing for arbitration in their legal codes. The Center recommended in the draft Convention would help those countries to implement such legal provisions on arbitration. With regard to the question of promoting foreign investment, he felt that there was a definite need in this field for a code of good conduct similar to that drawn up by the OECD in connection with foreign property, for an international code of arbitration procedure, and for an international investment guarantee fund for investors of the kind that had been proposed by the representatives of Tunisia and Morocco.

The meeting rose at 5:55 p.m.

SECOND SESSION
(Tuesday, December 17, 1963 - 10:00 a.m.)

General Remarks by the experts (continued)

The CHAIRMAN invited Mr. Yossanengar to take the floor.

Mr. YOSSANENGAR (Chad) said that the creation of a Center for the settlement of disputes between capital-importing countries and investors was very timely. It would provide a necessary international guarantee, calculated to give investors more confidence than would the arbitral provisions normally inserted in bilateral and other arrangements.

PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES (COM/AF/1)

ARTICLE I - International Conciliation and Arbitration Center

Establishment and Organization (Sections 1 - 3)

The CHAIRMAN invited the meeting to consider Article I, Sections 1-3 of the draft Convention.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) supported by the representatives of the Central African Republic, Ethiopia and Somalia, suggested that in Section 1 the word "investment" should be inserted at the end of the first line after the word "international" in order to distinguish the Center from other institutions dealing with international arbitration and conciliation generally.
With regard to Section 2(3), he suggested that the paragraph should end after the word "institutions" in the third line, the word "such" in line 2 being deleted. The remainder of the sentence should be transferred to Section 6 (page 6) to form an additional sub-paragraph (vii) to read: "To make arrangements with the Permanent Court of Arbitration and with such other public international institutions it may from time to time designate by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the members".

Mr. MOUSTAFA (United Arab Republic) said that while the connection of the Center with the Bank would give the Center added prestige, the intention was nonetheless to create an independent body. It might therefore be desirable to indicate at the outset, rather than in Section 6, sub-paragraph (vi), that the seat of the Center could be transferred to another location.

The CHAIRMAN admitted that the link with the International Bank, with separate provision (Section 6, sub-paragraph (vi)) for the possible removal of the seat of the Center, might not be legally elegant. However, the connection of the Center with the Bank, which in no way endangered the impartiality of the Center, was in his view the essential point. The reference to the possible transfer of the seat of the Center was in reality only a saving clause, included to permit such a transfer without having to amend the Convention, and it would therefore be preferable to let it remain in Section 6.

Mr. ALI (Somalia) suggested that the circumstance under which the seat of the Center could be transferred under Section 6, sub-paragraph (vi) should be clearly defined and the transfer limited to certain specific places.

Mr. GISCARD D’ESTAING (Central African Republic) asked whether it would not be possible instead of moving the seat of the Center, to establish regional offices, or use branch premises of the Bank and other institutions.

Mr. MACAULAY (Sierra Leone) said that although the link with the International Bank would give the Center added prestige, certain countries might not wish to include an arbitration clause in possible arrangements owing to the preponderant role of the Chairman in the functioning of the Center, which could be seen by reference to Sections 5, 7(1), 9(1) and (2), 11(3) and 12(3) of Article I. He asked whether it would not be possible to transfer some of the functions at present vested in the Chairman to some other person or body.

The CHAIRMAN said that the draft Convention had been drawn up on the assumption that the link with the International Bank was considered beneficial and that the President of the Bank was recognized to be a suitable person for the functions vested in him. He pointed out that the functions of the Chairman were not such as could influence proceedings under the auspices of the Center.

Mr. MOUSTAFA (United Arab Republic) said that the recognition of the Center as a juridical personality enjoying the corresponding privileges and immunities would require legislative measures varying in kind from country to country.

Mr. BROWN (Tanganyika) said that if States were going to have to
legislate under their municipal law in order to confer legal personality on the Center, some indication of the need for such legislation should be included in the Convention.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) said that the provision included in Article XI, Section 2, appeared to him adequate to meet the point raised by the delegate of Tanganyika and suggested that any further provisions that might be deemed necessary should be included in the administrative rules of the Center rather than in the Convention.

The Administrative Council (Sections 4 - 7)

Mr. MOUTAFA (United Arab Republic) said that he had no objection to the constitution of the Administrative Council prescribed by the draft Convention except that the Chairman was not allowed to vote except in the case of an equal division. The chairmanship of a council did not normally deprive the chairman of his voting rights.

In Section 6, sub-paragraphs (i) to (iv) indicated that the work of the Council was purely administrative. The Council was, however, entitled under sub-paragraph (v) to approve and adopt conciliation rules and arbitration rules, and it ought to be stated by whom those rules were to be formulated.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the functions of the Council were two-fold. Firstly, as a housekeeping body its work was exclusively administrative, and in administrative matters it was supreme; secondly, as a body empowered to adopt arbitration and conciliation rules subject to certain restrictions, its functions were somewhat different. It had to be remembered that the substance of the rules that might be adopted by the Council would deal mainly with questions of implementation of the provisions of the Convention and with purely procedural matters. Those rules, however, would in a sense be only "model" rules. They were not obligatory and parties to a dispute could reject them in favor of other rules if they so desired. The initial formulation of those rules for consideration by the Council would be the responsibility of the Secretary-General and his staff.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) said that he thought it desirable to describe in greater detail the role of the Secretariat.

The CHAIRMAN said that the Secretary-General would act in much the same way as the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague; in other words, he would act as the registrar of the Center and his functions would not be judicial or arbitral. The importance of the Secretary-General did not lie in any powers conferred on him by the Convention, but in the fact that he was a person who could be consulted on all relevant matters which would generally be of a procedural nature.

Mr. KPOGNON (Dahomey) suggested that in Section 4, paragraph (1), it was unnecessary to state that no alternate could vote in the absence of his principal. In his view, the liaison between the Center and the Bank, indicated in Section 4, paragraph (2) was eminently desirable and could also, in the light of Section 7, paragraph (2), represent a valuable
economy for members, whose representatives at the annual meeting of the Bank would be also able to represent them at the annual meeting of the Administrative Council.

The CHAIRMAN stated that the annual meeting of the Council would be held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the Bank not only as a way of stressing the psychological value of the link between the two but also in a desire to save time and money. If governments wished to send different representatives to the two meetings they were at liberty to do so.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) suggested that in Section 6, sub-paragraphs (v) and (vi), the wording should be amended to read "by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the members" instead of "by a two-thirds majority of the votes of all members".

Mr. ABDOUAYE (Guinea) said that the two-thirds majority required for the decision to move the seat of the Center was so great that it might block the action of the Council. He pointed out that the quorum for meetings of the Administrative Council was a simple majority and suggested that the two-thirds majority should be interpreted as two-thirds of the members voting and not of all the members.

Mr. KPOGNON (Dahomey) said he would like to know why a two-thirds majority was required for the adoption of arbitration and conciliation rules. With regard to moving the seat of the Center he felt that the importance of the question fully justified insisting on a majority of two-thirds of all the members. He was not in favor of the proposal made by the representative of Guinea to accept a majority of two-thirds of the members voting.

The CHAIRMAN replied that the two-thirds majority had been prescribed for the adoption of arbitration and conciliation rules because of the importance of the issues involved.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) suggested that most of the substantive part of Section 7(1) be left for inclusion in the rules of procedure.

Mr. ABDOUAYE (Guinea) supported the suggestion made by the representative of Nigeria concerning Section 7, paragraph (1).

The CHAIRMAN said with regard to Section 7(1), that he doubted whether the second sentence could be safely dropped. The proposal called for further consideration.

Mr. DODOO (Ghana) with regard to the second sentence of Section 7(1), shared the view of the Chairman that that paragraph should stand since it might be argued that the regulations subsequently drafted did not give the Council the necessary authority.

Mr. ENGAY (Central African Republic) suggested that the casting vote given to the Chairman in Section 5 was unnecessary since a casting vote was normally used only in the case of issues of special importance and according to the Convention such issues would in any case have to be decided by a two-thirds majority.
Mr. FOALEM (OAMCE) asked for a clarification of the meaning of the words "in conjunction with" in Section 7, paragraph (2). If the meetings were to be held concurrently it might prove necessary to ask all member States to nominate representatives and alternates for the Council.

The CHAIRMAN replied that in the case of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and its affiliates it had been possible in practice to hold the annual meetings of the various institutions within the same limited period, although the period of one week which was now the rule might prove too short and might have to be extended.

Mr. BOUITI (Congo, Brazzaville) said that while he appreciated the reasons of economy which made it desirable to hold the annual meetings of the Bank and the Center concurrently, he felt that the work of the Bank was so heavy that it was doubtful whether the Governors would have time to attend the annual meetings of the two institutions. Most of them were Government Ministers and it was as much as they could do to attend the Board meetings of the Bank.

The CHAIRMAN said that the difficulty could perhaps be met by asking advisers who accompanied the Governors to attend the meetings of the Administrative Council which, except during its first year, would probably not have a great deal to do.

Mr. FOALEM (OAMCE) suggested that even if members of the Council served without compensation, the question of their expenses would have to be considered.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) asked whether members were, or were not, entitled to subsistence allowances.

The CHAIRMAN replied that no one had thought of depriving representatives of subsistence allowances to which they were entitled.

The Secretariat (Sections 8 - 10)

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) said that he found the proposed text generally acceptable but he felt that the Secretary-General ought to be an independent full-time employee of the Center. He therefore suggested that in Section 9(2), lines 4 and 5, the words "other than employment by the Bank or by the Permanent Court of Arbitration" should be deleted, or if they were retained, it should be clearly understood that they were included only on a very temporary basis. In spite of the fact that during the first years the Secretary-General would not have much to do, the importance of his position made it desirable that he should if possible be a full-time employee from the start.

Mr. KPOGNON (Dahomey) shared the views expressed by the representative of Nigeria but said that for reasons of economy it might nevertheless be convenient to have an employee of the Bank as Secretary-General of the Center.

Mr. BOUITI (Congo, Brazzaville) said that the political nature of the membership of the Administrative Council made it necessary to take steps to guarantee the complete independence of the Secretary-General.
Mr. FOALEM (OAMCE) said he had no objection to the employment on a temporary basis of a member of the staff of the Bank as Secretary-General. At the same time he felt that the powers of the Chairman ought to be reduced in favor of those of the Administrative Council. It should not be forgotten that nomination by the Chairman of a candidate for Secretary-General was a question likely to divide industrialized and developing countries and one in which the non-industrialized countries were likely to have little say.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the President of the Bank was only entitled to nominate the Secretary-General, and the candidate he nominated could be rejected by the Council, on which the developing countries would be represented by a large majority. The President would naturally try to nominate an acceptable candidate. As an institution for the promotion of development rather than as a purely lending institution, the Bank if it failed to be impartial would compromise its chances of success. Investors would have to rely on the discretion of the President while developing countries could count on their voting power in the Council.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) and Mr. DODOO (Ghana) shared the view of the representatives of Nigeria and the OAMCE that the Secretary-General should preferably be a full-time employee of the Center from the start. He would not only have to supervise the launching of the institution and the recruitment of its personnel, but he would also be the most important member of its staff. He must therefore be fully independent. Since the Chairman was also President of the Bank it was obvious that the office of Secretary-General, and also that of the Deputy Secretary-General should be incompatible with any other employment, even employment in the Bank.

Mr. OGBAGZY (Ethiopia) suggested that in view of the importance for the prestige of the Center of having a completely independent Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General, the incompatibility referred to in Section 9(2), should be extended to cover financial interests that might also be incompatible with those offices.

Mr. ABDOUAYE (Guinea) referring to Section 9(1) and Section 10(2), suggested that the work of the Deputy Secretaries-General ought to be divided among them according to previously established principles and taking into account the need for representation of geographical regions, in order to facilitate the task of the Secretary-General when, under Section 10(2), he had to determine the order in which deputies had to act as Secretary-General.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that Deputy Secretaries-General would probably for some time to come be officers concerned only with routine matters. It was therefore too early to think of planning an organic structure for the employment of deputies in accordance with geographical and other representational principles, such as representation of the principal legal systems.

Mr. DODOO (Ghana) suggested that the power of the Secretary-General to determine in what order each deputy would act as Secretary-General, would be better included in Section 8 so that in the case of the death or absence of the Secretary-General the order of priority of the Deputy Secretaries-General would have been already established.
Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) pointed out that the question would not arise, since the order of priority of deputies was a question that would be determined at the time of their appointment.

The CHAIRMAN said that the same question had been put to him on several occasions and that he thought the text might be made more explicit.

Mr. OGBAGZY (Ethiopia) referring to Section 2, paragraph 9, said that it would be preferable not to require the concurrence of the Chairman in deciding whether any particular occupation or employment was compatible with the office of Secretary-General. Such requirement would give a sort of veto power to the Chairman over the Administrative Council.

The Panels (Sections 11 - 15)

Mr. KPOGNON (Dahomey), referring to the need to ensure that persons nominated to serve on the Panels were technically competent, proposed that Section 11 should contain a paragraph authorizing the Center to screen candidates for membership on the Panels.

The CHAIRMAN said that it had not so far been possible to find a satisfactory way of guaranteeing the best composition of the Panels. It was, however, unlikely that unsuitable persons would be called upon to serve on commissions or tribunals even if their names were included. Similarly, the Chairman's right to nominate members to serve on the Panels, which he might usefully employ if certain legal systems or branches of activity were not represented, would not be decisive since the right to call on members of the Panel to serve on a specific commission or tribunal would not depend on him.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) suggested that the numbers of appointees, placed in brackets in Sections 11(2) and 12(2) of the draft, should be reduced to three for each country, following the example of other organizations such as ICAO. He feared that if all the Bank's members joined the Center this would result in a panel of 612 persons, i.e. 6 for each member, which seemed to him to be excessive. The Chairman's right to appoint members to serve on the Panels should be restricted to 2 members to cover possible cases of distinguished individuals who had not been nominated, although he would prefer to see that right eliminated altogether. He also suggested that, in cases of multiple designations to a Panel of a single individual, provisions on determining the priority of designation should be inserted in the rules adopted by the Administrative Council, rather than in Section 14(2). In that connection some attempt should be made to avoid a situation that would prevent a person's being nominated by his own State because another State had previously designated him. As to the selection of persons to be designated to the Panels he felt that States should be free to consult whatever institutions they thought appropriate and that therefore the last clause of Section 15, paragraph (1) should be deleted.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the instruction to States to consult competent bodies was qualified by the words "as they may deem appropriate". If the Chairman were to be entitled to designate only one or two members he agreed that his power of designation could be dispensed with.

Mr. MACAULAY (Sierra Leone) felt that the word "qualified" in the second lines of Section 11, paragraph (1), and Section 12, paragraph (1), was not clear and could be deleted, since the point was covered by Section 15, paragraph (1).
He suggested that the Chairman, as well as the Contracting States, be required to pay due regard to the qualifications of candidates for designation to the Panels specified in Section 15, paragraph (1). He supported the proposal made by the representative of Nigeria that the last clause of that paragraph be deleted.

Mr. OGBAGZY (Ethiopia) said that the matter of ensuring representation on the Panels of the principal legal systems and main forms of economic activity could best be dealt with in the Rules of Procedure of the Administrative Council, which could ask member States to indicate the areas in which they might be in a position to offer suitable nominations.

Mr. MOUTAPA (United Arab Republic) suggested that in Section 15(1), the words "juridical organizations" be inserted before the words "highest courts of justice".

Financing the Center (Section 16)

The CHAIRMAN, in opening the discussion on Section 16, indicated that the President of the Bank was prepared to recommend to the Executive Directors that the Bank assume the cost of the overhead of the Center.

Mr. MALLAMUD (Uganda) asked whether member States could be informed of the estimated cost they would have to bear if the Bank were not going to finance the Center.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) hoped that the Bank would be prepared to finance the Center.

Mr. BIGAY (Central African Republic) said he would appreciate a more specific reference to the possible financing of the Center by the Bank to replace the words "or out of other receipts".

Mr. KPOGNON (Dahomey) said that the section indicated the criterion for contributions that might have to be made by members of the Bank, but gave no such indication in the case of non-member States.

The CHAIRMAN said he felt that that question could be left to the Administrative Council.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) asked whether, or to what extent, the loan of premises and other facilities, could be included in members' contributions.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the question was essentially a matter of accounting, which had not been considered at this early stage. He repeated that in his view these matters could be left to the Administrative Council.

Privileges and Immunities (Sections 17 - 20)

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) pointed out that Section 20(2) was incompatible with Section 7(5) and suggested that the words "The Chairman, members of the Administrative Council or" should be deleted, since those officers were not entitled to either salaries or emoluments.

Mr. BIGAY (Central African Republic) said that the provisions contained in Section 18(1) would be difficult to apply. The Central African Republic was bound by agreements to accord specific and often different privileges and immunities.
to various States. He suggested that the privileges and immunities contemplated should be those normally accorded to international organizations.

Mr. BROWN (Tanganyika) said that it would be difficult to decide what immunities and privileges should be granted in the case of persons connected with proceedings before the Center, whose status did not correspond with that of any State officials.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) suggested that the privileges and immunities in question should be granted under the same conditions as those accorded to officials of the Bank.

The CHAIRMAN said that the proposals put forward by the representatives of the Central African Republic and Cameroon could be considered and that the criteria adopted in the case of the United Nations and the specialized agencies might serve as a basis for an adequate solution.

The meeting rose at 1:30 p.m.

THIRD SESSION
(Tuesday, December 17, 1963 - 3:19 p.m.)

ARTICLE II - Jurisdiction of the Center

The CHAIRMAN invited representatives to consider Article II of the Draft Convention. He explained that the word "jurisdiction", which might be questioned, had been borrowed from the Hague Convention of 1907. The jurisdiction of the Center was defined in Section 1 to include procedures for conciliation and arbitration; this was not intended to exclude the possibility that in certain cases arbitration would follow conciliation if the conciliation effort failed.

Mr. MACAULAY (Sierra Leone) stated there was no reason why the facilities to be established by the Bank should be limited to Contracting States and nationals of Contracting States; they should be available also to non-contracting States. It would be easier for the developing countries to obtain the investments they needed if all agreements contained a clause to the effect that disputes could be referred to the Center. The fact that the facilities of the Center were available to all would make for uniformity in arbitration procedures. Article 17 of the Hague Convention of 1907 provided that the facilities of the Permanent Court could be used by States not parties to the Convention.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the mere institutional facilities of the Center could be placed at the disposal of non-contracting States. The Draft Convention, however, contained a number of rules of law binding only the States which had signed and ratified the Convention. He doubted that a host country which was a Contracting State would want to assume obligations towards an investor who was a national of a non-contracting State whose national State would not be bound by the Convention. If a country were unwilling to sign the Convention it could still agree that the rules contained in it should be regarded as model rules to be applied in its agreements.
Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) referred to the question of dual nationality, a basic problem in public international law. Much of the structure of Article II represented a departure from accepted principles of international arbitral procedure, and the provisions of Section 3(3) ought therefore to be re-examined in the light of what was contained in Section 1. He also referred to the definition of "national of another Contracting State" in Article X, paragraph 2, and to the statement in paragraph 6 of the comment to Article II to the effect that there would be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Center disputes between a Contracting State and one of its own nationals unless that person possessed concurrently the nationality of another Contracting State. An examination of paragraph 2 of Article X would reveal the difficulties the question of dual nationality was bound to raise if the written affirmation referred to in Section 3(3) were to be regarded as conclusive proof of nationality. It had to be remembered that the laws of some States prevented their nationals from divesting themselves of their nationality even if they acquired the nationality of another State. Unless the tribunal were empowered to determine nationality - as the International Court of Justice had done in 1955 in the case of Liechtenstein v. Guatemala - it would have difficulty in discharging its duties under Section 4(1) (applicable law) and Section 17(2) (recourse to procedures for settlement of disputes between the States concerned) of Article IV. In his view, the Convention should not stretch international law too far in order to make things easier for the investor. The written affirmation should be regarded as merely prima facie evidence of nationality. If there were no dispute about the investor's nationality the written affirmation could be accepted as sufficient proof, but if there were a dispute the tribunal should decide the question of nationality as a preliminary issue.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that at this point nationality was relevant only to determine whether the facilities of the Center could be used by the parties which had agreed to do so. He thought that in this context it should be possible for a State to agree with an investor to resort to the facilities of the Center even if the investor was a national of that State and another Contracting State at the same time, and gave as an example the case of a company incorporated in the host State and controlled by nationals of another State. However, he would have no difficulty in accepting the specific suggestion that the written affirmation of nationality be regarded as prima facie evidence rather than as conclusive proof.

Mr. MALLAMUD (Uganda) pointed out that the effect of Article II, Section 1 would be to place nationals on a par with States. That represented a departure from customary international law and was a step which should not be taken lightly. He asked what justification there was for such a move and whether there were many private investors clamoring to be put on a par with States in order to sue States outside municipal courts. He agreed with the representative of Nigeria that the question of nationality could not be determined on the basis of a government certificate only.

Mr. FOALEM (OAMCE) agreed with the representative of Nigeria that the question of dual nationality would have to be very carefully studied. In particular, arrangements should be made to prevent nationals of former colonial powers who adopted the nationality of an African State from invoking dual nationality should they wish to sue the African State.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that a Contracting State was free to treat
an investor having dual nationality either as one of its own nationals or as a foreigner and therefore refuse or accept settlement under the Convention. Although the question of dual nationality may be important in the determination of the applicable law or for diplomatic protection, in Article II all the Convention does is to allow a State, if it so desired, to agree to the settlement of disputes with such an investor.

Mr. FOALEM (OAMCE), referring to the provision on subrogation in Section 1, suggested that it should include subrogation of any institution which had indemnified any investor.

The CHAIRMAN said he was not prepared to give his immediate reaction to that proposal but that he envisaged that if an investor had entered into an agreement which included a dispute settlement clause there might be a case for permitting a guarantee fund to succeed to the rights of the investor. On the other hand he would have difficulties in permitting a guarantee fund to be an original party to an arbitration agreement.

Mr. BERNARD (Liberia) asked whether the World Bank, any of its subsidiaries or any other international organization would have the right to appear as a party in a dispute.

The CHAIRMAN replied in the negative.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) asked whether the Center would be competent to decide political questions or merely questions relating to pecuniary matters or private law. The question of the Center's competence was important because States always tried to avoid any diminution of their sovereignty.

The CHAIRMAN replied that States were not required to submit any questions to the Center unless they had previously agreed to do so with an investor. Section 1 stipulated that the Center would be concerned only with disputes of a legal character.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) suggested that there should be progression in the procedure for the settlement of disputes; conciliation should precede arbitration. In that way the position of the Secretary-General of the Center would be enhanced who could throughout lend his good offices to arrive at a friendly solution.

The CHAIRMAN replied that since the Convention was based on complete flexibility and on the consent of the parties involved in a dispute, it would be unwise to force them to go to arbitration or to go before conciliators. It should be left to the parties to decide whether the procedure should consist of conciliation only, arbitration only or conciliation followed by arbitration.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) said that despite the explanations given in paragraph 5 of the comment on page 18, he was of the opinion that a lower limit should be fixed for the value of the subject-matter of a dispute. If that were not done frivolous claims might be made.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that Section 1 of Article VI dealt with frivolous claims by providing that an arbitral tribunal instead of applying the normal rule of apportionment of costs, could assess the costs of
proceedings against the claimant. On the other hand against the proposal
of the representative of Cameroon, it could be argued that there would be
cases in which it would be impossible to place a pecuniary value on the
subject-matter of a dispute.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) supported the views expressed by the represent-
ative of Nigeria on the question of dual nationality.

Mr. KPOGNON (Dahomey), referring to the question of a lower limit
for the value of the subject-matter of a dispute, said that in his view
the Secretary-General of the Center, rather than the tribunal, should
determine whether or not a request for arbitration was receivable.

The CHAIRMAN replied that in cases of claims to which a pecuniary
value could not be attached it would be difficult for the Secretary-
General to decide whether or not the matter was important enough. While
he thought that the functions of the Secretary-General would include not
only that of helping people to agree to go to the Center but also that
of persuading people from going to the Center, this could be done through
informal discussion and persuasion rather than by acting as a legal
"filter".

Mr. KPOGNON (Dahomey) supported the view expressed by the represent-
ative of Nigeria on the question of dual nationality.

Mr. BROWN (Tanganyika) asked whether the term "Contracting State"
included statutory corporations or public companies in which the govern-
ment was a shareholder. If quasi-governmental institutions were excluded
from that term the value of the Convention would be reduced, because in
many countries investment agreements would be entered into with those
institutions.

The CHAIRMAN replied that the words "Contracting State" meant exactly
what they said. However, the representative of Tanganyika had raised an
important question which was also of significance as regards the constituent
parts of a federal or non-unitary State. It would be possible to have an
additional article in which the scope of the Center's activities was ex-
tended to undertakings entered into between an investor and a statutory
corporation, or to a region, canton or province. Such a provision should,
however, require that the undertaking by the entity in question be sanction-
ed by the State.

Mr. BROWN (Tanganyika) enquired about the meaning of the phrase
"dispute of a legal character" and asked to what extent the meeting was
committing itself to the principle that individuals should be subjects
of international law. For instance, would the Center be competent to hear
a claim questioning the legality of an act of expropriation without adequate
compensation which was perfectly legal under the national law of the State
concerned. He asked whether the phrase was wide enough to cover a case
where, in the absence of this convention, the dispute could only be taken
up by one State against another, or in other words, a dispute arising under
international law but not in municipal law.

The CHAIRMAN replied that the Executive Directors of the Bank had
expressed the view that it be made clear first that the Convention did not
obligate anyone to submit any dispute to the Center and second that dis-
Discussions on political or commercial matters would per se be outside the
scope of activity of the Center. Section 1, therefore, sought to restrict
the jurisdiction of the Center to "legal disputes" as distinct from purely
economic, political or commercial disputes. The tribunal would be competent
to examine a claim that an act of nationalization without compensation was
illegal and the Convention left it to the Tribunal in the absence of a
stipulation by the parties, to decide whether a claim was subject to nation-
al or international law.

Mr. BROWN (Tanganyika) said that, in his opinion, the provision that
the tribunal may apply international law did not make it clear if that
had been the intention - that an investor could press an international
claim on the same basis as his own State would have been entitled to do.
Municipal courts often applied international law in deciding claims, but
that did not make them "international" claims.

The CHAIRMAN replied that by giving the investor the right to go
before a tribunal, and by providing for the surrender of the right of
diplomatic protection, the Convention implied that the investor would have
the same right as his Government would have had if it had come before the
tribunal on his behalf.

Mr. GACHEM (Tunisia), referring to the types of disputes to be re-
ferred to the Center, recalled that the Chairman had emphasized the optional
character of the Center's jurisdiction. That optional character would,
however, become more and more theoretical because investors prior to making
their investment would always try to obtain from States the right to go to
the Center. The types of disputes to be submitted to the Center should
therefore be defined from the outset. The representative of Cameroon had
spoken of a quite legitimate expropriation by a government in the public
interest. Such an action was composed of two parts, expropriation and com-
pensation. No State should be attacked for expropriation in the public
interest and therefore such cases should not be submitted to the Center.
In such a case the only question that could be submitted to the Center was
that of adequacy of compensation.

The CHAIRMAN replied that the view that interest in the Convention
would be limited to cases of indemnification on expropriation, was too
narrow. Disputes frequently resulted from expropriation and the Bank had
had experience of such disputes. On the other hand there were many other
types of disputes which arose in the complex relationships between investors
and host States, and the Center would be a suitable forum for their settle-
ment.

Mr. GACHEM (Tunisia) agreed with the suggestion of the representative
of OAMCE that it should be possible for an international investment guaran-
tee fund to be subrogated to the investor. The suggestion left the door
open for the Bank to consider the establishment of such a fund.

In his opinion the question of dual nationality was a false one.
Either the investor had entered into an agreement with a State, in which
case the State would be aware of his nationality or, if there were no
agreement, the optional character of the Center came into play and the
State would refuse to go to the Center. He suggested however that instead
of the written affirmation being signed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
it should be signed by the authority competent in accordance with the
legislation in force in the State. He agreed with the representative of Cameroon that a lower limit should be fixed for the value of the subject-matter of a dispute. He also pointed out that certain companies made investments with funds from the World Bank, which were then guaranteed by a State, and asked whether the Center's jurisdiction would extend to a dispute between the Bank on the one hand and the guarantor State or the company on the other.

The CHAIRMAN replied in the negative. All World Bank loans not made directly to governments bore a government guarantee, and all agreements between the Bank and its members were public international agreements. They would not qualify for submission to the Center.

Mr. GACHEM (Tunisia) asked what tests would be applied to determine jurisdiction in the case of a dispute between a State and several persons or companies of various nationalities acting as a group.

The CHAIRMAN replied that Article X contained two tests for determining the nationality of a company viz., domestic law and control. If the investors were of different nationalities and had organized themselves into a Swiss Company and Switzerland was a party to the Convention, it would then be open to the host State to regard the Company as Swiss. There might on the other hand be a case of a company which, although organized under the law of the host State, was a subsidiary of a foreign company. In such a case under the control test, that company would have foreign nationality.

Mr. BOUITI (Congo, Brazzaville) asked how the "control" test for nationality could be applied if all the members of a company held equal shares.

The CHAIRMAN replied that if all the members were nationals of Contracting States the Center would clearly have jurisdiction, and there would be no problem. If they were not, the matter would have to be decided by the arbitral tribunal.

Mr. OGBAGZY (Ethiopia) said that in his opinion the concept of dual nationality should be admitted only in the case of juridical persons; that the jurisdiction of the Center should be extended to nationals of non-contracting States; that the Center should be empowered to hear political and commercial claims; and that a lower limit for the value of the subject-matter of a dispute should be established but only in cases of claims of a financial nature.

The CHAIRMAN said the suggestions made would be carefully considered. In particular, with reference to the problem of dual nationality, it might be possible to require that the investor's foreign nationality should exist not only at the time of the agreement but also at the time when the claim was brought before the Center. A host State would thus be protected from having to submit to international adjudication the claim of a foreign investor who had subsequently assumed the nationality of the host State.

Mr. BIGAY (Central African Republic) asked if the validity of an arbitration clause might not be limited in time.
Mr. LOBEL (Mali) agreed with the representative of Tunisia that the recourse to the facilities of the Center was optional in theory only. In his view the nationality of the investment was more important than that of the investor. The Convention should apply only in cases where the funds invested came from outside the country rather than from foreigners residing in the country out of local capital owned by them, since the aim of the Convention was to encourage the flow of such funds.

The CHAIRMAN said that he could not agree that the recourse to the facilities of the Center was optional in theory only. It was very definitely not the Bank's idea that every foreign investment should be subject to the Convention.

Referring to the proposed criterion of the origin of the invested funds, he said that if those funds were really not of foreign origin, the host State was entirely justified in treating the resident investor on the same footing as its own nationals. On the other hand he did not see how the Convention could make a distinction based on the origin of funds once the host State had agreed with the investor to accept the jurisdiction of the Center.

Mr. NICAYENZI (Burundi) pointed out that a foreign company which lent money to a State could not be regarded as an investor and asked if the Convention provided for the settlement of a dispute in such a case.

The CHAIRMAN said that in English the word "investment" would cover the type of loan referred to. It might be necessary to modify the language of the French text.

Mr. GACHEM (Tunisia) suggested that the Convention should contain a comprehensive definition of the term "investment".

Mr. NICAYENZI (Burundi) asked if two States which had signed a cooperation agreement might have recourse to the Center in case of dispute.

The CHAIRMAN said that the Bank should not go into the field of interstate relationships. On the other hand, States could always refer their disputes to the Permanent Court of Arbitration or the International Court of Justice.

Mr. NICAYENZI (Burundi) asked if it would be possible for the Bank to appear before the Center.

The CHAIRMAN replied in the negative.

The meeting rose at 6:35 p.m.

FOURTH SESSION
(Wednesday, December 18, 1963 - 9:40 a.m.)

ARTICLE III - Conciliation

Request for Conciliation (Section 1) and Constitution of the Commission (Sections 2-3)
The CHAIRMAN suggested that further discussion of Article II be deferred, and invited the meeting to consider Article III.

Mr. MACAULAY (Sierra Leone) pointed out that the sections referring to conciliation did not prescribe the selection of conciliators from the Panel except in Section 2(2) and appeared to leave the parties to a dispute free to choose conciliators outside the Panel. He wished to know if that had been the intention of the drafters of the document.

The CHAIRMAN replied that it was intended to allow the parties the maximum freedom to agree upon the persons they wished to have as conciliators. In the event of their failure to reach agreement on the composition of the Commission, the provisions of Section 2(2) laid down the number of conciliators and the mode of their appointment stipulating in addition that they should all be selected from the Panel.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) said he thought Member States should be encouraged to use the Panel they had set up with so much care.

Mr. GISCARD D'ESTAING (Central African Republic) said that it was desirable to leave a certain measure of liberty to parties accepting conciliation. In some cases, when specialized technical questions were involved, the persons best qualified to deal with the particular issue might not be on the panel.

The CHAIRMAN said that opinions appeared to be divided on the desirability of restricting the choice of conciliators to the Panel or leaving the parties always free to choose them outside the Panel. The question was not so important in the case of conciliators, as in that of arbitrators.

Mr. MACAULAY (Sierra Leone) said that if parties were to be allowed absolute freedom in choosing conciliators, that freedom was incompatible with the provisions of Section 2(2), which deprived the parties of that freedom once they had failed to agree among themselves on the composition of the Commission. He suggested that the requirement that where there had been no prior agreement on the method of appointing conciliators the appointees be selected from the Panel of Conciliators (Section 2(2)) be deleted, and that that requirement be retained only with reference to appointment by the Chairman (Section 3(2)).

Mr. ABDoulaye (Guinea), supported by the representative of Cameroon, said Section 1 should be explicit in requiring that the consent of the other party to the jurisdiction of the Center be demonstrated in such a way as to leave no room for doubt.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that Section 1 laid down only the formal requirements for requests for conciliation. Since those requests would in any case have to be dealt with by the Secretary-General, a statement that the other party had consented to the jurisdiction of the Center was enough at that stage.

Mr. OGRACZY (Ethiopia) pointed out that it was necessary to establish the consent of the parties to the jurisdiction of the Center before commencement of proceedings. Under Section 1 in its present form one party could by its request set in motion the machinery which would lead to constitution of the Commission, even though the other party's consent were defective.
The Commission's task would then be limited to determining that there was no valid consent to jurisdiction. He, therefore, suggested that any request for conciliation should be endorsed by the other party.

The CHAIRMAN replied that the suggestion of the representative of Ethiopia, if accepted, would mean that consent to jurisdiction would, in a sense, be revocable. He thought that that would be destructive of the purpose of the Convention which was to ensure the efficacy of agreements to submit disputes to the Center. Any inconvenience or embarrassment caused by an unfounded request for conciliation might be avoided through informal consultations between the Secretary-General and the parties concerned.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) asked at what point the Commission was to be considered as having been legally constituted.

The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Administrative Council could deal with that question in the Rules of Procedure.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) felt that the requirement in the second sentence of Section 3(1) that the Chairman "instruct the Secretary-General to consult with the parties" before appointing a conciliator was unnecessary, and that the substance of it would be better included in the Council's Rules of Procedure. In the first sentence (line 4) the words "and after consultation with both", should be inserted after the word "party".

Mr. KPOGNON (Dahomey) said he did not wish to have arbitration and conciliation treated as though they were on the same level. While conciliation had undoubtedly given positive results in certain cases and numerous conciliation agreements had been signed in the inter-war period, the method had not as a general rule proved effectual, and since the Second World War the tendency had been to prefer arbitration. Conciliation ought to be regarded as a first stage to be followed automatically, in the event of the failure to reach a settlement, by arbitration.

He also felt that Section 2(1), in leaving the parties to decide on the number of conciliators they wished to appoint, carried the desire to respect national sovereignty to unnecessary lengths. He suggested that the paragraph should include at least a stipulation that the number of conciliators should not be an even number.

The CHAIRMAN observed that the experience of the Bank had led it to appreciate the value of conciliation, which in some cases brought together parties who might have been unwilling to bind themselves beforehand to accept an arbitral award. He feared that if one were to make conciliation a first step to automatic arbitration, some States might be unwilling to have recourse to the Center.

Powers and Functions of the Commission (Sections 4-5)

Mr. ELIAS, supported by the delegates of Guinea and Dahomey, proposed that Section 5(3), which provided that reports on the conciliation proceedings should not contain the terms of settlement recommended or accepted by the parties, should be deleted since what was sought to be achieved by it was adequately met by the provisions of Section 7 which put an embargo on the use, in later proceedings, of any material which resulted
from the conciliation proceedings. Moreover the conciliation record would be incomplete without the recommendations of the conciliators themselves. He could not find any precedent for Section 5(3) in international practice.

The CHAIRMAN said he would personally be in favor of the proposal of the delegate of Nigeria.

Mr. MOIGNARD (Senegal) also supported the proposal to omit Section 5(3). At the same time he suggested that those who wished to retain the substance of Section 5(3) would perhaps be satisfied if its terms were inverted so that the report referred to in paragraph (2) would contain the terms of settlement recommended to or accepted by the parties unless the parties expressly stipulated the contrary.

Mr. HARELIMANÉ (Rwanda) asked what would happen if one of the parties refused to submit a dispute to the Commission, in contravention of a prior undertaking to do so.

The CHAIRMAN replied that conciliation by definition did not imply other than moral sanctions. The report would merely say that one party had refused to co-operate in the proceedings.

Mr. BOUITI (Congo, Brazzaville) suggested that the rule in Section 4 requiring the concurrence of the Commission in the choice by the parties of procedural rules other than those adopted by the Center, should be deleted.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the concurrence of the Commission had been required because it had been felt that conciliators ought to have a greater say in what procedure was most suitable to their task. On the other hand, in the case of arbitration it was felt that the parties ought to have greater liberty in matters of procedure as the result would be binding upon them. But he did not feel strongly on the point.

Mr. MACAULAY (Sierra Leone) supported the suggestion made by the representative of the Congo (Brazzaville); he did not feel that the Commission should be in a position to veto procedures that had been agreed to by the parties.

He also suggested that the report of the Commission should set forth the facts in issue and that an additional clause should be added to Section 5(2) stating that all reports should be communicated to the parties. With reference to Section 5(3) he proposed that the report of the Commission not contain terms of settlement accepted by the parties unless the parties had so agreed.

Mr. BROWN (Tanganyika) asked the Chairman if he could indicate what was likely to be dealt with in the Conciliation Rules referred to in Section 4.

The CHAIRMAN said that while he could not indicate the precise content of the Rules, which would have to be determined by the Administrative Council, he thought that they would deal with such matters as periods of time, the order of presentation of arguments etc. These Rules would, of course, be less formal than in the case of arbitration. Precedents for such rules existed in international practice.
The meeting was suspended at 11:30 a.m. and resumed at 11:50 a.m.

Obligations of the Parties (Sections 6-7)

Mr. NIKIEMA (Upper Volta) had the impression that the idea of regarding conciliation as a first stage in settlement of a dispute to be followed in the event of its failure by arbitration had not been accepted. However, he would propose that if the parties had agreed that arbitration should be a necessary second stage, parties should be entitled to invoke, if they wished to do so, any views expressed or statements made in the conciliation proceedings - material which they were at present prevented from disclosing by the terms of Section 7.

The CHAIRMAN said that there was nothing to prevent parties waiving the protection afforded them by Section 7, if they so desired. He would prefer to see the section retained, since he felt that its removal might make parties reluctant to have recourse to conciliation.

ARTICLE IV - Arbitration

Request for Arbitration (Section 1) and Constitution of the Tribunal (Sections 2-3)

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) suggested that in Section 2(2) the first sentence should be deleted. He asked whether it had been inserted by mistake.

The CHAIRMAN replied that the mistake was in the order of the sentences. Section 2(2) should have begun with the second sentence in Section 2(1); that arrangement would leave the parties free to choose their arbitrators.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) supported by Mr. KPOGNON (Dahomey) felt that if the parties to a dispute were to be given the freedom to appoint to a tribunal or commission persons from outside the Panels, that freedom should be qualified by a requirement that the persons so appointed should not be of a quality inferior to those designated to the Panels under Sections 11(1) and 12(1) of Article I. He hoped that effect would be given to this proposal when drafting the definitive text of the Convention.

Mr. BERNARD (Liberia) said that Article IV, Sections 1-3, although they were a counterpart of Article III, Sections 1-3, contained an innovation in the shape of the stipulation regarding the nationality of the arbitrators. He asked whether it would be correct to assume that that requirement only applied when the parties had failed to agree on the appointment of arbitrators.

Mr. MACAULAY (Sierra Leone) asked why there should be a difference between the procedure laid down for constitution of an arbitral tribunal and that prescribed for constitution of a conciliation commission. He felt that an arbitration award was likely to be more readily accepted when the parties had chosen their arbitrators freely. If freedom was the objective, the special conditions imposed in the case of the constitution of an arbitral tribunal were unnecessary, and there was no reason to distinguish between constitution of a commission and a tribunal in this respect.
The CHAIRMAN said that flexibility seemed to be more appropriate in conciliation. The innovation with regard to the nationality of arbitrators should not be applied to cases of conciliation. On the contrary, the appointment of conciliators of the same nationality as the parties might be helpful in reaching a settlement. Arbitration tribunals, in cases where agreement had not been reached by the parties concerned, would always comprise three arbitrators of other nationalities in order to avoid any possibility of their judgment being swayed in any way by national feelings.

Mr. BIGAY (Central African Republic) said that if the arbitrators were not to be nationals of any State party to a dispute, it would also be advisable to exclude non-nationals if they had been designated to the Panel by the States concerned.

Mr. Moustafa (United Arab Republic) objected to the prohibition in Section 2(2) regarding the nationality of arbitrators. An arbitrator of the same nationality as the party to the dispute was more likely to understand the issues involved and to be in a better position to offer the necessary explanations; he might even make an unfavorable award more acceptable. He saw nothing to be gained by the prohibition and wished to know the grounds for it.

The CHAIRMAN remarked that there were two views on whether the nationals of the States concerned should be excluded from the tribunal. With regard to the whole question of appointment of arbitrators, there were three distinct alternatives. Firstly, the parties could be given absolute freedom to choose arbitrators from outside the Panel; secondly, if the parties were not to be given absolute freedom, they could be allowed to select arbitrators from outside the Panel provided they were not nationals; and thirdly, the parties could be given no freedom whatever to choose arbitrators from outside the Panels. He was personally in favor of the second of these alternatives.

Mr. Mpanjo (Cameroon) asked whether the request for arbitration could be made by a third party, as might be implied from the French text. He also suggested that the text require that a tribunal always be composed of more than one arbitrator.

The CHAIRMAN replied that it had not been intended that the request for arbitration could be made by a third party.

**Powers and Functions of the Tribunal (Section 4)**

Mr. Mallamud (Uganda) asked how far the parties to a dispute were entitled to limit the law to be applied to it. While it was quite natural they could stipulate national law, could they go so far as to limit the issue to a question of the fulfilment of a contract, or a matter of compensation for expropriation, regardless of the legality or otherwise of the expropriation. He also pointed out that while Section 4 stated that, in the absence of agreement between the parties as to the applicable law, the tribunal would have to decide that issue, this provision did not take into account the case where the law applicable to a dispute was specified in some unilateral act of a State, e.g. in legislation, or in some bilateral agreement between the States concerned.
The CHAIRMAN remarked that the delegate of Uganda had raised two separate questions, the one relating to the scope of the dispute to be dealt with by the tribunal, and the other to the applicable law. There was no doubt that the parties had complete freedom to limit the scope of the dispute which was to be submitted to the Center, and it was likewise open to the parties to prescribe the law applicable to the dispute. Either stipulation could be included in an agreement with an investor, in a bilateral agreement with another State, or even in a unilateral offer to all investors, such as might be made through investment legislation.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) said that the provisions of Section 4 were adequate for the purposes of the Convention. The problem was similar to that of finding the appropriate law in the case of a "conflict of laws". Parties either applied the law specified in an agreement or, in the absence of any such indication, left the court to decide which law (e.g. law of flag, of the place with which the contract had the closest connection, of the place of payment, or of the place where a contract was entered into) was proper to the contract in question. However, under Section 4(1), the tribunal would always be free to use the principles best calculated to promote an equitable and just solution. Moreover the Convention required that a decision be reached by the tribunal in every case. (Section 4(2)).

Mr. MPAMBO (Cameroon) observed that where the parties had undertaken to have recourse to arbitration without specifying the law to be applied, the Draft left open the question of the applicable law. If an act of nationalization were to be questioned before a tribunal, would the tribunal be competent to decide upon the legality of such a sovereign act, and if so, by reference to which system of law?

The CHAIRMAN replied that unless parties specifically restricted the tribunal, it would look into all the legal aspects of any dispute brought before it from the standpoint not only of domestic, but also of international law, to see if the rights of either party had been infringed. The tribunal would be in the same position as any international tribunal before which, say, the investor's State had brought a claim based on the expropriation of its nationals property. However, he pointed out that it was for the parties to determine in their agreement the scope of the tribunal's jurisdiction and exclude or include particular issues such as the legality of expropriation or nationalization, or to exclude the application of international law.

Mr. BROWN (Tanganyika) observed that he would have difficulty in construing Section 4(1) as empowering a tribunal to apply the principles of international law to the exclusion, if necessary, of municipal law in the absence of a specific agreement between the parties to that effect. He felt that his difficulty could not be resolved until the definition of "dispute of a legal character" in Article II had been clarified.

The CHAIRMAN said that legal character was given to a dispute when a party claimed that a legal right had been infringed and that it was not merely moral, commercial or political misbehavior that was in question.

Mr. MALLAMUD (Uganda) asked whether where an investment agreement did not contain any specific clause on expropriation, but contained a general clause referring to arbitration under the Convention, the investor whose property had been expropriated could refer the question of expropriation to the Center.
The CHAIRMAN replied that the competence of the tribunal would be determined by its terms of reference as set out in the agreement. In order to answer the question of the delegate of Uganda it would be necessary to look at all the provisions of the agreement and determine whether the question of expropriation was covered.

Mr. BROWN (Tanganyika) asked whether where an investment agreement contained specific provisions on expropriation it could properly be dealt with by the tribunal notwithstanding that no remedy might be available in the municipal courts.

The CHAIRMAN answered in the affirmative pointing out that unless the parties had agreed to restrict the competence of the tribunal to determining the validity of the act of expropriation by reference to municipal law, the tribunal could look to municipal law as well as international law. This was the very purpose of going before an international tribunal.

Mr. MACAULAY (Sierra Leone) observed that everything depended on how the arbitration agreement was drafted. Article IV, Section 1 indicated that consent was the basis for the jurisdiction of the tribunal and the ways in which consent could be given were listed in Article II, Section 2. It was for the parties to determine in advance what questions were to be dealt with by the tribunal.

The meeting rose at 1:25 p.m.

FIFTH SESSION
(Wednesday, December 18, 1963 - 3:15 p.m.)

Powers and Functions of the Tribunal (continued)

The CHAIRMAN invited representatives to consider Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of Article IV.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) asked with respect to Section 6, whether the question of a quorum might not be considered. If a tribunal were composed of five members, only three of whom were able to attend a meeting, two of them would constitute "a majority" of those present, but not a majority of the whole tribunal. It should be stated whether the "majority" referred to was a majority of the tribunal or a majority of those sitting.

With respect to Section 7(2) he stated that in his opinion the Secretariat should be responsible for communicating the award, in which case the words "by the Secretariat" should be added at the end of the sentence. If the task were to be the responsibility of some other person or body that fact should be specified in the sub-section.

Referring to Section 10, which dealt with provisional measures, he thought that it should be left to the tribunal to judge the situation presented to it, and if it thought fit, to prescribe such provisional measures as were necessary, even without the specific request of a party. This would bring the provision into line with the corresponding provision on stay of enforcement of an award pending the decision by the review Committee (Section 13(5)).
Mr. BIGAY (Central African Republic) said that the arbitrators' power of investigation (e.g. inspection, requiring production of documents) was so important that the Convention should state clearly whether or not they had that power. The matter should not be left to the Rules.

He also suggested that in cases where a majority view of the tribunal could not be obtained - if, for instance the tribunal were composed of three members each of whom had differing views - the appointment of a "tiers arbitre", whose vote would be decisive, might be considered. This system which was frequently met with in French practice was also incorporated in the investment code of the Central African Republic.

Finally he remarked that under French law provisional measures could be prescribed only at the request of one of the parties to a dispute. In his opinion, therefore, the wording of Article 10 was satisfactory.

The CHAIRMAN said that, insofar as the question of the arbitrators' power of investigation was concerned, he agreed that if it was intended that the tribunal should have the power to demand production of evidence the matter was sufficiently important not to be left to the Rules. In this connection it was to be noted that the draft model rules on arbitral procedure between States prepared by the International Law Commission provided that parties should cooperate with the tribunal in the production of evidence and comply with measures ordered by the tribunal for that purpose. In any event it was clear that in the absence of such a power the tribunal would still be free to attach to failure to submit evidence such weight as it might think appropriate. In his opinion, a separate provision on the matter was not necessary, but the views of the delegates would be welcome.

He was reluctant to resort to the use of a "tiers arbitre" as the tribunal had a legal duty to reach a decision.

Mr. MOUTAFA (United Arab Republic) said that he agreed with the provisions of Sections 4, 5 and 6, but wished to propose the following text for Section 7:

"The award shall consist of four obligatory elements:

(a) it shall state the reasons upon which it is based;
(b) it shall be dated and shall indicate the place at which it was rendered;
(c) it shall be signed by all the arbitrators;
(d) it shall be immediately communicated to the parties.

In cases, however, where there are more than two arbitrators and the minority refuses to sign, this fact shall be mentioned by the other arbitrators and the award shall remain valid."

He agreed with the provisions of Section 8 on default of a party, but considered that there should be some protection of the defaulting party against violation of his right of defense. He therefore proposed that the Section should contain a provision to the effect that parties were requested
to submit their pleadings and documents within a time limit before the date fixed for the rendering of the award. If the party failed to comply within that time limit, the award would then rest only on the evidence submitted by one of the parties, provided the claim appeared well-founded in fact and in law.

He observed that Section 9 should not be interpreted as permitting the competence of the tribunal to be extended beyond what the parties had agreed. It might be better to provide that additional claims or counter-claims could be decided by the tribunal only if a new agreement had been entered into by the two parties.

The CHAIRMAN said that as he read it, Section 9 did not extend the competence of the tribunal beyond what the parties had agreed. That section only made it unnecessary for parties making additional claims or counter-claims to start new procedures.

Mr. KPOGNON (Dahomey) asked if the "applicable arbitration rules" referred to in Section 5 were those adopted by the Administrative Council or if they were rules that went beyond that body's competence.

He asked whether the "majority" referred to in Sections 6 and 7 was a simple or an absolute majority.

The CHAIRMAN said that Section 5 was intended to refer either to the rules formulated by the Administrative Council or to the rules adopted by the parties. The text would be clarified on this point.

Insofar as the meaning of "majority" in Sections 6 and 7, what was intended was a simple majority, i.e. half of the members of the tribunal, plus one.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) said that at the previous session he had raised the question of the composition of the tribunal. If it were to be composed of several arbitrators the wording of the Draft Convention was appropriate. If, however, the tribunal were to consist of only one arbitrator the question of a majority would not arise.

Referring to Section 8(2) he asked how the tribunal was to satisfy itself that it was competent and whether a decision on competence would precede an award as in French judicial practice.

With respect to Section 10 he asked how provisional measures prescribed by the tribunal but conflicting with the municipal law of the State could be carried out, as the execution of such measure would have to be carried out internally. He also asked whether the social and political effects of such provisional measures had been considered.

The CHAIRMAN, in reply to the last question raised by the representative of Cameroon, said that if an arbitral tribunal had been empowered by the parties to review the legality of an action under international law then it should have the right to prescribe provisional measures and require the State's compliance with those measures. While this was not something new in international practice, any arbitral tribunal would be reluctant to order provisional measures of the kind under discussion unless there were compelling reasons.
As to the question when a tribunal would decide that it was competent, he thought that this decision would normally form part of the award, although there might be separate intellectual steps, i.e., a decision on competence followed by a decision on the merits.

Mr. MOIGNARD (Senegal), supported by Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria), said that a tribunal would render a preliminary ruling on the question of its competence only where it had been questioned by one of the parties.

Mr. BROWN (Tanganyika) said he found it difficult to accept the representative of Nigeria's suggestion for a provision on a quorum of the tribunal. While the present draft was not entirely satisfactory, in that if a tribunal consisted of five arbitrators, any proceedings before less than five would be coram non judice, he would rather be in favor of a provision allowing the proceedings to continue where one of the arbitrators was unable to attend.

The CHAIRMAN thought that refusal by one of the members of the tribunal to attend a session should not invalidate the procedure. He added that perhaps the suggestion of the U.A.R. delegate on formal requirements and signing of the awards would overcome these difficulties.

Interpretation, Revision and Annulment of the Award (Sections 11-13)

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) suggested that Section 12 should state that revision of the award would not be granted where there had been fraud or deliberate concealment on the part of the requesting party.

In his opinion, the period of ten years during which a review of the award could be requested was too long; it should be reduced to three or four years.

He suggested that lack of jurisdiction be added as an additional ground for challenge of an award in Section 13(1)(a). In Section 13(1)(b) the word "bias" might be included in addition to or in substitution for the word "corruption", and in Section 13(1)(c) departure from the principles of natural justice be added as another ground for challenge of the award.

The CHAIRMAN thought that these suggestions deserved careful study.

Mr. KPOGNON (Dahomey) agreed with the representative of Nigeria that the period of ten years suggested in Section 12(2) was too long and should perhaps be reduced to two years. Similarly, the period of six months suggested in the same sub-section might be reduced to three months.

Enforcement of the Award (Sections 14-15)

Mr. BOUITI (Congo, Brazzaville) suggested that a period of grace should be introduced between notification of the award to the party and compliance by the party with the award; this period could correspond to the period within which an interpretation of the award could be requested (Section 11) or the award challenged (Section 13). This would avoid difficulties which could result from having to interpret or annul an award.
which had already been carried out as well as give time to the parties for reflection.

Mr. MOUSTABA (United Arab Republic) referring to Sections 14 and 15 pointed out that, in his country for instance, an arbitral award rendered abroad could not be enforced unless an exequatur had been granted by the President of the Civil Tribunal responsible for the enforcement. As the U.A.R. had acceded to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards he wholeheartedly supported Sections 14 and 15 but would like to remind the meeting that each member would have to take the necessary steps to ensure that awards could be enforced in their territories.

The CHAIRMAN remarked that the representative of the U.A.R. had drawn attention to a special feature of the Convention, i.e. that under Section 15 the award of the tribunal would be enforceable in the same way as a final judgment of a national court.

The Convention did not deal with the internal formalities for the execution of an award within a State, such as the granting of an exequatur. The internal law of a Contracting State might require modification so as to comply with the obligation to enforce the award. This might in some States be automatic upon ratification or acceptance of the Convention, or in others, require special implementing legislation. Section 15 went beyond any known forms of recognition of foreign judgments in requiring that the award of a tribunal be treated as final. The only exceptions to that rule were provided in the Convention itself.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) said that, in his opinion, Section 15 was one of the most important sections of the Convention, and he wished to suggest that it be strengthened so as to read:

"Each Contracting State shall accept an award of the Tribunal as binding and shall take all appropriate measures to enforce it within its territories as if it were a final judgment of the highest court of that State."

Consideration might be given to the possibility of a provision requiring the Secretary-General or the registrar of the Center to communicate as soon as possible the award to the government concerned with a view to expediting the internal formalities for its enforcement.

The CHAIRMAN explained that the word "recognize" had been used in the first line of Section 15 as the award was to be recognized by all Contracting States and not merely by the State party to the dispute. He thought that the suggested reference to a "final judgment" of the "highest court" might be a pleonasm.

Mr. GACHEM (Tunisia) drew attention to the constitutional and technical difficulties that would arise in enforcing the award if the wording of Section 15 were accepted. In his opinion the section should contain a provision requiring the State to grant the exequatur for the enforcement of the award.

Mr. SELLA (Secretary) explained that the system adopted in the European Community for the enforcement of decisions of the European Court was to provide that in each government there would be an official to affix the writ of execution to judgments of the court.
Mr. DIAWARA (Ivory Coast), referring to the suggestion by the representative of Nigeria that the word "highest" should be inserted before the word "court" in Section 15, observed that it was possible for a judgment of a first degree court to be final, and that use of the word "highest" would result in a pleonasm.

Mr. KPOGNON (Dahomey) said he wished to be assured that once an award was binding it would be enforced. He suggested that the Convention by analogy with Article 94 of the Charter of the United Nations include a provision which would compel the losing State to comply with the award.

The CHAIRMAN said he did not believe that any State which had acceded to the Convention would fail to fulfill its provisions. If it did, other Contracting States might take such action as might be appropriate, but he did not see how the Convention could refer such a case to the Security Council.

The meeting was suspended at 4:55 p.m. and resumed at 5:10 p.m.

Relationship of Arbitration to Other Remedies (Sections 16-17)

Mr. BIGAY (Central African Republic) asked whether the omission of any reference to conciliation in Section 16 was intentional as it was not clear whether recourse to other remedies was available where the parties had consented to conciliation.

The CHAIRMAN replied that the omission was intentional. Section 16 contained a rule for interpreting the intention of the parties which had not been thought necessary in case of conciliation. However, a similar rule could be included in Article III on conciliation, if so desired.

Mr. BIGAY (Central African Republic) with reference to Section 17(1) inquired what was meant by "diplomatic protection", to whom such diplomatic protection would extend and what was the nature of such protection.

The CHAIRMAN replied that a Contracting State could not extend diplomatic protection to one of its nationals who had agreed to submit his claims to arbitration under the Convention. Once an investor had been given the right to direct access to a foreign State, he should not have the right to seek the protection of his own State, and his State should not have the right to intervene on his behalf. The purpose of the section was to remove disputes from the realm of diplomacy and bring them back to the realm of law.

Mr. MALLAMUD (Uganda) asked whether the word "agreement" in the ninth line of Section 17(2) referred to any agreement other than the Convention.

The CHAIRMAN replied in the affirmative, and explained that Section 17(2) was intended to cover the case where in addition to an investment agreement providing for recourse to the Center there was a bilateral agreement between the two States which provided for other means of settlement of disputes between them. In that case the States could still proceed under their bilateral agreement, even on questions decided by an arbitral tribunal, but without prejudice to the award rendered by the tribunal in the dispute with the investor.
Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) asked what would happen if an investor, dissatisfied with the award of the arbitral tribunal, prevailed upon his own State to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice. The decision of the latter court might not correspond with that of the arbitral tribunal.

The CHAIRMAN explained that the arbitral tribunal's award would be final and binding upon the investor. If the State of which the investor was a national queried the arbitral tribunal's decision it might refer the bilateral agreement with the host State to the International Court of Justice for interpretation. The decision of that Court would, however, in no way affect the award of the arbitral tribunal; its decision would be merely declaratory. There would be no question of the arbitral award being set aside.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) said that although the arbitral award might not be set aside, a conflicting decision of the International Court could have serious extra-legal consequences.

The CHAIRMAN conceded that when recourse could be had to two jurisdictions the likelihood of contradictory decisions could not be excluded. That could be avoided only if there were a single jurisdiction.

Mr. BROWN (Tanganyika) suggested that the difficulty might be solved if the words "for relief of a declaratory nature" were inserted after the word "claim" in the third line of Section 17(2).

Mr. GACHEM (Tunisia) said he shared the fear expressed by the representative of Cameroon. The only way the difficulty could be avoided was by the inclusion in the Convention of a provision to the effect that, where a question could either be brought before the Center under the present Convention or before another international forum under a bilateral agreement, a party should elect the forum to which he would have recourse to the exclusion of the other one.

The CHAIRMAN said he would have difficulties with the suggestion of the Tunisian delegate, because in the case he mentioned there were two distinct sets of contractual relationships - the one between the host State and a foreign investor and the other between the host State and the investor's State. The possibility of conflicting decisions in such a case was unavoidable. All the present Convention was concerned with was to ensure that the final and binding character of the award under the agreement between the host State and the investor would not be affected by a decision under the bilateral agreement between the States.

Mr. GACHEM (Tunisia) observed that bilateral agreements between States not only regulated relations between those States but also provided for appeals for arbitration by a national of one State in relation to the other State.

The CHAIRMAN in reply pointed out that Section 16 prevented the investor from having recourse to the remedy granted under the bilateral agreement once he had agreed to submit his dispute with the host State to arbitration under the Convention.

Mr. MALLAMUD (Uganda) raised two questions. Regarding acceptance of jurisdiction, he inquired what would be the effect of a unilateral
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Center by a State which had not entered into an investment agreement with a particular investor. Secondly he had doubts about the usefulness of having recourse to the remedies provided under a bilateral agreement between States unless the decision of an international tribunal on the interpretation of the bilateral agreement was binding in subsequent proceedings.

The CHAIRMAN, in reply to the first question, said that unilateral acceptance of the Center’s jurisdiction constituted an offer which could be accepted by a foreign investor and so become binding on both parties and bring into operation Section 17(1). As to the second question, he thought that a decision under a bilateral agreement would become part of that agreement and any other international tribunal, in applying that bilateral agreement, would have to follow that decision.

Mr. OGBAGZY (Ethiopia) asked what would happen in the following case: two States have entered into a bilateral agreement providing for a guarantee by one State of investments made by its nationals in the other States with a subrogation clause; the investor had also entered into an investment agreement with the host State providing for recourse to the Center; the investor has a claim against the host State, goes before the Center and loses; the guarantor State indemnifies the investor, is subrogated in his rights and then sues the host State under the bilateral agreement.

The CHAIRMAN replied that, in that case, he thought that the award of the arbitral tribunal would be binding on the guarantor State by the very fact that the guarantor was subrogated only in such rights and obligations as had accrued to the investor. The award would thus be res judicata as far as the investor and his subrogee State were concerned.

Mr. MALLAMUD (Uganda) thought that in its present form Section 17(2) might preclude a State from becoming subrogated to one of its nationals under Article II, Section 1, and should therefore be clarified.

The CHAIRMAN agreed.

Mr. KPOGNON (Dahomey) asked the Chairman to restate his understanding of the meaning of Section 17(1).

The CHAIRMAN explained that the intention was to change the rule of international law under which a State had the right to espouse the claims of one of its nationals against another State. An investor who had the right of direct access to the host State would lose the right to request his own State to protect him and his State would lose its right to appear on behalf of its national as long as the host State performed its obligations under the Convention.

The meeting rose at 6:10 p.m.

SIXTH SESSION
(Thursday, December 19, 1963 - 9:35 a.m.)

ARTICLE V - Replacement and Disqualification of Conciliators and Arbitrators (Sections 1 - 2)
Mr. MACAULAY (Sierra Leone), supported by the representative of Cameroon, pointed out that under the terms of Section 2(1)(b) of Article V a proposal to disqualify an arbitrator appointed by the Chairman was only allowed when based on facts arising subsequent to his appointment, or otherwise in cases where the appointment had been made without knowledge of the disqualifying fact or as a result of fraud, whereas by Section 2(1)(a) arbitrators nominated by the parties to the dispute could be disqualified on the grounds of "any fact whether antecedent or subsequent to their appointment". The Chairman's nominees were therefore in a privileged position compared with the parties' nominees. He would like to know the grounds for this distinction.

The CHAIRMAN observed that whereas the Chairman's sole concern in appointing an arbitrator was to select an impartial person, and he was bound under Article IV to consider his choice very carefully, the parties to a dispute might naturally be inclined to seek persons in sympathy with their interests.

Mr. MACAULAY (Sierra Leone) said that if, for example, an arbitrator appointed by the Chairman were challenged on the grounds that he had a personal interest in the matter in dispute, the Chairman would be entitled to say that he had known of that interest but had not considered it a valid objection to his appointment, and his decision would be unchallengeable. It was not a matter of questioning the Chairman's integrity, but rather his judgment.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) shared the views of the representative of Sierra Leone and asked what authority would remain to a judge who had shown himself to be lacking in judgment or integrity. He was opposed to the distinction made by the draft Convention.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) recognized that the arguments against the distinction had force; nevertheless the special position of the Chairman was consonant with the spirit of the Convention, and he could normally be expected to consult with the parties before making his selection. The distinction was not made by the International Law Commission because their rules dealt with the settlement of purely legal and general disputes, and not exclusively with economic questions.

Mr. BOUITI (Congo, Brazzaville) observed that the Chairman would have a casting vote in the case of an equal division between the other arbitrators on a request for disqualification of another arbitrator — whether the latter was appointed by the Chairman or by a party. He did not see any reason for distinguishing between the rules on disqualification of arbitrators on the basis of who had appointed them.

The CHAIRMAN said that although the Article would only be invoked in exceptional circumstances, enough concern had been shown by the meeting to make it questionable whether the privileged position allowed by the Convention to the Chairman's nominees should be maintained. It might be better to treat all arbitrators on the same level. The observations made during the discussion would be borne in mind and further opinions on the point would be sought at the three further consultative meetings.
ARTICLE VI - Apportionment of Costs of Proceedings (Sections 1 - 3)

The CHAIRMAN in introducing the Article invited attention to the clause in Section 1 which empowered a Commission or Tribunal to assess the cost of proceedings against a party which has brought a frivolous or vexatious claim. He explained that the clause had been introduced to allay the fears expressed in certain quarters that States might be exposed to unreasonable claims.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) supported by the delegate of Liberia proposed that the charges referred to in Section 2 be made payable according to a tariff established in advance in accordance with accepted principles and in the light of the Bank's or other organization's experience. If, under the provisions of Section 2, the Secretary-General were to fix charges that were, according to the circumstances, different for different parties, he would be liable to be accused of partiality.

Mr. BIGAY (Central African Republic) suggested that any tariff of charges established be reviewed at fixed intervals e.g. each year.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) referring to Section 3 said that fees and expenses of conciliators and arbitrators should not be fixed on an ad hoc basis by agreement with the parties. He suggested that the words "in the absence of agreement between them and the parties" be deleted, in order to avoid giving the impression that after a dispute had been settled the parties were going to sit down and haggle over what they had to pay.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that Section 1 laid down that the fees and expenses of members of the Commission or Tribunal would be borne equally by the parties, so there would be no cause for haggling on that score. He thought, however, that it would be convenient if the parties were to agree beforehand with the arbitrators or conciliators upon fees and expenses payable. In the absence of such agreement the fees and expenses would be fixed by the Commission or Tribunal in consultation with the Secretary-General.

Mr. MACAULAY (Sierra Leone) said he felt that the Nigerian proposal to amend Section 3 should not cover "fees". The Tribunal and the parties should reach agreement on the fees to be paid before an award was made. Expenses, on the other hand, ought to be fixed by the Commission or Tribunal.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) said that if it was desired to make a distinction between fees and expenses, he had no objection; he was willing to leave the assessment of expenses to the discretion of the Tribunal.

Mr. OGBAGZY (Ethiopia), supported by the representative of Rwanda, said that the parties should know in advance the fees that were going to be charged. At the same time the procedure for fixing those fees should not be allowed to infringe the independence of the Tribunal or Commission. He suggested that the appropriate fees should be established by the Tribunal or Commission in accordance with a tariff drawn up and approved from time to time by the Administrative Council.

The CHAIRMAN thought that it was necessary to avoid paying
different fees for the plaintiff's and the defendant's arbitrators and the umpire. However, the establishment of a fixed tariff by the Administrative Council might create certain difficulties in view of the variety of types of dispute and the different conditions in various parts of the world. He suggested that the Council might give guidance in certain cases as to what fees would be reasonable.

Mr. MACAULAY (Sierra Leone) suggested that the clause beginning "provided" should form part of the arbitration rules together with all details regarding the award of costs, which should receive no more than a brief mention in Article VI.

The CHAIRMAN said that Article VI reflected the friendly nature of procedures under the Convention; the clause authorizing the Tribunal or Commission to assess costs had been included for the same reason. However the parties were free to agree to depart from these provisions.

Mr. ARDOULAYE (Guinea) thought that a distinction should be made between frivolous claims and claims brought in bad faith. In the latter case all costs should be assessed against the claimant party.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the term "frivolous" in English was a very strong one and bordered on "irresponsible". The distinction between bad faith and "irresponsibility" might be so fine that it was better left to be determined by the Tribunal.

ARTICLE VII - Place of Proceedings (Section 1 - 2)

Mr. KPOGNON (Dahomey) said that Article I, Section 2(3) read in the light of Article VII, Section 1, gave the Administrative Council authority to determine the places where proceedings could be held, whereas Article VII, Section 1, itself authorized the Secretary-General in cases where there was no agreement between the parties, to fix the place of proceedings even outside the places specified by the Administrative Council.

The CHAIRMAN replied that the intention was that the Secretary-General would be authorized to choose only such places and institutions as had been approved by the Administrative Council, and that the text would be amended accordingly.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) suggested that the substance of Article VII did not warrant two paragraphs. He proposed that the Article should read "Conciliation and arbitration proceedings shall be held at such place and at such time as may be prescribed by the Administrative Council". All necessary details should be transferred to the Administrative Rules.

Mr. MACAULAY (Sierra Leone) shared the view of the representative of Nigeria but felt that the text should require that conciliation and arbitration proceedings be held either at the Center or at such other place as the parties shall agree, or in the absence of such agreement at such place as the Conciliation Commission or the Arbitral Tribunal might decide. His proposal, less rigid than having the matter laid down in the Administrative Rules, would leave more room for choice by the parties.
ARTICLE VIII - Interpretation

Mr. MUSTAFA (United Arab Republic) said that the attitude of States to the question of accepting the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice differed widely and he reserved his position on that point.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) said that the text of the Article did not imply an obligation to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court, being qualified by the final phrase "unless the States concerned agree to another mode of settlement". However, if a State did not accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, it was up to that State to find another mode of settlement, and that might be more difficult.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that clauses of the type comprised in the second sentence of Article VIII were normally interpreted as constituting acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the limited class of disputes covered.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria), supported by the representative of Dahomey, suggested that provision should be made in the Article extending the jurisdiction of the Court as regards interpretation to questions arising between a Contracting State and the national of another Contracting State. He asked whether the question of individual nationals had been inadvertently or intentionally omitted from the provisions of the Article.

The CHAIRMAN said that the International Court would be unable to deal with issues between States and individuals unless the matter was referred to it by the States concerned. In addition the inclusion of nationals might considerably delay the proceedings of the tribunal by increasing the number of questions of interpretation which would have to be referred to the International Court.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) said that he was not concerned at this stage with how a question raised by an individual could be brought to the International Court. That could perhaps be done by the Secretariat. As to the Chairman's second point, in his opinion it was preferable to reach a satisfactory solution after delays rather than make a speedy award calculated to lead in the end to the breakdown of the Center. Failure to refer questions of interpretation to the Court would tend to make the parties feel that the awards of the tribunal were unjust and thereby prejudice its prestige and efficacy.

The CHAIRMAN said that the problem was a difficult one, but that it deserved consideration. It would be an ideal solution if the Center could be brought within the advisory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 96 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) said that the question was one of principle: since the Convention had admitted nationals to the jurisdiction of the Center, if a national raised a question of interpretation some mode for the submission to the Court of that question ought to be established. In a dispute arising between a Contracting State and an individual who was the national of another Contracting State, the case of the individual as far as that particular question was concerned could perhaps be taken up by his State.
Mr. BROWN (Tanganyika) said he could not support the proposal made by the representative of Nigeria, which was not an amendment but in effect a new clause which would give a limited right of appeal to individual persons in some cases. Article II(3), for instance, was likely to give rise to many questions of interpretation. Arbitral proceedings would consequently be stayed while a kind of interlocutory appeal was made to the Court.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) asked whether the representative of Tanganyika wished to limit to States, and to debar nationals from exercising the right to raise questions of interpretation. Once the national had been admitted to the Tribunal he ought to be allowed all further rights that followed from that admission on the same level as Contracting States.

Mr. BROWN (Tanganyika) said that if the proposal put forward by the representative of Nigeria did not mean that whenever an individual, subject of a Contracting State, raised a question of interpretation, his State was under an obligation to espouse the cause of its national but could do so at its discretion, his own view was not so very different.

The CHAIRMAN said that the representative of Nigeria had raised a question and proposed a solution based on the assumption that individuals would be treated on the same level as Contracting States for the purposes of the Convention. The representative of Tanganyika had observed rightly that arbitral proceedings would be likely to be frequently stayed pending decisions of the International Court on the many questions of interpretation of the Convention that would almost certainly be raised. The Nigerian representative accepted the possibility of delays in the interest of obtaining fully satisfactory awards; the representative of Tanganyika on the other hand feared that delays would be too frequent to allow for the speedy settlement of disputes that was desirable. If the Nigerian proposal were accepted the appropriate technical mechanism would have to be very carefully considered.

Mr. NICAIENZI (Burundi) asked why there was a separate article on interpretation when the question was dealt with in Section 11, 12 and 13 of Article IV. The question of interpretation could, in his opinion, only arise between two States, although one of the States might be subrogated on behalf of its national.

Mr. KPOGNON ( Dahomey) pointed out that Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article IV dealt with interpretation of an award, while Article VIII dealt with interpretation of the Convention.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) said he agreed with the representative of Nigeria that under Article VIII an investor should have the same rights as a Contracting State, but the representative of Tanganyika was right in emphasizing that an investor could not go to the International Court of Justice. The possibility might be considered of empowering the Center to approach the International Court on behalf of the investor. Otherwise the investor would have to approach the International Court through his own State.

The CHAIRMAN explained that the representative of Nigeria had wished to provide in Article VIII for a question which might arise between a Contracting State and an investor rather than between two Contracting States. He did not thereby intend, however, to impose an obligation on
a Contracting State to bring that question before the Court.

Mr. KPOGNON (Dahomey) pointed out that if an investor wished to go to the International Court the question of diplomatic protection would come into play and his State could go to the Court for him.

Mr. GACHEM (Tunisia) pointed out that although the Convention enabled individuals to have direct access to an international forum a physical person was a third party to the Convention, which was a Convention between States. If an individual contested an interpretation his State would have to plead his case before the International Court.

Mr. OGBAGZY (Ethiopia) said that a question of interpretation of the Convention might arise either in the course of a dispute before the Center or independent of any such dispute. In the first case, the question of interpretation might or might not have a bearing on the award. In the latter case the question would be theoretical. If, however, it had a bearing on the award the tribunal could give alternative awards, the enforcement of which would depend on the result of the decision of the International Court.

The CHAIRMAN suggested that another section might be added to the Article stating that if in the course of proceedings a question of interpretation arose and if the investor’s State and the other State were prepared to bring it to the International Court and if the tribunal were satisfied that the question of interpretation was material, then the proceedings should be stayed.

Mr. MALLAMUD (Uganda) said that Section 17(2) of Article IV which prohibited diplomatic protection would have to be amended if the Chairman’s suggestion were adopted.

Mr. BERNARD (Liberia) remarked that traditionally only parties to an international agreement could raise questions of interpretation of that agreement. This Convention introduced an innovation in that it made individuals subjects of international law. Consequently to permit to be brought before the Court only questions of interpretation of the Convention arising between Contracting States would defeat the purpose of the Convention. He thought that a way should be found to permit questions of interpretation of the Convention arising between a Contracting State and a foreign investor to be brought before the International Court of Justice.

Mr. MACAULAY (Sierra Leone) thought that the Convention should expressly empower the tribunal to stay proceedings where a question of interpretation arose and was referred to the International Court.

The meeting was suspended at 11:50 a.m. and resumed at 12:15 p.m.

ARTICLE IX - Amendment

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) suggested that the text of a proposed amendment should be communicated to the Secretary-General rather than to the Chairman of the Administrative Council, because the Secretary-General was the official responsible for administrative matters.
He wondered whether the majority of four-fifths suggested in Section 2 of the Article was not too high, and suggested it might be limited to a simple majority at least in the early stages of the Convention's operation.

Mr. MOUSTAFA (United Arab Republic) pointed out that the Administrative Council was a purely administrative body and ought not to be competent to decide questions of amendment. After adoption by the Council, the amendment should be submitted to all Contracting States for ratification or acceptance.

The CHAIRMAN said that Mr. MOUSTAFA's proposal followed more closely the procedure in the Charter of the International Bank. That procedure had been changed in the Charter of the IFC. In practice the difference was slight. It was true that the Administrative Council did not appear to be a suitable organ to decide on amendments. Since, however, its members were Government representatives, States could feel assured that their representative would not vote in favor of an amendment without proper authorization.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) agreed with the representative of Nigeria that the text of any amendment should be communicated to the Secretary-General. He also agreed that the majority suggested in Section 2 was too high; it could be reduced to perhaps three-fifths but at any rate should exceed a simple majority.

Mr. KPOGNON (Dahomey) expressed himself in favor of a three-fourths majority. He suggested that those opposed to the amendment should be permitted to enter a reservation rather than be forced to denounce the Convention if they did not want to be bound by the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN said that while he would consider the point, he feared that to permit reservations would lead to confusion.

ARTICLE XI - Final Provisions

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) addressed himself to the number of ratifications or acceptances required to bring the Convention into force (Section 3). On the assumption that eventually all 102 members of the Bank would become parties, he thought that roughly two-thirds, or 65, would be an appropriate number.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) was inclined to agree with the representative of Nigeria. A fairly high number of ratifications would prove the success of the Convention. However, he did not feel strongly on the matter.

Mr. KPOGNON (Dahomey) asked what was the usual number of ratifications required before a Convention of this kind entered into force.

The CHAIRMAN replied that the New York Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards provided for entry into force three months after the date of deposit of the third instrument of ratification. That figure was obviously too low, but in his opinion sixty-five was far too high.

Mr. NICAYENZI (Burundi) asked if it would be possible for a State to suggest an amendment before it ratified the Convention.
Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) asked whether conditional ratification would be acceptable.

The CHAIRMAN replied that a conditional ratification would be a ratification subject to reservations because a ratification termed conditional would not be a ratification. The question of reservations was a difficult one. When the Secretary-General of the United Nations received a ratification subject to reservation, he circulated the reservation to other States asking them if they accepted it. If they did not, the ratification was invalid.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) asked what procedure was followed if the first State ratifying had a reservation.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) replied that the Secretary-General held it until other ratifications had been received; it was then submitted to the other ratifying States.

He pointed out, insofar as the required number of ratifications was concerned, that if the number of ratifications was too low and either all the African and Asian members ratified, or all the capital-exporting countries, the Convention might appear an instrument to serve the interests of only one category of countries. If the figure sixty-five were adopted a reasonable proportion of ratifications might be expected from capital-exporting and capital-importing countries. He agreed with the Chairman that the 1958 New York Convention was not a proper precedent since the Convention now proposed dealt with a much more sensitive area.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that the Convention would be a failure if those ratifying it did not include both capital-importing and capital-exporting countries. He noted that in the Bank only eighteen countries were regarded as capital-exporting countries. He was convinced that the Bank should not and would not submit a Convention to States unless it had satisfied itself of substantial support in both groups of countries. But international practice seemed to indicate that a distinction was made between the measure of support required before an agreement was put up for signature and the number of ratifications required to put it into effect as among those ratifying it. One had to take account of inertia in this field, and he would argue that a relatively low number of ratifications should be required. The matter had better be left open until one had a clearer picture of the number of countries indicating an intention to join.

The following are examples of international agreements requiring relatively low numbers of ratifications for their entry into force:

- Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Signed April 18, 1961) - 22 ratifications or accessions (Article 51);
- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) - 20 ratifications (Article XIII);
- Revised General Act for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes (1949) 2 accessions (Article 44);
- Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons etc. (1950) - 2 ratifications (Article 21);
- Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) - 6 ratifications (Article 43);
Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) suggested with reference to Section 4 (Territorial application), that the words "either at the time of signature or subsequently" should be added at the end of the Section.

Mr. MALLAMUD (Uganda) said that when a Convention had been adopted by a metropolitan country on behalf of a territory for which it was responsible, there was sometimes some doubt whether the Convention applied to that territory once it had attained its independence. Perhaps the Convention should contain a provision saying that the Convention would not apply once such a territory had attained independence.

The CHAIRMAN replied that he would have to reflect on the matter.

ARTICLE X - Definitions

The CHAIRMAN invited representatives to examine Article X. The Bank had thought that, as a general rule, if a host State knowingly wished to regard a person of dual nationality - one of the nationalities being that of the host State - as a foreigner it should be permitted to do so. In particular, paragraph 2 of Article X reflected the view that the jurisdiction of the Center was not excluded merely because the investor, in addition to being a national of another Contracting State was also a national of the host State.

Mr. MACAULAY (Sierra Leone) asked whether where a group of say 20 nationals of a Contracting State formed an association for business purposes in another State in which their association was not regarded as having juridical personality, what nationality they would be deemed to have under the Convention.

The CHAIRMAN replied that for the purposes of the Convention a host State could elect at the time of consent to jurisdiction of the Center to treat the association either as a national of the State in which they are associated to do business or as a national of the State to which the individuals belonged.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) reverted to the question of dual nationality insofar as companies were concerned. Even though a Company might have taken the nationality of the host country there was nothing to prevent the State which supplied the capital of the company from insisting that any dispute that may arise had to be submitted to international adjudication.

The CHAIRMAN repeated that he thought that the problem of dual nationality was not a real one because it was up to the host State to say whether it would or would not enter into an agreement to go before an international tribunal. All the definitions did was to permit States to make their own choice.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) said he was partially satisfied by the Chairman's answer but that it did not take account of the power of subrogation given to States. In many cases agreements did not contain a clause specifying the type of arbitration to be used.
The CHAIRMAN replied that no submission to arbitration would be regarded as coming under the Center unless the agreement contained a clause stating that the provisions of the Convention would be applied in case of a dispute. A subrogated State would have no more rights than those of the investor concerned.

Mr. RATSIRAHONANA (Malagasy Republic) suggested that if a national of a Contracting State possessed concurrently the nationality of the host State the jurisdiction of the Center should be excluded.

He pointed out insofar as the question of dual nationality was concerned that a certain number of Malagasy had French nationality under French law and Malagasy nationality under Malagasy law. Such persons should not be able to go before an International Court in a suit against the Malagasy Republic by invoking their French nationality. The Chairman had said that States were always free to refuse to go to the Center, but such a refusal might deter future investors. Once the Convention had entered into force, investors might deliberately take advantage of their dual nationality in order to secure agreements to have recourse to the Center.

The CHAIRMAN replied that in the example mentioned by the Malagasy representative a refusal on the part of the State would be so obviously justified that it would not deter foreign investors.

Mr. FOALEM (OAMCE) said the Chairman had often referred to the consensual nature of reference to an arbitral tribunal under the Convention. However, once the Convention had been adopted, all investors would want agreements to contain a clause to the effect that disputes had to be referred to the Center. It would therefore be worthwhile to give further consideration to the problem of dual nationality.

The meeting rose at 1:53 p.m.

SEVENTH SESSION
(Friday, December 20, 1963 - 9:40 a.m.)

ARTICLE X - Definitions (Sections 1 and 2) (continued)

...
a) la propriété de biens meubles et immeubles ainsi que de
tous autres droits réels tels qu'hypothèques, droits de
gage, etc;

b) les droits de participation à des sociétés et autres sortes
de participations;

c) les créances pecuniaires ou celles relatives à des prestations
présentant une valeur économique;

d) les droits d'auteur, droits de propriété industrielle, procédés
techniques, éléments incorporels de fonds de commerce (goodwill);

e) les concessions de droit public, y compris les concessions de
recherche et d'exploitation.

If the nationality of juridical persons were not satisfactorily defined,
the problem of dual nationality would be raised, but that problem was in
reality theoretical owing to the optional nature of the Convention.
Nationals of a Contracting State could be defined as: "All physical
persons having the nationality of that country in accordance with pre-
vailing legislation." Companies having their seat in a given State, and
organized according to the law of that State, would according to a
definition along those lines be nationals of that State.

The CHAIRMAN commented that although the proposal put forward by
the representative of Tunisia for the definition of nationals of a Contract-
ing State was interesting, it would conflict with the laws of certain
countries, such as those within OAME, which treated foreign-owned
companies established according to the laws of those countries as foreign,
and not national.

Mr. OGBAGZY (Ethiopia) suggested that Section 1, sub-section (b)
of Article X be deleted since it did not protect minority shareholders
or bondholders in foreign companies. He proposed that the intention of
Section (b) be covered by stating that the foreign investor should appear
in a dispute as an investor and national of his own State, and not as a
bondholder or shareholder and thereby avoid raising the question of the
nationality of the company; it should always be remembered that the
company and the individual were different persons.

The CHAIRMAN said that the definition in the Convention would
have to be reconsidered. The suggestion put forward by the representative
of Ethiopia would be taken into account together with other suggestions
that had already been made.

The CHAIRMAN said it had occurred to him that, as many of the
countries present were currently engaged not only in studying the Bank's
proposals but also the OECD Draft Convention and the possibility of
setting up an international investment guarantee fund, it might be useful
to distinguish these different techniques. The OECD Convention laid down
rules against which the validity of an expropriation and the quantum of
compensation could be assessed, and created a system whereby on signature
a State would assume certain obligations as to its behavior and undertake
to submit disputes to compulsory arbitration before an international
tribunal. On the other hand, the Bank proposed the creation of a Center
for arbitration and conciliation to which parties to a dispute could have recourse on a purely voluntary basis.

Certain rights and obligations were conferred on foreign investors by the OECD draft, and as a result, it became essential to be able to determine who was a "foreign investor". Under that draft, therefore, the question of nationality was of crucial importance. Under the Bank's proposals a definition of nationality was relatively unimportant by reason of the essentially voluntary nature of recourse to the Center. A State would always be able to choose for itself in the first place whether or not to enter into an investment agreement with a particular investor, and secondly, whether to include in that agreement a clause on submission to arbitration before the Center.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) thought that the definition of "national of a Contracting State" in Article X could result in some imbalance in the positions of parties to a dispute if applied in relation to Section 17. He cited the case of a company, a national of the host State but controlled by nationals of another State, which had entered into an investment agreement with the host State. In the event of a breach of the agreement by the company, the host State might not be able to bring the company before an international tribunal as the company could claim that it was a national of the host State. On the other hand, the State whose nationals controlled the company might be able to bring the host State before an international tribunal in the event of a breach, under Section 17(2).

The CHAIRMAN said he could not agree that the situation described by the delegate of Cameroon could result in disequilibrium in the context of the Convention. In the first place if an arbitration clause had been included in the investment agreement, the host State could bring the company before the international tribunal, and secondly, an international claim with respect to a particular dispute by the foreign State in question would be prevented by Section 17(1). The Convention, therefore, helped to establish equilibrium in this situation.

Mr. BIGAY (Central African Republic) pointed out that the aim of the Convention was to attract foreign capital. That aim would be achieved if as many companies as possible could avail themselves of the arbitration facilities of the Center. He would be in favor of the present text provided it was amended to make it clear that when a government consented to submit to arbitration disputes between it and a company with dual nationality, that consent would have to be reviewed if, at the time when a dispute arose it was found that the company had lost its foreign nationality. If this was not provided for the following might occur: A company established in the Central African Republic and controlled by French investors, could enter into an agreement including an arbitration clause under the Convention. If the controlling interest later passed to Central African nationals and then a dispute arose, Central Africa might be brought before the tribunal by its own nationals although consent had been given on the assumption that the company was controlled by foreigners. He suggested that an additional sentence be added to paragraph 2, which should read: "Dans ce dernier cas le requérant devra présenter un compromis spécial émanant de l'État partie au différend."

The CHAIRMAN said that the proposal put forward by the representative
of the Central African Republic deserved consideration.

Mr. LAMIN (Libya) said, with reference to Article I, Section 6(1), that he felt that the broad lines of the administrative rules and regulations should be described in the Convention. With regard to Article IX, Section 2, on the amendment procedure he proposed that the majority of the members of the Council stated in brackets as four-fifths should be fixed at two-thirds. He also asked for a definition of a Contracting State which would include government controlled operations.

DRAFT PROVISION ON EXTENSION OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE CENTER TO DISPUTES INVOLVING POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS OR INSTRUMENTALITIES OF STATES (COM/AF/7)

The CHAIRMAN invited the meeting to consider the proposed new section which read as follows:

"Section ... Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1 of Article II the jurisdiction of the Center shall extend to any dispute between a political subdivision or instrumentality of a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State, where such political subdivisions or instrumentality and such national have consented to the jurisdiction of the Center in respect of such dispute, and such political subdivision or instrumentality has given its consent with the approval of the Contracting State concerned."

The CHAIRMAN said that since agreements might not always be concluded with States, but sometimes with political sub-divisions such as a canton, province or constituent state of a federation, it had to be decided whether such component parts of States could enter into agreements with investors under the provisions of the draft Convention. Furthermore, certain fields of economic activity were sometimes reserved to State entities or public institutions and the draft Convention did not cover the inclusion of an arbitration clause in agreements with such entities. The document before the meeting was an attempt to provide for those contingencies by permitting inclusion of clauses referring disputes to arbitration under the Convention in agreements between such entities and foreign investors - subject to the approval of the State concerned. The State would then be responsible for the fulfillment of the engagements undertaken by the entity.

Mr. MALLAMUD (Uganda) asked whether the Instrumentalities referred to in the draft provision would include a Development Corporation.

The CHAIRMAN replied that it would cover any public body acting with State approval.

Mr. AMETHIER (Ivory Coast) suggested that in the French text the words "subdivision politique" in lines 2 and 3 should be replaced by the words "collectivité locale".

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) suggested that the words "collectivité publique décentralisée" would be preferable.
Mr. MACAULAY (Sierra Leone) said that State approval might raise special problems in countries like Canada, Australia or India where certain matters came within the exclusive competence of the constituent states or provinces of a federal State. He suggested that the requirement of State approval should be omitted.

Mr. BIGAY (Central African Republic) suggested that the jurisdiction of the Center might be extended to cover disputes between investors and instrumentalities or subdivisions of a State either where such agreements were entered into with the approval of the host State or where such instrumentalities or subdivisions were acting on behalf of the host State.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) said the position of non-unitary States raised a number of difficulties which would need further consideration. Nigeria, for example, was a federation, but no separate region in Nigeria was entitled to deal with a foreign company except through the Federal Government, which alone dealt with all external questions. Foreign investors were obliged to enter into an agreement with the Federal Government which, in return, gave them its guarantee. He would like to have the Convention introduce a State guarantee to reimburse the investor, instead of State approval of the agreement. Since in all federated States a share of the federal revenue was given by the central government to the regional provinces, states, etc., the Federal Government would have no difficulty in retaining part of the revenue due to any region for the payment of an indemnity due to an investor in that region. Those cases would in any case be abnormal, so there was no reason why the Federal Government should not be asked for a guarantee of this kind. Public corporations could be dealt with separately, and provided with similar government level guarantees.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) said that his country was also a federation and would be faced with the same problem that had been raised by Sierra Leone. Since the Cameroon federation had been formed, only the central authority was entitled to borrow in the name of the country; municipalities, however, could enter into contracts with individual foreign persons. In those cases most companies asked for a State guarantee, but the guarantee referred only to questions of payment. He asked whether that would be enough to bring the government into proceedings in the case of a dispute between a municipal authority and a foreign individual.

The CHAIRMAN observed that while there were great difficulties in bringing the needs of non-unitary states within the scope of the Convention, he wondered whether the guarantee of the undertaking to submit to arbitration given by the central authority would not be sufficient to cover the difficulty referred to by the representative of Sierra Leone. Agreements with the central authority would be international and would therefore be made directly with the Federal Government or central authority of non-unitary states, regardless of the domestic relations between the federal and the provincial authorities. The matter called for further consideration.

Draft Additional Section on Interpretation
(Doc. COM/AF/8)

The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider a draft of an
additional section on Interpretation which read as follows:

"1. ...... 

2. (1) If in the course of any arbitral proceeding pursuant to this Convention a question arises between the parties thereto concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention, and the arbitral tribunal is of the opinion that the question has merit and may affect the outcome of the proceedings, the tribunal shall suspend the proceedings for a period of three months.

(2) If within that period the tribunal shall have been notified that the International Court of Justice has been seized of the question by the States concerned the arbitral proceedings shall remain suspended as long as the question is pending before the International Court of Justice.

(3) If the tribunal shall not have been so notified, the arbitral proceedings shall be resumed at the expiration of the aforesaid period."

The proposed additional section on Interpretation dealt with legal questions on which the tribunal might need an answer in order to reach a decision.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) pointed out that in paragraph 2(2), line 3 of the draft, the words "by the States concerned" appeared to have been misplaced. They should follow the word "notified" in the first line unless the notification was to be made by the Secretariat, as he had suggested at an earlier stage in their discussions.

Mr. KPOGNON (Dahomey) said that the matter was a "question préjudicielle" in that the tribunal before it could take any decision needed to have the opinion of a competent authority on the interpretation of the Convention. The wording of paragraph 2(1) appeared to authorize the tribunal to interpret the Convention at least to the extent necessary to determine whether the question had merit. In his opinion as soon as any question of interpretation arose it was not for the tribunal to decide on its merits but to stay the proceedings forthwith, while the matter was referred to the International Court.

The CHAIRMAN observed that an automatic procedure of the kind proposed by the representative of Dahomey would make it easy for parties to frustrate the proceedings. The tribunal was a quasi-judicial body competent to determine questions of law including those concerning interpretation of the Convention. Furthermore, the tribunal could not itself address questions to the International Court. That initiative had to be taken by States. However, there was no assurance that a State would support an individual national who might want a ruling from the Court. In the absence of any reference to the International Court, the tribunal would be obliged to decide the issue. He felt that since one of the aims of the Convention was to provide for the speedy, as well as the just settlement of disputes, it should be possible to trust the tribunal to judge the merits of a query. It would in any case have to decide
whether the question of interpretation was, or was not, going to affect
the issue before it.

Mr. KPOGINON (Dahomey) suggested that if the tribunal were in
certain cases going to have to interpret the Convention, the Convention
should state explicitly that the tribunal was competent to do so.

The CHAIRMAN said that no such statement was necessary since in
the absence of any other competent body the tribunal would automatically
have to give the interpretation.

Mr. OGBAGZY (Ethiopia) wished to raise three questions regarding
paragraph 2(2) of Doc. COM/AF/8. That section referred only to the Inter-
national Court of Justice, whereas in Article VIII it was stated that
States could agree to another mode of settlement. Secondly, he inquired
whether the decision of the International Court on the question referred
to it would be legally binding upon the tribunal, and thirdly whether
an arbitral tribunal could, of its own motion, refer questions of inter-
pretation to the International Court.

The CHAIRMAN replied that the decision reached by another mode
of settlement would not necessarily be binding on the arbitral tribunal.
Only a court of law ought to be competent to decide questions of inter-
pretation. As to the second question raised by the delegate of Ethiopia,
he thought that the arbitral tribunal would be bound by the decision of
the Court in fact if not in law, while as to his third question he did
not think that in the present state of international law the tribunal
could of its own motion refer questions of interpretation to the Court.

Mr. BERNARD (Liberia) said that he had understood that another
mode of settlement would be used when the State of an investor had not
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

The CHAIRMAN said that in his opinion Article VIII as it existed
in the preliminary draft did confer compulsory jurisdiction with respect
to the question of interpretation. Article VIII constituted a "special
agreement" to refer certain questions to the International Court of Justice.
He did not think that legal questions should be resolved by negotiation
and then become binding.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) agreeing explained that it was unusual to allow
parties to determine the interpretation of the law to be applied by any
tribunal or court. It would be dangerous to allow States A and B to
decide that a particular meaning should be attached to a certain provision
when some years later States Y and Z might attach a different interpretation
to the same provision.

Mr. MACAULAY (Sierra Leone) suggested that the clauses contained in
Doc. COM/AF/8 should come under Article IV rather than under Article VIII.

The CHAIRMAN explained that their inclusion under Article VIII
was only tentative. If they were adopted, their position in the Convention
would have to be carefully considered and all necessary consequential
changes made.

Mr. MACAULAY (Sierra Leone), referring to the fact that whereas
Article VIII mentioned "any question or dispute", the clauses in Doc. CCM/AF/8 mentioned only "a question", said that a question of interpretation could also be a dispute. It could indeed be argued that a dispute raised a question. He pointed out that the meeting seemed to be concentrating on the question of interpretation and losing sight of that of application. In most cases where a question of application arose it was really a dispute and not a question.

He disagreed with the contention of the representative of Dahomey that the text should clearly state that the arbitral tribunal was competent to interpret the Convention. Article IV, Section 4(2) laid down that a finding of non liquet was not permitted.

He agreed with the representative of Nigeria about the meaning and position of the word "seized" and suggested that the phrase "by the States concerned" be amended to read "by one or more of the States concerned".

As now drafted, Article VIII meant that States would have to consent to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. There might, however, be some States which would not be prepared to accept that jurisdiction and which would, in consequence, ratify the Convention with a reservation as to Article VIII. The Article should be so drafted that it could be ratified without reservations. He suggested that that might be achieved if the text provided that any question or dispute arising between the Contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which was not settled by negotiation or another mode of settlement should, if the parties so agreed, be referred to the International Court of Justice.

Mr. KPOGNON (Dahomey) said that in international law competence was divided depending on whether the question to be decided was one of the interpretation or application of a treaty or a dispute of a private nature. It had to be admitted that the International Court of Justice was, as a rule, competent to decide questions relating to the interpretation of the Convention and that the Arbitral Tribunal would as a rule be competent to decide the actual investment dispute. It was proposed that the Arbitral Tribunal should be competent to interpret the Convention. If that proposal were accepted this should be made explicit in the Convention.

The CHAIRMAN said that if the International Court had exclusive jurisdiction to decide every question of interpretation he would find it easier to agree with the representative of Dahomey. It was not certain, however, that even the clause in Article VIII giving it compulsory if non-exclusive jurisdiction would be acceptable to all States. The role of the International Court in relation to the Convention would have to be studied carefully.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon), referring to the proposed additional section on interpretation of the Convention, suggested that it should be left to the most diligent party to notify the tribunal that the question had been submitted to the International Court.

The meeting was suspended at 11:55 a.m. and resumed at 12:15 p.m.
The CHAIRMAN invited representatives to examine the Preamble to the draft Convention.

Mr. ELIAS (Nigeria) said that in his opinion some way should be found of merging paragraphs 4 and 6, both of which dealt with the optional nature of the Convention. The contents of the other paragraphs were acceptable to his delegation, with some changes in the drafting.

Mr. MANKOUBI (Togo) said that the Preamble should contain a paragraph stressing the fact that the Convention conferred upon investors the novel right of direct access to international tribunals.

Many French-speaking representatives had drawn attention to the lack of French legal language in the text of the draft Convention. Much of the Convention was based on The Hague Convention, a French text of which existed. That text should be consulted when the text of the draft Convention was being finalized.

He agreed with earlier speakers that the Convention should contain a definition of the word "investment". He suggested that the definition of that word supplied by the representative of Tunisia should be circulated as a conference document.

Mr. KPOGNON (Dahomey) said that in his opinion the Preamble would be improved if each paragraph began with the word CONSIDERING. That was the practice normally adopted in such documents. As the Convention was concerned with international private investment, specific reference to "private investment" should be made in the Preamble. He suggested that in paragraph 2 the word "desirable" in the fourth line be replaced by the words "highly desirable" and that in the fifth and sixth lines the words "with due respect for the principle of equal rights of States" should be replaced by the words "with reciprocal respect for the equal rights of States".

Mr. DODOO (Ghana) said that his delegation agreed with the order of paragraphs as contained in the draft Preamble. He agreed with the drafting improvements to paragraphs 2 and 3 suggested by the representative of Nigeria but did not agree that paragraphs 4 and 6 should be merged. Paragraph 4 merely drew attention to the fact that recourse to the Center's facilities was subject to consent while paragraph 6 indicated that the fact that a Contracting State by signing the Convention did not necessarily undertake to have recourse to the facilities of the Center.

Mr. MPANJO (Cameroon) said that his delegation accepted the spirit of the Preamble. Since however it had been at the World Conference on World Peace through Law that the Chairman had informed States that the Bank was preparing the Convention, the words "peace and" should be inserted before the words "mutual confidence" in the fifth line of paragraph 2.

Mr. NIKIEMA (Upper Volta) said he supported the amendments to paragraph 2 proposed by the representative of Dahomey.

Mr. MACAULAY (Sierra Leone) said he wished to raise two points.
which were not directly relevant to the Preamble, which his delegation accepted as it stood.

He assumed that the Executive Directors of the Bank were anxious that the Center should prove successful. It would not be a success, however, unless in their agreements with foreign investors Contracting States included clauses stipulating that any disputes that might arise were to be referred to the Center. Earlier in the proceedings he had said that the institutional facilities of the Center should be available to non-members. Many African countries accepted investments from countries in the Eastern bloc which will presumably not be members of the Center. If those countries had not signed the Convention how could an arbitration clause referring to the Center be included in any agreement with them? It could be said, therefore, that the Center would be used only for the purposes of one set of countries. He would, therefore, suggest that the institutional facilities of the Center should be made available to non-members of the Convention.

His second point concerned the use of the phrases "capital-exporting country" and "capital-importing country". He felt sure that the use of these phrases would give rise to difficulties in some of the underdeveloped countries. Finally, he suggested that care should be taken about the position occupied by the Chairman of the Administrative Council because if it were too prominent the idea that the Convention was intended to protect investors would become prevalent.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the Convention would be open to signature by any sovereign State. In his opinion it was an exaggeration to say that unless its institutional facilities were available to non-members, the Center would serve no useful purpose. The institutional facilities were so minimal that he wondered if they would be of any real value to non-members. In any case, if the Bank was distasteful to the countries of the Eastern bloc it was unlikely that they would be willing to use the Center's institutional facilities.

The position and powers of the Chairman of the Administrative Council touched the essence of the Convention, which was a Convention sponsored by the Bank. He would have powers to appoint the members of a specific tribunal only to the extent desired by the parties. If the parties wanted an umpire designated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the Organization for African Unity or by some body, say, in the Soviet Union, their wishes would be respected.

The Bank would be willing to accept any appropriate phrases to replace "capital-exporting country" and "capital-importing country".

Mr. EL TAYEB (Sudan) said that the Convention was a friendly instrument as compared with most contracts, but the clause on interpretation, even as amended, went some way to dispelling that friendly atmosphere. If possible, recourse to the International Court of Justice should be avoided and some way found of settling disputes on interpretation or application of the Convention through the Center. An arbitral tribunal should be empowered to interpret the Convention and should be enabled to refer any questions of interpretation it could not solve to a Committee of the Administrative Council.
In his opinion, the question of nationality was a complex one which should not be decided by a Conciliation Commission or an Arbitral Tribunal. The written statement from the government should be regarded as conclusive proof rather than as _prima facie_ evidence.

Parties to a dispute should be entirely free to choose their arbitrators; such a provision would preserve the friendly nature of the Convention.

**Closure of the Meeting**

The CHAIRMAN said the discussions had revealed how many of the problems treated were complex ones. In reviewing the meeting's work he felt gratified that there had been a consensus of opinion on so many issues. In those cases where there had been differences of opinion a better understanding of the various points of view had been achieved. There had been many valuable suggestions for improvement of the Preliminary Draft. All the views expressed would be reported to the Executive Directors. The drafters had not been spared criticism, but he felt that the criticism had always been constructive. He appreciated the spirit of cooperation, the full participation and the patience of representatives.

He thanked the Executive-Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa for providing the facilities for the meeting, and the Ethiopian Government for its cordial hospitality.

The Chairman declared closed the first regional consultative meeting of legal experts on the Settlement of Investment Disputes.

The meeting rose at 1:15 p.m.

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As the members of the Board know, the meeting was held from the 16th through the 20th of December in Addis Ababa.

Let me start out by saying that I believe that from the point of view of all concerned it was a very successful meeting. We had invited 32
countries, and 29 of those countries were represented at the meeting. The number of delegates was 50. The countries that weren't represented were Algeria and Mauritania, which had advised us that unfortunately they were unable to spare the personnel at that particular time, and Gabon, which sent a cable to Mr. Woods saying that since they agreed with the text as it stood they thought there was no need to send delegates to the meeting.

The arrangements were very good. Africa Hall is a magnificent building, comparable to the United Nations headquarters in conference facilities, with simultaneous interpretation, recording equipment and the like.

The Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, Mr. Gardner, just got back in time from the Kenya independence celebrations to attend the opening session. He made a very friendly and constructive statement, in which he pointed out that even though in Africa, probably more than in any other part of the world, attention is being given to the question of investment promotion unilaterally and through bilateral arrangements, he felt that the time had come to consider whether this shouldn't be put into a broader multilateral, international framework. Without expressing himself on the details of the proposals, he thought that they merited attention. Mr. Gardner expressed his appreciation for the initiative which you and the Bank have taken in this matter, as well as for our continuing interest in the affairs of the African Development Bank.

The meeting ran for five days. We had long and fruitful sessions during which a great number of comments were made dealing with matters of principle as well as detail. A report on the discussions is being drafted and will be sent to the governments invited to the Addis Ababa meeting. It was the opinion of the delegates at that meeting, and I share their view, that it would not serve a useful purpose to report to you in detail on the proceedings until all four regional meetings have been held. Therefore, with your permission, I shall stick to the main points only.

I made a fairly long opening statement, in which I sought to stimulate discussion of some of the salient features of the convention, which are all very well known to you and which I shall not repeat here. Thereafter, we first had a round of general statements and then four days of detailed discussion.

In the general statements there was complete agreement expressed with the ideas underlying the convention. Most of the representatives were lawyers. Some were economists. Some were very distinguished lawyers, and without making any invidious comparisons I want to mention especially Dr. T.O. Elias, the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Nigeria, who in addition to his duties at home serves as a member of the U.N. International Law Commission. In his opening statement, Dr. Elias said that the task that the Bank had undertaken constituted both an attempt to codify existing law and to work towards the progressive development of international law. He strongly welcomed the Bank's initiative.

No objections were expressed, as I said, to the principles underlying the draft, and when we went through the Articles it was interesting that while delegates had many comments, criticisms and suggestions none affected the substance of our present thinking. For instance, nobody raised any question on whether our proposals should be given the form of an international agreement rather than being put into effect by the Bank by administra-
tive means. Nor was any question raised about the link between the Bank and the Center. In fact, one delegation said that the link with the Bank should be even stronger because this would give capital importing countries a greater sense of confidence.

Going on to the question of the position of the Secretary-General -- and I am selecting those points which have been discussed at some length in this Board sitting as a committee of the whole -- there was some feeling that the Secretary-General ought to be a full-time official and that he should have no link with any other institution. The main proponent of this suggestion said that this was not because he thought that the Secretary-General, if an employee of the Bank, would be lacking in impartiality, but he felt that it would lessen the status of the Secretary-General. For that reason he was equally opposed to combining the functions of the Secretary-General of the Center and Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague.

The need for a possible removal of the seat of the Center from the headquarters of the Bank was not well understood and objected to by some as unnecessary and undesirable, although suggestions were made for decentralizing the location of actual proceedings.

By way of an aside, I might mention that we came in for strong criticism of the French version of the draft most of which was deserved. The French text definitely can stand a very thorough review. I pointed out that for the moment the French version was no more than a working translation, and that eventually an authentic French text would be prepared.

Some new ideas were expressed to which I would like to refer briefly.

The group of countries in the CAME, the French speaking countries, are very much interested in and are working with the Council of Europe and with the Common Market on an investment guarantee fund, to which repeated reference was made in the discussions. These countries would like the investment guarantee institution, if created -- it would be a regional one in their mind, not an international one -- to have the right to come before the Center after having been subrogated in the rights of investors who had been indemnified by it in the same way in which we now provide that a state which has paid off an investor might stand in the shoes of the investor before the Center. I think this is an interesting idea, and it certainly could be implemented if there is general support for it.

Some delegations expressed the view that it might be too limited to have the scope of activity of the Center defined as restricted to disputes between an investor and a foreign state, because in so many countries, at least in Africa, it is state-controlled corporations and development boards that would give concessions or make investment agreements. It was therefore suggested that we ought to find some way in which disputes arising out of such agreements could be brought before the Center. This was a useful suggestion which we are now studying.

Finally, some delegates felt that the term "investment" should be defined, and as I have indicated to the members of this Board on earlier occasions, we shall probably in the end have to devise a suitable definition of investment, difficult though it may be.
Taking the meeting as a whole, it was very encouraging. The need for an instrument of the character of our draft was recognized. Nobody found anything radically wrong with it. My impressions at the meeting itself were confirmed by what I learned from various sources about reactions of delegates expressed to others who were in Addis Ababa for other conferences being held concurrently.

I had expected a good and sympathetic discussion, but it was more constructive and more helpful and encouraging than I had dared to expect.
Mr. E. Richmond OLSON
Mr. H. Courtney KINGSTONE
Mr. George Bernard SUMMERS

Mr. Luis ARTEAGA Barros
Mr. Hugo GALVEZ
Mr. Helmut BRUNNER
Mr. Fernando GAMBOA Serazzi
Mr. Ricardo WALKER

Mr. Antonio del CASTILLO
Mr. Jaime CANAL Rivas

Mr. Jose Antonio CASTRO
Mr. Froylán GONZALEZ

Mr. Antonioe FIALLO

Mr. Luis René SALAZAR
Mr. Teodoro HUSTANANTE Muñoz
Mr. José V. ORDENANA

Mr. Rafael Ignacio FUNES
Mr. Francisco VEGA-GOMEZ

Mr. Eduardo PALOMO
Mr. Victor Salomón PINTO

Mr. Roberto RAMIREZ

Mr. V.E. GRANT
Mr. K.O. RATTRAY

Mr. Gonzalo MENENDES Oceán
Mr. Guillermo SEVILLA-SACASA

Mr. Dulio ARROYO G.
Mr. Oscar UCROS G.

Mr. Miguel Angel PANGRAZIO

Mr. Antonio NAVARRO Madrid
Mr. Alfredo CARPIO Aguirre
Mr. Hubert WIELAND

Department of Justice
Legal Division, Department of External Affairs
Canadian Ambassador to Chile
Subsecretario de Relaciones Exteriores
Banco Central de Chile
Profesor de Derecho Internacional
Ministerio de Relaciones
Primer Abogado, Banco Central de Chile
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
Banco Central de Costa Rica
Asesor Legal, Banco Central de Costa Rica
Consultor Jurídico de los Bancos del Estado
Banco Central del Ecuador
Embajada del Ecuador en Chile
Abogado
Jefe, Sección Jurídica, Banco Hipotecario de El Salvador
Colaborador Jurídico, Ministerio de Justicia
Vice Ministro de Economía
Abogado, Ministerio de Economía
Banco Central de Honduras
Attorney General
Crown Counsel
Ministro de Estado en el Despacho de Educación Pública
Embajador de Nicaragua, Decano del Cuerpo Diplomático en Washington
Decano de la Facultad de Ciencias Políticas, Universidad de Panamá
Decano de la Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de Panamá
Abogado Adjunto del Banco Central de Paraguay
Abogado
Embajada del Perú en Chile
NOTE

This document contains a summary record of the views of the experts on the proposals contained in the Working Paper entitled "Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States" (Doc. COM/WH/1).

Suggestions made for changes in drafting, for improvement of the English and Spanish texts, and for confirming one text more closely to the other, were noted by the Secretariat but have not been included in this record.

FIRST SESSION
(Monday, February 3, 1964 - 3:45 p.m.)

The CHAIRMAN invited Mr. Daza to take the floor.

Mr. DAZA (Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Chile) welcomed the delegates on behalf of the Chilean Government and wished them every success in their deliberations. The fact that the study of the project put forward by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development had begun in Addis Ababa; and would continue in Geneva and Bangkok, was proof of the universal validity of the juridical concepts that it was desired to formulate and place at the disposal of the international community.

Countries such as Chile that needed foreign capital in order to accelerate their development must view with satisfaction any study that might contribute to such co-operation between nations.
The CHAIRMAN invited Mr. Santa Cruz to take the floor.

Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Deputy Executive Secretary, Economic Commission for Latin America) reminded the delegates that ECLA had from its inception devoted a major part of its efforts to studies connected with economic development and the financing of such development, and was consequently interested in both the subject-matter and the objectives of the present meeting.

Foreign private investments could contribute much to the economic development of the Latin American countries, especially if they could be adapted to the needs of those countries at their present state of economic, social and political development. On the other hand, the investment of private capital made necessary a juridical system guaranteeing the legitimate interest of the investor. Hence the importance of finding a formula that could effectively guarantee such interests, while respecting the sovereignty of each country in accordance with the principles of international law and the constitutional rules of the country.

The CHAIRMAN thanked the representatives of the Government of Chile and of ECLA for their words of welcome and in turn welcomed the delegates on behalf of the President of the World Bank. He said that the present meeting was the second of four consultative meetings of legal experts called by the World Bank to discuss informally the draft of an international convention on settlement of investment disputes. The first had been held at Addis Ababa, and almost all the African nations invited had sent delegates. Several of the more important African countries had expressed support and no country had been opposed to the basic features of the proposals. The comments made at that meeting would be very useful in studying more deeply the new problems of international law. The headquarters of the regional economic commissions of the United Nations had been made available for the other three meetings; for the present meeting, ECLA had given its valuable support, and its effective help in preparing the administrative arrangements was very much appreciated.

It was gratifying to see that so many nations of the Western Hemisphere had sent such eminent jurists to the meeting, which reflected the importance attached by their governments to the matters to be discussed.

All countries of the Western Hemisphere had won political independence less than two centuries ago, some much more recently, but their economic vicissitudes since then had been such that their representatives would bring to the meeting valuable ideas concerning their past experience in the field of foreign investment, some of which had not been pleasant. However, international law could no longer be feared as a tool of the strong against the weak.

 Certain juridical traditions that had developed in the Western Hemisphere might have been justified in the past, but the time had come to reappraise them in the light of the present urgent needs for the betterment of human life in an atmosphere of growing co-operation among independent nations.

The World Bank's initiative in promoting an international agreement in a field which might not be regarded as falling directly within its sphere of activity was not unusual in view of the nature of the Bank, which was not
merely a financing mechanism but, above all, a development institution. Its activities necessarily consisted largely in the provision of finance, but much of its energy and resources were devoted to technical assistance and advice directed toward the promotion of conditions conducive to rapid economic growth, and the creation of a favorable investment climate in the broadest sense of the term. To that end, sound technical and administrative foundations were essential, but no less indispensable was the firm establishment of the rule of law.

In the past, international investment might justifiably have been of interest chiefly to the capital-exporting nations and their citizens. Today it was universally recognized as a factor of crucial importance in the economic development of the less developed parts of the world and had become one of the major features of the partnership between the richer and poorer nations; its promotion was a matter of urgent concern to capital-importing and capital-exporting countries alike. This was particularly true of private foreign investment which, if wisely conducted, could make great contributions to the development of the economies of the recipient countries. Unfortunately, private capital was not moving in sufficient volume to areas in need of capital, one of the most serious impediments to its flow being the fear of investors that their investment would be exposed to political risks such as outright expropriation without adequate compensation, government interference and non-observance by the host government of contractual undertakings on the basis of which the investment had been made.

The Bank had therefore been led to wonder whether, in view of its reputation for integrity and its position of impartiality, it could not help in removing that obstacle to international private investment. It had on a number of occasions been approached by governments and foreign investors who had sought its assistance in settling investment disputes that had arisen or might arise in the future. The Bank had concluded that the most promising approach would be to attack the problem of the unfavorable investment climate from the procedural angle, by creating international machinery which would be available on a voluntary basis for the conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes. Some might think it desirable to go beyond that and attempt to achieve a substantive definition of the status of foreign property, and there was undoubtedly a need for a meaningful understanding between capital-exporting and capital-importing nations on those matters. At the same time, however, there was need to pursue a parallel effort of more limited scope, represented by the proposals to be discussed at the meeting.

The Convention would make available facilities to which States and foreign investors could have access on a voluntary basis for the settlement of investment disputes between them. The method of settlement selected might be conciliation, arbitration, or conciliation followed by arbitration if the conciliation effort should fail. The Convention would set up a mechanism for the selection of conciliators and arbitrators and for the conduct of proceedings. The initiative for such proceedings might come from a State as well as from an investor. In the opinion of the Bank those institutional facilities and procedures were better suited to disputes between a State and a foreign investor than those offered by other existing or proposed institutions. Taken by themselves, however, they could be put into effect by corporate action by the Bank and would not require the conclusion of any inter-governmental agreement.

Such institutional facilities were nevertheless, in his opinion, secondary to other parts of the proposals, which it was necessary to embody in a convention.
Those parts comprised, firstly, recognition of the principle that a non-State party, an investor, might have direct access in his own name and without requiring the espousal of his cause by his national government, to a State party before an international forum. States, in signing the Convention, would admit that principle, but only the principle. No signatory State would be compelled to resort to the facilities provided by the Convention, or to agree to do so, and no foreign investor could in fact initiate proceedings against a signatory State unless that State and the investor had specifically so agreed. However, once they had so agreed, both parties would be irrevocably bound to carry out their undertaking and the Convention established rules designed to prevent frustration of the undertaking and to ensure its implementation.

Secondly, while the Convention implied a recognition that local courts were not necessarily the final forum for the settlement of disputes between a State and a foreign investor, it did not imply that local remedies could not play a major role. When parties consented to arbitration, they would be free to stipulate either that local remedies might be pursued in lieu of arbitration, or that local remedies must first be exhausted before the dispute could be submitted for arbitration under the Convention. It was only if the parties had not made either stipulation that the Convention provided for arbitration in lieu of local remedies.

Thirdly, a far more important feature of the Convention was that in traditional international law a wrong done to a national of one State for which another State was internationally responsible was actionable not by the injured national but by his State. In practice that principle had been superseded by a number of instances in which provision had been made for settlement of investment disputes by direct conciliation or arbitration between the host State and the foreign investor. The internationally binding character of such arrangements had not, however, been recognized hitherto, and the Convention was designed to fill that gap. Thus the Convention would be in harmony with the growing recognition of the individual as a subject of international law.

While an agreement by a State to submit to international arbitration admittedly implied some limitation of national sovereignty, one of the essential attributes of sovereignty was the capacity to accept limitations on it, which is what happened whenever a State entered into an international agreement. The proposed Convention would give internationally binding effect to the limitation of a sovereignty inherent in an agreement by a State, pursuant to the Convention, to submit a dispute with a foreign investor to arbitration. But as a corollary of the principle allowing an investor direct and effective access to a foreign State without the intervention of his national State, the Convention introduced an important innovation, namely, that the investor’s national State would no longer be able to espouse the claim of its national. A host State would therefore not be faced with the likelihood of having to deal with a multiplicity of claims and claimants. The Convention would offer a means of settling directly, on the legal plane, investment disputes between the State and the foreign investor, and would insulate such disputes from the realm of politics and diplomacy. He was convinced that this would serve the best interests of investors, host States and the cause of international co-operation generally. Local remedies would inevitably sometimes be unsatisfactory from the standpoint of the investor; as things stood, the investor would be left to claim the protection of his own government, which would transform the controversy into a dispute between States, a result more often than not dis-
tasteful or embarrassing to all the parties concerned.

Fourthly, awards of arbitral tribunals rendered pursuant to the Convention would be recognized by, and enforceable in all Contracting States as if they were final judgments of their national courts regardless whether the State in which enforcement was sought or was not a party to the dispute in question. This aspect was of particular interest to host States rather than to investors. Since any State against which an award was granted would have undertaken in advance a solemn international obligation to comply with the award, the question of enforcement against a State was somewhat academic. In that connection he wished to make it clear that where, as in most countries, the law on immunity of foreign States from execution would prevent enforcement against a State as opposed to execution against a private party, the Convention would leave that law unaffected. All the Convention would do would be to place an arbitral award rendered pursuant to it on the same footing as a final judgment of the national Courts.

Fifthly, it should be borne in mind that the Convention did not lay down standards for the treatment by States of the property of aliens, nor did it prescribe standards for the conduct of foreign investors in their relations with host States. The Convention was therefore not concerned with the merits of investment disputes but with the procedure for settling them.

While the Bank believed that private investment had a valuable contribution to make to economic development, it was neither a blind partisan of the cause of the private investor, nor did it wish to impose its views on others. He did not expect or think it desirable that every dispute between a foreign investor and a host State should necessarily be dealt with by the facilities established under the Convention, nor was it intended to supersede national jurisdiction generally. It should, however, be stressed that there might be instances when recourse to an international forum would be in the interest of the host State as well as of the investor.

Two further points needed emphasis. The first was that the Convention was designed to deal with claims by host States against investors, as well as with claims by investors against host States; the second, that the Convention dealt with conciliation as well as with arbitration. Indeed, it might well be found that when the Convention came into being, conciliation activities under the auspices of the Center proved more important than arbitral proceedings.

In conclusion he pointed out that the Convention left States and investors free to establish their mutual relations on whatever basis they deemed proper, and no signatory State would be under any obligation to submit a dispute either to conciliation or arbitration. The true significance of the Convention lay in the fact that it ensured that, if the parties agreed to have recourse to an international forum, their agreement would be given full effect. This would create an element of confidence which would, in turn, contribute to a healthier investment climate.

It was important to realize that there were no easy solutions to problems of development. For that reason every new idea ought to be studied with an open mind and with the sole concern of determining whether it could make any contribution to the common goal. The view had already been expressed in Latin America that the time had come for jurists to play a role in modifying the traditional legal concepts in the field of
international trade and investment, and he hoped that the proposals before the meeting would be studied in that spirit.

The session was suspended at 4:30 p.m. and resumed at 5:00 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN invited representatives to make general remarks on the preliminary draft of a Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States.

Mr. BRUNNER (Chile) said that the draft Convention touched on novel problems and concepts in the field of international law in giving individuals direct access to States before international tribunals. The most enlightened jurists had long denied that only States could be subjects of international law, and it had been increasingly recognized that the individual was both an active and a passive subject of rights beyond those granted under national laws. Although the draft Convention was of a highly technical character, it contained theoretical implications that would endow the deliberations of the present meeting with special importance and interest. Direct access of individuals to an international jurisdiction which was found in the Statute of the Central American Court of Justice and had been acquiring increasing importance in the European Economic Community was being projected upon the world plane through the initiative of the International Bank.

The present age of international organizations which followed a period when the rights of national States were regarded as paramount made it necessary to seek the common good by means of a redistribution of wealth not only within particular communities but on a world-wide basis. This was a meeting of jurists who, because of their high calling should persevere in the search for that common good through law and justice.

In establishing adequate rules and institutions for conciliation and arbitration between a State and nationals of another State in disputes relating to investments, the present meeting would help to facilitate the inflow of capital to areas in need of it. That work would also help to promote the legal conditions favoring the social and economic development essential for many nations and areas if they were to live in peace and freedom, and the Chilean delegation were glad to collaborate in it.

Mr. RAMIREZ (Honduras) emphasized that the long period of Latin American disintegration was drawing to a close, as demonstrated by the formation of the Latin American Free Trade Association and the economic integration of Central America. However, juridical institutions had not caught up with the changing economic conditions of the world today, and it was therefore highly significant that jurists should be meeting to discuss an instrument designed to resolve conflicts that might arise in connection with the investments that countries needed for their economic development.

One of the basic requirements for the development of a country was the protection of investments. The legal processes of arbitration and conciliation embodied in the draft Convention might furnish the required procedural guarantees, but those processes would require greater refinement because they touched on new economic and legal questions. Naturally, the mechanism designed for the purpose must be entirely independent and not linked with any interests which might have a deter-
Mr. GRANT (Jamaica) said that the social conscience of the world strongly felt the need to reduce the existing gap between the developed and the developing countries. But efforts to do so must take due account of the developing countries' sovereignty over their natural resources and their control over their own economic planning, and in that connection he referred to the U.N. General Assembly's resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962.

He congratulated the World Bank on the effort represented by the comprehensive draft placed before the meeting. He recalled that the International Law Commission's efforts in respect of the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure between States had not borne fruit but he believed that past disappointments should not blight hopes for the future.

He wondered whether the principle of non-frustration of an agreement to have recourse to the Center embodied in Articles III and IV might not prove an obstacle to acceptance of a convention truly multilateral in its conception; refusal by a State to nominate its member on a tribunal would imply a decision not to co-operate or accept an adverse award, and could undermine respect for the institution. He also believed that the exclusion of national arbitrators might impair the confidence of States. Since the new machinery would be required to administer national as well as international law, it would be important that the background of national legal arguments and principles be fully understood by the Tribunal. An idealistic approach that could accept a denationalized tribunal might also accept the concept of an impartial national arbitrator. While recognizing the merit of the draft Convention, he had put forward certain criticisms designed to avoid dangers to the success of the proposed institution, and in that connection he also questioned the need for the new Center to be so closely linked with the World Bank itself.

Mr. RIBEIRO (Brazil) considered that the proposed Center possessed certain characteristics that set it apart from the principles that had traditionally inspired international arbitration, a legal institution designed for the peaceful solution of disputes between nations. Moreover, the draft Convention raised constitutional problems, since it implied a certain curtailment of the scope of national legal processes. Brazilian constitutional law guaranteed the judicial power a monopoly of the administration of justice (see Art. 141, paragraph 1, of the Brazilian Constitution) and therefore it would be inadmissible to create within the territory of the nation a body entrusted with decisions in the field of law. Were such activities to be delegated to an international organization, the violation of this constitutional precept would be even more flagrant. Another aspect of the problem that raised doubts in his mind was that despite the optional character of the draft Convention, foreign investors would be granted a legally privileged position, in violation of the principle of full equality before the law.

He was also disturbed by the possibility mentioned in the Preamble that a State might espouse the cause of one of its citizens involved in a dispute with another State; this possibility, legally questionable, did not in any case provide a sufficient justification for overlooking constitutional principle.

All the above considerations would influence Brazil's decision as
Mr. SUMMERS (Canada) said that the draft Convention was an impressive and forward-looking document, but it would have to be examined with great care by each country in the light of its own political, constitutional and financial circumstances. The present capital requirements of the developing countries exceeded domestic resources, and an inflow of capital from abroad was needed to provide foreign exchange and furnish the experience and techniques of long-established industries elsewhere. Most of such capital must come from industrial countries where the great part of the capital available for such purpose was in private hands, and the general investment climate abroad was therefore a major factor. Canada had long been supporting programs of economic and technical assistance in Latin America, Asia and Africa, as well as measures to improve the investment climate and increase the flow of private capital to the developing countries, and now supported the Bank's initiatives in that field. The Bank had played a useful role both in the preparation of investment programs in the developing countries, and in guiding private capital into countries urgently in need of it. It had also played a major role in settling a number of important investment disputes (such as the Suez Canal and City of Tokyo Bonds cases). The Bank was therefore well equipped to take the present initiative in seeking to establish voluntary facilities which might be available in appropriate cases for the conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes with a view to improving the investment climate and increasing the flow of private capital to the developing countries.

Mr. ARROYO (Panama) wished to make two observations which, although of a formal nature, might contribute to a better understanding of the draft Convention. In the first place, the present layout of the draft Convention was not conducive to an understanding of the subject-matter, and he asked that it be divided into chapters and articles in the usual manner, instead of into long articles and sections as it now was. He also referred to the comments accompanying each part of the draft, and said that some of them were of unquestionable value in themselves and could well be incorporated into the actual text of the draft.

Mr. UCROS (Panama) said he wished to make a comment of substance. The competence of the proposed Center was limited to disputes in connection with investments between one State and the nationals of another State. In fact, however, most of the investments in question were now made by international organizations, and consequently the scope of the draft Convention should be extended to include the problems arising between such organizations and States or their Nationals.

The CHAIRMAN said that disputes between States had deliberately been excluded from the draft Convention, since there were already available a number of procedures for settling such disputes. As regards international bodies, most agreements in which they were involved contained specific arbitration provisions which had generally proved satisfactory because they operated in a field of international law which was traditional, and not in a new field, such as that which would be covered by the draft Convention.

Mr. BARBOZA (Argentina) found great difficulty in accepting the principle underlying the draft Convention for several reasons. National sentiment could not accept the delegation to international organizations...
of powers belonging to national institutions. Foreign investors in Argentina had sufficient guarantees so as to make recourse to other bodies unnecessary. No shadow of suspicion must be allowed to fall on those guarantees, as would be the case were the suggested agreement ratified. There were also legal difficulties. Agreeing with the opinion expressed by the Brazilian delegate, the speaker pointed out that an unjust discrimination would exist if some persons could be excepted from the principle of equality of all before the law. From the theoretical point of view, there were no firmly established precedents for the use of arbitration between an individual and a State. While it was true that the individual had found increasing recognition in international law, especially in the field of human rights, it would still be long before he could act legally on equal terms with other international persons.

Despite the urgent need for investments, the draft Convention involved a cession of the powers of the State with regard to persons and things situated within its national territory. Argentina was not prepared to curtail its jurisdiction and felt that to detract from national sovereignty was not an acceptable method for improving the investment climate.

Mr. BELIN (United States of America) said that the United States took a great interest in the draft Convention, which was obviously the result of arduous and thoughtful preparation. If a sufficient number of countries proved interested in working out some arrangement on the basis of the draft, the United States would support it. He stressed the voluntary nature of the arrangements proposed in the draft, which should appeal to many countries. While his delegation would in the course of the proceedings present comments on individual provisions of the draft, the United States was in full accord with the basic design of the Convention.

Mr. ESCOBAR (Bolivia) said that the sovereignty of States could not be subordinated to the authority of an international institution without being seriously impaired. Sovereignty could not be alienated, for any consideration whatever, without undermining the State through the dispersion of its powers. He believed that those responsible for preparing the draft had failed to appreciate its adverse effects. Thus the Bank itself seemed to be displaying a lack of confidence in the institutions of the countries wishing to attract foreign capital; moreover, the existence of the draft Convention might have caused investors to defer action pending the Governments' decision on it. In view of those ill effects, he would prefer the Bank to abandon the project.

Bolivia had an investment development law in force which recognized a series of rights, privileges and safeguards in respect of foreign capital invested in the country. Any problems that might arise must be settled by Bolivia's own courts, so as to preclude any unconstitutional discrimination against its own nationals.

The Bank should suggest to governments the adoption of a specific and expeditious procedural system to settle disputes with foreign investors within the legal and administrative machinery of each country. He also observed that if the draft Convention were not unanimously rejected, foreign capital might blacklist the countries that did not wish to submit their disputes with investors to international adjudication.

The CHAIRMAN said that he would not presume to dispute interpretations by participants of specific provisions of their own Constitutions, but he
would comment on the relation of the draft Convention to what had been called by several speakers the democratic spirit on which all such Constitutions were based. He himself had stressed in his opening remarks that when a State agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration or conciliation, it was exercising a sovereign right, namely that of limiting its own sovereignty. He could not agree that sovereignty was inalienable in the sense that every State would be the judge of its own actions; he was convinced that the world had progressed beyond that extreme and narrow view. He had no intellectual difficulty with the point of view of the Argentine representative who had simply said that in the circumstances he did not wish to curtail its sovereignty, but he thought that the draft Convention could hardly be regarded as violating "natural" international law. He did not believe that the Bolivian representative had intended to suggest that the Bank's aim had been to destroy the confidence of investors in the good faith of governments. The Bank's proposal had been inspired by the fact that experience had shown that many investors and prospective investors were concerned about the lack of satisfactory means of settling disputes, and the effect had been a falling off in foreign private investment in many underdeveloped areas, including in particular Latin America.

Mr. ESPINOSA (Venezuela) pointed out that in the course of the meeting two schools of thought had been expressed. Some speakers had stressed that the law should be adapted to present-day changes in order to favor the inflow of capital and contribute to the economic development of the countries of the Western Hemisphere. Others had dwelt on constitutional problems, emphasizing principles, attitudes, beliefs and feelings adopted towards certain institutions and certain general legal principles.

The tone of some of the statements did not augur well for the meeting. However, the participants were jurists and therefore it was particularly incumbent upon them to find ways of reconciling both schools of thought.

In Venezuela, conciliation was a fully recognized procedure in both public and private law, without any restrictions, but arbitration was subject to certain limitations established by the Constitution and by national legislation. In Venezuela an agreement to arbitrate was not complete or binding unless ratified before the competent Court. No undertaking to submit to arbitration was valid in respect of matters connected with public interest or good morals.

As regards public law, Venezuela's Constitution clearly distinguished, with respect to arbitration, between the agreements concluded with other nations, or international institutions such as the World Bank, and contracts touching the public interest that the Government, in its administrative capacity, concluded with private persons. Disputes regarding the former were subject to the means of peaceful settlement recognized by international law or previously agreed to by the parties, such as arbitration; but the settlement of disputes relating to the second category of agreements was reserved to the exclusive competence of Venezuela's Courts, in accordance with its legislation. Those constitutional precepts were considered as falling within the domain of public policy which precluded the conclusion of agreements inconsistent therewith; even with the consent of the litigants or interested parties. Foreign judicial decisions, including arbitral awards, could not be enforced if they contained provisions contrary to public policy or to the national public law of Venezuela.

Although the foregoing comments might seem to cloud the possibility
of Venezuela's adhering to the Convention, they reflected his country's legal situation at the present time. Speaking personally he repeated his sincere hope that a way would be found of harmonizing the two positions. It would be up to his Government to take the appropriate decisions on the matter at the proper time.

Mr. PALOMO (Guatemala) shared the concern expressed by other delegations as to a possible conflict between the draft Convention and national legal systems. Such was his uneasiness that he wondered whether the meeting should continue studying the draft, which had given rise to serious misgivings on the part of other delegations. He therefore suggested that the meeting first decide the general question of the desirability of the proposals before proceeding to a detailed study of the draft Convention.

Mr. BUSTAMANTE (Ecuador) said that the draft Convention was based on two assumptions. The first was that private foreign investment was regarded as a prime factor in the development of countries in the process of growth or in the process of increasing impoverishment. Its contribution hitherto had been negligible; presumably the Bank had calculated the increased investment that would result from the proposed Convention. He feared, however, that if the draft Convention were approved, governments would have serious difficulties, particularly of a constitutional nature, in signing it. In Ecuador, as in other countries, the Constitution embodied the principle of equality of nationals and foreigners before the law. To make a different jurisdiction available to foreigners would place them in a privileged position.

The second assumption was that the State could act in two capacities: as a person under private law borrowing capital and as a sovereign body under public law granting protection to investors. In the first case, it was very difficult to accept the idea of submission to an international tribunal; and in the second such submission came very close to impairing the exercise of sovereignty.

Mr. VEGA-GOMEZ (El Salvador) said that although all the delegates of the Latin American countries had expressed objections to the draft, they all admitted that conciliation and arbitration were valuable instruments. There must be an attempt to reconcile the constitutional side of the question with the need to find incentives to development, but that did not mean that in order to obtain such incentives, principles vital to the very existence of the Latin American countries could be abandoned. A way should be sought to reconcile difference, and if necessary to seek other solutions, always bearing in mind the idea of conciliation and arbitration.

Mr. CANAL (Colombia) had some doubts as to the appropriateness of the creation of the Center, but would consider the proposals in a conciliatory spirit. He requested that the summary records and final report of the Addis Ababa meeting should be made available, to assist the present meeting in its discussion.

The CHAIRMAN said it had been decided not to distribute the records of previous meetings in order to minimize the already considerable task of studying the complex provisions of the draft Convention. He would, however, refer to the views expressed at the Addis Ababa meeting where it would be necessary or useful in the discussion.
Referring to the general remarks made by some of the experts he observed that they were inspired by sentiments very different from those that had prevailed in Addis Ababa. The African experts had shown less interest in conceptual problems of sovereignty and had taken a pragmatic approach being concerned, however, to establish a balance between an admitted need for and desire to encourage private foreign investment, and the degree in which adherence to the Convention might limit a State's freedom of action. Thus some African experts had suggested that the Center should not be empowered to judge the legitimacy of certain acts of a government, and that States should be permitted to stipulate in advance, for instance, that they would not agree to consideration of questions of the legality of expropriation but would submit to the Center only matters such as the amount of compensation. Such a stipulation would not require a reservation to the Convention in the strict sense, since the Convention imposed no legal obligation to submit disputes to conciliation or arbitration unless there had been a specific undertaking to submit a particular dispute or a particular category of disputes to these procedures.

The meeting rose at 6:55 p.m.

SECOND SESSION
(Tuesday, February 4, 1964 - 10:45 a.m.)

General Remarks on the Draft Convention (conclusion)

The CHAIRMAN invited Mr. Navarro to take the floor.

Mr. NAVARRO (Peru) commended the meeting's purpose of adopting new procedures for promoting a favorable foreign investment climate. Peru was convinced of the importance of foreign capital in the process of development and provided ample safeguards for investors in the form of free exchange and laws for economic promotion and social and economic development. The interests of investors were guaranteed under the constitution by the independence of the powers of the State and in particular of the judiciary. While it was true that in Peru the constitution established certain restrictions on the use of arbitration, the development of the life of peoples and international coexistence required new legislation and new developments in that field, and Peru would make the greatest efforts to achieve this. in order to overcome any difficulties which might arise he fervently hoped that it would be possible to harmonize the requirements of domestic law with the purposes of international law.

ARTICLE I - International Conciliation and Arbitration Center

The CHAIRMAN invited the meeting to start consideration of the text of the draft Convention before them. He recalled that some delegations had voiced objections of principle, which, if maintained, would lead them to advise their governments not to adhere to the Convention. Once the discussion of the Articles of the Convention had been concluded the Preamble would be considered and delegations would then have a further opportunity to address themselves to questions of principle.
In view of certain shortcomings in the Spanish text he asked the meeting to regard it simply as a working document. Authentic texts in Spanish, French and English would be prepared at a later stage, in the light of the amendments suggested at the various consultative meetings.

He invited the meeting to begin by considering Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Article I.

Establishment and Organization (Sections 1 - 3)

Mr. KINGSTONE (Canada) raised a point with respect to the last sentence in Section 1: "The Center shall have full juridical personality." Although admittedly a common expression it was usually followed, in conventions of a similar kind, by details elaborating upon its meaning. For example, in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, it was specified that the United Nations had the power to contract, to acquire and dispose of immovable and moveable property and to institute legal proceedings. He wondered whether such details had been deliberately omitted in the case of the present Convention, and if so, for what reason.

The CHAIRMAN explained that the Center had been endowed with juridical personality to distinguish it from the Bank. But no further details had been added because he had not thought that they were necessary from a legal point of view and they might give the erroneous impression that the Center was thought of as a large bureaucracy. He did not think that the phrase as it stood would give rise to difficulties of interpretation.

Mr. ESPINOSA (Venezuela) suggested that Article I should stipulate who would be empowered to sign on behalf of the Center.

The CHAIRMAN thought that Section 10(1) of Article I would answer the question raised by the expert from Venezuela, but recognized that it was desirable to indicate clearly who was to act on behalf of the Center, either in the Convention itself or in the regulations of the Administrative Council.

Mr. RAMIREZ (Honduras) agreed with the Venezuelan expert, but considered that the appropriate place to clarify this point was the Sections in which the duties and functions of the Secretary-General were described. With regard to Section 1, he wondered whether it might not be advisable to incorporate into it a general description of the objectives and main activities of the Center. Regarding the point raised by one of the Canadian experts, he considered that the expression "full juridical personality" in Section 1, would suffice and need not be elaborated.

Mr. ESCOBAR (Bolivia) wondered what would be the source of the Center's personality.

Mr. SALAZAR (Ecuador) referred to Section 2(1), and suggested that the meeting consider the possibility that the Center, especially when the conciliation was to be used, might function in the country where the dispute had arisen, and act as a kind of court of first instance. This might inspire confidence in the State concerned and contribute to the efforts toward conciliation. The Center, the investor and the country where the problem had arisen could appoint their respective representatives, and an initial effort could be made there to resolve the conflict. Should this fail, a fresh effort would be made toward conciliation, this time
at the headquarters of the Center. He would therefore suggest that Section 2(1) provide that the Center be able to function occasionally in the country where a dispute occurred.

The CHAIRMAN explained that the expression "the seat of the Center" in Section 2(1) referred to the administrative headquarters of the Center only. It was made clear later in the Convention that actual conciliation and arbitration proceedings could be held wherever it was deemed to be most appropriate for the case in question. The suggestion made by the expert from Ecuador was more relevant to Article III, dealing with conciliation. He would like to consider further whether some general statement should be included in Section 2(1) to the effect that it referred only to the headquarters of the Center and not to the place of proceedings which could be held wherever they were most likely to lead to the best results.

Mr. MENESES (Nicaragua) pointed out that there was a contradiction between the words in Section 2(1) "the Center shall establish its Headquarters ...", which appeared to create a binding obligation, and Section 2(2) which referred to the discretionary power of the Center to enter into agreements with the Bank covering the use of the latter's offices.

The CHAIRMAN replied that the wording of Section 2(2) was merely intended to authorize the Center to make administrative arrangements with the Bank. The ambiguities that had been pointed out would be removed by redrafting the Section.

Mr. PALOMO (Guatemala) proposed that the provision in Section 2(1) be permissive rather than mandatory as he did not feel it necessary for the Center to have its headquarters at the Bank; if this were done the provisions of Section 2(2) could stand.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that Section 6(vi) empowered the Administrative Council to move the seat of the Center away from the headquarters of the Bank. The main issue was whether it was acceptable for the Center to have an administrative link with the Bank. Although the Bank would be powerless to influence the Center's proceedings, its image would inevitably be associated with the Center. But once it was agreed that such relations would be desirable, the question of where the Center should be located became of secondary importance, and should be decided on grounds of practicability. Section 6(vi) provided the necessary flexibility in case it was thought desirable to move the headquarters of the Center elsewhere at some future date.

Mr. FUNES (El Salvador) reverting to Section 1(1) pointed out that the term "juridical personality" expressed adequately the concept of "full" juridical personality. He therefore proposed that the word "full" be deleted. He asked whether that adjective appeared in the text of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN replied that the term used in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations was simply "juridical personality" without the adjective "full".

Mr. RATTRAY (Jamaica) said that the significance of the expression "juridical personality" varied from one country to another, and should
therefore be explained in more detail in the present Convention.

Mr. RAMIREZ (Honduras) thought that Section 2 should also establish the right of the Center to move its headquarters. He suggested the deletion of Clause 2 of Section 2, since the power to conclude the agreements referred to was inherent in the Administrative Council.

Mr. PALOMO (Guatemala) pointed out the desirability of permitting the Administrative Council to determine the location of the Center's headquarters at will, without specifying in the Convention that the headquarters would be in the offices of the Bank.

The CHAIRMAN said that it was desirable to specify the location of the institution in conventions of the kind under consideration. If no such reference was made, it should be made clear that one of the first duties of the Administrative Council would be to choose the site of the Center. From a practical point of view it would be helpful to link up the Center with the Bank at the administrative level, since the Administrative Council would be composed mainly of the Governors of the Bank and its meeting should preferably coincide with the annual meeting of the Board of Governors. He agreed with the delegate of Guatemala that the provision could be reworded, although he believed that most member countries were agreed that the Center might, initially at least, have its seat at headquarters of the Bank.

Mr. RATTRAY (Jamaica) agreed that it was a question of drafting, and suggested that the words "subject to Section 6(vi)" might be added to Section 2(1).

Mr. MENESES (Nicaragua) suggested that a particular city be designated as the headquarters of the Center rather than the offices of the Bank. That would be more in accordance with the possibility that the Center would enter into agreements with the prescribed type of institution whether it was the Bank and or Permanent Court of Arbitration.

The CHAIRMAN said that the Bank had deliberately refrained from mentioning a headquarters city for the Center, since it would be difficult to select a city in the abstract. There was a reason for having the headquarters at the Bank, regardless whether the Bank's seat was in Washington or elsewhere.

The meeting adjourned at 11:30 a.m. and resumed at 11:45 a.m.

The Administrative Council (Sections 4 - 7)

Mr. ARROYO (Panama) expressed doubts concerning the composition of the Administrative Council, since Section 4(1) would appear to convey that it was composed both of representatives and alternates. Alternates were not members of the Council and it should be specified that they could act only in the absence of the principal representatives.

He wondered, too, whether the President of the Bank was a member of the Council. In that respect, he pointed out that there appeared to be some contradiction between the wording of Section 4(1) and that of Section

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and he failed to see how the President of the Bank, if not a member of the Council, could have the right to vote or to cast a deciding vote in a case of an equal division.

The CHAIRMAN referring to the voting rights of the Chairman of the Administrative Council observed that there were several precedents for this system, such as the Charters of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and its affiliates and the Inter-American Bank. It would, however, be possible for Section 4 to be amended so as to provide that the Chairman of the Administrative Council would also be a member of that body.

Mr. ARROYO (Panama) thought it inexplicable from a legal standpoint that a person who was not a member of an organ should be able to vote. He pointed out that the institution now being set up should not be bound by precedents like those of the Bank. He thought it preferable, if the President of the Bank were to have a vote, that he should be a member of the Council.

Mr. UCROS (Panama) supported Mr. Arroyo's opinion. He also observed that, since the Center was an arbitral agency essentially juridical in its principles, the representation of its members was of paramount importance were the Chairman of the institution of the same nationality as one of its members, the problem of double representation of a country would arise.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the question of nationality was not important because the Administrative Council would not be engaging in arbitration. Moreover, the President of the Bank was a public international official.

Mr. RAMIREZ (Honduras) recalled that the President of the World Bank was Chairman of the Board of Executive Directors but not of the Board of Governors of the Bank. If the Governors would be members of the Administrative Council the same procedure should be followed and they should elect their own Chairman from among themselves.

Mr. NAVARRO (Peru) cited the first part of Section 5 and pointed out that it would not be desirable for the President of the Bank to act as ex officio Chairman of the Administrative Council, since that might be interpreted as legal tutelage when actually it was no such thing. Since he had the power to elect twenty-four of the Panel members, he acted not merely in an administrative capacity but also as the head of the organization. He therefore thought that the Chairman should be elected by the members for a term of four years, and proposed that the wording of Section 5 be changed to read: "The Chairman will be elected by the members of the Administrative Council."

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the two points raised by the expert from Peru were not necessarily interdependent. The Bank did not lay particular stress on the right of the President to designate members of the Panels. But that right was useful in that it enabled a larger number of highly qualified people to be selected from a particular country than would be possible for the country itself to designate in view of the limit placed on the number of persons it could nominate.

Mr. ARROYO (Panama) referred to the second part of Section 5: "During the President's absence or inability to act and during any vacancy
in the office of President of the Bank, the person who shall be the chief of the operating staff of the Bank shall act as Chairman." He thought that a very vague system and considered that the Administrative Council should itself designate two persons to replace the Chairman in case of his absence or inability to act.

The CHAIRMAN said that the suggestion made by the expert from Panama would have to be considered once it had been decided whether or not the Chairman of the Council was to be elected.

Mr. RAMIREZ (Honduras) stressed that each member should have one vote in the Administrative Council and that there should be no weighted voting as in the Bank.

Mr. PALOMO (Guatemala) did not consider it desirable for the President of the Bank to act as Chairman of the Administrative Council with the power to designate twenty-four members to the Panels. This link between the Bank and the Center might prove embarrassing for the Bank in its relations with a losing party.

The CHAIRMAN observed again that the question of the President's right to designate members to the Panels was not of crucial importance. He stressed on the fact that the Bank did not wish to become too intimately involved in disputes, particularly those submitted to arbitration, and recalled that it had taken part in conciliation proceedings in the past only at the express request of the parties involved.

Mr. UCROS (Panama) wondered how the system contemplated in Section 7(1) would work, since that section stipulated that the Administrative Council "may by regulation establish a procedure whereby the Chairman may obtain a vote of the Administrative Council on a specific question, without calling a meeting of the Administrative Council." He pointed out that since the Center was going to deal with problems of an international character any decision taken would be of great importance. He asked what purpose was served by deciding specific questions without convoking the Administrative Council.

The CHAIRMAN said that the Administrative Council would not become involved in proceedings between States and private investors. With respect to the possibility of obtaining a vote of the Council on a specific question without calling a meeting, it had been thought that much time and trouble would thus be saved since the members of the Council were scattered all over the world and decisions often had to be taken without delay. This provision was based on similar provisions in the Charters of the Bank and International Monetary Fund.

Mr. NAVARRO (Peru) referring to Section 7, observed that no provision had been made for cases where the Council would have to meet at the request of a certain number of States. He also inquired whether any decision had been taken as to the number of States constituting a quorum.

The CHAIRMAN said that provision had been made for a quorum in Section 7(3), but that the number of requests from members required for calling a meeting had not been specified. A provision on the matter could be inserted if it was deemed advisable.

Mr. ARROYO (Panama) suggested that in Section 7(1) a distinction
should be drawn between ordinary and extraordinary sessions, and that in Section 7(2), where it said that "The annual meeting of the Administrative Council shall be held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the Bank", it should be made clear that the Convention was not stipulating "joint sessions" in the strict sense, but separate sessions timed to take place at the same time in order to take advantage of the presence of the representatives of the members concerned.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that the wording of Section 7(2) should be amended to indicate that the annual meetings in question would take place at the same time rather than in conjunction with those of the Board of Governors of the Bank.

The Secretariat (Sections 8 - 10)

Mr. RATTRAY (Jamaica) wondered whether Section 8 gave sufficient recognition to the autonomy of the Administrative Council, especially when it was considered that the Secretary-General would be nominated by the Chairman and not by the Council. He also doubted whether the concurrence of the Chairman ought to be required for determining whether the office of the Secretary-General was compatible with some other office. Finally, he thought that provision should be made for designation of which Deputy Secretary-General should act in the absence of the Secretary-General when the latter is unable to make such designation.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that, although the Council could not itself nominate a Secretary-General, it could reject a candidate designated by the Chairman if it so wished. The proposal that the Council elect the Secretary-General raised problems in connection with the system of voting to be used. The advantages and disadvantages of some voting systems had been discussed in paragraph 8 of the Comment to Article I. It should be borne in mind that the aim of the draft Convention was to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence between the capital-importing and capital-exporting countries, and that this end could best be served by a procedure for impartial designation such as the one proposed.

With respect to the incompatibility of the office of Secretary-General with any other office he recalled that it had been suggested at the Addis Ababa meeting that the post of Secretary-General should be full-time rather than part-time in order to have sufficient prestige. The reason for drafting the provision in its present form was that it was impossible to assess beforehand the amount of work that the Center was liable to have and that without the assurance that there would be sufficient interesting work the right type of person could not be attracted to the post. Consideration would be given to an express provision in the draft indicative that a combination of functions would be permitted only in the early years of the Center as a temporary measure. As to the concurrence of the Chairman in decisions on questions of incompatibility of function, he had no strong views. As to the third point raised by the expert from Jamaica, he thought that a Secretary-General would promptly after his appointment determine the order in which his Deputies would act.

Mr. FUNES (El Salvador) referring to Section 9 and Section 10(2) considered it more logical that the order of precedence among Deputy Secretaries-General should be determined at the time of their nomination, and not later by the Secretary-General.
Mr. ARROYO (Panama) referred to Section 9(1), and proposed that the Chairman should nominate three candidates for selection, and that the Secretary-General should be elected from among these.

The CHAIRMAN observed it might be difficult to find three persons willing to stand for election to the office. He did not think that this procedure should be compulsory, but thought in practice sufficient consultation regarding candidates would take place through the Executive Directors of the Bank between the Chairman and the Administrative Council to meet the objectives underlying the suggestions which had just been made.

Mr. ARROYO referring to the concluding words of Section 9(2): "... except as the Administrative Council, with concurrence of the Chairman, may otherwise decide." He proposed that this formula should be changed, since it placed the Chairman on a higher level than the Council, which should be the supreme authority. He proposed the inclusion in Section 10(1) of the words: "The Secretary-General shall be the principal administrative officer of the Center." Minimum requirements should also be laid down for the selection of the Secretary-General (as had been made for members of the Panels) such as professional and moral qualifications; provision should also be made for the length of tenure of the post (say four years) the grounds for removal from that post and a precise definition of the duties involved. The Secretary-General was the principal officer of the Center and therefore his functions should be clearly indicated.

Mr. ESPINOSA (Venezuela) suggested that the text should be amended to make it clear that the Secretary-General's absence or inability to act or vacancy in the office of Secretary-General contemplated by Section 10(2) was of a temporary nature.

The Panels (Sections 11 - 15)

Mr. SALAZAR (Ecuador) suggested that Sections 11(1) and 12(1) be merged into one provision and Section 11(2) should read: "Each Contracting State shall designate up to six persons..." and that the number of designations by the Chairman under Sections 11(3) and 12(3) be reduced to two or three. He also proposed that the minimum qualifications for the arbitrators designated by States should be stipulated in detail. Referring to Section 14(2), he suggested that it be made clear that two or more States could not jointly designate the same person to the Panels. He concluded by suggesting that the right to designate a substitute Panel member under Section 13(2) be reserved to the State which had first proposed him.

The CHAIRMAN agreed with the representative of Ecuador that the qualifications of the Panel members should be specified in greater detail. Consideration might be given to elaborating upon the meaning of the term "qualified persons" in Sections 11(1) and 12(1) by enumerating therein the type of qualifications now listed as desirable in Section 15(1), and also to making it obligatory that the designation be guided by those criteria. Section 15(1) might then be deleted.

Mr. ARROYO (Panama) proposed that Section 11(3) and 12(3) should indicate that the members of the Panels designated by the Chairman must not be from the same country, but rather from different countries representing different legal systems.

Mr. PALOMO (Guatemala), referring to the Chairman's right to desig-
nate twelve persons to serve on the Panels of Conciliators and Arbitrators as set out in Sections 11(3) and 12(3), wondered whether such a right did not represent a form of weighted voting, which, while acceptable in a purely financial organization, would not be appropriate for the Center.

The CHAIRMAN remarked that it had not been intended to give the Chairman any particular weight as regards the composition of the Panels, but rather to enable the Chairman to fill gaps that might occur if, for instance, one field of activity was not represented and so achieve a balance in the conjunction of the Panels. If there was a fear that designations of the Chairman would lead to an imbalance, the provision could be omitted.

Financing the Center (Section 16)

The CHAIRMAN explained that the phrase "out of other receipts" in Section 16 had been inserted in order to take account of the possibility that the Bank itself might finance the overhead cost of the Center. The President of the Bank was prepared to recommend to the Executive Directors that the Bank pay the administrative expenses, which were expected to be very low.

Privileges and Immunities (Sections 17 - 20)

The CHAIRMAN introduced Sections 17 to 20 on privileges and immunities of the Center and explained that in general they followed the provisions of the Charters of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and its affiliates, and the Inter-American Development Bank.

Mr. UCROS (Panama) referring to Section 18(1)(ii), felt that in the case of arbitrators and conciliators, in order that they might act with greater freedom, their privileges and immunities should be better defined, because of the delicate nature of their functions in settling legal disputes affecting the interests of countries.

The CHAIRMAN agreed with the remarks of the expert from Panama and incidentally remarked that the reference to privileges and immunities of "officials and employees and comparable rank of other contracting States" seemed on reflection to lack precision, and reference might be made to the privileges and immunities of the United Nations Specialized Agencies.

Mr. ARROYO (Panama) pointed out the apparent contradiction existing between Section 20(2), regarding taxation on "salaries or emoluments paid by the Center to the Chairman and members of the Administrative Council", and Section 7(5) which stated that members of the Administrative Council and the Chairman would serve as such without compensation from the Center.

The CHAIRMAN said that the contradiction referred to in Section 20(2) was apparent rather than real. The members of the Council did not receive salaries but their travel expenses and per diem could be paid, and in some countries payments of that kind were subject to taxation.

Mr. ARROYO (Panama) suggested that the contradiction be removed
by eliminating the term "salary" in relation to the Chairman and members of the Administrative Council.

The meeting rose at 1:05 p.m.

THIRD SESSION
(Tuesday, February 4, 1964 - 3:30 p.m.)

ARTICLE II - Jurisdiction of the Center

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that Article II referred to both jurisdiction and competence. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 had been used as precedents, since the proposed Center had much in common with the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in that the Center itself would not engage in conciliation or arbitration, just as the Permanent Court was not actually a court. In both cases a framework was provided for certain proceedings to take place. In The Hague Conventions the word jurisdiction was used in the sense of the scope of the Convention or of the Permanent Court.

In the present draft Convention the word "competence" was used in relation to the commissions or tribunals set up under the auspices of the Center. Section 1 defined the scope of the Center, in the first place in terms of the kinds of proceedings that could take place under its auspices, namely, conciliation and arbitration. There was no specific reference to conciliation followed by arbitration, since such reference had been considered unnecessary. Secondly, the type of disputes to be dealt with was defined, namely, existing or future investment disputes of a legal character. The jurisdiction or scope of the Center was further limited by reference to the parties to the disputes to be dealt with, namely, in the first place a Contracting State, in the second place the national of another Contracting State, and thirdly that other Contracting State, if it replaced its national in the dispute on the grounds that it had been subrogated in the rights of its national, for example, in the case of an investment guarantee. The most important feature was that the jurisdiction of the Center was based on the consent of the parties. Section 2 showed how that consent might be evidenced.

Mr. PALOMO (Guatemala), referring to the definition of the jurisdiction of the Center in Section 1, considered that the words "existing or future" used to qualify a dispute of a legal character were superfluous, in view of the fact that existing disputes should be treated from a different angle, and that the Center should really only concern itself with future disputes. The words "existing or future" in Section 1 should therefore be deleted.

The CHAIRMAN explained that the reference to existing or future disputes was intended to cover both disputes existing at the time when the parties decided to apply for conciliation or arbitration procedures, which might be termed an ad hoc reference of disputes, and also disputes arising out of an agreement that included a reference to the procedures of the Center as the course to be followed for settling such disputes. In both cases consent was required.
Mr. PINTO (Guatemala) raised the problem of the definition of nationality for the purposes of submitting a dispute to the jurisdiction of the Center. For the definition of nationality different countries applied different criteria, for whereas in some of them the principle of *jus sanguinis* held good, others followed the principle of *jus soli*; this could give rise to disputes caused by dual nationality, with regard to both natural and to juridical persons.

The CHAIRMAN said that he was aware that Section 3(3) posed a problem but he thought Section 1 should be discussed on the assumption that some satisfactory way of defining and determining nationality could be found. The nationality referred to in Section 3(3) was that of either a natural or a juridical person. Some of the problems involved might be solved by amendments to Article X.

Mr. RATTRAY (Jamaica) asked if the Tribunal would be empowered to decide whether or not a State was involved in a dispute, for example in the case of a dispute involving State agencies or corporations.

The CHAIRMAN said that in Africa, for example, investment agreements were normally entered into by public development agencies rather than by the State itself. It had been suggested that Section 1 might be expanded to cover disputes between public institutions of Contracting States, or political subdivisions such as states in a federal system or provinces. In such a case double consent would be required, both by the public institution or political subdivision of the Contracting State, and by that State itself.

Mr. ESPIÑOSA (Venezuela) pointed out that in the legislation of the majority of countries the scope of arbitration procedures was limited to exclusively two contractual matters and excluded all matters connected with the status or capacity of persons. This criterion coincided with the scope of Section 1, but it would be advisable to make the wording more precise by inserting, after the words "investment dispute of a legal character" the words "arising out of contractual transactions".

The CHAIRMAN wondered if a limiting phrase of that nature might have the effect of excluding certain major investment agreements, of the type Ghana had entered into for a power and aluminum smelting project, for instance, covering such varied fields as free entry of raw materials, undertakings to export on a given scale, training of local staff, entry permits for experts, tax facilities, etc. He thought such a limitation as that suggested by Venezuela might lead to unnecessary confusion over the type of dispute that could be dealt with under the Convention, and it might be preferable, for States whose legislation precluded them from submitting disputes of a particular type, to make a declaration of the limitations in question when signing the Convention.

Mr. ESPIÑOSA (Venezuela) said that in view of the explanation offered by the Chairman, he withdrew his suggestion.

Mr. FUNES (El Salvador) considered that the wording of Section 1 would gain in clarity and conciseness if it were simply stated that the jurisdiction of the Center was limited to investment disputes between States and nationals of other States. He therefore proposed that the words "to proceedings for conciliation and arbitration with respect" be deleted, together with the words "existing or future", as had been
suggested by the Guatemalan delegate.

The CHAIRMAN replied that this drafting suggestion would be considered.

Mr. BELIN (United States of America) suggested the deletion of the words "of a legal character", on the grounds that it might lead to misunderstandings of the scope of the draft Convention.

The CHAIRMAN said that the phrase in question was the result of compromise between two positions, the first being that the reference need only be to investment disputes, and the second that there should be a precise definition of an investment dispute. The danger had been envisaged that a party might attempt to bring before the Center disputes of a purely commercial or political nature. The words "of a legal character" were intended to cover cases involving a difference of view as to a legal right. That would exclude such cases as those, for example, of a company wishing to raise objections to a price control system, which involved questions of fairness and not of legal right. It was perhaps advisable to make it clear that if no legal right were involved, the facilities of the Center would not be available. In that connection he referred to Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice which defined "legal disputes".

Mr. BELIN (United States of America) thought that the case of the Center would be somewhat different from that of the International Court, since in the case of a Center disputes might be submitted which were not necessarily of a legal character. If a State party to the dispute first went through legal proceedings according to its own legislation which resulted in a nominal financial award, should the dispute be regarded as a commercial dispute and not as a legal dispute under this Article?

The CHAIRMAN said that submission of a dispute to the facilities provided by the Center would include the issue of whether or not any local decision was proper as a matter of law which, in the case mentioned by Mr. Belin, would be international law. If the parties had agreed that only local law would apply, then the local decision would settle the matter and there would be no review of local law by the proposed international body. If, for example, a State expropriated a public utility company in accordance with its own laws and the law was in accordance with its constitution, a question might still arise as to the amount of compensation. If there were provisions in the concession agreement for the submission of any dispute, say, after exhaustion of local remedies, to the Center but there was no provision on applicable law, then the party concerned could argue that although local legal requirements had been met there had been a violation of international law, and the Tribunal would decide whether or not international law applied. The point to be argued must be the alleged violation of a legal right, and he did not believe that that would limit the scope of the Center unduly. Several European countries believed that the field for voluntary conciliation should be unlimited; but that arbitration should be limited to legal disputes.

The CHAIRMAN suggested that the meeting should proceed to consider Section 2, which described the three ways in which consent to the jurisdiction of the Center could be evidenced. The first would be a prior
written undertaking such as an investment agreement containing an arbitration or conciliation clause. The second, an ad hoc submission of a dispute where there was no pre-existing agreement. The third, which had been put in for sake of completeness, covered acceptance by a party in respect of a dispute submitted to the Center by the other party.

Mr. PINTO (Guatemala) reiterated his doubts with regard to the definition of nationality for the purposes of the draft Convention under discussion. He wondered what would be the most appropriate authority to decide questions of nationality, above all where a natural person possessed two nationalities. He was equally disturbed about the problem of the nationality of juridical persons. He mentioned the specific case of a company that claimed to possess a certain nationality for the purpose of carrying on its activities in a certain country, and asked who could be held responsible if that company failed to honor its agreements, to the prejudice of the State contracting with it, and then disappeared. The draft Convention dealt solely with the protection of the private investor vis-à-vis the Contracting State, but there was no provision for guaranteeing a similar protection to the State vis-à-vis a foreign juridical person who had failed to honor its agreements.

The CHAIRMAN said that if a company were assumed to have disappeared, it would be difficult to decide against whom the award was to be executed. It could be enforced in any Contracting State in which assets of that corporation were found.

Mr. PINTO (Guatemala) suggested, on the basis of the view he had just expressed, that the draft Convention should include a clause providing that the State that had certified that a juridical person was of its nationality should be obliged to compensate the Contracting State for damages the latter might suffer as a result of the private investor failing to honor agreements entered into.

Referring to the problem of the existence of persons possessing dual or even triple nationality, he considered the solution given in Section 3(3), providing for certification of nationality by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State, as unsatisfactory, because insufficiently precise. There were States that conferred their nationalities on investing companies in return for payment. The Convention seemed to recognize as valid a fictitious nationality of that kind and that could leave the capital-importing countries at a disadvantage. He also thought that cases where a group of States had a common nationality had not been adequately covered.

He suggested that the whole question should be more thoroughly studied and should be dealt with specifically in the revised draft Convention.

The CHAIRMAN said that in Africa it had been suggested that the certificate mentioned in Section 3(3) should be issued by the "competent" official rather than necessarily by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and that this certificate be only prima facie evidence of nationality so that the Arbitration Tribunal would have to determine the nationality of the party. It might be to the interest of capital-importing States to have a method of confirming in advance that an investor was a national of the other State concerned, in order to be able to claim the enforcement of any award against the investor in respect of assets held in that State.
Referring to the definition of nationality in Article X, he said the aim had been to leave the Contracting States maximum freedom to decide that a person was to be regarded as foreign, if he had multiple nationality, even if one nationality were that of the State in question, so that the Convention would make such an agreement effective. In Africa it was not unusual for countries to retain the liberty to treat people enjoying dual nationality as either nationals or foreigners. It was for the meeting to say whether or not such an approach was desirable in respect of the draft Convention. It might also be possible for the question of nationality to be treated as a question of interpretation of the Convention which might eventually be referred by the States concerned to the International Court. He agreed that the question of multiple nationality was one that required further study.

Mr. UCROS (Panama) referring to the procedure suggested for proving the consent of one of the parties when a dispute was submitted to the jurisdiction of the Center, pointed out that the present Spanish text of sub-paragraphs (ii) and (iii) of Section 2 seemed to indicate that the intention of one of the parties to submit the dispute to the Center would suffice for the other party to come under that jurisdiction. He considered that submission and acceptance should be simultaneous acts, and for that reason he proposed that the two sub-paragraphs referred to should be combined to form one sub-paragraph only.

The CHAIRMAN said that the Spanish version of Section 2(ii) was unfortunately not correct, and that the English text was not open to the criticism just advanced, but he would like to consider in any event whether sub-paragraphs (ii) and (iii) might be combined as suggested.

The meeting was suspended at 5:10 p.m. and resumed at 5:35 p.m.

Mr. UCROS (Panama) referred again to a point that he had raised at the first meeting. International organizations were at present the most active agents of capital investment; in view of the possibility of disputes arising that might affect them, they should be covered by the provision of the draft Convention, and he hoped that this point would be taken into account in redrafting the Convention.

Mr. ESPINOSA (Venezuela) referred to sub-paragraph (i) of paragraph (2) of Section 3 of Article II and said that the objection that there was no dispute could not be treated as a preliminary question, since a finding that no dispute existed in itself constituted a decision on the merits. Therefore the sub-paragraph should be deleted, or transferred to a special section dealing with substantive questions. The same section should also provide for another objection to the Commission's or Tribunal's competence, namely, that the dispute was not of the nature specified in Section 1.

With regard to sub-paragraph (iv) of the same paragraph, the objection described should be amplified by the addition of the words "or one of the parties to the dispute is not a Contracting State". Unless that amendment were incorporated, there would be no provision concerning one of the procedural requirements necessary for the dispute to be tried.

The most important point raised in the present session was the question of the definition of nationality. For the Latin American countries, where the concept of nationality was based on the principle of
jus soli, it was very difficult to admit the definition that appears in Article X of the draft Convention. He suggested that the rule in cases of conflict of nationality be that the nationality of the State with which the dispute has arisen prevail, since it was difficult to conceive of a State in full possession of the facts wishing to submit to an international jurisdiction, a dispute with a person whom it regarded as possessing its own nationality.

With respect to paragraph (3) of Section 3, he pointed out that the certifying of nationality was not in all countries the responsibility of the Foreign Minister, and that consequently a more flexible wording should be used, such as "by a competent official and duly authenticated".

Mr. MENESES (Nicaragua) warmly supported the statement made by the representative of Venezuela regarding sub-paragraph (iv) of Section 3(2). He would like to add in that same sub-paragraph the exception of any case in which the party to the dispute was a national of the State party to the dispute. The issue might arise in the case of a juridical person with mixed capital that had obtained the nationality of that State and wished to make use of the Center as a means of litigation against that State.

The CHAIRMAN said that he agreed with the specific suggestion respecting the various subdivisions of Section 3(2). There would probably be no great problem with respect to natural persons if the concept of dual nationality were omitted from the definition, but the question of corporations required further thought. In certain African countries foreign investment legislation permitted companies to choose whether they would be treated as domestic or foreign, for the purposes of taxation, etc. A company that was mainly foreign-owned could be treated as a foreign company even though established under the laws of the host State and in some cases such treatment was mandatory. A number of African countries had asked that such situations be taken into account in the draft Convention.

Mr. RATTRAY (Jamaica) said that the listing of preliminary objections in Section 3(2) might be interpreted wrongly as being exhaustive and should be drafted so as not to rule out any other types of preliminary objections. For instance, one ground for objection which had not been covered was that the State party to the dispute was not a Contracting State.

He also pointed out that the mandatory language of Section 3(2) which required that objections on the grounds listed be treated as preliminary objections was insufficiently flexible and did not allow for joinder of such objections to the merits. In that connection he referred to the Rules of the International Court of Justice, and suggested that perhaps Article 62, paragraph 5 of those Rules might be adapted for the purposes of the draft Convention.

Mr. WALKER (Chile), said that without entering upon an abstruse juridical analysis, the beginnings of a solution to the problem of determining nationality might be found through certain practical measures. In concluding an undertaking with a State, a foreign investor could declare his nationality and evidence it by an instrument issued by the competent authority of the State whose nationality was claimed. If later the
investor should change his nationality, the undertaking would be terminated unless it were renewed by agreement between the parties.

The meeting rose at 6:00 p.m.

FOURTH SESSION
(Wednesday, February 5, 1964 - 10:40 a.m.)

ARTICLE II - Jurisdiction of the Center (conclusion)

Mr. DEL CASTILLO (Colombia) pointed out that the Colombian Constitution did not permit the types of arbitration provided for in the draft Convention, since it affirmed the principles that nationals and foreigners were equal before Colombian courts. At the present time, Colombia was studying an agreement with an important investing country, which included a special provision: that country's investors in Colombia would submit to the jurisdiction of the Colombian authorities all disputes with the State, but in case of denial of justice recourse to an international arbitration tribunal was contemplated after exhaustion of local remedies. The international tribunal would consist of a single arbitrator appointed by agreement between the parties or, failing that, by the President of the International Court of Justice. Two years ago in Colombia a draft intended to amend the Code of Commercial Law was made, in which text the creation of arbitral tribunals was envisaged; these provisions might be of interest in connection with the present discussions.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the Colombian limitation on consent to arbitration was completely consistent with the system envisaged by the draft Convention. For instance, it was possible under the draft Convention to stipulate that no arbitration could take place until all national judicial remedies had been exhausted and that the issues to be dealt with by the Center would be limited to denial of justice or other specific matters which the country in question was willing to have examined. The Convention also left the parties to a dispute free to decide on the number of arbitrators and the method by which they would be selected. He stressed that the aim of Articles III and IV was simply to indicate some rules for the selection of arbitrators and to fill any gaps that might occur in arrangements between the parties to a dispute.

Mr. CARPIO (Peru) suggested that a further sub-paragraph, to be numbered (3) should be added to Section 3 of Article II, worded as follows: "The Commission may carry on its work in the headquarters of the Center or in the place or country designated by the parties or chosen by the Commission itself."

ARTICLE III - Conciliation

Request for Conciliation (Section 1)

Mr. RATTRAY (Jamaica) referred to Section 1 of Article III which indicated that the request for the initiation of conciliation proceedings had to state expressly that the other party had consented to the
jurisdiction of the Center. There was an apparent inconsistency between that Section and the provisions of Articles II, which stated that consent might be evidenced by the acceptance of one party of jurisdiction in respect of a dispute submitted to the Center by another party. He therefore suggested that the words "as far as possible" be inserted in the last sentence of Section 1 of Article III, between the words "shall state" and "that the other party".

Mr. UCROS (Panama) considered that the second sentence of Section 1 of Article III was in conflict with previous articles and the spirit of the draft Convention which was based on consent to conciliation or arbitration. He proposed that it be amended to read "and shall submit evidence that the other party has given its consent ...", or that it should state that the other party would be asked to furnish proof of its consent. The provision in question would then agree more closely with Section 2 of Article II.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that the suggestions made by the expert from Panama would clarify the meaning of the provision and make it more compatible with Section 2 of Article II.

Constitution of the Commission (Sections 2 - 3)

Mr. BELIN (United States of America) inquired, with reference to Section 2(2) of Article III, whether the members of the Conciliation Commission would be selected from the Panel only if the parties to the dispute had been unable to agree on the choice of persons?

The CHAIRMAN explained that the intention was to allow the parties to choose a conciliator from among the members of the Panels or from outside as they wished, except, of course, in cases of disagreement. It had been suggested at the Addis Ababa meeting that the choice should be restricted in all cases to Panel members, but there had been a slight preference for not making the provision absolutely binding either for conciliation or arbitration.

Mr. BELIN (United States of America) pointed out that as the States had been enjoined to nominate highly qualified persons as members of the Panels, it seemed logical to require parties to use their services in preference to those of others.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that the desirability of selecting conciliators from the Panels might be indicated in the draft Convention but the freedom of choice of the parties should not be restricted.

Powers and Functions of the Commission (Sections 4 - 5)

Mr. SALAZAR (Ecuador) suggested that the rules of procedure for conciliation should be clearly established in the draft Convention and not left to the regulations. He also reiterated the proposal he had made earlier that the conciliation procedure should take place in two stages, the first to be carried out in the country where the dispute arose.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that it might be helpful for the conciliation proceedings to be held in the country where the dispute originated. But as the aim in drafting the Convention had been to keep it as flexible as
possible no special provision to that effect need be inserted. The regulations to be drawn up by the Administrative Council could deal more fully with the matter since it would be easier to amend them later, if it were found necessary.

Mr. FUNES (El Salvador) said that Section 4 of Article III appeared to admit the possibility of two sets of rules, one in force when consent was given, and the other in force at the time when the request for conciliation was submitted. That point should be clarified, because there might be a lapse of several years between the two events.

The CHAIRMAN confirmed that the rules (referred to in Section 4) applicable in a particular proceeding were those in force at the time the State had agreed to resort to conciliation. The English text was quite clear on that point but the Spanish version would have to be reworded.

Obligations of the Parties (Sections 6 - 7)

The CHAIRMAN introduced Section 6, he said that it embodied two basic rules for conciliation, the first being that the parties must fully cooperate with the Commission and the second that the recommendation of the Commission should not bind the parties unless they so agreed. Section 7 was also very important since, without the protection that it extended to the parties in a dispute, they might be reluctant to seek agreement and take rigid positions that might defeat the purposes of the conciliation proceedings.

Mr. SALAZAR (Ecuador) suggested that in cases where the parties had agreed to be bound by the recommendations of the Commission, they should be allowed to make use of these recommendations in later proceedings.

The CHAIRMAN agreed.

Mr. BRUNNER (Chile) suggested the adoption of the solution laid down by the Tratado de Soluciones Pacificas signed at Bogota: recommendations would appear in the record of the conciliation proceedings, but would only be published at the request of the parties.

The CHAIRMAN thought that the best way to deal with the problem would be through the rules. He agreed that it was important that records be kept of the conciliation proceedings and that Section 7 would not be infringed thereby.

Mr. ARROYO (Panama), suggested that Section 7 in the Spanish text be reworded to make it clear.

The meeting was suspended at 11:32 a.m. and resumed at 11:50 a.m.

ARTICLE IV - Arbitration

Request for Arbitration (Section 1) and Constitution of the Tribunal (Sections 2 - 3)
of Article IV were much the same as those expressed in relation to Section 1 of Article III, it could be taken for granted that they wished similar amendments to be introduced.

He pointed out that Sections 2 and 3 resembled the equivalent Sections in Article III as regards the number of arbitrators and the method of selection. But there was one significant distinction between the constitution of conciliation commissions and arbitration tribunals, viz., the provision that no member of an arbitral tribunal could be a national of the State party to the dispute or of the investor's State. It was a departure from the usual practice but was expected to give more satisfactory results. The possibility of having five arbitrators of whom three would not be nationals of the parties concerned had not been provided for in the draft Convention since the cost might be prohibitive in all but particularly important cases.

Mr. ESPINOSA (Venezuela) referring to the first part of Section 2(1) of Article IV dealing with the constitution of the Tribunal suggested that, in order to avoid a possible impasse, it should be specified that an uneven number of arbitrators must be appointed.

The CHAIRMAN agreed.

Mr. BELIN (United States of America) pointed out that there were discrepancies between Sections 2 and 3 and the Comment thereto. He asked whether it was obligatory for the arbitrators to be selected from the Panel irrespective of whether the parties agreed on the choice of nominees. If they were in agreement, might it be possible for them to choose arbitrators from outside the Panel and, if so, to designate their own nationals? His Government attached great importance to the principle of having, in all cases, arbitrators who were members of the Panel and, more particularly, who were not nationals of the parties concerned.

The CHAIRMAN agreed with Mr. Belin on the importance of the principle involved. He favored a compromise whereby the autonomy of the parties would be respected except that they would not be permitted to choose their own nationals as arbitrators. He also agreed that the Comment would have to be reconciled with the provisions of Sections 2 and 3.

Mr. DEL CASTILLO (Colombia) stressed that the best solution would be for the parties in all cases to agree upon a single arbitrator.

Mr. RATTRAY (Jamaica) referred to Section 3 of Article IV. He doubted whether the rule was sufficiently flexible since it seemed to him that it empowered the Chairman to select arbitrators only from the Panel when the parties could not agree on their choice of persons. It might happen that although the parties disagreed on the choice of persons, they agreed that certain persons outside the Panel were less objectionable than others. In such cases the Chairman should be allowed to select arbitrators from outside the Panel.

The CHAIRMAN stated that as the parties were allowed to select arbitrators from outside the Panel, the Chairman could be empowered to give effect to the parties' preference and select arbitrators from outside the Panel. He would like to consider how this rule could best be expressed.
Mr. LOWENFELD (United States of America) referring to the suggestion of Mr. Rattray, said that in his opinion arbitration proceedings would be slowed down if the Chairman had to seek agreement of the parties to persons outside the Panel. The consultation provision in Section 3 was intended in his opinion to take account of objections of the parties to particular individuals but not to obtain agreement at any cost.

The CHAIRMAN expressed the view that the two positions could perhaps be reconciled to permit the appointment of some persons outside the Panel whom the Chairman found to be acceptable to both parties, although not expressly agreed upon by them. He would want to stress, however, the exceptional character of such a case.

Powers and Functions of the Tribunal (Sections 4 - 10)

The CHAIRMAN, introducing the Sections dealing with powers and functions of the Tribunal, pointed out that the main aim was again to preserve the autonomy of the parties involved. In the case of lack of agreement between the parties on the law to be applied, the Tribunal would itself be responsible for deciding whether to apply a particular domestic or international law as it found most appropriate. The provisions in paragraph (2) of Section 4 were commonly included in conventions of the kind under consideration.

Mr. RATTRAY (Jamaica) wondered whether existing rules of national or international law would be adequate in many cases to settle an investment dispute and whether the arbitrators ought not to decide issues on the basis of law, justice and equity when the parties had not agreed on a specific law. Section 4 did not specify the type of international law that would be applicable and should enter into more detail on that point, on the lines of Article 10 of the Model Rules adopted by the International Law Commission.

The CHAIRMAN explained that he had deliberately refrained from following Article 10 of the Model Rules since many of the decisions would not be based on international law. But he had no objection to the inclusion of some explanation as to the meaning of the term "international law".

Mr. LOWENFELD (United States of America) asked whether, it was necessary to state that the Tribunal, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, would decide in accordance with rules of law, whether national or international, and suggested that the Tribunal might of its own motion wish to rule ex aequo et bono.

He pointed out that Section 7, in its present form, required a statement of the reasons on which an award was based which would presumably include a reference to the particular law that had been applied. He suggested that it might be desirable for the Tribunal not to be compelled to state its reasons if, in its opinion, a satisfactory settlement could be achieved without making detailed reference to them.

The CHAIRMAN said he attached great importance to the requirement of a statement of reasons. He felt, however, that statement need not refer to the particular law applied unless that had been a crucial issue involved in the decision.
Mr. SALAZAR (Ecuador) referring to provisions contained in Section 5 and the corresponding provisions for conciliation, emphasized that the Arbitration Rules by their nature represented an instrument for the mere application of the provisions of the Convention, both substantive and adjective. He considered that the Rules should not be used to legislate, as might be implied from the last part of Section 5: "If any question of procedure arises which is not covered by the applicable arbitration rules, the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide that question." He stressed the fact that what was not contemplated in the Convention should and could not be covered by the Rules.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the Administrative Council had to have certain powers to decide on such matters as timetables, languages, etc., that were purely administrative in nature, and could be properly set forth in the Arbitration Rules. In that connection he invited attention to Section 6 of Article I which made quite clear that the Council could not adopt Rules inconsistent with the provisions of the Convention but could only supplement the Convention in matters of detail.

Mr. UCROS (Panama) suggested that it should be specified in Section 6 of Article IV that all questions before the Arbitral Tribunal must be decided by an absolute majority vote. He pointed out the possible danger of providing, as was done in Section 7(1), that an award signed by the majority of the Tribunal would constitute the award of the Tribunal, and took the view that if the award was to have full legal validity it should be signed by all the members of the Tribunal but that any dissenting members might put their reasons for their dissent in writing.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the rule might be that award should be signed by all the members of the Tribunal. In that case it should also be provided that refusal by one of the members to sign should not frustrate the award. It had been suggested at the Addis Ababa meeting that if a minority refused to sign the award, that fact should be recorded in the award signed by the majority.

Mr. FUNES (El Salvador) suggested that the Convention should impose an obligation on all the members of the Tribunal to sign while giving those members who disagreed with the award the right to offend their dissenting opinions.

Mr. MENESES (Nicaragua) described how decisions were rendered by the Courts of his own country. The award of the majority of judges was signed by them and set forth the reasons on which the decision had been based. The Secretary thereupon recorded that the award had been approved by the majority and listed the number of dissenting members. He considered that all the members of the Arbitral Tribunal should be required to sign the award but agreed that failure to do so by one of them should not frustrate the award.

Mr. SEVILLA-SACASA (Nicaragua) proposed that Section 7(1) should be redrafted to require that an award should be arrived at by a majority decision of the Tribunal, that it should be in writing and be signed by all the members of the Tribunal, and that it should set out the reasons upon which it was based. Dissenting members should be required to sign, but could attach their dissenting opinion.

Mr. ARROYO (Panama) endorsed the views of the representative of
Nicaragua to the effect that it should be specified that the award was to be signed by all the arbitrators. Any case of failure to sign should be placed on record.

Mr. ESPINOSA (Venezuela), suggested that a final paragraph might be inserted to the effect that notwithstanding the obligation of all the members of the Tribunal to sign an award, should one of them fail to sign it, the award signed by a majority would constitute the award.

Mr. KINGSTON (Canada) thought that the last sentence of Section 8(1) seemed to imply that the non-appearance of a party would automatically call for a decision in favor of the party appearing. Although that impression was offset to some extent by paragraph (2) it might be best to amend paragraph (1) so as to read: "Whenever one of the parties does not appear before the Tribunal, or fails to defend its case, the Tribunal may nevertheless continue to consider the case."

The CHAIRMAN explained that Section 8(1) followed closely a similar provision in the Model Rules adopted by the International Law Commission. He suggested that the point made by the representative of Canada might be met if the words "to decide in favor of" were replaced by "decide", and Section 8(2) could then be reworded accordingly.

Mr. RAMIREZ (Honduras), referring to Section 7(2) proposed that a time limit be set for notification of the award to the parties concerned. With regard to Section 8(1) he expressed his agreement with the Canadian expert and suggested that the provision be redrafted from the point of view of what the Tribunal could do rather than in terms of the plaintiff's position. Section 8(2) should be redrafted to give more scope to the Tribunal's discretion and not restrict the Tribunal by referring to a decision in favor of one of the parties.

Mr. RATTRAY (Jamaica) expressed his doubts about the phrasing of the last sentence in Section 8(2). The word "appears" was not included in the relevant Model Rule of the International Law Commission and could with advantage be omitted, because the Tribunal could, in his view be "satisfied" only on the basis of the evidence before it.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that the word "appears" should be deleted.

Mr. LOWENFELD (United States of America) considered that Section 8 had a twofold purpose: firstly, to prevent the failure of a party to appear before the Tribunal from defeating the purpose of the proceedings and, secondly, to ensure that there should be no automatic judgment by default and that the criteria on which an award would be based in case of default ought not to be different from those set forth in Section 4. He suggested that Section 8(2) be reworded as follows: "In such case, the Tribunal may nevertheless hear the case and proceed to an award in accordance with the provisions of Section 4."

Mr. ARROYO (Panama) considered that, if an investor or a Contracting State were requested to appear before the Tribunal, it would be imperative for them to appear and defend their respective points of view. He therefore suggested that a sanction for non-appearance should be provided and it seemed appropriate that non-appearance should constitute a presumption of confession which the Tribunal would take into account rendering its award.
The CHAIRMAN said that the observations made by the expert from Panama were particularly interesting. He observed that the reason why provision had been inserted expressly enjoining the Tribunal to ascertain that the claims presented to it were well-founded, was that international proceedings were of a delicate nature. Procedural requirements in such proceedings frequently went beyond those provided for in national codes of procedure.

Mr. ESPINOSA (Venezuela) pointed out that in domestic procedural law a fictional confession based on non-appearance of a party in the first instance was justified because a losing party had the right to appeal. Where only a tribunal of first instance existed, as was the case with the Arbitration Tribunals under the Convention, he could not agree that such fictional confession be admitted solely on the grounds of non-appearance, because such a measure would be unduly severe, at least in the absence of an opportunity for the non-appearing party to cure his default. The Rules should establish the correct procedure for summoning the parties, and some other sort of sanction might perhaps be found for cases of non-appearance. As regards Section 8(2), he agreed with the change proposed by the expert from Jamaica.

As to the proposal of the expert of Honduras on notification of the award to the parties, he referred to the procedure established in Venezuelan law, whereby judgments were delivered at a previously announced time and in the presence of anyone who wished to attend. He suggested that Section 7(2) be amended to read as follows: "The award will be delivered by the Tribunal in the place where it normally sits, on the day and at the time appointed, these having been notified to the parties, and in the presence of those parties that may have appeared."

The meeting rose at 1:10 p.m.

FIFTH SESSION
(Wednesday, February 5, 1964 - 3:50 p.m.)

ARTICLE IV - Arbitration (continued)

Powers and Functions of the Tribunal (Sections 8-10) (continued)

The CHAIRMAN said that there seemed to be general agreement that Section 8(1) should provide that the failure of one party to the dispute to appear or co-operate in the proceedings should not defeat the proceedings, but that the Tribunal should in such a case be empowered to decide the case. As to the proper course in those circumstances, there appeared to be three views. The first was that the party failing to appear or defend its case must be presumed to admit the allegations against him, if the defendant, or to have withdrawn his own allegations, if the plaintiff. The second was the position as set forth in the draft Convention under Section 8(2). The third view was that in addition to making out a prima facie case the claimant should produce some evidence in support of his claim, which appeared to be the system of the International Court of Justice in the application of Article 53 of its Statute.
Mr. DEL CASTILLO (Colombia) expressed serious doubts about the inclusion of Section 8 of Article IV in the draft Convention. He agreed with the comment made at the previous meeting by the representative of Panama, that it would be highly unlikely that a party would fail to appear before the Tribunal after having given its consent to arbitration. However, he had arrived at the opposite conclusion to that reached by the representative of Panama. While under the terms of Article II, the jurisdiction of the Center based on the consent of the parties, the Section under consideration appeared to imply that arbitration was compulsory, and paragraph 5 of the Preamble gave the same impression. The proposed Convention by itself represented such a departure from established principles of international law by allowing an individual to litigate with a State on the same level, that any element of compulsion should be avoided. Accordingly, he thought it inadvisable to include either Section 8 or paragraph 5 of the Preamble.

The CHAIRMAN thought the Colombian comments might be based on a misunderstanding. No signatory of the Convention would assume any obligation to enter into an undertaking to submit to arbitration but once such an undertaking had been voluntarily made, no subsequent withdrawal was possible. In most cases a foreign investor would agree to operate under the laws of the country concerned, but there had been cases where governments had agreed to grant special treatment, and later had withdrawn the privileges in question. There would be no point in contemplating a Convention unless a government’s word was regarded as its bond. The decision to submit a dispute was voluntary, but once made, became binding. The obligation in question was not to make a promise, but to keep it once made.

Mr. MENESES (Nicaragua) said that two situations were confused in Section 8: failure to appear before the Tribunal and abandonment of the case after appearing before the Tribunal. The first situation was unlikely, since the two parties had agreed to request arbitration; in the second type of situation three different possibilities should be considered. Firstly, if the plaintiff abandoned the claim, he should be considered to have abandoned the case and the Tribunal should rule in the defendant’s favor. Secondly, if the defendant did not appear there should be some sanction or penalty for his non-appearance, but not necessarily a presumption of confession. Thirdly, if the defendant abandoned his case after appearing in the proceedings, no penalty should be imposed on him since the burden of proof lay not on him but on the plaintiff. He asked that his comments be taken into account in redrafting the Convention.

Mr. SEVILLA-SACASA (Nicaragua) considered that the Convention would not be favorably received if it established compulsory arbitration. It was not a question of one party bringing an action against the other, but rather of the two parties presenting a joint request for arbitration. He was surprised, therefore, to find the word "claim" in the draft Convention because, in practice, there was neither a "plaintiff" nor a "defendant". Hence, if one of the parties failed to appear, that did not mean that the Tribunal should necessarily decide in favor of the other. The reason for failure to appear could be the belief of the party in default either that a point of law was involved which did not need to be proved to the Tribunal but merely to be applied by it, or else that the opposing party was right. He suggested that the wording of Section 8 be changed in order to clarify those concepts.

The CHAIRMAN said that the situation contemplated in Section 8 was
the refusal of one party to appear after having agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration. There was no suggestion of compulsory arbitration, unthinkable at the present stage of legal and political development as a method of resolving disputes between States and private parties; the proposal was that neither a State nor an investor, having agreed to submit the dispute, should be allowed to retract that voluntary agreement.

Mr. RAMIREZ (Honduras) recalled that the draft Convention represented a completely new approach, which was at variance with the classic formalistic concepts of legal procedure. Arbitration proceedings had been ruled less and less by such formalism, since the parties appeared before an arbitrator with the request that he declare not only who was right, but on whose side justice lay. It would be fatal for the draft Convention to introduce the penalties and classic procedural formulae, of legal procedure. He emphasized that the draft Convention was concerned with the economic aspects of a dispute and not only with its formal legal aspects. He agreed with the substance of Section 8, but would like to see its form changed in line with his comments.

Mr. ARROYO (Panama) said that the representatives of Colombia and Nicaragua had raised a very important issue. Their approach completely vitiated the existing concept of the proposed Convention, since if one party could voluntarily agree to arbitration and then fail to appear before the Tribunal, the present meeting would be wasting its time. He endorsed the Chairman's explanation and maintained that there was no question of imposing compulsory arbitration. A State was obliged to accept arbitration only if it had voluntarily decided to enter into a prior agreement providing for such a procedure. There were two possibilities: first, there must be recourse to arbitration wherever there was a prior undertaking to that effect, as was most frequently the case. Secondly, if there were no such clause and a dispute arose, the parties could decide whether they would jointly agree to have recourse to arbitration. Only in the first case could there be any question of compulsory arbitration. He urged that the position stated by the experts from Nicaragua and Colombia not be accepted.

Mr. CANAL (Colombia) explained that Colombian law placed nationals and foreigners on an equal footing; hence, Colombia would only agree to the procedure proposed in the draft Convention in very exceptional cases, that is, if there were a denial of justice by the State towards the foreign investor. In that respect, he read a few paragraphs from a statement prepared by the Inter-American Juridical Committee on the American legal principles governing the international responsibility of States: "A State is not responsible for acts or omissions with respect to foreigners except in the same cases and subject to the same circumstances in which, in accordance with its own legislation, it is responsible towards its own nationals ... The State is relieved of all international responsibility if the foreigner has by agreement renounced the diplomatic protection of his Government or if the domestic legislation subjects the foreign contracting party to local jurisdiction or assimilates him to a national for the purposes of the contract."

He wondered whether the obligation of a State and an individual person to have recourse to the Center was incurred at the time when a dispute arose or at the time when the investment was decided upon.

The CHAIRMAN said that as to the time when the obligation arose,
there were two possibilities. An investor might enter into a contract with a government that included an arbitration clause and, if any dispute arose, that clause would take effect. Alternatively, there might be either no contract, or a contract without such a clause, and yet a State, although under no pre-existing obligation to submit a dispute to arbitration under the auspices of the Center, might nevertheless wish to do so for some reason at that time. In the latter case the obligation would arise after a compromiso providing for such submission had been concluded.

With respect to the position of the expert from Colombia, if that country was not able to submit any question to arbitration except one relating to a denial of justice, that was a fact that must be accepted. Such a position was not, however, inconsistent with Section 8. If Colombia agreed with an investor that, after exhaustion of local remedies, a question of denial of justice could be considered by an arbitral tribunal, Colombia should not then be free to withdraw its prior consent to such a course. The question was one of honoring a specific commitment; the scope of the commitment could be limited as thought proper by the government and as permitted by the laws and constitution of the country concerned.

Mr. CHERRIE (Trinidad and Tobago) said that there might be various reasons why a party to the dispute should fail to appear or defend his case. He thought the text might include some provision on the application of Section 8 in cases where the default was for reasons, not involving the culpability of the party for failure to appear, in order to guide the Tribunal in rendering the award.

The CHAIRMAN said that possibly provision might be made for a period of grace, in line with the International Law Commission's Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure. He observed that Section 8 was not intended to provide an automatic penalty against a defaulting party. However, he thought Section 8, which was a reflection of the principle pacta sunt servanda, was of crucial importance as preventing the frustration of arbitration agreements.

Mr. ARTEAGA (Chile) did not share the fears expressed by some other experts. He agreed with the Chairman that Section 8 did not establish compulsory arbitration. He thought that the situation contemplated under this Section was an unlikely one, namely that a party that had agreed to go to arbitration would fail to appear; it was logical to provide in such a case that the matter would be resolved according to law.

Mr. NAVARRO (Peru), reverting to a question dealt with earlier, said he would like to see a closer co-ordination between paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 8. If the words "in favor of its claim" were deleted from paragraph (1), consequential changes would have to be made in paragraph (2). He agreed with the speakers who considered that Section 8 did not establish compulsory arbitration.

Mr. CARPIO (Peru) considered that language should be included to enable the Tribunal of its own motion and after an examination of the relevant facts, to declare that it had no jurisdiction.

The CHAIRMAN proposed that the meeting should consider Section 9, dealing with counterclaims and incidental or additional claims. Since the question had been raised at the African meeting, he wished to stress
that the aim of the section was not in any way to extend the competence of the Tribunal. No issue could be brought before the Arbitral Tribunal that the parties had not agreed to submit to arbitration. The point of the section was to obviate separate proceedings for incidental claims, but in all cases there must be a specific undertaking to submit the question to arbitration.

Mr. BELIN (United States of America) suggested that the phrase "to the extent that the parties so agree" might be used rather than "except as the parties shall otherwise agree", as in the text of the draft Convention.

The CHAIRMAN said that if the Tribunal was to possess that power as a general rule, the existing wording should be retained, so that any other procedure would be regarded as a departure from the rule; but if the Tribunal were not, as a rule, to have that power the United States' suggestion could be accepted. It might be advisable to make clear beyond any doubt that submission of any incidental claims was subject to the overriding principle of consent: for instance, the words "and within the competence of the Tribunal" might be added at the end of the section.

Mr. CHERRIE (Trinidad and Tobago) suggested that it should also be made clear that proceedings for incidental claims should be subject to the provisions of Sections 4 to 8.

The CHAIRMAN proposed that the meeting should consider Section 10 on provisional measures.

Mr. UCROS (Panama) considered that it would be advisable to clarify what kind of provisional measures lay within the powers of the Tribunal for the purpose of safeguarding the rights of the parties. It would likewise be necessary to state clearly the rights of which party were to be safeguarded, and whether the status quo to be protected should be that existing during the normal execution of the contract or that existing at the time when the controversy arose. That was important in order to ensure that the measures adopted provisionally were not to be regarded as prejudgment of the situation.

The CHAIRMAN thought that the purpose of the provisional measures must be as far as possible to preserve the status quo at the time when the provisional measures were asked for.

Mr. LOWENFELD (United States of America) said that the purpose of provisional measures must be to ensure that a party did not take action that would frustrate a possible award. If the question related to the ownership of land, for example, the land should not be parceled out in such a way that it could never be recovered if awarded to the other party. He suggested therefore that the words "necessary for the protection of the rights of the parties" in Section 10 be substituted by the words "necessary to prevent the frustration of such award as the Tribunal might render" or words to that effect.

Mr. WALKER (Chile) said that in Chilean law and in that of other Latin American countries, such measures were called "precautionary" measures and their purpose was to safeguard the rights which the parties invoked, with good reason and on the basis of sound assumptions. The draft Convention should state in general terms what those provisional
measures should be, and under what circumstances they could be granted.

Mr. SALAZAR (Ecuador) suggested that it would be advisable, with regard to the provisional measures, to consider the adoption of some provision similar to the one appearing in Section 15 with regard to the enforcement of awards. It would be appropriate for the Contracting States to be bound by a similar obligation to enforce the provisional measures.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that the expert from Ecuador had pointed out a lacuna that should be filled, and that there should be no difference between provisional measures and arbitral awards in that respect. He also accepted the suggestion made by the expert of Chile.

The meeting was suspended at 5:10 p.m. and resumed at 5:35 p.m.

Mr. RATTRAY (Jamaica) suggested that in addition to the provision on provisional measures a new provision should be included in the Convention imposing an obligation on the parties, once the Center was seized of the dispute, to refrain from taking any steps that would aggravate or extend the dispute.

Mr. PALOMO (Guatemala) questioned the advisability of empowering a tribunal to prescribe provisional measures as a means of safeguarding the rights of the parties. Arbitration was ultimately dependent on the goodwill of the contending parties, while provisional measures were of a binding nature. It would be difficult to require that the national courts, which had been deprived of jurisdiction to resolve the dispute should enforce the provisional measures prescribed by an arbitral tribunal.

Mr. WALKER (Chile) pointed out that an arbitral tribunal lacked the power to enforce any decision, whether it were an award or a provisional measure. However, that should not prevent it from prescribing such measures. Explaining this more fully, he proposed that the wording of Section 10 should be changed to read as follows: "Unless the parties shall otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall be empowered to prescribe, at the request of either party, such provisional measures as it may deem appropriate, according to the merits of the case for the purpose of protecting the rights invoked by both parties. For that purpose the plaintiff shall furnish sufficient evidence for the Tribunal to have a strong presumption that his claim is made in good faith and that his rights may be impaired if the request for provisional measures is denied." He observed that he had used the term "good faith" as that criterion was used in Article VI of the Convention in connection with the assessment of costs against a party.

Interpretation, Revision and Annulment of the Award (Sections 11 - 13)

The CHAIRMAN suggested that the meeting consider Sections 11, 12 and 13 dealing with interpretation, revision and annulment of awards. He remarked that there was no provision for appeal to an authority outside the Center.

Mr. VEGA-GOMEZ (El Salvador) requested that in Section 11 the words
"after the date of award" should be replaced by the words: "from the date of notification of the award to the parties."

Mr. UCROS (Panama) referred to the problem of the enforcement of awards. At what moment precisely would the award become operative and its carrying out obligatory? There was an unsatisfactory translation at the end of paragraph 1 of Section 11, where the words (in the Spanish version) "pendientes de resolucion" after the word "laudo" appeared to give the impression that the said award was not complete and final.

Referring to paragraph 3 of Section 12, he considered that revision was the responsibility of the same Tribunal that rendered the award. If, as was contemplated in that Section, a new Tribunal had to be constituted to hear the proceedings for revision then perhaps one ought to speak of an appeal, rather than of revision in the strict sense of the word.

The CHAIRMAN agreed with the representative of Panama that Sections 11, 12 and 13 might have to be studied with a view to removing certain ambiguities particularly in relation to when an award had to be executed and how a stay of execution would operate. These matters might be discussed when considering Sections 14 and 15. He thought that it might be left to the Tribunal to decide whether an award should take immediate effect, as it could do if it were a question of money, or if it should be executed within a given period, as it would have to be if it consisted in the undoing of certain acts. In that case a stay of execution would be possible. As to the possibility he thought this was unlikely to happen. However, the award had not yet been complied with, there would be a need to defer compliance until the interpretation had been determined. As for revision, on the other hand, new facts might well come to light after the award had been complied with. With respect to the comments of the representative of Panama, he observed that the view that a revision properly so called could only be carried out by the Tribunal which rendered the award would create no difficulties where there were standing Tribunals. However, despite its obvious desirability, such a procedure might not be possible to apply in relation to an ad hoc tribunal, some of whose members might not even be alive at the time when revision was requested. Section 12(3) provided an alternative procedure since it would be unfair to the parties to limit the right to revision to those cases in which the original Tribunal could be reconvened.

Mr. ARROYO (Panama) pointed out that Section 11 did not set any limit to the number of times that an interpretation of the award could be requested, and this seemed to allow a party to stay enforcement indefinitely by using this procedure on a separate occasion with respect to different parts of the award. He therefore suggested the inclusion of the words "once only" after the words "be submitted".

Mr. RATTRAY (Jamaica) said that an award in an investment dispute might impose a continuing obligation over a long period, so that questions as to the meaning of the award could arise even after a considerable delay. In that connection he referred to Article 60 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in which no time limit was fixed for requests for interpretation of judgments and said that allowance should be made for the possibility of a long delay before interpretation was requested. He wondered if the time limits relating to annulment on grounds of corruption were sufficiently flexible, and suggested that they should be related to the time when the corruption was discovered. There should,
however, be a maximum time limit, such as ten years. In that connection
he referred to Article 36 of Model Rules adopted by the International Law
Commission.

The CHAIRMAN thought that for a stay of enforcement in connection
to proceedings for interpretation of an award, a short period of time
was more appropriate. It might of course be possible that in some requests
for interpretation stay of execution of the award would be appropriate.
It might for instance be advisable to consider allowing a time limit of
three months for requests for interpretation involving a stay of execution,
leaving open the question of requests subsequent to the execution. He
observed that claims based on a question of interpretation brought after
long delay could be treated either as a request for interpretation of the
original award, or as a new case, as convenient to the parties.

Mr. GAMBOA (Chile), referring to sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 1
of Section 13, on annulment asked how corruption could be proved if the
Tribunal consisted of only one member. This member could hardly be ex-
pected to give a decision regarding corruption of which he himself stood
accused.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that in the case of annulment, unlike that
of revision, the proceedings would not be before the same Tribunal, but
before an ad hoc Committee, and it was expressly provided that none of the
members of the Committee could be persons involved in the original decision.

Mr. RAMIREZ (Honduras) expressed the opinion that annulment was not
the proper remedy in cases of corruption and that the remedy would possibly
be to proceed against those who were guilty of corruption. Referring to
sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 1 of Section 13, he suggested that it should
be expanded by inclusion of "violation or unwarranted interpretation of
principles of substantive law" as an additional ground for annulment.

The CHAIRMAN said that if sub-paragraph (c) were expanded to cover
serious errors in the application of substantive law, it would be tantamount
to providing for an appeal, a step which had not thus far been contemplated.
However, one expert at the African meeting had suggested adding a reference
to serious departures from the principles of natural justice, in the sense
of some unconscionable act.

Mr. WALKER (Chile) expressed great interest in the suggestion of
the Jamaican delegate, namely that a time limit should be established for
challenging the validity of the award on the grounds described in sub-
paragraph (b) of paragraph 1 of Section 13. With regard to Section 11,
he thought that if one of the parties were to request interpretation,
two situations might result; firstly, if the award contained an obligation
to be fulfilled immediately, and the request was made after three months
there would be no point in allowing it; on the other hand, when the award
imposed a continuous obligation on the party, then requests for inter-
pretation should be allowed, e.g., for the purpose of clarifying some
provision of the award but without stay of execution.

Mr. ARROYO (Panama) observed that Section 14 of the Convention
said that the award was binding but did not say from what moment. He
could not agree that an award should be enforceable immediately and
even during the periods allowed for the making of requests for inter-
pretation, revision or annulment.
He also thought that there was insufficient reason to provide, as the draft had done, that the effect of a request for interpretation would be different from that of requests for annulment or revision. In paragraph 1 of Section 11 it was laid down as mandatory that a request for interpretation should automatically stay the execution of the award. On the other hand, the request was one for revision or annulment (both of which could fundamentally affect the award), it was merely left to the discretion of the Tribunal to decide whether there should be a stay of execution. He asked the reason for this distinction.

The CHAIRMAN said he would like to reconsider the question of introducing in Section 14 a short time limit for compliance with an award, corresponding to the period allowed for appeal in private law systems of procedure.

As to why the draft did not provide for automatic stay of execution in case of requests for revision and annulment, he pointed out that such a requirement might have no meaning in relation to requests for revision which might be brought during a ten-year period and perhaps even after the award had been carried out. This was less true of requests for annulment under Section 13 as it stood. However, if that Section were redrafted, as had been suggested, along the lines of Article 36 of the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure so as to provide for a ten-year period, automatic stay would be inappropriate.

Mr. ESPINOSA (Venezuela) said that, like the Chilean delegate, he too was interested in the question of the extension of the time limit within which a request for interpretation could be made. In his opinion Section 11(1) was broad enough to cover questions arising in connection with the carrying out of an award over a period of time, and any time limit should run from the time when such questions arose. For the purpose of clarification, he suggested that, in paragraph 1 of Section 11, after the words "to the Tribunal which rendered the award" the following words should be added: "while the award to the extent that such award shall not already have been carried out shall be stayed."

The meeting rose at 6:30 p.m.

SIXTH SESSION
(Thursday, February 6, 1964 - 10:45 a.m.)

ARTICLE IV - Arbitration (continued)

Interpretation, Revision and Annulment of the Award (Sections 11 - 13) (continued)

Mr. GONZALEZ (Costa Rica) pointed out that the periods of time referred to in Sections 11, 12 and 13, while representing provisional suggestions only, were too long. In Costa Rica it was a constitutional principle that justice should be executed promptly, and although the time limits in international proceedings were longer than those in national proceedings, he urged that the time limits specified in the Sections referred to be reduced.
He also proposed that in each case time should run from the moment when the award was communicated to the parties.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that any period of time decided upon should start from the moment of notification of the award to the parties. With respect to the question of immediate compliance with the award, he inquired whether the delegates felt that some period of grace should be allowed for, as was done in domestic legislation? While agreeing with the delegate of Costa Rica that there should be as little delay as possible in the interests of justice, it might be necessary to authorize a longer period, in the Convention, since in the case of international disputes, the two parties were liable to be geographically far apart and that would inevitably lead to more delay than might be encountered in the case of purely local disputes.

The ambiguity arising out of the use of the word "immediately" in Section 14, which had been pointed out by one of the experts at a previous session, had not yet been cleared up. The Tribunal might indicate a time limit in each case, or the Convention might specify a general time limit which would apply unless otherwise stated by the Tribunal.

Mr. FUNES (El Salvador) asked for clarification of the provisions of Section 11(1), and Section 13(1). He thought that the first of those provisions empowered the Arbitral Tribunal to determine the sense and scope of the award, while the second established, as a ground for invalidating an award, the Tribunal having exceeded its powers. Neither provision seemed to take account of cases where the Tribunal had failed to exercise its jurisdiction to the full, as where it omitted to decide some of the issues or had rendered an incomplete or contradictory award. This was not a case for annulling an award but for referring it back to the original Tribunal for rulings on issues not previously dealt with.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that he did not consider that the case mentioned by the representative of El Salvador would properly come under Section 11. It seemed to him that it would be covered by Section 13, in sub-paragraphs (a) or (c). The difference between Section 11, which was a sui generis provision on interpretation of the award on the one hand, and, Sections 12 and 13 on the other, was that these two sections provided a limited form of appeal, in the broad sense of the term.

Mr. FUNES (El Salvador) pointed out that Section 13(2) referred to a tribunal established ad hoc, and made no provision for the case of an omission to decide on the part of the Tribunal that had rendered the award.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that the point raised by the representative of El Salvador might not be properly provided for in the present text. He had no immediate solution and would like to consider the matter further.

Enforcement of the Award (Sections 14 - 15)

Mr. UCROS (Panama) suggested that in Section 14 a distinction should be made between the time limit set for the issue of the writ of execution and the time limit set for the implementation of the award.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that it would be useful to make a distinction
between the two periods. The first would be short and the second would depend on the nature of the award, and of the acts to be performed thereunder.

Mr. RATTRAY (Jamaica) referred to Section 15 dealing with the enforcement of the award. His first impression on reading the draft Convention was that the intention had been to derogate from the doctrine of State immunity. While that impression had later been dispelled, there were, in fact, good grounds for claiming that such immunity was excluded, because under the Section the Contracting States assumed the obligation to recognize the award of the Tribunal as binding and to enforce it as if it were a final judgment. He thought the Convention should make it clear that the doctrine in question was not affected.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that it was essential to make that completely clear and suggested that something on the following lines might be inserted "Nothing in this provision shall have the effect of derogating from the respective local laws on the subject of State immunity." He observed that a precedent for the provision proposed in Section 15 existed in the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. The relevant provision of that Treaty had been reproduced in Doc. COM/WH/8 and reads as follows:

**Article 192**

"Decisions of the Council or of the Commission which contain a pecuniary obligation on persons other than States shall be enforceable.

Forced execution shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure in force in the State in whose territory it takes place. The writ of execution shall be served, without other formality than the verification of the authenticity of the written act, by the domestic authority which the Government of each Member State shall designate for this purpose and of which it shall give notice to the Commission and to the Court of Justice.

After completion of these formalities at the request of the party concerned, the latter may, in accordance with municipal law, proceed with such forced execution by applying directly to the authority which is competent.

Forced execution may only be suspended pursuant to a decision of the Court of Justice. Supervision as to the regularity of the measures of execution shall, however, be within the competence of the domestic courts or tribunals."

Mr. LOWENFELD (United States of America) said that Section 15 in its present form seemed to cover two distinct subjects which, in the opinion of his delegation, should be dealt with separately. The first concerned enforcement of an award in the State party to the dispute or the State of which the other party was a national, while the second related to the enforcement of the award in a third State. He agreed that in the second case there should be no derogation from the rules of sovereign immunity. But in the first case, it was important that the concept of sovereign immunity should not be maintained.
The CHAIRMAN said that he saw no particular reason for differentiating between the two cases, and, in fact, had deliberately placed them on the same level. As he had indicated in his opening statement, the principal purpose of Section 15 (although this was not its only effect) was to give States which had been successful plaintiffs a means to enforce awards against investors who did not have assets within the host State's territories. States would be directly bound by the Convention to comply with awards rendered against them, which could not be void of investors. In the unlikely event that a losing State failed to comply with an award it would be in clear violation of the Convention itself, and the State whose national had failed to obtain satisfaction, could take up his case.

Mr. LOWENFELD (United States of America) felt that the Chairman was over-simplifying the issue by treating an award as a judgment between a winner and loser. More often than not an award would require some action on the part of both parties and would be relied upon not only for purposes of collection or enforcement, but also for the defense of res judicata. Recognition of awards was not, in his opinion sufficiently covered in Section 15, and the text should contain principles designed to ensure that an award - whether invoked for the purpose of enforcement or as a defense - should not be re-examined on such basic grounds as, for instance, consent of the parties or jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

He also raised an additional point which concerned federal states in particular; in a federal system, recognition of an award might not be granted automatically by a constituent State even though the federal authority, by signing the Convention, had in effect consented to the enforcement of the award.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that awards were not necessarily a mere matter of collecting a sum of money from the loser and that recognition and enforcement were two different aspects. He would give further thought to the res judicata aspect although he was inclined to doubt that the issue of sovereign immunity would arise in that connection. He invited the attention of the experts to Article 192 of the Treaty of Rome which had excluded enforcement against States. He thought that this exclusion had been based on the same reasoning that had led the staff of the Bank, in drafting the present Convention, to think that forceable execution against States should not be provided for. The draft Convention was based on the recognition by States that once they had agreed to comply with an award, they would hold that agreement valid. He also referred to the technique used in Article 192 of the Treaty of Rome for enforcing awards against non-State parties and suggested that a similar technique might be used in the draft Convention.

With respect to the last problem raised by the United States representative, he assumed that a country could, if necessary, modify its legislation to allow for compliance with Section 15. The problem, however, deserved further study.

Mr. OLSON (Canada) wondered whether a point of substance would be involved if the word "enforce" in Section 15 were changed to "enforceable".

The CHAIRMAN agreed that the suggested change would be closer to the intent of that provision.
Mr. OLSON (Canada) agreed with the Chairman that consent was the keystone of the Convention. It was, however, absent in two important areas of Section 15, viz., in cases of enforcement in the State of the private party and of enforcement in a third State and he wondered whether one could devise a way of introducing the element of consent in these areas as well, for instance by requesting recognition by those States of enforceability at the time the investment was actually made or at the time the dispute arose or was being heard.

The CHAIRMAN said that he was not quite clear where the question of consent was involved. The provisions in question were similar to those contained in a number of existing treaties on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and foreign awards and differed from them only inasmuch as they did not grant rights of review to local courts.

Mr. OLSON (Canada) replied that the issue of consent was involved in the sense that States might be obliged to change their domestic legislation to make allowance for the provisions of Section 15 in a way that would be in conflict with other principles on which such legislation was founded. He wondered if the lack of success in obtaining ratifications of the treaties referred to by the Chairman might not have been due to the provisions under discussion, and suggested that they should be lightened.

The CHAIRMAN thought that the relatively slow progress in securing widespread acceptance of, for instance, the 1958 New York Convention was principally due to the conservatism of most lawyers and the lethargic attitude of governments on purely procedural questions. He explained that the provisions in question were bound up with a number of other innovations made in the draft Convention, and hoped that States which thought the objectives of the Convention important would find it possible to accept the procedural aspects as well as the substantive innovations.

Mr. PALOMO (Guatemala) suggested that, in Section 15, the word "enforce" should be replaced by the words "shall be enforceable" or a similar expression, since that Section in its present form would be in conflict not only with local legislation but also with international Conventions on this matter, like the Bustamante code, under which a State did not have to enforce an award if it conflicted with its public policy. This was particularly important as an award might have to be enforced in a State which was not a party to the dispute, or possibly not even a signatory to the Convention.

Mr. LOWENFELD (United States of America) suggested that the Convention provide that when a State manifested its consent to the jurisdiction of the Center, in any of the ways indicated in Article II, Section 2, it might be presumed to have thereby waived its sovereign immunity in respect of the enforcement of an award.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that the suggestion might solve the problem, but would run counter to the basic presumption of the Convention, that States would live up to the obligations which they assumed thereunder.

Mr. PALOMO (Guatemala) pointed out that in Latin America the internal juridical principles of a country prevailed. If the provisions of the Convention were in conflict with those already incorporated in the legislation of the country concerned, such as the Bustamante code, there
might be a contradiction between the internal procedural law of the country, and the terms of the award.

The meeting rose at 11:35 a.m. and resumed at 11:55 a.m.

Mr. ESPINOSA (Venezuela) supported the suggestion put forward by the experts of Canada and Guatemala. If the text were amended as suggested, the scope of the provision under study could better be explained to the legislative bodies and governments of the various countries. The question raised by those representatives should be carefully studied with a view to reaching a satisfactory solution.

Mr. GONZALEZ (Costa Rica) referring to Sections 14 and 15 on enforcement of the award rendered by a tribunal, proposed that in order to resolve the serious problem involved, the text might be amended to read: (1) "A Contracting State is in fact and in law compelled to enforce the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal"; and (2) "The Arbitral Tribunal, in rendering the award, should take into account the provisions in force wherever the award is to be enforced." This would avoid conflicts with local laws.

Mr. RATTRAY (Jamaica) said that the meeting ought to give careful consideration to the purpose of Section 15. Under Articles XI, when a State signed the present Convention it would declare that it had taken all steps necessary to enable it to carry out all its obligations under the Convention. This would allow awards to be reciprocally enforced. He found the provisions of Section 15 to be very useful because awards would be recognized as final and binding in every Contracting State - subject to the perhaps overriding principle of State immunity. It might be worth considering as an exception to that provision some notion of international public policy.

Mr. SUMMERS (Canada) pointed out the practical difficulties involved in the enforcement of non-pecuniary awards. For instance, he wondered how an award requiring some action such as training of personnel could be effectively enforced by local courts in the absence of local legislation requiring that action. It should also be borne in mind that the parties, being free to choose arbitrators from outside the Panel, might, with the best of intentions, choose arbitrators who were not of the highest competence and who might render an award which was difficult to enforce because of its vagueness.

He hoped that the phraseology of the draft Convention would be tightened up with respect to the whole question of enforcement of awards.

The CHAIRMAN summarizing the discussion on recognition and enforcement of awards said that several issues had emerged: the first was the question whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity should, as he thought, be preserved; the second the possible distinction to be made between enforceability in the States concerned in the dispute on the one hand, and enforcement in a third State on the other; the third issue was whether enforceability should be general or limited to pecuniary obligations for which methods of enforcement existed in every country; and fourthly, whether the rule of enforceability should be subject to some exceptions based on public policy, at least in third States. Finally, it had also
been suggested that it might be useful to distinguish between recognition of awards as binding and their execution. Although no very clear conclusions had been reached on these issues, the discussion had been extremely helpful. He observed that Section 15 was intended to protect the interests of the host States which while they were themselves internationally bound to comply with the award, might want an effective assurance that the private party would be compelled to do the same.

Mr. PALOMO (Guatemala) drew attention to the close connection between the provisions of Sections 14 and 15 of Article IV and those of Section 10 of that Article on provisional measures.

With regard to pecuniary obligations, he wondered whether parties having recourse to the Arbitral Tribunal, might be required to post a bond or otherwise guarantee compliance with their respective obligations. That would assure compliance with an award which might not be otherwise enforceable because its provisions were in conflict with domestic public policy. Even though, as the expert from Jamaica had pointed out, the legislation of each Signatory State would have to be adapted so as to permit enforcement, this might be a long drawn process.

Mr. ARROYO (Panama) referring to the comment made by the representative of Guatemala, considered that bonds or similar guarantees could be furnished only when the two parties were willing to do so, and he failed to see how the defendant could be compelled to furnish such guarantees.

Mr. PALOMO (Guatemala) agreed with the representative of Panama that guarantees could not be furnished without the prior consent of the party, but he thought that they could be required at the time of consent to arbitration.

Mr. ARROYO (Panama) explained that in his own country the investor was required to provide bonds to secure fulfillment of his contract. The investor, however, had no guarantee in the event of the State's failure to comply with its obligation.

**Relationship of Arbitration to Other Remedies (Sections 16 - 17)**

The CHAIRMAN explained that Section 16 merely contained a rule of interpretation whereby a party in undertaking to go to the Center would be deemed to have chosen those proceedings as the sole method of resolving the dispute. That provision did not seek to establish any substantive rule on the exhaustion of local remedies, and indeed left the parties entirely free to stipulate that local remedies must be exhausted before recourse to the Center or that there could be a choice between local remedies and recourse to the Center. However, where a compromis or compromissory clause contained an unqualified undertaking to have recourse to the Center, it should be reasonable to presume that arbitration was to be the sole remedy.

Mr. ARROYO (Panama) supported by Mr. MENÉDEZ (Nicaragua) considered that it was impossible to fully understand the meaning of Section 16 without reading the relevant comment. The Articles of the Convention ought to be drafted clearly and categorically and he suggested that both the English and Spanish texts of that Section be revised.
Mr. GALVEZ (Chile) considered that the scope of Section 16 was far broader than might appear at first sight, since it brought to light a possible conflict between national legislation and the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal. A foreign investor, having exhausted all his remedies under the national legislation would be able to resort to arbitration and thus be placed in a privileged position vis-à-vis nationals of the host State. Hence, it should be specified what issues could be submitted to arbitration.

The CHAIRMAN said there had certainly been no intention of creating a problem in that respect. Rather, the aim was to help States, such as Colombia, which were unable to accept the principle of arbitration unless local remedies had first been exhausted. He observed that the parties could follow any one of three possible courses: first, the States in agreeing to arbitration might require the prior exhaustion of all local remedies; second, parties might agree to go either to arbitration or to the local courts; and third, if there were no such stipulation, it would be assumed that it was the intention of the parties that arbitration be the exclusive remedy. As the representative of Panama had suggested, the wording of this Section could be made clearer.

Mr. MENDESES (Nicaragua) proposed that the wording of Section 16 should be changed to read along the following lines: "Consent to have recourse to arbitration will be presumed to be consent to the exclusion of any other remedy, unless otherwise specified."

Mr. ARROYO (Panama) requested that it should be made clear in Section 16 whether reference was made to arbitration in conformity with the law or ex aequo et bono.

The CHAIRMAN referring to Section 17, pointed out that an innovation had been made in the sense that the Section curtailed the right of the Contracting States to espouse a claim of their nationals when these nationals had agreed to resort to the Center. He was aware that there was no general agreement at any rate in the Western Hemisphere on the existence of the right of espousal.

Mr. UCROS (Panama) pointed out that Section 17(1) which sought to limit a State's right of diplomatic protection, seemed by implication to prohibit a State from being subrogated to the rights of its nationals and that this would be inconsistent with Section 1 of Article II which contemplated the State as subrogee.

The CHAIRMAN explained that it was not the intention of Section 17(1) to prohibit a claim on the grounds of contractual subrogation by a State, e.g., where as guarantor it had satisfied the claims of an investor. What was excluded was the traditional legal right of a State to espouse the cause of one of its nationals through the usual international channels, thus protecting the host State from exposure to the risk of multiple claims.

Mr. ESPINOSA (Venezuela) considered that the provisions of Section 17 was superfluous since it was self-evident, that no Contracting State whose national had had recourse to arbitration could resort to other means of resolving the dispute, such as diplomatic protection, unless that national had grounds for complaining of the other State's failure
to abide by the agreement in connection with the arbitration proceedings. He also pointed out that as Venezuela had had unpleasant experiences with regard to diplomatic and foreign claims, public opinion there might react unfavorably to the concepts contained in Section 17. He therefore proposed that it be deleted.

The CHAIRMAN said that if there was universal acceptance of the Venezuelan representative's point of view, there would be no need for the provision. However, since the Convention would be signed by countries in different parts of the world where different views on the right of espousal prevailed, he thought that it would be dangerous to delete the Section. It was too early, however, to take a decision on the matter.

Mr. FUNES (El Salvador) asked if the obligations referred to in Section 17(1) were only those resulting from the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal, or all the obligations of a Contracting State under the Convention, such as the obligation to appear before the Tribunal, to defend one's case, etc. Since the Convention provided remedies for breaches of most of the procedural obligations, he thought that it should refer only to those resulting from the awards.

The CHAIRMAN said that the questions arising out of non-compliance with the award were probably the only ones for which the provisions in this Section were necessary. If that were the case it would be made clear in redrafting the text.

Mr. SUMMERS (Canada) supported the view put forward by the delegate of Venezuela that Section 17 was unnecessary. A State would seem to be debarred from making diplomatic representations or presenting in international claim either on its own behalf or on behalf of one of its nationals in a matter in which the State had accepted the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal, and if it did attempt to do so those representations could be answered without difficulty.

Mr. MENESES (Nicaragua), referring to Section 17(1), pointed out that in his country no foreigner could have recourse to diplomatic channels of complaint, except in the case of denial of justice. The Section seemed to allow, at least implicitly, the possibility of such complaints by States that were not parties to the Convention, thereby contravening the law of his country prohibiting foreigners from resorting to diplomatic channels of complaint. That prohibition was included in the laws of several Latin American countries.

The CHAIRMAN said that he would consider the point raised by the representative of Nicaragua as to a possible argumentum a contrario to be derived from the provision.

Mr. UCROS (Panama) considered that paragraph (2) of Section 17 was liable to give rise to a concurrent jurisdiction. It was necessary by some means to prevent the possibility that a private person who was party to a dispute might have recourse to arbitration, while his State would have recourse to diplomatic channels.

The CHAIRMAN said that the case intended to be covered by Section 17(2) was one in which there existed at the same time an agreement between a host State and an investor to submit to arbitration under the Convention,
as well as a bilateral investment protection agreement (like those concluded recently by Germany and Switzerland with certain developing countries) between the host State and the investor's State which provided inter alia a forum for the settlement of disputes arising under that bilateral agreement. In such a case, a dispute might be referred either to the Center, or to the forum set up under the bilateral agreement. Section 17(2) provided that if the investor were to bring his case before the Center, this would not prevent his State from instituting proceedings on the same facts under the inter-governmental agreement. The decision in the latter proceedings was, however, expressly stated to be without effect on an award made in the case before the Center. It had been suggested in Addis Ababa that that intention might be made clearer if the words "of a declaratory nature" were added after the words "international claim" in Section 17(2).

On the other hand, the investor's State might institute proceedings under the bilateral agreement before the investor himself brought his claim before the Center. Those proceedings could not, of course, be brought on behalf of the particular investor, as such action would be precluded under Section 17(1). It was likely, however, that the Tribunal constituted under the Convention would regard itself as bound by the decision under the bilateral agreement, to the extent that the interpretation of that agreement had a bearing on the case before it.

Mr. CANAL (Colombia) said that he had refrained from intervening in the discussion on Section 16, since he had understood that that Section contained only a rule of interpretation, and that it was to be redrafted to make it clear that States could make their consent to arbitration conditional upon the exhaustion of national judicial procedures. He wanted to point out, however, that if Colombia were to ratify the Convention, it would not want to attribute to the Center the character of a court of appeal after exhaustion of local remedies, except in cases of denial of justice. With regard to Section 17, he had thought that its purpose had been to limit recourse to the Center only to cases of denial of justice. After the discussion and particularly the Chairman's explanation he realized that this was not the case and he did not consider that his country could accept the Section in its present form.

Mr. ORDEÑANO (Ecuador) suggested that, in order to try to reconcile the conflicting views expressed by the experts, the text of the Convention should be amended so as to make it clear that the concepts contained in Section 17(1) did not constitute a limitation of the sovereign right of each State to include in its Constitution provisions prohibiting foreigners from having recourse to their States for the purpose of making claims through diplomatic channels. The Section so amended would be very useful.

The meeting rose at 1:10 p.m.

SEVENTH SESSION
(Thursday, February 6, 1964 - 3:50 p.m.)

ARTICLE V - Replacement and Disqualification of Arbitrators and Conciliators
The CHAIRMAN, introducing Article V, said that at the African meeting some delegates had had doubts about the distinction between challenges of conciliators or arbitrators appointed by the parties, and of those appointed by the Chairman; although there were good reasons for making that distinction, some experts had suggested that it introduced an element of discrimination which might not be well regarded by prospective Contracting States. If that were the general view, sub-paragraph 2(1)(b) could be deleted, together with the reference in sub-paragraph 2(1)(a) to Article III, Section 3 and Article IV, Section 2.

Mr. RATTRAY (Jamaica) said he was not sure the drafting of the English version of Section 1 was sufficiently flexible to allow a party who had initially failed to appoint an arbitrator or conciliator to do so later when a vacancy occurred. He suggested that the formula used in the Model Rules of the International Law Commission was to be preferred, since it spoke of following the method "prescribed" for the original appointment rather than the method which was actually used.

Mr. ORDEÑANA (Ecuador) said that paragraph 1(b) of Section 2 was ambiguous, since it could be taken to mean that the fraud alluded to had been committed by the Chairman, whereas the meaning must be that the fraud was committed by one of the interested parties, or by the arbitrator himself. He asked that the wording be changed accordingly.

Mr. PANGRAZIO (Paraguay) suggested that provision should be made for the designation, by election or by casting of lots, or by agreement of the parties, of an alternate conciliator or arbitrator in the event that an conciliator or arbitrator was disqualified, became incapacitated or resigned.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that although it would be useful to have alternates, three would have to be appointed on the assumption of a tribunal consisting of three members, and it might be difficult in practice to find persons willing to serve on that basis. The parties were free to appoint alternates if they wished, but rather than inserting a provision to that effect in the draft Convention, it might be preferable to refer to the possibility in the report that would be forwarded to States with the draft Convention.

ARTICLE VI - Apportionment of Costs of Proceedings

The CHAIRMAN said that the two main guiding principles in drafting Article VI on the apportionment of costs of proceedings had been, first, that since the proceedings were to be of a friendly nature, it had seemed appropriate that each party should bear its own expenses and an equal share of the costs of the proceedings; and second, that it would be inconsistent with the friendly nature of the proceedings to bring claims that were frivolous or motivated by bad faith. Consequently the Tribunal had been empowered in the latter case to award costs against a party that brought such claims, such costs to include both the expenses of the other party and the costs of the proceedings.

Mr. ESPINOSA (Venezuela) considered that Section 1 of Article VI could be improved. Instead of the Tribunal having the power to evaluate culpability and award costs, there should be an automatic system whereby
costs would be awarded against a party only in the event that the decision was wholly in favor of the other party. If the findings were that the position taken by a party was not wholly without justification, that fact would be sufficient proof that that party had valid reasons for resorting to arbitration or conciliation.

The CHAIRMAN replied that the system proposed in the draft Convention was that as a rule each party would bear his own expenses and one-half of the costs of the proceedings regardless whether he won or lost the case. The only exception was based not on the substantive merits of the claims as adjudicated by the Tribunal, but on the motives of the party initiating proceedings.

Mr. VEGA-GOMEZ (El Salvador) supported to some extent the views of the representative of Venezuela. It was a common principle of Latin American legislation that the party that brought an action and lost it was liable for all the costs of the proceedings including the expenses of the defendant and that, if his claim was a frivolous one, he must also pay damages to the other party. If the decision was not entirely in the defendant's favor, each party had to bear its own costs. In that way equity was observed and frivolous claims were discouraged. That seemed a fair principle, which should be maintained in an arbitration tribunal's decision.

He thought the words "from time to time" in Section 2 of Article VI were unfortunate. There should be pre-established charges for the use of the facilities of the Center, because otherwise it would not be known whether it was worthwhile instituting proceedings in respect of minor claims.

The CHAIRMAN said that the purpose of Section 2 was to enable the Administrative Council to review the level of charges in the light of experience, but at any given moment the tariff would be known. He also asked the expert from El Salvador whether the apportionment of costs should be based on the results of the case rather than on the question of good or bad faith.

Mr. VEGA-GOMEZ (El Salvador) confirmed that, in his opinion, a claimant in bad faith ought to indemnify the other party for damage suffered in addition to reimbursing him for the normal expenses of the case. Where there was no bad faith, i.e., when a claim is founded on mistake, the losing party should bear only the cost of the suit itself.

Mr. LOWENFELD (United States of America) pointed out that the present wording of Section 1 left it open to the parties to agree not to pay the charges for the use of the Center; that seemed to be a drafting error that needed correcting. The costs assessment referred to in the last part of Section 1 was based on the British system, in that it included attorney's fees. A different system had been adopted in the United States, in the belief that all should be free to seek justice without fear of having to bear heavy costs if they lost their case; consequently any costs apportioned included only the expenses of such items as clerical work, translations, etc. He believed the Article as drafted was sound. Parties seeking to resolve a dispute should not be penalized by the risk of having to bear the major expenses of the other party if they did not succeed in their claim, unless it could be shown that the claim was frivolous.
The CHAIRMAN said that apparently there was support for the view that costs should be split; he understood the view of the delegate of Venezuela to be that such an arrangement would be in order except where the award was wholly against one party, in which case the costs assessed would include those referred to in both sub-paragraph (a) and sub-paragraph (b).

Mr. ESPINOSA (Venezuela), while agreeing with the representative of El Salvador, added that even if a party completely lost his case, he might still be exempt from payment of costs if the Tribunal feels that there were reasonable grounds for resorting to the proceedings.

Mr. GALVEZ (Chile) said that such a system was applied by Chilean law. It was the courts' responsibility to evaluate the grounds for the action, which made possible a more flexible system.

Mr. GONZALEZ (Costa Rica) said that his country followed a similar procedure and suggested that the Arbitral Tribunal should have the power of awarding costs against one party or the other in the light of the circumstances of each case.

The CHAIRMAN noted that although sharing of costs was usual in cases of international arbitration, it was apparently not so in national cases.

Mr. PINTO (Guatemala) considered that submission to arbitration based on consent presupposed the good faith of both parties. He thought that to give an arbitration tribunal the power to penalize by awarding costs implied that one of the parties might have instituted proceedings frivolously or in bad faith and he wondered whether such a rule would be consistent with the consensual nature of arbitration. He therefore suggested that the reference to frivolous proceedings or bad faith in the last part of Section 1 be eliminated.

Mr. ORDENANA (Ecuador), referring to the same part of Section 1, said that the words "a party has instituted proceedings" should be replaced by the words "a party has resorted to arbitration", to avoid the implication that costs would be awarded only against the plaintiff.

The CHAIRMAN said that several delegates had suggested that the system envisaged should not refer to a "plaintiff" or "defendant", and that the position of a party as plaintiff or defendant would be irrelevant if the Tribunal was given the power to award costs on the basis of good or bad faith. In any case the aim would be to find the system most likely to appeal to the majority of the countries that would wish to accede to the Convention.

**ARTICLE VII - Place of Proceedings**

The CHAIRMAN said that the aim of Article VII was to leave the maximum flexibility to the parties to decide on the place of the proceedings, while bearing in mind the administrative aspects and the convenience of persons willing to act as arbitrators or conciliators. Administrative considerations suggested a preference for proceedings either at the headquarters of the Center, namely, the International Bank, or at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, or at other institutions in various parts of the world with which the Center could make the
necessary arrangements to provide facilities. Hence the Secretary-General was left some discretion. It had been suggested that with respect to conciliation, the proceedings should be held at least in their initial phase in the country where the dispute arose, unless otherwise agreed.

There was no comment.

ARTICLE VIII - Interpretation

The CHAIRMAN observed that Article VIII which provided for submission of disputes and questions of interpretation of the Convention arising between Contracting States to the International Court of Justice was of the type usually found in international agreements of this character. Such disputes might arise in connection with the recognition and enforcement of awards, immunities of the Center, etc. It had been pointed out at the African meeting that no provision had been made regarding questions of interpretation of the Convention arising in the course of arbitral proceedings between a State and a national of another State. A tentative amendment to Article VIII was now submitted to the meeting (Doc. COM/WH/9) as follows:

1. ....

2. (1) If in the course of any arbitral proceeding pursuant to this Convention a question arises between the parties thereto concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention, and the arbitral tribunal is of the opinion that the question has merit and may affect the outcome of the proceedings, the tribunal shall suspend the proceedings for a period of three months.

(2) If within that period the tribunal shall have been notified that the International Court of Justice has been seized of the question by the States concerned the arbitral proceedings shall remain suspended as long as the question is pending before the International Court of Justice.

(3) If the tribunal shall not have been so notified, the arbitral proceedings shall be resumed at the expiration of the aforesaid period."

Mr. BELIN (United States of America) said that he could not see the function of the proposed addition to Article VIII in relation to Article II, Section 3(2) on preliminary questions and Article IV, Section 11 on interpretation of awards. So little was left uncovered by those two provisions that he thought Article VIII would be more likely to lead to unnecessary delay and confusion than to be helpful and would provide an occasion for the possible intervention of States which would presumably have to espouse their national's case in order to bring it before the International Court. He thought that the purpose of the Convention was to avoid as much as possible the intervention of States and he would prefer to see the amendment deleted.

The CHAIRMAN said that Article IV, Section 11, referred to the
Tribunal's power to interpret its own decisions, and did not cover questions of the interpretation of the Convention itself. It had been thought desirable to provide for some forum to rule on such matters. Although Section 3(2) of Article II empowered the Tribunal to decide certain questions of interpretation as preliminary questions, that was only in specific cases, and interpretations might be asked for not in relation to a specific case. Different Tribunals might take different views of the meaning of an Article in deciding cases, and an independent forum would be a means of ensuring some uniformity of decisions. It was, of course, the right and duty of an arbitration tribunal to interpret the Convention in relation to the case before it, but the additional procedure proposed might be useful.

Mr. BELIN (United States of America) thought the position might be clarified if it were provided that problems of interpretation of the Convention arising as preliminary questions in the course of a proceeding were to be dealt with in Article II and that Article VII would allow States to have recourse to the International Court for interpretations of a general nature.

The CHAIRMAN thought that while the proposed new provision might not be strictly necessary, it could be helpful.

Mr. GALVEZ (Chile) suggested that in paragraph 2(1) of Article VIII as amended, it should be clarified whether the words "the parties thereto" meant the parties to the arbitral proceedings or the States parties to the Convention.

The CHAIRMAN said that the present text of the amendment was imperfect in both English and Spanish, since the word "thereto", which appeared to refer to the Convention, was meant to refer to the arbitral proceedings. He pointed out that the State would be espousing the cause of its national not on the merits but only on the narrow question of interpretation of the Convention. If it were considered important that there be uniform interpretation of the Convention, and this was his own view, then the proposed new provision as well as the existing provision of Article VIII would be useful. If, however, as had been suggested by the expert from the United States, these procedures might lead to confusion and delay, both provisions might be omitted.

Mr. OLSON (Canada) asked if it would complicate matters if another signatory State also wished to intervene before the International Court.

The CHAIRMAN said that he did not think so and referred in that connection to the Statute of the International Court which provided that if a question involved a multilateral Convention, the signatories were notified so that they could intervene in the case if they so wished.

Mr. PALOMO (Guatemala) considered that it would be well to revise the whole of the additional clause because as it stood at present it appeared to refer to a dispute between States parties to the Convention. In disputes covered by the Convention a Contracting State did not institute proceedings against another Contracting State, but against a foreign national, who would have to be sponsored by his own State in order to bring the matter before the International Court.

The CHAIRMAN said that the existing provision in Article VIII of
the draft Convention dealt with questions arising entirely outside any arbitral proceedings, but the proposed amendment dealt with questions arising during such proceedings. He believed there was a case for including the proposed amendment, but there seemed to be a difference of opinion at the present meeting.

Mr. ORDENANA (Ecuador) raised the following problem: if an arbitration proceeding between State A and a national of State B was under way at the same time as an interpretation proceeding between States C and D before the International Court and the Arbitration Tribunal felt that the judgment of the Court on interpretation might affect the award, would the arbitration proceedings be suspended?

The CHAIRMAN said that, in the case mentioned by the expert from Ecuador, it would be logical to extend the application of the proposed new provision and require the suspension of the arbitration proceedings.

Mr. RATTRAY (Jamaica) remarked that Article VIII did not cover disputes between the Center and a State and some provision might be made for resolving these differences perhaps through the means of an advisory opinion of the International Court.

The CHAIRMAN said that presumably the Center would not wish to press a question of an interpretation of the Convention unless at least one State supported the position of the Center. That State could then perhaps be prevailed upon to espouse the Center’s claims before the International Court. He did not think that it would be possible to obtain for the Center the right to obtain advisory opinions having regard to the provision of the U.N. Charter which strictly limited this right to specialized agencies.

Mr. VEGA-GOMEZ (El Salvador) pointed out that disputes of the type envisaged by Article VIII could only arise during the course of arbitration proceedings, and consequently, Article VIII would be clarified by the insertion of the words “during the course of arbitration proceedings” after the words “between Contracting States”.

The meeting was suspended at 5:05 p.m. and resumed at 5:35 p.m.

Mr. ESPINOSA (Venezuela) said that he wished to digress briefly from the discussion on Article VIII. He pointed out that the draft Convention did not have general provisions dealing with the rules necessary for the implementation of the provisions of the Convention. He wondered what would be the nature and scope of those rules, and whose responsibility it would be to draft them. In Venezuela when the Convention would be presented to Congress, that body would want to know the precise scope of the legislation it was approving as well as the degree of delegation given to the Administrative Council. The rules could cover two different fields. In the first place, they could fulfill the primary objective of any rules, i.e., to interpret and develop the provisions of the Convention without altering its spirit, purpose or meaning. That was not a legislative but an administrative function, and as such it could without difficulty be granted to the Center. Secondly, the rules could also establish principles for the organization and internal functioning of the Center itself, and no legislative body would have reason to object to those. It would be advisable to establish clearly the regulatory powers of the Administrative Council and their limits.
The CHAIRMAN observed that Article I, Section 6, sub-paragraphs (i) and (v) did confer regulatory powers to the Administrative Council with respect to administrative matters and to conciliation and arbitration proceedings and specified that these rules could not be inconsistent with the Convention.

Mr. ESPINOSA (Venezuela) replied that the rules referred to by the Chairman were only some of the rules which might be required to interpret and develop the Convention and fill any gaps.

The CHAIRMAN remarked that he agreed with the ideas expressed by the representative of Venezuela and thought that, without paralyzing the administrative functions of the Council, it should be made clear that it could not legislate beyond the letter or spirit of the Convention. Incidentally, he wished to point out, by way of clarification only, that the Conciliation Rules referred to in Article III and the Arbitration Rules referred to in Article IV would apply unless the parties otherwise agreed, so that the rules could be derogated from by the parties.

Mr. WALKER (Chile) suggested that paragraph 2(1) of the proposed amendment to Article VIII would be clearer if the word "thereto" in the second line were replaced by the words "to the case". Likewise, in paragraph 2(2) the sense would be clearer if the words "the States concerned" were replaced by the words "the litigating State or by the State to which the other litigating party belongs". It did not appear to him advisable that, as provided in paragraph 2(2), the proceedings should be stayed during the entire time that the question was pending before the International Court of Justice. The text should be amended so as to empower the Tribunal either to suspend arbitration proceedings, or to continue them if it considered that the nature of the case did not justify suspension.

The CHAIRMAN said that if a question of interpretation arose, the Arbitral Tribunal could decide that the question was without merit or irrelevant to the dispute. If this did not entirely meet the point made, a provision could be made in Section 2(2) of Article VIII enabling the Tribunal to permit such action as the taking of evidence, etc. to proceed pending the decision of the International Court.

ARTICLE IX - Amendment

The CHAIRMAN said there was no universally accepted practice with respect to amendments, but where provision for amendment was made it was usual to require a high majority as was done in the draft Convention. The Convention under Article XI, Section 5 allowed States that objected strongly to the amendment to withdraw from the Convention before the amendment took effect. Amendments, moreover, would not have retroactive effect.

Mr. LOWENFELD (United States of America) said that the Article posed a problem for his country. International agreements had to be submitted, prior to ratification, to the United States Senate for advice and consent, but as the text stood, the Convention would be an open-end convention that could be amended without ratification by the United States, and still be binding. It did not seem desirable to impose the alternative of denouncing the Convention. He thought an amendment should enter into force only for those governments which accepted it, thus permitting States which opposed it to declare that they did not consider themselves bound by it, without being obliged to denounce the Convention.
Mr. ESPINOSA (Venezuela) agreed with the United States delegate that the meeting should consider the situation that would arise if a government did not accept an amendment approved by a majority of the members of the Council. In Venezuela the draft Convention would constitute a law, therefore amendments to that Convention should be subject to the same constitutional procedures as the original document.

The CHAIRMAN recalled that the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and many new institutions that had been created in recent years contained similar provisions for amendment by a majority vote.

Mr. ESPINOSA (Venezuela) pointed out that the proposed Convention contained several provisions which could be contrary to existing domestic legislation while the charters of international financial institutions referred to did not.

The CHAIRMAN said that the main issue was whether a State should be bound by an amendment against its will or be forced to choose between being so bound and denouncing the Convention.

Mr. VEGA-GOMEZ (El Salvador) agreed with the United States delegate. He considered that a majority of States could not oblige another State to accept the validity of the amendments they had approved. Each country should be free to submit the amendments to its own legislative body for approval.

Mr. LOWENFELD (United States of America), replying to a question from the CHAIRMAN, said that he was not suggesting that the majority requirement should be ruled out; no amendment should be effective for any State until a majority had been obtained.

The CHAIRMAN said that the system requiring adoption of an amendment by a qualified majority as well as ratification would not have the effect of defeating any important objectives of the Convention; actually an amendment procedure was not essential.

Mr. RATTRAY (Jamaica) said that the full meaning of the Convention might only be revealed by experience, and an interpretation by the International Court might show that the Convention as drafted could not be applied as intended. Therefore an amendment procedure was needed, to enable a change to be made in accordance with the views of a substantial majority, otherwise one State might stand in the way of the continuation of the Center as a practical working body. No doubt some means could be found for dealing with the constitutional problems posed for a number of countries.

Mr. ORDENGANA (Ecuador) agreed with the delegate of Jamaica and expressed the view that the approval of the Convention itself should follow the appropriate constitutional procedure, but not the approval of the amendments. In his opinion, that constituted a most useful and necessary innovation in the field of Public International Law.

The meeting rose at 6:30 p.m.
ARTICLE X - Definitions

The CHAIRMAN stated that, as had been borne out by the discussion at earlier sessions, the main issue raised by Article X was that of dual nationality, this form being used in the sense of two nationalities, one of which was that of the host State. Some host States might be reluctant to extend the benefits of the Convention to persons or companies possessing their nationality, and Article X did not require them to do so. All that was intended by the broad definitions in Article X was to enable a country, if it so desired, to enter into a valid and binding agreement to have recourse to conciliation or arbitration under the auspices of the Center with a person possessing dual nationality. Dual nationality might arise in relation to natural persons as well as to companies.

Mr. FUNES (El Salvador) requested that the meaning of Section 1 (b) of Article X be clarified. Companies might be stock corporations in which the control was determined by the number of shares held by each shareholder, or partnerships in which each partner had one vote, regardless of his capital contribution. It was necessary to state more precisely what was meant by "controlling interest" in each case.

Mr. UCROS (Panama) said, with reference to Section 1, that in his country commercial organizations were not legally considered to be "companies" unless they possessed juridical personality.

The CHAIRMAN said that the provision had been deliberately drafted to take into account the fact that countries might differ in the way their national laws treated partnerships. For that reason it had been thought desirable to keep the definition as neutral as possible.

Mr. RAMIREZ (Honduras) thought that Section 1 had adequately considered the comparative law aspects of one problem, since some national laws, such as those of Italy, did not recognize the juridical personality of all companies.

Mr. ARTEAGA (Chile) agreed with the expert from Honduras, and pointed out that the definitions established in Article X had been formulated for the purposes of the Convention only.

Mr. BELIN (United States of America) understood Article X to mean that a corporation or company in which the controlling interest was held by a national of another Contracting State could designate itself as being a national of that State, if it so wished. But he did not understand the definition to mean that a Contracting State would have the right to deny that quality to a corporation owned by a national of another Contracting State.

The CHAIRMAN thought that there was no difference of opinion about the interpretation of Article X. Nationality could be defined in two ways: by the country of incorporation or by the country of control. Under paragraph (2) of Article X, whenever a company or person had a nationality of a Contracting State other than the host State, than it could be regarded as a national of another Contracting State for the purposes of the Convention.

Mr. BELIN (United States of America) asked whether under paragraph (2)
a State could decline to regard a company as a national of another Contracting State, on the ground that it also possessed its own nationality.

The CHAIRMAN replied that it was improper for a State to do so on that ground. However, if a State had strong constitutional or other reasons and had announced in advance that it would not make use of the facilities of the Center in a dispute with company or person, possessing, in addition to some other nationality, its own nationality under its legislation, such refusal would be quite consistent with the Convention.

Mr. BELIN (United States of America) expressed the view that that possibility would lessen the value of the Convention.

The CHAIRMAN emphasized the importance of distinguishing between natural persons and companies. Some countries would never submit to arbitration disputes with natural persons possessing dual nationality, and he would consider such a position not unreasonable. As regards the dual nationality of companies, he pointed out that at the Addis Ababa meeting some African countries were in favor of the definition given as it would permit them to treat a company organized under their laws as a national of another State, if there was any convenience in so doing, but they would not be compelled to enter into an arbitration agreement with them.

Mr. RAMIREZ (Honduras) considered that Article X contained all the necessary elements, since it dealt with the problem of the juridical personality and nationality of companies and the different forms of organization of their capital. It would be dangerous to carry the definition too far.

The CHAIRMAN said that at the Addis Ababa meeting one of the African delegates, the expert from Ethiopia, had shown a way out of the difficulty indirectly raised by the representative of the United States at the present meeting. If a country found it difficult to consent to arbitral proceedings with a foreign owned company organized under its own laws, it was always possible for the State to enter into an agreement with the foreign investors who owned the company.

Mr. UCROS (Panama) explained that in his country all companies set up according to national law were considered to be Panamanian. A predominance of foreign shareholders merely involved certain restrictions on the activities of the companies (such as the prohibition against engaging in retail trade).

Mr. BELIN (United States of America) was deeply concerned about the interpretation of the Convention in the light of what the expert from Panama had just said. He thought that the usefulness of a Convention that was optional in nature would be seriously impaired if a number of countries were to insist on major exceptions in respect of the companies that might invoke it.

The CHAIRMAN did not think that there were grounds for concern, but agreed that it was important to clarify the meaning of the provisions in question. What was intended was to shape the definition so as to give it the greatest possible flexibility.

Mr. LOWENFELD (United States of America) wished to elaborate on the point made by Mr. Belin, particularly with regard to the possibility of an agreement with the investors who owned a company as distinct from the company itself. The idea was acceptable in theory but he pointed out that
the way in which business was conducted depended on many factors, such as local tax and labor laws, which often required local incorporation. The Convention should not contain anything that would force a change in business organization and decisions; it should be open in any event as a means of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with all the objectives outlined by the Chairman at the opening of the meeting.

Mr. ESPINOSA (Venezuela) stressed the importance of the observation made by the Chilean delegate that the definitions in question were established for the purposes of the Convention only. He drew attention to the difficulty of ascertaining the proportion of the capital held by nationals and by foreigners in the case of companies with bearer shares, which could be transferred without any form of registration. He also remarked that there may be different groups of interest in any company with different nationality and it might be extremely difficult to determine at any given moment the nationality of the "controlling interest", especially if bearer shares are used.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that it was more difficult to prove nationality in the case of a company with bearer shares than in the case of a company with registered shares. However, the basic concept itself remained valid.

Mr. RAMIREZ (Honduras) remarked that each country could achieve a sufficient degree of control through its domestic legislation, for instance by requiring, at the time a company invested in the country, information on holdings of shares in connection with Annual General Meetings of Shareholders.

Mr. RATTRAY (Jamaica) said that the question of what constituted a controlling interest varied widely from one country to another. It was desirable to keep the definitions as flexible as possible so that the element of "control" may be determined in each particular case. This would enable a wide variety of disputes to be brought within the jurisdiction of the Center. The Convention already provided that questions of nationality be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal as preliminary questions.

Mr. UGROS (Panama) suggested that the wording of Article X be amended to provide that a company could be considered foreign, even though it has been established under the laws of the host State if that company were subject to restrictions in the exercise of commerce by reason of the nationality of its shareholders.

The CHAIRMAN remarked that the suggestion of the expert from Panama might solve the problem in some countries but might create more difficulties in other countries. The definitions contained in the Convention gave maximum recognition to the wishes of the parties who freely entered into investment agreements.

Mr. DEL CASTILLO (Colombia) said that the Colombian Constitution did not allow foreign governments to own real estate in Colombia. Foreign States which acquired shares in a company owning real estate in Colombia therefore violated that constitutional principle. He pointed out that in Chapter IV, entitled "Private Investments" of the 1948 Economic Convention of Bogota, it was established that foreign capital was subject to national laws, with the guarantees provided by that Chapter, and without prejudice to existing or future obligations between States. The Bogota Convention still influenced Latin American thinking on the question of investments. If the draft Convention under discussion were to be accepted, it would create an entirely different set of guiding principles.
ARTICLE XI - Final Provisions

The CHAIRMAN, in introducing Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Article XI emphasized the open nature of the Convention and observed that it did not require signature or acceptance before any specific date. The draft had left blank the minimum number of acceptances or ratifications required for the entry into force of the Convention.

Mr. LOWENFELD (United States of America) suggested that it might be useful to insert in the Convention a formula which had been used in a number of multilateral agreements since the war, namely "This Convention shall be open for signature on behalf of States members of the Bank, the United Nations or the specialized agencies." He also indicated that he had comments not of a substantive nature which would be communicated to the Secretariat.

Mr. PINTO (Guatemala) proposed that the broader term "adherence" be used in Section 1 instead of "signature".

The CHAIRMAN agreed to take note of the suggestions made by the delegates of the United States and Guatemala.

Mr. ARTEAGA (Chile) understood that in treaties or conventions of this kind there was a distinction between the terms "signature" and "adherence", and suggested that due account would be taken of the idea put forward by the representative of Guatemala if the Convention were stated to be open "for signature or adherence."

The CHAIRMAN felt that there was no particular reason for establishing a distinction between signature and adherence, unless the original signatories were in a position to control the admission of later signatories. He thought that the question of substance was that all States referred to in Section 1 should be welcome to the Convention, and that the difference between signature and adherence was a matter of legal technicality rather than of substance.

Mr. ESPINOSA (Venezuela) suggested that Section 2 of Article XI be changed to allow for the possibility of restrictive declarations by States in order to allow as many States as possible to adhere to the Convention. He consequently proposed that the last part of the Section should read: "The instruments of ratification or acceptance shall be deposited with the Bank and shall contain a declaration that the State in question has taken all the necessary steps to enable it to carry out all the obligations undertaken upon signature of, or adherence to the Convention." This wording would allow the State to commit itself only to those obligations that the State felt it could undertake, but not necessarily all obligations imposed by the Convention.

The CHAIRMAN recalled that some experts had indicated that after signing and ratifying the Convention countries might be prevented by their own constitutions from consenting to arbitration of particular disputes. It was important to note that that position was not inconsistent with their obligations under the Convention, and no reservation was necessary to maintain it. It was only when a State wished to sign the Convention, but felt unable to carry out the obligations imposed by the mere signature and ratification of the Convention that the question of reservations would arise. Reservations to international agreements posed several complex problems and he hoped they could be avoided.
The modification of the text proposed by the expert from Venezuela was designed to underscore the difference between two separate sets of obligations—those which were undertaken upon ratification merely, and others assumed only when an agreement for conciliation or arbitration was concluded pursuant to the Convention. He saw no objection to the deposit by a State, at the time of signature or ratification, of a statement explaining the constitutional limitations on its recourse to the Center. While such a statement might be useful in making the State's position known to other States, it was not legally necessary in order to preserve its right to withhold consent to the jurisdiction of the Center in a specific case. Such a statement should not be confused with a reservation properly so called, which modified those obligations of a State which were undertaken by mere ratification of the Convention.

Mr. RAEBEY (Jamaica) endorsed what the Chairman had said, but expressed the fear that any expression in the Convention concerning explanatory statements by signatory States might create some confusion as to whether or not reservations to the Convention were permitted. He thought it preferable that any such statement be submitted together with the instruments of ratification or acceptance, but that no explicit provision be made to that effect in the Convention.

The CHAIRMAN introduced sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article XI, on which the meeting had no comments to make.

Preamble

Mr. PANGRAZIO (Paraguay) proposed that the term "international co-operation" in paragraph 1 of the Preamble be replaced by "co-operation among nations."

Mr. GAMBOA (Chile) proposed that in the Spanish version of paragraph 3 of the Preamble the phrase "or may be subjected to these processes" be inserted after "subject to national legal processes." That would allow for recognition of such a possibility and would avoid any misinterpretation to the effect that international methods were preferable to national legal processes, which was not the intention of that paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN said that he would consider the suggestion which seemed consistent with the intent of the paragraph.

Mr. CANAL (Colombia) reaffirming the position taken by his delegation at earlier meetings, considered that paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Preamble were in conflict with each other since paragraph 5 recognized that an undertaking to submit disputes to conciliation or to arbitration through facilities of the Center was a legal obligation, while paragraph 6 which was the keystone of the Convention, declared that no Contracting State was obliged to do so by the mere fact of its ratification or acceptance of the Convention.

The CHAIRMAN remarked that there was possibly latent ambiguity in paragraphs 5 and 6 as a result of the use of the word "undertaking" in two somewhat different contexts. At the Addis Ababa meeting some experts would have preferred to invert the order of the two paragraphs. The drafting of these two paragraphs would be carefully considered.

Mr. BRUNNER (Chile) thought that the question was one of ambiguity in the Spanish translation, since the English text clearly established that recognition of an undertaking inevitably involved legal obligations.
Mr. ESPINOSA (Venezuela) pointed out that the essence of paragraph 3 of the Preamble was the recognition that "international methods of settlement might be appropriate in certain cases." He therefore suggested that the essential part of the paragraph be retained and that the rest of the paragraph be deleted.

The CHAIRMAN noted that the discussion of the Convention had been completed and thanked the delegates for their valuable advice, and the many improvements they had suggested. With reference to the steps that would be taken after this meeting, he explained that the report of the proceedings would be sent to all delegates and their governments as well as to the governments which had been unable to be represented at this meeting. Two more regional consultative meetings would be held in the near future in Geneva and Bangkok and thereafter a composite report on all four meetings would be distributed to the Executive Directors of the Bank and all member governments. The Executive Directors would decide how to proceed further, but he thought that the Executive Directors, assisted by legal advisers of their choice, would study the reports and prepare a new text of the Convention for admission to governments.

Mr. GONZALEZ (Costa Rica) said his delegation was gratified to have been able to participate in the meeting. His delegation accepted the Draft Convention in principle, but recognized that it might be improved. The draft, which was in harmony with the contemporary trend towards the universal establishment of the rule of law, might improve conditions for an increasing extension of credit to countries in need of it.

He believed that the Convention would have a favorable effect on investment and economic growth. Moreover, in providing a mechanism for the settlement of disputes between States and nationals of other States, it would contribute to the reduction and eventual elimination of conflicts among nations.

Such obstacles as might exist in the way of its ultimate adoption could be overcome through introduction of the relevant amendments and changes in drafting. He did not share the view of those who thought that the Convention would endanger the sovereignty of Contracting States.

He emphasized, however, that final approval of the Convention was a matter for the appropriate governmental agencies of his country, and that the opinions he had expressed should not be interpreted as committing them in any way. He would like, however, on behalf of his delegation, to express their best wishes for the achievement of the purposes of the Convention.

Mr. BRUNNER (Chile) said that in the opinion of his country's delegation the draft Convention represented a useful step forward. He commended the Bank's initiative in seeking a solution to a difficult problem and emphasized the importance the Convention might have for encouraging the flow of capital to the areas in need of it. States would be able to submit some disputes to the proposed mechanism while reserving jurisdiction over others. Gradually general standards would be evolved through an internationalization of the jurisdiction over investment disputes.

Mr. BELIN (United States of America) thought that the meeting had been extremely helpful and thought-provoking and had contributed greatly to the development, a significant new international agreement.
Mr. SEVILLA-SACASA (Nicaragua) on behalf of all delegates thanked the Chilean Government for its hospitality and the Chairman for his conduct of the meeting.

The meeting rose at 11:40 a.m.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS' MEETING, FEBRUARY 11, 1964

EXTRACTS FROM STATEMENT BY MR. CANCIO ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE REGIONAL MEETING HELD IN SANTIAGO, CHILE, FEBRUARY 3-7, 1964, FOR DISCUSSION OF A DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES DATED OCTOBER 15, 1963

Twenty countries, out of the 23 countries invited, were represented at the Santiago meeting. Only Mexico, Uruguay and Haiti were absent.

The sessions were held in the Hotel Carrera and the administrative arrangements were handled by the Economic Commission for Latin America. The arrangements were most satisfactory. We had excellent press coverage. The newspapers of Santiago ran daily articles and editorials on the importance of the discussions.

The meeting lasted five days. Many comments and suggestions were made by the delegates which, I am sure, will be very helpful for our work. As in the case of the Addis Ababa meeting, a report will be prepared and sent to the governments invited to the Santiago meeting. At the opening session, Mr. Broches made a long statement in Spanish. After Mr. Broches' speech, there were general statements made by the delegations of some 15 countries. The next four days were devoted to detailed discussions.

Most of the delegates were lawyers, some of them of great distinction, like Mr. Sevilla Sacasa of Nicaragua and Mr. Alfonso Espinosa of Venezuela, both veterans of Bretton Woods. Mr. Roberto Ramirez, president of the Central Bank of Honduras and an old friend of the Bank, represented his country. Many others were diplomats, professors or of cabinet rank.

Some countries voiced their worry that provisions of their constitutions, such as those which consecrate the principle of equality of both citizens and foreigners before the law, and the principle of the exclusive power of the domestic judiciary to administer justice, would be in conflict with our proposals. One country, for instance,
has a constitutional article which specifically requires that all
Government contracts must contain a clause of submission to the do-
mestic courts. Others stated that the adjudication of conflicts by
arbitration tribunals such as those foreseen in our draft Convention
would be constitutional only after exhaustion of all local remedies
and only in the case of denial of justice. However, the great majority
of the delegates agreed that, even though the countries would have to
make changes in their internal legal structures, including their con-
stitutions, the proposals were of great importance to the developing
countries and that efforts should be made to modernize their laws in
order to enable them to put the Bank's proposals to good use.

Many comments were of a very technical legal nature. As, among
the delegates, we had experts in all branches of the law, their com-
ments often reflected their diverse backgrounds. There is certainly
no lack of legal development in Latin America! Both civil law and
common law training were represented, the latter by Canada, Jamaica,
Trinidad and the United States. Some comments, I understand, were
very similar to the comments made in Addis Ababa, while other points
raised were quite different. This is, of course, what we are trying
to achieve, so that, when the results of the four meetings are brought
together, the text of the Convention can be drafted so that it would
be acceptable to a substantial majority of the members of the Bank.

The Board will recall that in Africa it was thought useful to
expand the scope of the Convention by bringing before the Center in-
vestment conflicts between foreign investors and state-controlled
enterprises or development boards. In some countries of Latin America,
the governments, by law, seldom enter into investment agreements with
foreign investors or lenders. This is done exclusively through the
so-called financieras which, although entirely separate legal entities,
in their operations speak for and have the full backing of the State.
In others, public corporations with separate personality are charged
with all aspects of the economic development of entire regions, or deal,
on a nationwide basis, with one or more of its basic factors, such as
electric power or railroads. The Latin Americans felt that this feature
would make the draft Convention more attractive to their governments.

All in all, the meeting was, in my opinion, very encouraging. We
received excellent counsel from men who had prepared themselves well.
The constitutional issues raised were not new. In the past we have had
to face similar issues in loan negotiations where domestic public policy
has been invoked, for instance, against the Bank's arbitration clauses.
In fact, some of the issues raised are not at all alien to the legal
systems of very large and sophisticated countries. Changes in these
systems will be part of the price which will have to be paid for progress.

Personally I have returned from Santiago with a feeling that much
was accomplished there. The discussions were constructive and there was
general awareness of the need for an instrument such as the one we have
proposed.
NOTE

This document contains a summary record of the proceedings of the consultative meeting of legal experts held at Geneva on the proposals contained in the Working Paper entitled "Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States" (Doc. COM/EU/1).¹

Suggestions made by the experts for changes in drafting, for improvement of the English and French texts, and for conforming one text more closely to the other, were noted by the Secretariat but have not been included in this record.

¹This summary record was sent to the delegates for clearance in provisional form and reflects their comments.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Chairman: A. BROCHES, General Counsel, IBRD

AUSTRIA

Mrs. Maria PILZ
Mr. Kurt HERNDL

Commissioner, Fed. Ministry of Finance
Secretary, Fed. Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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Belgium
Mr. Jacques Karelle
Mr. Karl Andre
Mr. Jean-Jacques Rey

Denmark
Mr. Jørgen Trolle
Mr. Svend Hartlev

Finland
Mr. Ake Roschier-Holmberg
Mr. Pertti Tammivuori

France
Mr. Andre Rodocanachi
Mr. Daniel Deguen

Federal Republic of Germany
Mr. Wilhelm Bertram
Mr. Helmut Künzer
Mr. Hans Arnold

Greece
Mr. Nicholas Kanellopoulos
Mr. Derays Mantzoulinos

Italy
Mr. Giuseppe Guarino
Mr. Ricardo Monaco

Netherlands
Mr. C.W. van Santen
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Norway
Mr. Egil Amlie
Mr. Thomas Løvold

Portugal
Mr. Andre Pereira

South Africa
Mr. David Gould
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Spain
Mr. Jose A. Gonzalez-Bueno
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SWITZERLAND  Mr. Angelo HUSLER  Legal Service of the Political Federal Department

TURKEY  Mr. Samim BILGEN  Chief Legal Advisor of the Ministry of Finance

UNITED KINGDOM  Mr. P.J. ALLOTT  Miss Gillian M.E. WHITE  Assistant Legal Advisor, Foreign Office Legal Assistant, Board of Trade

YUGOSLAVIA  Mr. Ladislav SERB  Mr. Djordje FRKIC  Assistant Chief Legal Advisor, State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs Councillor, Yugoslav Investment Bank

Secretariat:  Mr. P. Sella  Mr. L. Cancio  Mr. C.W. Pinto  Legal Department, IBRD

FIRST SESSION  (Monday, February 17, 1964 - 3:00 p.m.)

Opening Statements

Mr. VELEBIT (Executive Secretary, Economic Commission for Europe) welcomed the participants and stressed the great interest which the United Nations and its Economic Commission for Europe took in the subject to be discussed by them. In particular, the Economic Commission for Europe had been closely associated with the development of arbitration in matters of a similar kind and was also deeply involved in the work of economic development. It was therefore natural that the Commission should take a very keen interest in the result of the work of the present meeting. He expressed his sincere wishes for the success of the Bank's consultation and the certainty that the Bank's initiative could make a very valuable contribution to the economic development of the developing countries.

The CHAIRMAN thanked Mr. Velebit for his words of welcome and encouragement and expressed the Bank's appreciation for the assistance it had received from the United Nations and particularly from its European Office. He welcomed the participants on behalf of Mr. Woods, President of the World Bank, and stated that the present meeting was the third of four consultative meetings of legal experts called by the World Bank to discuss informally the draft of an international convention on the settlement of investment disputes (Document COM/EU/1). The first, attended by countries of the African continent, had been held at Addis Ababa in December 1963. The second had been held early in February 1964 at Santiago, Chile, and had been attended by countries of the Western Hemisphere. The last would be held at Bangkok in April 1964.

He would not attempt at the outset to report in detail on the views expressed at the Addis Ababa and Santiago meetings; he would do so in

1 See Doc. 25  2 See Doc. 27  3 See Doc. 31
connection with the discussion of the various articles of the Draft. At this stage he could say, however, that he had been greatly encouraged by the reception of the Bank's proposals. At the African meeting, general support had been expressed for the proposal and no objections of principle had been raised; the consensus seemed to be that the draft had taken account of the legitimate interests of capital-importing countries as well as of investors. At the Santiago meeting, a number of Latin American participants had expressed their governments' reservations concerning certain innovations which the draft sought to introduce into traditional international law and their uneasiness about what they regarded as a serious limitation on their countries' sovereignty which the use of the proposed Center might entail. Other Latin American delegates, however, had welcomed the proposal, emphasizing the optional nature of the Convention, and felt that it should be acceptable to Latin American countries even if many of them might not be able, without changes in their laws, to make full use of the arbitration facilities, as distinguished from facilities for conciliation.

The fact that the World Bank had taken the initiative in promoting an international agreement in a field which might not be regarded as falling directly within its sphere of activity was due to the fact that the Bank was not merely a financing mechanism but, above all, a development institution. While its activities did consist in large part in the provision of finance, much of its energy and resources were devoted to technical assistance and advice directed toward the promotion of conditions conducive to rapid economic growth, to creation of a favorable investment climate in the broadest sense of the term. To that end, sound technical and administrative foundations were essential, but no less indispensable was the firm establishment of the Rule of Law.

International investment was universally recognized as a factor of crucial importance in the economic development of the less developed parts of the world and had become one of the major features of the partnership between the richer and poorer nations: its promotion was a matter of urgent concern to capital-importing and capital-exporting countries alike. That was particularly true of private foreign investment which, if wisely conducted, could make great contributions to the development of the economies of the recipient countries.

Unfortunately, private capital was not moving in sufficient volume to areas in need of capital, one of the most serious impediments to its flow being the fear of investors that their investment would be exposed to political risks such as outright expropriation, government interference and non-observance by the host government of contractual undertakings on the basis of which the investment had been made.

The Bank had therefore been led to wonder whether, in view of its reputation for integrity and its position of impartiality, it could not help in removing that obstacle to private investment. It had on a number of occasions been approached by governments and foreign investors who had sought its assistance in settling investment disputes and had been encouraged to bend its efforts in that direction by such events as the enactment by Ghana of foreign investment legislation which contemplated the settlement of certain investment disputes "through the agency of" the World Bank. Similarly, Morocco and a group of French investors had entrusted to the President of the Bank the appointment of the President.
of an arbitral tribunal to settle disputes that might arise under a series of long-term contracts.

The Bank had concluded that the most promising approach would be to attack the problem of the unfavorable investment climate by creating international machinery which would be available on a voluntary basis for the conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes. Some might think it desirable to go beyond that and attempt to reach a substantive definition of the status of foreign property. There was need for a meaningful understanding between capital-exporting and capital-importing nations on those matters. The draft on Protection of Foreign Property, prepared in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, might constitute a useful starting point for discussions between those two groups of countries. At the same time, however, there was need to pursue a parallel effort of more limited scope, represented by the Bank's proposals.

The Convention would make available institutional facilities and procedures to which States and foreign investors could have access on a voluntary basis for the settlement of investment disputes between them. In the opinion of the Bank those facilities and procedures were better suited to disputes between a State on the one hand and a foreign investor on the other than those offered by other existing or proposed institutions. Taken by themselves, however, they could be put into effect by administrative action by the Bank and would not require the conclusion of any inter-governmental agreement.

Such institutional facilities were nevertheless, in his opinion, secondary to other parts of the proposal, which it was necessary to embody in a Convention.

Those parts comprised, firstly, recognition of the principle that a non-State party, an investor, might have direct access, in his own name and without requiring the espousal of his cause by his national government, to a State party before an international forum. States, in signing the Convention would admit that principle, but only the principle. No signatory State would be compelled to resort to the facilities provided by the Convention, or to agree to do so, and no foreign investor could in fact initiate proceedings against a signatory State unless that State and the investor had specifically so agreed. However, once they had so agreed, both parties would be irrevocably bound to carry out their undertaking and the Convention established rules designed to prevent the frustration of the undertaking and to insure its implementation.

Secondly, while the Convention implied a recognition that local courts were not necessarily the final forum for the settlement of disputes between a State and a foreign investor, it did not imply that local remedies could not play a major role. When parties consented to arbitration, they would be free to stipulate either that local remedies might be pursued in lieu of arbitration, or that local remedies must first be exhausted before the dispute could be submitted for arbitration under the Convention. If the parties to a dispute had not made either stipulation, then and only then, did the Convention provide that arbitration would be in lieu of local remedies.

A third and more important feature of the Convention followed from

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*See OECD Doc. 15637, dated December 1962, revised and reissued as OECD Doc. 23081, dated November 1967*
the fact that in traditional international law a wrong done to a national of one State for which another State was internationally responsible was actionable not by the injured national, but by his State. In practice that principle had been superseded in a number of cases in which provision had been made for the settlement of investment disputes by direct conciliation or arbitration between the host State and the foreign investor. The internationally binding character of such arrangements had not, however, been recognized hitherto, and the Convention was designed to fill that gap.

Every international agreement signified the acceptance in one form or another of a limitation of national sovereignty. The proposed Convention was intended to give internationally binding effect to the limitation of sovereignty inherent in an agreement by a State pursuant to the Convention to submit a dispute with a foreign investor to arbitration. As a corollary of the principle of allowing an investor direct and effective access to a foreign State without the intervention of his national State it was proposed - and this was an important innovation - that an investor's national State would no longer be able to espouse a claim of its national. In this way it was sought to ensure that States would not be faced with having to deal with a multiplicity of claims and claimants. The Convention would therefore offer a means of settling directly, on the legal plane, investment disputes between the State and the foreign investor and insulate such disputes from the realm of politics and diplomacy.

Fourthly, awards of arbitral tribunals rendered pursuant to the Convention would be recognized by, and enforceable in all Contracting States as if they were final judgments of their national Courts, regardless whether the State in which enforcement was sought was or was not a party to the dispute in question. In that connection he wished to make it clear that where, as in most countries, the law of State immunity from execution would prevent enforcement as opposed to execution against a private party, the Convention would leave that law unaffected. All the Convention would do would be to place an arbitral award rendered pursuant to it on the same footing as a final judgment of the national Courts. If such judgment could be enforced under the domestic law in question, so could the award; if that judgment could not be so enforced, neither could the award.

Fifthly, it should be borne in mind that the Convention did not lay down standards for the treatment by States of the property of aliens, nor did it prescribe standards for the conduct of foreign investors in their relations with host States. Accordingly, the Convention would not be concerned with the merits of investment disputes but with the procedure for settling them.

While the Bank believed that private investment had a valuable contribution to make to economic development, it was neither a blind partisan of the cause of the private investor, nor did it wish to impose its views on others. He did not expect or think it desirable that all disputes between foreign investors and host States should necessarily be dealt with by the facilities established under the Convention, nor was it intended to supersede national jurisdiction generally. It should, however, be stressed that there might be instances when recourse to an international forum would be in the interests of the host State as well as in those of the investor.

Two further points needed emphasis. The first was that the Convention...
was designed to deal with claims by host States against investors, as well as with claims by investors against host States; the second, that the Convention dealt with conciliation as well as with arbitration. As to the latter, it might well be found when the Convention came into operation, that conciliation activities under the auspices of the Center proved more important than arbitral proceedings.

In conclusion he pointed out that the Convention left States and investors free to establish their mutual relations on whatever basis they deemed proper. Its true significance lay in the fact that it ensured that if the parties agreed to have recourse to an international forum, their agreement would be given full effect. This would create an element of confidence which would, in turn, contribute to a healthier investment climate.

At the present meeting the Bank would be able to draw on the experience of legal experts from a group of countries which included traditional exporters of capital, and also countries which were rapidly progressing on the road of economic development. European jurists had been particularly imaginative in creating new forms of economic co-operation and he was looking forward to lively and valuable discussions.

General Comment on the Draft Convention

The CHAIRMAN invited general comments on the draft Convention. He pointed out that the working paper had been drafted in English, and that the French text was no more than a working translation. On completing the series of regional meetings, equally authentic texts would be prepared in English, French and Spanish.

He reminded the participants that they were free to express their personal views on the paper before them. He hoped, however, that they would also give some indication of their governments' thinking but stressed that they would not be regarded as committing their governments in any way. In keeping with the essentially consultative character of the meeting, no formal decisions or resolutions would be adopted. No minutes of the proceedings would be issued during the meeting, but a summary record of the proceedings would be sent to all participants at a later date.

Mr. RODOCANACHI (France) commended the Chairman for his illuminating address which had enabled participants to have a clearer understanding of the proposed machinery and of the principles involved.

The French authorities supported the Bank in its efforts to obtain maximum support for a convention of the proposed type to deal with disputes between private investors and capital-importing States.

While there was general support for the aims pursued, the difficulty lay in the search for machinery to achieve the proposed objective. The machinery proposed by the Bank had undoubted merits and the discussion would bring these to light. At that stage, he stressed that in the subject under discussion procedures played an essential role. On the quality of the procedures adopted would depend the number of ratifications that the proposed convention would ultimately secure. A convention of that type was important only in so far as it attracted ratifications from a sufficient number of countries, capital-importing and capital-exporting alike.
It was necessary to arrive at a balanced system which would ensure
due respect for the sovereignty of the capital-importing countries and
which would give investors the protection to which they were entitled.

Lastly, he stressed that he was in full agreement with the objectives
of the proposals under discussion, and would co-operate fully in trying
to work out a satisfactory system.

Mr. KOINZER (Federal Republic of Germany) commended the Chairman and
the staff of the Bank for their work and expressed satisfaction at being
given an opportunity to exchange views with his European colleagues on
the Bank's proposals.

His Government had invariably stressed the value of private invest-
ment in the developing countries, a form of investment which constituted
an excellent means of transferring know-how and experience to those
countries. Accordingly, his Government had consistently striven to
create incentives for such private investment, particularly in the form
of guarantees given to investors.

All those efforts, however, would be in vain unless they were
supplemented by a corresponding effort on the part of the recipient
countries to create a favorable investment climate. His Government had
endeavored to achieve that result by means of bilateral agreements, but
had nevertheless favored all the initiatives taken in that connection,
in particular by OECD and the Council of Europe. From the outset, there-
fore, his Government had welcomed the Bank's initiative in the matter;
the draft which had been prepared constituted an excellent basis of
discussion.

He welcomed the progressive idea of giving private persons the
right to be directly parties to international conciliation and arbitration
proceedings. That idea was consistent with a practice which had already
developed in the international sphere. It was gratifying to see that
conception receive the support of the Bank with its unique prestige. He
attached great importance to the fact that the proposed Center would
function under the auspices of the Bank.

The draft raised a considerable number of questions of detail, to
which he would revert during the discussion article by article. At this
stage, he wished to stress that the criterion should always be whether
the proposed provisions would afford an additional feeling of security to
private investors. In that connection, the proposed new arrangements must
not impair in any way existing schemes, such as those already practiced by
his Government in its relations with the developing countries. It was
on that understanding that he would wholeheartedly co-operate in the
discussion of the draft.

Lastly, he stressed that the willingness of the developing countries
to participate in the scheme was a decisive factor in its success. While
his Government had not yet taken a definite position regarding the Con-
vention, he believed that the discussion at the present meeting would help
to clarify its views.

Mr. van SANTEN (Netherlands) stressed the co-operative spirit in
which he approached the present Meeting. While he had, at the stage of
preliminary discussions, felt some reluctance in seeking to multiply the
possibilities of international jurisdiction, he had since become convinced that there might be merit in the proposal to establish a new and workable institution which would be enhanced by the prestige of the World Bank, particularly taking into account the assurance that there would be, to the extent practicable, co-operation with the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

He would, however, welcome clarification as to the precise character of the present Meeting. It was his understanding that participants were attending as guests of the World Bank rather than as national delegations, and were accordingly participating in their capacity as legal experts in order to explore all aspects of the draft Convention without in any way committing their governments to any specific stand.

He was also in some doubt as to the way in which it was proposed to ascertain the views of the various governments on the draft Convention and as to whether it was intended to convene a diplomatic conference at some juncture to enable governments to discuss the proposals with each other and with representatives of the Bank. The situation was not clear from the existing documentation. Moreover, it would appear necessary for the Meeting to have some further information of the reactions of those attending the Regional Consultative Meeting in Africa regarding whether it would be wise to institute procedures for the settlement of investment disputes under the auspices of the Bank. It was extremely important to know the views of the African experts regarding the desirability of a link between the proposed Center and the Bank as this would give some indication of whether the Convention would not only be signed but also used. Indeed, the extent to which the draft Convention would be put to actual use for the purposes of conciliation and arbitration, (since, as the Chairman pointed out, accession did not obligatorily imply recourse to it) constituted the primary criterion of its success.

The CHAIRMAN believed that the nature of the present Meeting had been accurately described in the invitation extended to the experts by the President of the Bank. It was indeed a purely consultative meeting and the experts would be expressing their personal opinions. Naturally, any indications they could give of the tentative or definitive views of their governments could but be helpful.

With regard to the procedure to be followed after the holding of the final regional consultative meeting in April, he said that a report, together with a revised draft of the Convention, would be submitted to the Executive Directors of the Bank, who had requested such regional consultations with a view to providing both them and the President of the Bank with guidance for future action. Should it be decided that it appeared useful to pursue the undertaking, the tentative plan would be to follow the procedures which had obtained in respect of the preparation of the charters of IFC and IDA. Discussion by the Executive Directors would then take the place of a diplomatic conference since both the capital-importing and capital-exporting countries were represented among them. It was likely that the Executive Directors would wish to have the assistance of legal advisers from some or all of their constituent countries. There was therefore no proposal in mind to convene a diplomatic conference for that purpose.

With regard to the consultative meeting held in Africa for which no full record was as yet available, the Bank did have notes on the sugges-
tions made, and he hoped that all delegations present would feel free to ask what particular comments had been raised in the course of the meetings held in Africa and in the Western Hemisphere. Since no votes had been taken and since the points of view expressed on which there was no disagreement had not necessarily been reiterated, it was somewhat difficult to assess the views of all the experts attending. Nonetheless, certain opinions had clearly emerged on the most important issues. In respect of the link of an International Conciliation and Arbitration Center with the Bank, no objections had been raised at the African meeting and a number of the experts from the most important countries had taken an extremely positive view.

He also emphasized the fact that the value of the Convention would indeed be measured by the practical use to which it was put. There were already some indications that it would in fact be used, although clearly no one could guarantee to what extent. It seemed to him that it was important to guard against seeking too many guarantees as to its application, and indeed as to accessions, in advance, though naturally the Bank had no intention of putting before governments for their signature a document which did not have the likelihood of acceptance by a representative number of both types of countries concerned.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) said that he was in a position to inform the Meeting of his Government's general attitude with regard to the draft Convention.

His Government warmly welcomed the initiative taken by the Bank. It supported the view that there was a need for international machinery of that type of a non-obligatory basis and endorsed the general lines of the proposal. It had been particularly impressed by the elegance and realism of the draft Convention, and with its lack of unnecessary detail at the present juncture.

Since the purpose of the plan was to improve the investment climate, the favorable reactions at the African Consultative Meeting were to be welcomed.

Mr. MELCHOR (Spain) said his delegation was in agreement with the general outlines of the proposal. By declaring that an individual could be a subject of international law, the proposed Convention could help to settle in a friendly spirit disputes which might otherwise have to be resolved at governmental level. From that point of view he thought that the proposal was of the greatest interest.

He would appreciate it if the Chairman could further elucidate one important point and indicate what the reactions to this point had been in Santiago. While he had noted that the type of dispute it was intended that the draft Convention should cover was to be of a legal character as distinct from political, economic or purely commercial disputes, that basic point called for additional clarification.

He also asked the Chairman to indicate the Bank's present intentions with respect to the procedure to be followed for the eventual signature of the Convention.

The CHAIRMAN, replying to the first specific point raised by the representative of Spain, said that the definition of the type of invest-
ment dispute to be covered would be considered in the context of the detailed consideration of Article II.

In respect of the more general points made by the Spanish representative, he stated that the tenor of the Western Hemisphere consultative meeting had been somewhat different from that of the African meeting. The fundamental point at issue had been the difficulty encountered by many Latin American countries in placing the individual or the individual company on the same level as the State. While specific constitutional difficulties existed in certain cases, other reservations had been made on grounds which were less clear-cut as regards constitutional repercussions but which were rather based on legal traditions in that continent. It had become apparent both from the discussions in the meeting and from private conversations that some eminent jurists were reluctant to run counter to such traditional attitudes and did not feel it possible, either legally or politically, to agree in advance to arbitration, other than on an ad hoc basis. It had been the point of view of the Bank that, rather than to seek to amend the draft Convention to meet those difficulties, governments might find it possible to sign it without stipulating a specific reservation but making a formal statement at that time showing their position in that respect. It would be a significant step forward for the draft Convention to receive the signatures of Latin American countries. Although those conceptual problems of not according special advantages to foreign investors had been stressed at the Western Hemisphere consultative meeting, he had been gratified by the pre-eminently practical approach voiced at the African meeting; African countries were possibly more familiar with the proposed procedures owing to their past associations.

With regard to future procedure, he recalled that a diplomatic conference had not been called in connection with the establishment of IDA and IFC but that the text of the constituent instruments of these institutions had been established by the Executive Directors. He noted the fact that both the Bank's Board of Governors and the Executive Directors have a system of weighted voting related to the size of members' contributions to the Bank's capital. The possibility was, therefore, always present that these organs of the Bank could take decisions over the objections of a numerical majority of the member countries. However, as had been borne out in the cases of IDA and IFC, the Executive Directors would wish to assure that the Convention would not merely be put up for signature but that it would be acceptable to an adequate number of developing as well as industrialized countries.

Mr. ROSCHIER-HOLMBERG (Finland) complimented the Bank on the work it had accomplished on the draft Convention. Its motivation and fundamental norms had been clearly expressed by the Chairman and he had nothing to add. He expressed full support for the proposal which should contribute towards encouraging investments.

He wished, in particular, to stress the importance of the Conciliation and Arbitration Rules, which would be just as important as the Convention itself.

While it was evident that in formulating the draft the Bank had cooperated with all the appropriate international organizations and would continue to do so, he drew special attention to the desirability of collaboration with the International Bar Association, which would soon
publish a report on the results of a study on the protection of investors abroad.

Mrs. Pilz (Austria) welcomed the efforts made by the Bank, which because of its experience was particularly well qualified to find ways and means for solving investment disputes.

The competent Austrian authorities had studied the draft Convention. A number of problems arising out of the Austrian legal system had become apparent but it was hoped that they could be settled. The draft Convention would require ratification by the Austrian parliament. The Austrian authorities considered that the draft Convention would contribute towards creating a favorable investment climate and were therefore inclined to take a positive view.

Mr. Pereira (Portugal) said that he believed his Government to be extremely favorably disposed towards a convention of the type proposed. Such a convention was clearly progressive in its recognition of the individual or individual company on an equal basis with the State. There were, however, a number of details which might not be entirely acceptable in that they had repercussions on the internal legal authority which in his own country was dependent on parliament. Furthermore, while signature of the draft Convention did not imply any obligation on the country acceding to make use of the facilities of the Center, provisions such as Article IV, Sections 14 and 15 on recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards had repercussions in the national field.

The Chairman confirmed that legislative action would in most if not all cases be needed following signature of the draft Convention.

Mr. Oberholzer (South Africa) expressed appreciation to the Bank for the invitation extended to his delegation to attend the present regional consultative meeting.

He viewed the initiative for a draft Convention as an attempt to improve the foreign investment climate, and coming as it did from the Bank, it was to be welcomed.

Commenting generally, he wondered whether it was in fact a sound principle to elevate the individual to the status of a subject of international law, and whether, if the answer to that were in the affirmative, the definition given of "national of another Contracting State" was sufficiently circumscribed; he would raise this point again at an appropriate stage in the discussion. He wondered further whether the arbitral tribunal envisaged by the Convention would be sufficiently equipped to deal with points of international law which might arise in connection with those provisions.

He expressed the hope that the discussions at the present Meeting would prove fruitful.

Mr. Karelle (Belgium) said that his Government was favorable to the conclusion of the draft Convention. He would raise some points on particular provisions of the Convention when they were taken up for discussion.

Mr. Serb (Yugoslavia) considered that in discussing the Convention
two questions of a general nature ought to be borne in mind. The first was the usefulness of a Center backed by the prestige of the Bank and the second, the matter of the enforcement of the awards of an arbitral tribunal. In connection with the first question, paramount importance should be given to the views of the capital-importing countries as the creation of the Center should primarily be in their interest. As to enforcement of awards it seemed to him that the draft Convention went too far in providing for enforcement against States as the proposal was not justified in the light of the record of States' compliance with arbitral awards. He believed that the draft Convention would be more widely acceptable if it were in a sense less revolutionary in that sphere.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that the record of States in complying with arbitral awards had been good and emphasized the fact that the question of the enforcement of awards had been included in the draft Convention mainly for the benefit of the developing countries who were thus given a means to enforce awards in their favor against foreign investors. Moreover, the draft Convention did not confer on the investor any right to seek judicial enforcement against the State unless such enforcement was possible under national law.

Mr. LOVOLD (Norway) wished, without committing his Government, to express support for the proposal for creating a Center for the settlement of disputes as that plan would be of great value in inducing investments in developing countries. He welcomed the fact that the proposals were put forward under the auspices of the World Bank.

The meeting rose at 5:10 p.m.

SECOND SESSION
(Tuesday, February 18, 1964 - 9:30 a.m.)

ARTICLE I - International Conciliation and Arbitration: Center

The CHAIRMAN invited the meeting to consider the sections of Article I in groups under the headings given them in the draft Convention.

Establishment and Organization (Sections 1 - 3)

The CHAIRMAN said that at the meetings held in Addis Ababa and Santiago the points raised had been mainly drafting suggestions. The location of the seat of the Center and the possibility of creating regional "sub-seats" had been discussed, but the question of where proceedings would take place was more important than the location of the administrative headquarters of the Center. The general desire had been to allow for the maximum flexibility in regard to the place of proceedings.

Mr. RODOCANACHI (France) said that the French text, which as the Chairman had said was only a rapid translation of the English version, did not in some cases correspond to the sense of the English original and he would like to point out these inconsistencies as the discussion progressed. Referring to Section 3 he suggested that the word "liste" be replaced by the word "corps".

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Mr. MELCHOR (Spain) proposed that in the same section in the Spanish text the word "nomina" be replaced by the word "lista".

The CHAIRMAN observed that the word "cuerpo" had also been proposed for this section.

Mr. RODOCANACHI (France) suggested that in the last sentence of Section 1 the words "capacité juridique" would be a better rendering of the English "juridical personality".

The CHAIRMAN said that at Addis Ababa the representative of Nigeria had suggested deleting the word "full", which was redundant, and replacing it by the word "international".

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) asked whether juridical personality under international, or municipal, law was envisaged.

Mr. AM-package (Norway) said that if the intention was to give the Center international juridical personality the statement to that effect was in its right place in Section 1. He felt, however, that the intention had probably been to give the Center juridical personality under the law of the host country. In that case the sentence would be better placed in the sections dealing with privileges and immunities.

The CHAIRMAN explained that the sentence had been placed in Section 1 rather than in the sections dealing with the privileges and immunities of the Center in order to make it absolutely clear that the Center was a wholly separate and distinct entity, particularly with regard to the World Bank. The juridical personality privileges, immunities, etc. of the Center would certainly have to be recognized at least by all the Contracting States. At a previous meeting it had been suggested that the personality of the Center be defined in terms of the traditional distinguishing qualifications of such personality, viz. the rights to acquire and dispose of property, to sue and be sued, and to enter into contracts.

Mr. RODOCANACHI (France) asked whether the Permanent Court of Arbitration had been approached in connection with the arrangements referred to in Section 2(3).

The CHAIRMAN said that no official contacts had been made with the Permanent Court, although informal talks had taken place. The Permanent Court of Arbitration had been specifically mentioned in Section 2 because the possibility of such arrangements had been suggested at an early meeting of the Executive Directors of the Bank by the Netherlands Executive Director. The general desire was to provide for arrangements with any appropriate body which could facilitate the work of the Center. Before the submission of the final draft of the Convention, the Permanent Court would have to be approached to make sure that it would be willing to consider the proposed arrangements.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) said that he would not like to have the interpretation of Section 2(3) restricted to institutions "which might in the future establish machinery for the settlement of investment disputes" as stated in the comment on page 4, paragraph 4, since that would exclude organizations such as the OECD, which did not at present contemplate setting up machinery of that kind.
Mr. MELCHOR (Spain) said that in the interests of giving the Convention the maximum flexibility it might be desirable to allow arbitration or conciliation proceedings to be held in the country where a dispute had arisen.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that maximum freedom should be given to the parties in the choice of the location of actual proceedings, but that this point could conveniently be taken up under Articles III, IV and VII.

Mr. van SANTEN (Netherlands) said that the place of honor accorded to the Permanent Court of Arbitration did not mean that any preference would be given to that Court, or imply any obligation on the new Center to come to an arrangement with it. However, no one could object to the World Bank's taking any initiative in that sense. The specific reference to the Permanent Court was, in his view, particularly useful since there was always a tendency when creating new institutions to give them competence in fields already covered by existing bodies. His delegation would regret the omission of the reference to the Permanent Court. He suggested that the word "may" in lines 1 and 4 of Section 2(3) be replaced by the word "shall". Since the new institution was intended to deal with investment disputes, he proposed that in Section 1 the words "for investment disputes" be added at the end of the name of the Center.

The Administrative Council (Sections 4 - 7)

The CHAIRMAN said that the only substantive comments made on Sections 4-7 dealing with the Administrative Council had been concerned with Section 5. At Santiago one delegation, supported by two others, had suggested that the Chairman of the Administrative Council be an elected Chairman instead of the President of the Bank acting ex officio. This suggestion had been supported by drawing an analogy with the Board of Governors, which unlike the Executive Directors, was presided over by an elected Chairman.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany), suggested that Section 6(vi) on transfer of the seat of the Center be deleted.

The CHAIRMAN observed that some experts at the Addis Ababa meeting had felt that paragraph (vi) could be deleted. In his opinion the major question was the location of arbitration or conciliation proceedings; he could not visualise circumstances in which the Center would be so divorced administratively from the Bank that it would be necessary to move it. Proposals had ranged from those requiring a simple majority to those requiring a nine-tenths majority.

Mr. MELCHOR (Spain) suggested that a two-thirds majority be required for the transfer of the seat of the Center.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) suggested that a two-thirds majority be required for adoption of financial regulations and for approval of the annual budget of the Center.

Mr. DEQUEN (France) questioned the need for a qualified majority for the establishment of administrative arrangements between the Center and other existing institutions. However, if it were necessary there, it was still more necessary for the adoption of financial regulations and the approval of the annual budget of the Center. At the same time
his delegation would prefer simpler arrangements, making the World Bank directly responsible for the budget. He felt that if, as was said in the comments, the Center was to be sponsored by the World Bank, the closest possible relations with the Bank should be maintained and the statement that the Center was sponsored by the Bank should be included in the text of the Convention. For the same reason he thought that no provision be made allowing transfer of the seat of the Center from the headquarters of the Bank and that it was desirable that the President of the Bank should be Chairman of the Administrative Council and he was in favor of deleting the provision opening the possibility of a transfer of the seat of the Center.

Mr. MELCHOR (Spain), supported by the representative of Portugal, agreed that the President of the Bank should be Chairman of the Administrative Council.

The CHAIRMAN observed that the three delegations at the Santiago meeting which had opposed the proposal that the President of the Bank be Chairman of the Administrative Council had done so in order to avoid giving the Chairman excessive powers, particularly in view of his authority to nominate members of the Panels.

Mr. van SANTEN (Netherlands) said that if the Center were sponsored by the World Bank it was desirable that everything done by the Center should be done under the eyes of the Bank's chief. He therefore supported the requirement that the President of the World Bank should be Chairman of the Council. The powers of the Chairman of the Council in connection with the Panels were also desirable since they would ensure the fair representation on the Panels of qualified persons from both investing and receiving countries.

The CHAIRMAN said that the views expressed by the representatives of France and the Netherlands, emphasizing the link between the Center and the World Bank were particularly valuable. The principle underlying the link with the Bank had not been seriously questioned at previous meetings, and this was, in his view, because the World Bank had now in practice become essentially a development institution and as such was necessarily impartial.

Mr. HELLNERS (Sweden) asked whether any draft had been made of the Conciliation and Arbitration rules referred to in Section 6(v). Those rules might have a bearing on the Convention and certain representatives might be of the opinion that some of them ought to be included in the Convention. He thought that the words "not inconsistent with any provision of this Convention" were redundant and suggested that they be deleted.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) said that the importance of the rules referred to in Section 6(v) could only be assessed after the articles on procedure had been discussed. It would be useful to have the cooperation of members of the Panels in drafting the rules of procedure. He felt that a two-thirds majority might be too small and that a larger majority or even unanimity would be desirable.

The CHAIRMAN observed that all essential points of procedure, such as those on rendering awards on default of a party, would be included in the Convention. The Conciliation and Arbitration Rules adopted by the
Administrative Council would not necessarily be applied because parties would be free to substitute other rules, or leave the tribunal to formulate its own rules. To insist on unanimity for the adoption of the Conciliation and Arbitration Rules might not afford sufficient flexibility and so discourage disputants from having recourse to the Center. With regard to drafting of the Conciliation and Arbitration Rules, he thought that some model rules should be available by the time the Convention was submitted to Governments. The advice of persons with practical experience in the field of international arbitration would have to be sought in this connection.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) felt that the question of default awards might need more detailed treatment than could be given it in the Convention. The Convention and Arbitration Rules adopted by the Council should be a model of their kind covering as many eventualities as possible. While it might be too much to require unanimity for their adoption it was important that they should receive the support of as large a majority as possible of the members of the Administrative Council.

Mr. van SANTEN (Netherlands) was of the opinion that the majority required for the adoption of the rules should be kept as low as possible, and that all matters of importance should be included in the Convention rather than relegated to the rules of procedure. Those rules were of a subsidiary character applicable only insofar as the parties had not agreed on their own rules of procedure.

Mr. MELCHOR (Spain) said that a two-thirds majority was necessary for the adoption of the rules in order to give them adequate prestige. That majority should not be hard to obtain since there were plenty of precedents to choose from in drafting the rules. He recalled that rules had been developed by the Permanent Court of Arbitration which dealt with disputes between States and by the International Chamber of Commerce which dealt with disputes between individuals. It should be borne in mind however that the Center would normally be dealing with disputes between individuals on the one hand and States on the other. The main requisite for its rules was that they should be flexible enough to cover as wide a range of cases as possible.

Mr. PEREIRA (Portugal) asked whether the President, in addition to his casting vote, would be entitled to vote in cases where his vote would complete a two-thirds majority.

The CHAIRMAN said that the President would be allowed a casting vote only as a means of avoiding a deadlock in the case of an equal division, in accordance with the precedent established by the Charters of the Bank and its affiliates.

Mr. DEGUEN (France) thought that the system, reflected in paragraph 7 of the Comment to Article I, whereby the Conciliation and Arbitration Rules would become binding on the parties to a dispute only with their consent, was unsatisfactory in that it allowed one party to frustrate proceedings by withholding its consent.

The CHAIRMAN replied that paragraph 7 of the Comment did not accurately reflect the provisions of Section 4 of Article III and Section 5 of Article IV which were to the effect that those rules would apply except as the parties might have otherwise agreed.
Mr. KOINZER (Federal Republic of Germany) speaking with reference to Section 7(4) on the voting procedure in the Administrative Council, asked whether in view of the fact that the majority of member countries could be capital-importing countries, consideration could be given to distinguishing, as had been done under the Charter of the International Development Association (IDA), between capital-importing and capital-exporting countries, and to requiring a majority in both groups of countries for decisions of the Councils.

The CHAIRMAN said that among the Executive Directors of the Bank - those representing capital-importing as well as capital-exporting countries - there had been strong opposition to any form of voting other than by a simple majority of all the members.

The meeting was suspended at 11 a.m. and resumed at 11.20 a.m.

The Secretariat (Sections 8, 9 and 10)

The CHAIRMAN explained that some of the legal experts at the Addis Ababa meeting had been opposed to the provision in Section 9(2) whereby the office of Secretary-General could be combined with employment by the Bank or the Permanent Court of Arbitration. One expert had explained that his opposition was not motivated by fear of partiality but by the conviction that it would detract from the dignity of the office if it were not held as a full time appointment and that as far as cumulation of functions was concerned he made no distinction between the Bank and the Permanent Court.

The experts had been informed that the provision had been inserted not for financial reasons but to avoid difficulties in finding a suitable candidate who might be unwilling to accept the post of Secretary-General for fear that it would not offer sufficient interest.

His impression was that, by and large, a provision of the kind contemplated in Section 9(2) would be regarded as acceptable as a temporary measure though some States might prefer employment by the Bank to be ruled out.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) said that he was not in favor of allowing the office of Secretary-General to be combined with employment by the Bank or the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

Mr. van SANTEN (Netherlands) said that in principle he was in support of Section 9(2) particularly at the outset when, for practical reasons, it might be desirable not to exclude the possibility of combining the function of Secretary-General with employment by the Bank. Perhaps if the provision were intended to be of a transitional character it should be transferred to a special section at the end of the draft Convention devoted to transitional measures as was more usual in international instruments.

The Chairman agreed that such a solution might allay the concern felt in certain quarters.

Mr. DEGUEN (France) said that bearing in mind the example of the Permanent Court it might prove unnecessary to make mandatory the appoint-
ment of Deputy Secretaries-General. The question of assuring continuity would only arise in acute form if the Center were kept very busy and it should not be impossible to devise means of filling any vacancy in the post of Secretary-General quite quickly.

Mr. BILGEN (Turkey) said that the last sentence in Section 10(2) needed revision. The Secretary-General could not determine in what order the Deputies would act as the situation would only arise if his post were vacant. The decision would need to be taken by some other person, possibly the Chairman of the Administrative Council.

The CHAIRMAN explained that the figures in square brackets in Sections 11 and 12 regarding the numbers of persons to be designated to the Panels were tentative. Some experts at other consultative meetings had expressed the view that the number suggested in Sections 11(2) and 12(2), viz. six persons, might be too high and some believed that the Chairman should not have the right to designate as many as twelve persons to serve on each Panel. The last point was prompted by the fear that in case of disagreement by the parties the Chairman would seek to designate his own appointees. While he did not think that the point had merit, he did not consider the Chairman's powers of designation essential.

There had been some criticism, mainly of a drafting nature, of Section 15. Although it had been generally recognized that some criteria for selection were necessary, the view had been expressed that the wording was not altogether satisfactory. It had also been pointed out by a number of experts that the second sentence in Section 15(1) should be deleted because, being purely an exhortation to governments to seek the advice of certain national institutions, it had no place in a draft convention and might better be embodied in a recommendation by the Administrative Council, by the Executive Directors or by the Bank's Board of Governors to accompany the submission of the draft Convention to governments. Certainly the provision was vague and imposed no obligation upon States to seek such advice.

Mr. BILGEN (Turkey) considered that there was no justification for conferring upon the Chairman the right to designate persons to serve on the Panels and therefore proposed the deletion of paragraph (3) in Sections 11 and 12 and paragraph (2) in Section 15. In his opinion the Panels could only be constituted by the Contracting Parties to an international convention the purpose of which was to establish arbitral machinery for the settlement of disputes between States and nationals of other States.

Regarding Section 13(1), he wondered whether a term of four years might not be too short since conciliators and arbitrators were not going to be called on to perform their functions continuously. It would seem desirable to enable the Contracting Parties to extend the term of service beyond four years and only to specify a minimum term.

The CHAIRMAN said that the proposed term of four years was a tentative one.
Mr. RODOCANACHI (France) said that some provision must be made to enable States acceding to the Convention after it had entered into force to designate persons to serve on the Panels.

He was in favor of the Chairman being empowered to designate persons to serve on the Panels in order to assure balanced representation on the Panels to the extent possible, but thought that designation of persons by the Chairman ought to be made mandatory as in the case of designation by States. Some mention must be made in Section 15(1) of independence among the qualifications of members of the Panels. The second sentence in Section 15(1) seemed a little peremptory: surely governments had the right to consult whomsoever they wished.

The CHAIRMAN said that although some distinction might be drawn in the final provisions between the original signatory States and States which adhered to the Convention at a later stage, no such distinction was made in the present draft. In the present text the term "Contracting States" included any signatory irrespective of the date on which it ratified the Convention.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) said that in general the scheme for selection of the Panels was acceptable and the argument in favor of giving the Chairman the right to designate members put forward in the Comment to Section 15 had considerable force.

For the reason given by the expert from France, he favored deletion of the second sentence in Section 15(1).

Mr. DEGUEN (France) was also in favor of deleting the second sentence in Section 15(1).

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) agreed with the expert from Turkey that a Panel member's term of office ought to be longer than four years which would be more conducive to the creation of a uniform body of law. It was noteworthy that the term of office of members of Panels under the Hague Convention of 1907 was six years.

It would be desirable to include a provision in Section 13 to ensure that the member of a Panel whose term ended during a hearing would continue to serve until the proceedings had been concluded.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that an express provision of that kind might be desirable although he felt there was no doubt that an arbitrator would continue to sit even though his term of appointment to the Panel had expired.

Mr. van SANTEN (Netherlands) said that it was probably necessary to enumerate criteria for selection even though the qualifications stated in the first sentence of Section 15(1) might appear self-evident. He also believed that express mention should be made of the need to designate persons of independence in the sense that not only should they be capable of exercising independent judgment but also of acting with complete impartiality without accepting instructions from the parties appointing them. This would be in accordance with the novel principle, which he endorsed, whereby the arbitrator could not be nationals either of the State party to the dispute or of the State whose national was a party to the dispute.
The CHAIRMAN agreed that independence should be mentioned among the criteria in the first sentence of Section 15(1) which would probably need some redrafting.

Mrs. PILZ (Austria) said that although she was in general agreement with the proposed system she would prefer that each State appoint four persons to each Panel as was done in the Permanent Court, which had proved satisfactory in practice. She was inclined to sympathize with the view that it was not absolutely necessary to empower the Chairman to designate persons to serve on the Panels, particularly if the main reason for doing so was to ensure a balanced representation of the principal legal systems of the world because that should be effected by the Contracting Parties and any failure in this regard would presumably be due to the fact that the legal systems concerned were those of States that had not adhered to the Convention.

Mr. AMIE (Norway) disagreed with the expert from the Netherlands and considered that the whole essence of arbitral procedure lay in the fact that the party appointing an arbitrator could not give him instructions. Accordingly, there was no need to make any reference to independence among the criteria in Section 15(1).

The CHAIRMAN said he had recently been informed by one of the legal advisers in an arbitration case between two States that a more rigid clause regarding independence of the arbitrators in the agreement between the parties would have been helpful.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) considered that it was useful to insert some express provision about independence so as to ensure that the arbitrators did not act under instructions. It might also be desirable to exclude from an arbitral tribunal a person who had previously been involved in the dispute in some other capacity. Perhaps suitable language might be borrowed from the rules of other international tribunals.

The new provision contained in Article IV, Section 2(2) raised some important issues. As the institution of a national judge or a judge ad hoc was a familiar one in international arbitral proceedings he would be reluctant to exclude that possibility. Surely if the Chairman of the tribunal were not a national of one of the States parties to the dispute that should provide an adequate safeguard.

Mr. DEGUEN (France) as a minor argument in support of the Chairman's power to appoint persons to the Panels, referred to the possibility that a dispute might arise between the only two countries ratifying the Convention. In that case no arbitrators could be appointed from the Panels in view of Article IV, Section 2(2).

Mr. PEREIRA (Portugal) said that an express provision specifying that arbitrators must act with complete independence, would greatly enhance the international prestige and authority of arbitral awards.

Mr. HELNERS (Sweden) doubted whether it was strictly necessary to touch upon the question of independence in Section 15, since the whole issue of disqualification on grounds of lack of independence was adequately dealt with in Article V.
Mr. MELCHOR (Spain) was also against including any specific reference to independence in Section 15. In the first place it was not clear what was covered by that requirement: would it, for instance, prevent a government from appointing one of its functionaries to Panels? Would professional relationships have to be taken into account? Secondly, lack of independence of members of a commission or tribunal was adequately covered by the provisions on disqualification in Article V. In this connection he also supported the power of the Chairman to appoint twelve persons to each Panel as these appointees would very probably be persons enjoying international prestige, and parties would often choose arbitrators from among them because of their independence.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) pointed out in reply to what had been said by the expert from Sweden that the disqualification of a member of an arbitral tribunal for lack of independence was a serious weapon which parties to the dispute might be very reluctant to use. Perhaps some provision on the lines of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 17 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice might be useful in the present draft.

Mr. PEREIRA (Portugal) emphasized that independence was not an abstract qualification. He doubted whether a man of complete independence existed anywhere, but persons of recognized standing could be found and relied upon in a given dispute to exercise their functions with complete impartiality in a given case.

The CHAIRMAN observed that two aspects of the quality of independence had been elucidated and that the matter needed further consideration.

Financing the Center (Section 16)

The CHAIRMAN explained that although the question of the Bank financing the Center’s overhead expenses had not yet been put to the Executive Directors, his personal impression was that such a proposal would not meet with serious opposition. The bare overhead costs might be of the order of $50,000.

The question of financing by the Bank of the overhead expenses of the Center had been discussed not so much in the context of avoiding possible additional burdens on governments, but in the context of how to determine the basis for contributions and how to avoid problems of collection and bookkeeping.

Mr. DEGUEEN (France) said that the idea of financing by the Bank was the best solution. There remained the problem of contributions from States not members of the Bank, but he thought the Bank could properly decide to bear the entire overhead cost of the Center without creating any undesirable precedent.

Privileges and Immunities (Sections 17, 18, 19 and 20)

The CHAIRMAN said that the provisions contained in Section 18(1) were modelled on those in the Bank’s Articles of Agreement but perhaps were not wholly appropriate. The immunities ought perhaps to be of the kind
accorded to officials of international organizations under the relevant agreements relating to the privileges and immunities of the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

Commenting on Section 20(2) he pointed out that although the Chairman and members of the Administrative Council served without compensation they might be eligible for subsistence allowances or travel expenses, which in some countries were in principle subject to taxation. However, that paragraph could be reworded in order to remove what to some experts had appeared to be an inconsistency.

The scope of the provisions concerning privileges and immunities was more or less the same as was customarily accorded to international organizations. In some countries they might require implementing legislation or executive action.

Mr. KOINZER (Federal Republic of Germany) said that the financial experts of the Federal Ministry of Finance had expressed misgivings about Section 20 and would prefer something on the lines of the provisions contained in the Convention on the privileges and immunities of the specialized agencies. He also advocated the deletion of Section 20(3) on immunity from taxation of honoraria or fees of arbitrators or conciliators which was not consistent with usual practice.

The CHAIRMAN said that Section 20(3) was intended to avoid the possibility that the location of the proceedings alone might attract tax liability.

Mr. MELCHOR (Spain) said that tax exemptions should only apply to the operation of the Center and not to possible decisions or effects of decisions of the arbitral tribunal itself.

The CHAIRMAN explained that the intention had not been to extend immunities to the tribunal's decisions. The language of Section 20(1) was taken from the Bank's Articles of Agreement and "transactions" referred in the context of the Center to such matters as purchases of office equipment and the like.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) commenting on the sections dealing with privileges and immunities asked for clarification of why the present draft differed from an earlier one in not conferring immunity from legal process in respect of their official acts on those taking part in the proceedings. It might be argued that such a provision could constitute a guarantee against pressure and hence an additional safeguard that arbitrators and conciliators would act with independence.

Some clarification was needed of the language used in Section 18(2). The term "agents" had been understood in the ordinary sense used in international proceedings but it was not clear what was meant by the term "representatives of parties".

Presumably the purpose of Section 19(2) was to accord to communications of the Center the kind of status given to government communications under the ITU Convention, Annex 3. That privilege was only accorded to a limited class of international organizations and he believed it was the policy of the parties to that Convention strictly to limit extensions of
the privilege. His own Government would prefer to accord the same type of privileges as those given to other international organizations.

Section 20(1) seemed to deviate from existing precedents in respect of privileges and immunities. It did not make clear to what extent the Center would be exempt from local taxes imposed by the municipality in respect of the services it provided which in the United Kingdom were known as "rates". The United Kingdom Government had consistently supported the view that exemptions for international bodies of the kind under discussion should be limited to that portion of those local taxes from which the Center would not derive any benefit. There were certain well-established precedents in that regard and the exemption would not be difficult to accord. He therefore suggested that Section 20(1) should be modified so as to specify more clearly for which internal taxes the Center would be liable.

The purport of the last sentence in Section 20(1) was not clear. The United Kingdom experts had deduced from the comment that it followed a precedent set in the Articles of the Bank. The question was whether it was intended that the Center should be in the same position as the Bank with regard to the holding of bonds, etc. He would have thought it to be surprising if the Center were in such a position as to have to collect taxes and customs duties and therefore preferred that provision to be dropped.

Section 20(2) on taxation of emoluments of the personnel of the Center would be acceptable if it were to be interpreted in the same sense as the corresponding provision in the Articles of the Bank. He understood that a recorded interpretation of that provision existed which if applied to the present provision would mean that nationals of the country other than those in which the Center had its seat would not be subject to local income tax in the country of their employment, but might be liable to tax in their own country if they came within its jurisdiction. If that interpretation was correct the provision would be acceptable.

Regarding Section 20(3) on the taxation of honoraria and fees of arbitrators he said that United Kingdom financial experts were somewhat doubtful about the provision but would hesitate to oppose it if it were regarded as necessary by the Bank and the legal experts attending the various consultative meetings. However, it would only be acceptable if its present scope were not extended and if the proviso therein remained unchanged.

The CHAIRMAN, replying to the United Kingdom expert, said that the provision in Section 18(1)(i) had been changed to conform to the Articles of the Bank because of the great opposition by certain governments to according additional immunities. However, there were cogent reasons for extending the immunity from legal process to conciliators and arbitrators and he would personally welcome such a provision.

The language of Section 18 paragraph (2) could be revised and he would have thought it possible to omit reference to "representatives of parties".

He noted the United Kingdom's objection regarding the privileges accorded to communications under Section 19(2) which he assumed related to the question of preferential rates. The point made concerning Section 20(1) would also be noted.
Section 20(2) should be interpreted in the same sense as the corresponding provisions in Articles of the Bank, the IMF, the International Development Association and the International Finance Corporation. By now the practice was a well-established one and no differing interpretations need be expected.

He confirmed that the proviso at the end of Section 20(3) was essential.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

THIRD SESSION
(Tuesday, February 18, 1964 - 3:00 p.m.)

ARTICLE I - International Conciliation and Arbitration Center

Privileges and Immunities (Sections 17 - 20) (continued)

Mr. AMLIE (Norway), questioned the necessity for modelling the provisions relating to privileges and immunities on the corresponding provisions existing in respect of the International Bank, particularly as the Center would be a separate entity having full juridical personality. He recalled the exhaustive work accomplished by the two recent codification conferences on privileges and immunities, the results of which were intended to be of lasting value. It might, therefore, be useful if the Bank could study those provisions and possibly revise the draft Convention accordingly.

He drew attention to a number of discrepancies in the text as compared with accepted international law. There was no provision in the draft Convention relating to the status of persons connected with the Center, and it seemed to him that the draft Convention should include a reference to their inviolability and protection. While provision for inviolability of the archives was contained in Article I, Section 19(1), there should also be included a provision regarding inviolability of the premises of the Center which might be transferred from the headquarters of the Bank pursuant to Article I, Section 6(vi).

A reference to the possibility of waiver of immunity should also be included.

On points of drafting, he suggested that the term "representatives, officials and employees of comparable rank" in Article I, Section 18(ii) required clarification.

The CHAIRMAN said that the reference to "representatives, officials and employees of comparable rank" would be adapted to be in line with the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies.

Mr. AMLIE (Norway) believed that the drafting of Article I, Section 19(2) should be improved in order to make it entirely clear what type of official communications it was intended to cover thereby.
With regard to Section 20(1), it was hard to see, as that provision was drafted at present, how "operations and transactions" could be subject to customs duties.

Clarification was required regarding the differentiation implied between local citizens, local subjects or other local nationals, as listed in Section 20(2).

While the points he had raised were not of fundamental importance, it seemed nonetheless desirable for the provisions relating to privileges and immunities to be constructed with the help of instruments which had recently been adopted.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that there was no actual necessity for the provisions under consideration to be based on the corresponding regulations obtaining in respect of the Bank itself. The Bank texts had been followed since member countries often preferred to follow the basis of an already accepted text which was well known to them. The points of drafting raised were clear in the context of the Bank documents. However, the question of principle should be decided whether the Center should, as a new affiliate of the Bank, follow its terminology or whether it should follow the newer codifications on privileges and immunities.

Mr. KARELJE (Belgium) asked what was meant by the phrase "other income" in Section 20(3) and suggested that the comment to this section specify that honoraria, fees or other income of conciliators and arbitrators could be taxed by the country in which they were resident or had their fiscal domicile.

The CHAIRMAN replied that the words "or other income" in Section 20(3) had been included as an omnibus clause and would be reviewed as they seemed superfluous. He confirmed that there was no intention to limit the right of national authorities to levy taxation in the country of residence; the final draft could be made more explicit.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) said that the personal immunity of arbitrators from jurisdiction constituted a central issue. He would welcome an indication of the attitude of other members to the view that arbitrators should have such immunity.

Mr. AMLIE (Norway), Mr. TROLLE (Denmark), Mr. HEILLERS (Sweden), and Mr. ROSCHER-HOLMBERG (Finland) associated themselves with that view.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) said that he was in agreement in principle with the extension of immunity to arbitrators and conciliators. Caution would have to be exercised in respect of other persons, such as experts and witnesses; circumstances might arise where a witness might not be able to give evidence without permission from a national authority.

Commenting on the term "representatives of parties" included in Section 18(2), he wondered whether it would cover, for example, the general manager of a limited liability company.

The CHAIRMAN confirmed that "representatives of parties" would indeed comprise such persons. The text of Section 18 would be studied further with a view to possible clarification.
Mr. van SANTEN (Netherlands) said that, while he agreed in principle with the opinion expressed by the representative of the United Kingdom, the point did not seem to him of primary importance since proceedings would take place in closed sessions. To make provision for every possibility, however unlikely, was not always altogether desirable. The question of immunity for the foreign investor himself was also worthy of consideration.

Mr. DEGUEN (France), commenting on Article I as a whole, was of the opinion that none of the provisions in that Article, as distinguished from the later Articles, really called for a convention and that a less formal decision taken on the initiative of the Bank could have been sufficient.

On the more general problem of the relationship between the proposed Center and the Bank itself, he felt that a delicate balance had been struck between maintaining the independent character of the Center and its enjoying the full benefit of the Bank's prestige. He wondered, however, whether undue stress had not been laid on that independence and whether it might not be preferable for the Center to be linked even more closely with the Bank, particularly by means of informal consultations with the Executive Directors of the Bank by the Chairman of the Center, who was of course also the President of the Bank, thus achieving the maximum unity among all initiatives undertaken under the auspices of the Bank with a view to ensuring the most favorable climate for public and private investment in developing countries.

The CHAIRMAN said that, while it had not been expressly stipulated in the draft Convention, the Chairman of the Administrative Council of the Center in his capacity as President of the Bank, could properly seek the informal advice of the Executive Directors and inform the Council of their views. His own preliminary reaction to the suggestion made by the representative of France was that it would be superfluous to have a specific provision on that point. However, the matter called for further consideration.

ARTICLE II - Jurisdiction of the Center

The CHAIRMAN, introducing Article II, suggested that the Meeting consider it section by section. He called particular attention to the comment which explained why the term "jurisdiction" had been used.

The point had been made in the course of the two regional consultative meetings already held, and particularly in Africa, that the possible parties to a dispute with a foreign investor might be a public authority, a development institution or a constituent part of a non-unitary State. It had therefore been suggested that Section 1 be expanded to include reference to disputes between an investor and an instrumentality of the State. The text of that suggestion in the form of an additional article would be circulated. If accepted, it might be incorporated in Section 1 or included as a separate provision.

The suggestion had also been put forward that a multilateral guarantee fund which had indemnified the investor could be subrogated to him in proceedings before the Center.

Mr. GOULD (South Africa) fully supported the principle of confer-
ment of procedural capacity on individuals and companies, which he con-
considered to be a wholesome development of international law. Certain
difficulties might, however, arise in connection with the definition of
nationals as proposed in Article X, which article he proposed to consider
in conjunction with Article II, Section 1.

While there could be no objection prima facie to the definition
of a national of a Contracting State as laid down in Article X, that some-
what simplified definition might in fact lend itself to a situation whereby
individuals could assume nationalities of convenience, with the result
that the individual might in fact take his own real State before an inter-
national tribunal. Any jettisoning of the accepted principle of inter-
national law regarding the real and effective nationality of the individual
might lead to that unwholesome position. In this connection he recalled
the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm Case
which had dealt with effective nationality as opposed to a nationality
of convenience. He believed accordingly that it was essential not to
relieve any tribunal of its duty to take an objective decision on the
nationality of an individual on the plane of international law. To give
an individual with dual nationality the right of bringing an action against
the State of his effective nationality would amount to additional privilege
and would represent an unwarranted invasion of the sovereignty of the
national State.

The question of the nationality of companies required even closer
scrutiny. The definition given in Article X represented an over-simplifica-
tion of the matter since in an overwhelming number of cases companies had
dual nationality. Speaking from his own experience in South Africa, there
was a growing tendency for the interposition of companies between the true
investing companies and the host State, and that was a basically undesirable
state of affairs. However great the difficulties, a real effort would have
to be made to determine nationality adequately if individuals were to be
given procedural capacity. It would not be a salutary principle for a com-
pany with control and management in the host State to have direct access
to litigation with the host State before international tribunals.

The case of consortia called for further consideration since it was
not covered by any of the definitions contained in Article X. He referred
to the situation in Southern Africa where the basic facilities were pro-
vided by a large number of private companies; in those cases it would be
difficult to put a stamp of true nationality on a particular company under
the terms of definition in Article X alone. Since in general it would be
the major components of an infra-structure which might be most liable to
be nationalized, it was important for there to be a general understanding
of where they stood from the point of view of international adjudication.
It seemed to him that a more precise and comprehensive definition of
nationality might make the draft Convention more acceptable.

Referring to the provision contained in Article II, Section 3(3) to
the effect that a written affirmation of nationality by the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the State whose nationality was claimed by the party
should be conclusive proof, he expressed the view that for a Minister of
Foreign Affairs to make a thorough investigation of the case, presuming
he were willing to do so, would be tantamount to usurping the function of
the international tribunal. He believed that the onus of establishing
his identity should remain with the claimant. A statement by the Minister
of Foreign Affairs should constitute only prima facie proof and should be

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subject to rebuttal by the other party.

He also drew attention to difficulties which might arise in connection with the reference to the operative date of nationality contained in Article X, paragraph 1, and suggested that as a pre-requisite for jurisdiction foreign nationality should be maintained throughout the proceedings.

With regard to the term "investment dispute of a legal character" in Article II, Section 1, he believed that there was a clear understanding of what was meant thereby and that no further definition should be sought.

The CHAIRMAN observed that the consideration of the definition of "national of a Contracting State" was related to the entire scope of the draft Convention. Since the draft Convention was based on consent, it had seemed possible to include a broader category of individuals than if it had been compulsory.

He agreed that the certificate of nationality provided for in Section 3(3) of Article II, should be accepted as prima facie evidence only.

Various views had been expressed regarding plural nationality and the undesirability of a citizen instituting proceedings against his own State. The purpose which those drafting the Convention had had in mind had been to meet cases where a host country with full knowledge of the facts elected to treat an individual with dual nationality as an alien. The original intention had been to omit mention of the question of effective nationality to see whether there would be acceptance of the general proposition that where a host State in full knowledge of the facts elected to treat an investor as a foreigner even though it could claim with justification that he was its national that election should be given effect by the Convention. Although some African countries were in favor of doing so, on balance opinion seemed to be against it.

With regard to companies, the term "nationality" had been used for the sake of convenience. Some objections had been raised in respect of the possibility that under the Convention a company might bring its own national State before an international tribunal, although such objections had not been as forceful as those with regard to natural persons.

He agreed that the question of consortia was not adequately covered under the draft Convention as it stood.

Referring to the use of the term "investment dispute of a legal character", he expressed the hope that there would be general agreement on not attempting to define further the term "investment dispute". The more definitions were included in the Convention the more likelihood there was of jurisdictional controversies.

Mr. MELCHOR (Spain) stressed the difficulty of defining the term "dispute of a legal character". He agreed that the term should exclude disputes of a political character but felt that commercial and economic factors were generally too closely bound up with legal disputes for those factors to be ruled out in the manner suggested in the Comment.

He urged the deletion from Section 1 of Article II of the words in brackets "or that State when subrogated in the rights of its national", which could only lead to difficulties in the application of the Convention.
It was precisely the merit of the proposed Convention that it would serve to avoid turning a dispute between a private investor and the host State into an Interstate dispute.

With regard to the problem of dual nationality, he felt that, where one of the two nationalities involved was that of the host State, that State would not agree to being brought before an international forum by a person whom it claimed as its national.

The complex problem of the nationality of such bodies corporata as limited companies had baffled many leading authorities in international law. However, the problem would probably not often arise in that form. It would normally not be a company as such that would invoke the Convention but rather the private foreign interests involved in the Company. Very often, the investing company was owned as to 50 per cent by such foreign interests (often a foreign company) and as to 50 per cent by local interests.

He felt that Section 2 on consent to jurisdiction should be removed from Article II and placed in the provisions dealing with procedure, as consent to conciliation and arbitration respectively would require different treatment.

Lastly, he had serious misgivings regarding Section 3. As Legal Adviser to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he doubted whether his Ministry was in a position to issue a certificate of the kind indicated in that provision. In many countries that Ministry was indeed not the authority competent to issue such a certificate. Perhaps the best course would be to require a certification from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the authority issuing a certificate of nationality was competent to do so under the laws of the State concerned.

Mr. RODOCANACHI (France) pointed out that the correct French translation of the English term "jurisdiction" was "compétence". The French term "jurisdiction" had a geographical connotation.

He found the term "dispute of a legal character" too restrictive. Discrimination in taxation, or even police measures, could adversely affect an investment contract without touching in any way the legal aspects of the contract. It was essential that disputes arising in such circumstances should be covered by the Convention.

He felt that the amendment contained in document COM/EU/6*/ would provide a solution to most of the problems which had arisen on the points covered by it; however, in the French text, he suggested that the terms

*/ The text of the amendment circulated by the Secretariat at the meeting reads as follows:

"Section ... Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1 of Article II, the jurisdiction of the Center shall extend to any dispute between a political subdivision or instrumentality of a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State, where such political subdivision or instrumentality and such national have consented to the jurisdiction of the Center in respect of such dispute, and such political subdivision or instrumentality has given its consent with the approval of the Contracting State concerned."
"subdivisions politiques" and "institutions publiques" should be replaced by the more appropriate terms "collectivités locales" and "organismes publics".

On the question of subrogation, he did not share the views of the Spanish representative: a State which was subrogated in the rights of its national would not have any different rights from that national himself and would be acting as an assignee under private law and not as a sovereign State.

He agreed with the doubts that had been expressed on Section 3. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs might well not be the competent body to issue a certificate of nationality. Moreover, the proposed provision would remove from the purview of the arbitral tribunal a matter which was essentially within its jurisdiction.

With regard to the complex problem of the nationality of companies, he was interested by the suggestion that an effort should be made to afford protection to the foreign interests involved in a company, regardless of the company's nationality, which might well not be that of one of the Contracting States.

He shared the misgivings expressed on the problem of dual nationality; a provision allowing a national of another Contracting State whom France claimed as a French citizen to invoke the Convention against France would imperil the chances of his country's accession to the Convention.

The CHAIRMAN recalled that the Convention was optional in character. It was clear, for example, that no Contracting State would have to face the problem mentioned by the French representative unless it specifically agreed to bring under the Convention an investment contract entered into with a person of dual nationality.

He wished to know whether the feeling in the matter was so strong that it was desired to preclude a State which was fully aware of an investor's dual nationality from consenting to give that investor the benefit of the Convention and its provisions on conciliation and arbitration.

With reference to the nationality of companies he noted that two approaches had been suggested. One would rely on the effective economic control of the company by foreign interests as a test of foreign nationality. The other would allow the foreign interests in a local company, as distinct from the company itself, to be parties to proceedings under the Convention.

With reference to the discussion on the expression "dispute of a legal character" he recalled that the words "all legal disputes" had been used in Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. He agreed that the language used in paragraph 4 of the Comment was not altogether satisfactory: the intention had been to exclude claims that were based on purely economic or commercial considerations and in which it was not even alleged that there had been a breach of legal rights.

Mr. MANTZOLINOS (Greece) urged that the emphasis should not be placed on the nationality of the investor, but on the movement of capital
from one national economic unit to another. He observed that three situations could arise: first, that of an investor who freely invested in a private company in a foreign country; second, an investment freely made by a foreign investor where the recipient of the funds was a foreign State or public entity; third, the situation arising where a special investment contract was concluded in response to an appeal or offer made by the host State. He wondered whether the term "investment" should cover all three situations or only the third.

The CHAIRMAN explained that the Convention was intended to cover all three situations, provided of course that there was consent by the parties.

Mr. MELCHOR (Spain) referring to the question of subrogation of the investor's State in the rights of its national, acknowledged that a State in such a case would have only the rights of the investor concerned and would not be acting in its sovereign capacity. On the other hand the Convention established the valuable principle whereby the investor and the host State could confront each other on the same plane before an international tribunal. If, through subrogation the investor's State became party to the proceedings this would to some extent modify this principle. It had been said that subrogation would arise principally in the context of a system of investment guarantees or insurance. In his opinion this Convention would eliminate the need for such insurance.

On the question of dual nationality he could not agree that a State would under any circumstance consider foreign an investment made by one of its nationals even if he had concurrently the nationality of another State. A national should have access to his State only before the Courts of that State.

In that connection he expressed the view that foreign nationality should be determined at the time the investment was made as he believed that any dispute between the investor and the host State should be decided according to laws of that State in force at the time the investment was made.

The CHAIRMAN said he would like the experts to consider whether an arbitration or conciliation agreement between a State and one of its nationals who had concurrently the nationality of another State should be treated as invalid and as being outside the scope of the Convention.

Mr. GUARINO (Italy) drew a distinction between three cases. First, the case of a person investing abroad for the same reasons which might lead him to invest in his own country. Second, that of an investor attracted by special legislation for the promotion of foreign investments, but having no specific investment contract, and third, the case where the investment was made under an investment contract. In the last mentioned case the contract could be with the State itself (a purely theoretical hypothesis nowadays), with a public entity (a rare occurrence) or, more usually, a company organized under private law but controlled by the host State. That last situation - by far the more common one - was not covered by the provisions under discussion. The same was true of the case of a State which retroactively abolished benefits offered to foreign investors under special legislation and on the basis of which investments had been made. He therefore suggested that the jurisdiction of the Center be extended to cover disputes with government-controlled corporations and disputes between private parties arising out of unilateral modification.
of the conditions under which the investment was made.

The CHAIRMAN explained that the provisions of the draft, with the proposed amendment (Document COM/EU/6), would cover all the cases mentioned, except conflicts between two companies organized under private law, conflicts which should be settled by the national courts, through commercial arbitration, or other appropriate procedures.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) recalled that, as between the parties to a dispute, the Center's jurisdiction was essentially based on consent. The provisions of Article II, however, were of special importance to other contracting parties who, under the Convention would be required to consider an award enforceable. For purposes of enforcement, the limits of the Center's jurisdiction, as defined in Article II, were especially relevant. In that connection, he noted the absence of any provision for ex officio determination of jurisdiction by a conciliation commission or arbitral tribunal, those organs should be able to say, as a matter of course, that a particular dispute was not covered by the Convention. The provisions under discussion covered only the case where the issue of jurisdiction was raised by one of the parties.

In Section 1, he found ambiguous the words "existing or future" which qualified the term "investment dispute". Those words should be deleted, or else clarified by reference to some point of time.

In view of the difficulty of defining the term "investment dispute" he wondered whether it might not be possible to establish some procedure for determining outside the tribunal whether an investment dispute existed in each particular case. Perhaps the President of the World Bank might be given this function.

He could not readily accept the qualification "of a legal character" if construed as tending to exclude questions of fact. That expression should only be used, for convenience, to designate disputes suitable for determination by semi-judicial bodies.

He urged the retention of the reference (in brackets) to subrogation in Section 1. The point was of considerable practical importance in view of the United Kingdom's and other countries' schemes of export credit guarantees.
With regard to Section 3, he felt that the Foreign Office would not gladly shoulder the burden of issuing certificates of nationality.

Section 1 seemed to envisage that there would only be two parties to a dispute; in fact, there might well be more than two, as other provisions of the draft seemed to admit. He thought some consideration ought to be given to this problem, although he realized the difficulties involved.

Lastly, he saw no difficulty in admitting that an individual could have a right of action before an international body against his own State.

The CHAIRMAN thanked the United Kingdom representative for drawing attention to a number of important points, in particular the relevance of Article II to the question of enforceability and the need to provide for the possibility of several parties.

Mr. OBERHOLZER (South Africa) said that while there might be no objection to the Convention being invoked by a person who had been born a national of the respondent State but had since acquired and effectively exercised another nationality, a State could not accept the possibility of being brought to international arbitration by a person who was effectively its own national.

It was essential to bear in mind, moreover, that once the Center was set up, a practice was likely to grow up of referring disputes to it by means of a clause in bilateral agreements. Clauses of that type which were often very brief would incorporate the provisions of Article II by reference. It would thus be necessary to define the jurisdiction of the Center as precisely as possible.

Mr. TROLLE (Denmark) and Mr. LØVOLD (Norway) agreed with the Chairman's remarks on the subject of dual nationality.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) agreed with the United Kingdom expert's observations in connection with Section 3 on certification of nationality.

Regarding the proposed amendment (COM/EU/6) he felt that serious problems could arise because it provided that a political subdivision or instrumentality of a Contracting State could take action against a national of another Contracting State in cases which would normally go to the competent domestic courts.

Mr. HERNDL (Austria) said that Section 1 gave rise to no difficulty in cases where an investor complained of action which affected the performance of the contract. In that event, the Center was merely a substitute for the domestic courts and would apply municipal law. However, the investor complained of State action contrary to international law, the question of the law to be applied stood in need of clarification.

Mr. HELLMERS (Sweden) pointed out that dual nationality was largely an academic issue in the case of natural persons, since at present practically all investors acted through limited liability companies. He wondered what would happen in the case where a local company controlled by foreign interests which had entered into an investment agreement with the host State was subsequently nationalized. In such a case it seemed as though the foreign shareholders would have no means of forcing the com-
pany to bring the dispute before the Center, and he thought some mention of this problem ought to be made in the Comment to Article II.

He doubted the wisdom of including in Article II the reference to "investment disputes of a legal character". He suggested that it should be transferred to the Preamble.

Mr. DEGUEN (France) said that a State and one of its nationals might well both participate in an investment operation in another Contracting State. In that case, it was perhaps desirable to provide for all three parties to be associated in the proceedings. Otherwise, there might be two conflicting decisions in the same dispute.

The CHAIRMAN said that it was preferable for a case of that type to be dealt with by means of an agreement between the two States that they would abide by the decision that would be given in the dispute between one of them and the investor. It was not desirable to introduce a radical exception to the provisions of the Convention.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) recalled that there existed a body of well-established case-law on the definition of the term "legal dispute" in the practice of the International Court; he referred, in particular, to the recent Advisory Opinion of the Court on certain expenses of the United Nations.

He reserved his position regarding the question just raised by the French representative, which appeared to come within the scope of the matter of the overlapping of competence of several international adjudicating bodies.

The meeting rose at 6:00 p.m.

FOURTH SESSION
(Wednesday, February 19, 1964 - 9:35 a.m.)

ARTICLE II - Jurisdiction of the Center (continued)

The CHAIRMAN invited the meeting to conclude its consideration of Article II except for the question of nationality which could be deferred. He invited the attention of the experts in particular to Section 2 dealing with consent to jurisdiction.

Mr. ROSCHIER-HOLMBERG (Finland) said he supported the observations made in paragraph 4 of the Comment to the effect that the inclusion of a more precise definition of the disputes that could be submitted to the Center would tend to open the door to frequent disagreements as to the applicability of the Convention. He stressed that under Section 3(2)(iii) the objection that a dispute was not within the scope of the Convention would be dealt with expeditiously and impartially. With regard to the question of dual nationality, he supported the view of the representative of Denmark.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) said he had no objection
to Section 2(iii) provided a party could refuse to accept the jurisdiction of the Center without having to give an explanation.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) said that in Section 2 line 2 he would prefer to have the words "may be evidenced by" replaced by a rendering nearer to the French version: "peut résulter". He suggested that consent to the jurisdiction of the Center should in all cases be given in writing and that once consent had been given, no party should be allowed to withdraw its consent unilaterally. He pointed out that in order to cover the case of acceptance by the other party of the jurisdiction of the Center following a unilateral approach under Section 2(iii), the drafting of the Section in Article IV dealing with requests for arbitration might need amendment.

The CHAIRMAN, with reference to the suggestion that no party having accepted the jurisdiction of the Center should be allowed unilaterally to withdraw that acceptance, observed that the Preamble affirmed that consent was binding and that this principle was further implemented at various stages by methods for overcoming possible attempts to frustrate the application of the Convention.

Mr. GUARINO (Italy) suggested the addition of a sub-paragraph in Section 2(i) to read: "Consent to the jurisdiction of the Center by any party to the dispute may be given by a declaration of the State, officially notified to the Center, that it will submit to the jurisdiction of the Center all future disputes or all disputes concerning foreign investments made in reliance on a law that the State has promulgated." A stipulation of that kind would constitute a prior guarantee in the legislation of the State that the foreign investor would be protected by international arbitration, whereas without some such guarantee it might be difficult after a dispute had arisen to make a State accept the jurisdiction of the Center.

The CHAIRMAN said that the suggestion put forward by the representative of Italy dealt in reality with a special case covered by the existing Section 2(i).

Mr. GUARINO (Italy) replied that he was not convinced that Section 2(i) covered the circumstances he had in mind. If a State passed a law inviting foreign investments and included in that law an undertaking to submit possible disputes to arbitration, that State could not be denied the right to modify the law in question at a later date. The Convention should therefore require that a definitive written undertaking be made to it directly expressing the consent of the State to the jurisdiction of the Center. Since the consent was in all cases voluntary, he saw no reason why States should not be willing to make general as well as particular undertakings to accept the jurisdiction of the Center.

The CHAIRMAN said that it might be desirable that all expressions of consent to submit disputes to conciliation or arbitration under the terms of the Convention should be registered at the Center.

Mr. PEREIRA (Portugal) said that he could not see how effect could be given to Section 2(iii) since in the case mentioned, it would be unlikely that the other party would be willing to submit to the jurisdiction of the Center.
The CHAIRMAN said that the paragraph followed the precedent of the International Court of Justice with regard to cases involving acceptance of its jurisdiction where no prior agreement existed.

Mr. PEREIRA (Portugal) asked whether a clause of the kind was in keeping with the nature of arbitration.

The CHAIRMAN said he had thought that it was a useful residuary clause in case other clauses did not apply, but he would give the matter further thought.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) said that the use of the word "submission" might lead to confusion. The Secretary-General would be "approached" to ask the other party if it would be prepared to have recourse to the tribunal. He suggested that some expression other than "submission" might be more appropriate.

Mr. DEGUEN (France) observed that Section 2(i) contained two important innovations from the juridical standpoint. In the first place, it involved the question of the extent to which a tribunal could judge whether consent was valid or not and, in the second place, the extent to which a Contracting State which did not recognize the right it had granted to the citizen of another State to arbitration could be brought by that other State before an international court such as the International Court of Justice for having failed to fulfill its obligations under an international convention it had signed. He felt that it was doubtful whether the tribunal could enforce its award if a State at the time of a dispute were unwilling to submit that dispute to arbitration and denied the validity of its earlier consent to do so. In that case the only recourse of the injured party would be to claim normal diplomatic protection and he feared that the introduction of an additional contractual obligation would tend to give rise to additional juridical controversy. He stressed the need to strengthen the international legal obligations of Contracting States to make their consent irrevocable and any form of evasion more difficult.

The CHAIRMAN said that the most important juridical innovation introduced by the Convention was the affirmation that agreements between States and individuals were internationally binding, a principle that had not till then been universally accepted and one that should, thanks to the Convention, be thenceforward definitely established. If it was felt that the Convention did not clearly establish the irrevocable character of such agreements its language could be modified so as to leave no doubt on this point.

Mr. KARELLE (Belgium) said that he shared the view of the representative of Spain that Article II Section 2 would better be transferred to Articles III and IV.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that since the section was applicable to both conciliation and arbitration, it had been thought more economical to include it in Article II. Furthermore, since consent was the most important prior condition to conciliation or arbitration it had also seemed logical that the section dealing with it should precede the articles on conciliation and arbitration.

With regard to the inclusion of the parenthetical language in Section 1, which was considered desirable by most speakers (except the representative of Spain) the difference of opinion might be due to the
question of how such cases of subrogation could arise.

Under the usual bilateral programs in which investments were guaranteed by a State, the only relations involved were those between the investor and his own State. However, investors might in addition enter into an investment agreement with the host State. In that case, an event claimed to be a violation of the investment agreement could also be one against which the investor was insured by his own State. The investor might then either bring the dispute at issue before the Center (assuming his agreement contained a compromissory clause to that effect), after which, whether the decision was in his favor, the matter as between him and the host State would be settled. If the investor lost his case, he could then turn to his own government and be entitled under the guarantee contract to recover his loss regardless of the legality of his claim against the host State. The State having paid the investor would thereafter be subrogated in his rights, but since the investor had already exhausted all possibilities for legal action, his claim even though preferred by the subrogee State could not lead to further proceedings. On the other hand, the investor might be entitled to claim an indemnity from the State or from a guarantee fund regardless of the legality of the event covered by the guarantee and without taking prior legal action. The provision included in Section 1 would then allow the guarantor to take the place of the investor and bring the corresponding claim before the Center, although the State would, in such a case, have no rights other than those of the investor. Section 1 indicated only the outer limits of possible action and whether in fact the State would or would not be able to have recourse to the jurisdiction of the Center would depend on the existence or otherwise of a compromissory clause.

Mr. MELCHOR (Spain) reiterated his suggestion that Section 2 ought to be transferred to Articles III and IV. He pointed out that where conciliation was in question, a compromissory clause would not normally be necessary, whereas in cases of arbitration a clause of that kind would have to be included. The two should therefore be dealt with separately in the corresponding Articles.

With regard to subrogation, while a State could obviously come before the Center as an individual in private law, in certain countries where for historical or other reasons sovereignty was a sensitive issue, the presence in proceedings of a State instead of an individual might give rise to political difficulties. Furthermore, he saw no reason why the State should not pay on the guarantee only after the tribunal had rendered an award. He asked whether subrogation would not be applicable also in the case of insurance companies. With regard to the definition of "investment dispute", he was of the opinion that the Preamble and Article I, read in good faith, adequately indicated the questions that could be submitted to the Center.

The CHAIRMAN said that insurance companies were not mentioned in the context of subrogation because they would come within the category of nationals of other States. Whether an insurance company could be subrogated to the investor would depend on the terms of the particular investment agreement. The parenthetical language had been inserted in order to avoid excluding a State from proceedings solely because it was a State.
He was of the opinion that any attempt to give a more detailed definition of investment disputes might lead to endless discussions, although a non-exclusive list of the types of investment involved could be made, if desired.

Mr. GOULD (South Africa) said that while Section 2 contained exhaustive and practical provisions from the standpoint of large-scale capital-exporting countries and for investments of major importance, he felt there was room for further consideration of the position of the smaller investor. The foreign capital needed by developing States was largely provided by a multiplicity of small investors. To attract those investors the developing countries had to offer and guarantee investment incentives, particularly in the field of taxation and tariff allowances, of special facilities for the repatriation of capital and the transfer of profits and of currency convertibility. Since no country could be obliged to keep its investment laws unchanged, the chief preoccupation of the small investor was to know how long the incentives offered him would be maintained. He suggested that countries should be left free to alter their investment laws, but not with retroactive effect. Undertakings to go to arbitration should be irrevocable in respect of disputes concerning implied or express promises in investment legislation and arising before the change in that legislation.

The CHAIRMAN observed that in the suggestion put forward by the representative of South Africa two issues appeared to be involved: irrevocability was applied in the first place to the incentives offered by the country's municipal law and in the second place to the consent to have recourse to arbitration. The Convention did not attempt to limit the right of a State to modify its legislation. All it did was to ensure that consent to arbitration would be irrevocable. Unilateral consent in advance to arbitration before the Center given by States in investment legislation was covered in Section 2(i). The Bank had, however, refrained from singling out this form of consent in order to avoid creating in developing countries the impression that this ought to be the normal means of dealing with foreign investors, and in the investors themselves, the expectation that Contracting States would follow this practice.

Mr. GOULD (South Africa) said that the small investor would not place his investments in a country for the sake of the incentives without the acceptance by that country of recourse to arbitration in the case of disputes. The point he had raised referred to the possible withdrawal of that acceptance.

The CHAIRMAN observed that in that event the remedy lay in the proper formulation of the acceptance of arbitration which should be in its terms irrevocable.

Mr. KOINZER (Federal Republic of Germany) said that while it would be impossible to establish the principle of irrevocability with regard to a country's legislation, investors ought nevertheless to be assured that the promises made to them would be fulfilled. He asked if an investor who responded to incentives offered him by laws or unilateral declarations which included a clause binding the Government to submit to arbitration brought a claim before the Center on the ground that those incentives had been revoked, would the tribunal be entitled to decide
that the State had to fulfill the undertakings given in the incentives originally offered?

The CHAIRMAN said that if there had been unqualified consent to submit all questions to arbitration the tribunal would be able to consider whether the revocation of incentives was proper under national and international law. Most agreements of that kind would, however, in all probability contain qualifying clauses with regard to the question of consent to arbitration. In that event, of course, no one could complain because the investor would have known exactly what was being offered to him.

Mr. GUARINO (Italy) said that an intermediate solution to the question raised by the representatives of South Africa and the Federal Republic of Germany might be found by mentioning explicitly in the comment that the State may give its undertaking to have recourse to the Center in a law for the promotion of foreign investments and within the terms of that law with respect to any investment made pursuant to the law.

Since the basis of the Convention was to be consent, he saw no reason why signatory States could not consent to have recourse to arbitration even in the case of investors from non-signatory countries. He therefore suggested that in Section 1, line 5, the word "Contracting" be deleted.

The difficulty raised by the representative of Spain with regard to subrogation could be met by removing the clause in parenthesis in Section 1 and excluding subrogation unless it were explicitly envisaged in the State's acceptance of arbitration.

The CHAIRMAN observed that the present Convention had to be limited to disputes between States and nationals of other States because it was essential that it should treat States and individuals on the same footing. In Article IV it would be seen that in return for a State's consenting to be sued by individual investors of another State before an international tribunal, nationals of the investors' State renounced their normal right to seek diplomatic protection. If the agreement were extended to non-contracting States, the diplomatic protection afforded to citizens of those States would stand and the principle of reciprocity which was the basis of the Convention would be abandoned. The Convention should not therefore be extended to cover investors who were citizens of non-contracting States.

The meeting was suspended at 11:05 a.m. and resumed at 11:25 a.m.

The CHAIRMAN referring to Section 3, suggested that paragraph (3) be left aside until the question of nationality was discussed in connection with definitions.

Paragraph (1) should give rise to no difficulties since it stated the generally accepted principle that an international tribunal was judge of its own competence.

The purpose of paragraph (2) was to list the kind of questions that might be determined as preliminary questions. Sub-paragraph (i) was
drawn from the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure drawn up by the International Law Commission but could be replaced by a statement that "the dispute is not within the jurisdiction of the Center". Such wording would be very broad indeed and the other sub-paragraphs could enumerate more specific examples, i.e. that there had been no valid consent, that the dispute was not within the scope of the consent or that a Party was not a national of a Contracting State etc. The list need not be exhaustive but there would be some advantage in indicating the kind of issues that might come up for decision as preliminary questions. He was uncertain whether the mandatory form used in the last phrase was desirable. Perhaps it would have to be left to the discretion of the commission or tribunal to decide whether or not these questions ought to be decided as preliminary questions.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) expressed doubts about the wisdom of using mandatory language in the last phrase of Section 3(2) and drew attention to Article 62, paragraph 5 of the Rules of the International Court of Justice according to which it was open to the Court after hearing the parties to give its decision on the objection or to join the objection to the merits.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) pointed out that there was an express provision in Article IV, Section 8(2) by virtue of which the tribunal would have to decide that it had jurisdiction before it could render an award on default. He attached considerable importance to the fact that the Center's jurisdiction was limited to a very narrow and specialized field and believed it essential to make it clear that a tribunal could raise the issue of its jurisdiction of its own motion.

He believed that another subparagraph would have to be inserted in Section 3(2) reading: "The dispute is not within the scope of the Convention", in order to cover the case where the parties might have agreed to submit a dispute to the Center, but in doing so had gone beyond the terms of the Convention itself. Such a case could give rise to a situation similar to that which occurred by the Monetary Gold Case, when Italy initiated proceedings in the International Court of Justice, then itself raised the question of jurisdiction and the objection had been upheld.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that one of the main underlying purposes of the draft was to secure general recognition of arbitral awards, and the United Kingdom representative's comments should be viewed with that consideration in mind.

Mr. AMLIE (Norway) said that the concluding phrase of Section 3(2) had not at first raised objections in his country but on closer examination he had found a puzzling disparity between the text of the article and paragraph 11 of the comment, from which it appeared that a decision by an arbitral tribunal as to its competence would be binding on the parties, but that a decision on the same subject by a conciliation commission would only have the force of a recommendation. The point was not of crucial importance but he could see no harm in the latter being made binding also.

The CHAIRMAN said that the original draft had followed the line advocated by the expert from Norway but had met with opposition. From the practical point of view he doubted whether it would make much difference since refusal to accept a recommendation by a conciliation commission on
the issue of jurisdiction would not be favorably received either by the other party or public opinion. On the other hand, as the members of the conciliation commission might not have been selected on grounds of legal competence, there was a case for not stipulating that their decision on the commission's own competence would have binding legal force.

Mr. HEINLERS (Sweden) observed that there seemed to be some inconsistency between the language used in Section 3(2) and the last sentence in paragraph 11 of the comment in so far as the text of the article did not explicitly state that the decision of the tribunal concerning its own competence would be binding. Nor was it clear what bearing such a decision would have on a decision by another court. It ought to be made clear that one of the parties could not secure from another court a ruling as to the validity of its consent to submit a dispute to arbitration under the Convention and an express provision in that regard might be inserted in Section 3.

The CHAIRMAN explained that the word "binding" had been used in paragraph 11 of the comment so as to emphasize the distinction between the ruling of a tribunal and a recommendation by the conciliation commission concerning competence. The binding character of any decision by the former on preliminary questions or merits, was clearly set forth in Article IV and could be discussed under that Article.

Mr. van SANTEN (Netherlands) said that at the outset of the discussion he had been reassured by the distinction the Chairman had rightly drawn between the jurisdiction of the Center and the competence of the tribunal. In his view the process should be regarded as consisting of two stages. The first was the written request addressed to the Secretary-General at which moment consideration would be given to the question whether the dispute came within the scope of the Convention, otherwise there would be no point in having a Center at all.

The second was the procedure envisaged in Section 3. At that moment the question of the tribunal's competence might become of primary importance and perhaps in that regard the Rules of the International Court of Justice were too liberal. Great caution should therefore be exercised about changing the last sentence in Section 3(2) from the mandatory to the permissive form. He also considered that greater precision was needed in the sub-paragraphs enumerating the grounds of lack of competence. In his own mind there could be no doubt that sub-paragraph (ii) should refer to "competence" and not "jurisdiction". It seemed to him that a confusion had arisen during the course of the discussion as to the difference between jurisdiction and competence.

The CHAIRMAN observed that, if one disregarded considerations of economy in drafting, the content of Section 3 could be transferred to Articles III and IV respectively. The expert from the Netherlands had rightly stressed the importance of ensuring that preliminary questions be disposed of as rapidly as possible so that time should not be wasted on discussions that might conclude with a decision that the commission or tribunal lacked competence because there had been no valid consent.

Perhaps the tribunal could be relied upon to dispose of as many issues as possible as preliminary questions in the interests of speed. Possibly the mandatory form used in the final phrase of Section 3 might cause difficulties. Perhaps the comment could make it clear that the
mandatory language would apply only when questions of jurisdiction could be decided without joining them to the merits.

It would be difficult to substitute the word "competence" for the word "jurisdiction" in Section 3(2)(ii) because the latter referred back to the "jurisdiction" of the Center and was not intended to refer to the jurisdiction of any particular tribunal. He would like to consider the matter further.

Mr. van SANTEN (Netherlands) emphasized the importance of giving careful thought to the wording so as to remove any confusion between the competence of the tribunal and the jurisdiction of the Center. He was inclined to disagree with the United Kingdom expert regarding determination by the tribunal sua sponte of its competence. Since the question of jurisdiction would have been discussed with the Secretary-General prior to proceedings a tribunal would have to express itself on its own competence only on rare occasions. Such an eventuality should not be over-stressed.

The CHAIRMAN said his understanding was that the United Kingdom expert had in mind cases where a dispute manifestly lay outside the scope of the Convention rather than more technical points such as whether the plaintiff was a national of one of the Contracting States or whether the dispute was within the scope of the consent.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) confirmed that the concern he had expressed was inspired in the main by the enforceability provisions which were very serious ones. He was not worried by marginal cases of excess of jurisdiction.

Mr. GUARINO (Italy) asked what was the relationship between the provisions contained in Section 3 and those in the last sentence of Article III, Section 5(2). It seemed that a party disputing the competence of a conciliation commission would not participate in the proceedings, in which case it seemed otiose to appoint a commission at all if its only function would be to state that fact in its report. For that technical reason he agreed with the expert from Spain that a sharp distinction must be drawn between the rules of governing the procedure of an arbitral tribunal and those of a conciliation commission.

The CHAIRMAN suggested that that point be taken up under Article III.

Mr. DEGUEN (France) hoped that the United Kingdom suggestion to give the Chairman of the Administrative Council some responsibility for determining the tribunal's competence would be carefully explored as it might offer a solution to some of the problems that had been raised.

Mr. KOINZER (Federal Republic of Germany), reverting to Section 1, said that the new draft provision extending the jurisdiction of the Center to disputes involving political sub-divisions or instrumentalities of States (Doc. COM/EU/6) had been considered by the Federal Republic's experts. Even after hearing about the opinions expressed at the Addis Ababa consultative meeting he did not view the proposal with any greater sympathy. He had already explained that as far as the Federal Republic was concerned the usefulness of the Convention would depend on whether

*See p. 28 of this document*
it would offer investors a greater sense of security. At first sight the proposal seemed to imply that claims could be brought against national agencies rather than States and that raised three questions. First, what would be the situation if a special agreement existed between an investor and a national agency and the State introduced measures that might adversely affect the interests of the former. Would it then be open to the agency to disclaim responsibility for those measures and thus frustrate any attempt to bring the matter to arbitration or would the investor still be entitled to sue the State?

Secondly, was the record of national agencies similar to the record of governments in observing arbitral awards? If not, the kind of loophole being proposed would weaken the force of the instrument under discussion.

Thirdly, could national agencies be expected to exercise the same kind of restraint that States were likely to exercise in instituting proceedings against investors. If the answer to that question were in the negative the amendment would greatly detract from the value of the Convention.

He also asked whether in the event of a State making a unilateral declaration of the kind mentioned by the expert from Italy that would imply some measure of reciprocity and whether the State would then be able to sue the investor even if the investor had not formally consented to the jurisdiction of the Center.

The CHAIRMAN, replying to the last question, said that in his opinion a unilateral declaration would not give the State any right to initiate proceedings against the investor.

The misgivings about extending the scope of the Convention to disputes involving political sub-divisions and instrumentalities of States seemed mainly inspired by doubts about the desirability of entering into agreements with entities other than States, a significant distinction. The reason for the amendment proposed at the African meeting was not to enable the State, to stand aside as it were, and escape liability but to cover those cases when agreements were in fact concluded not with the State itself and thus to bring them within the scope of the Convention. It was considered that their exclusion would be regrettable because investors might wish to have a means of submitting disputes with such agencies to impartial adjudication.

He could not give an answer to Mr. Koinzer's second question concerning the record of agencies in regard to compliance with arbitral awards.

Mr. Koinzer's third point could be taken up when the meeting discussed the cost of proceedings. Fears had been expressed at meetings of the Bank's Executive Directors and in the other regional meetings about the possibility of investors bringing forward unjustifiable claims in order to secure better treatment and it had been useful to be reminded of the converse possibility at the present meeting. There was no complete answer to either argument. The purpose of the present draft was to provide first for an unofficial screening process by the Center which would have no binding force on the parties, to be followed by some punitive provisions on the subject of costs. Of course, he could not
see into the future but doubted whether the fears on either side were really justified since the parties would probably be cautious about bringing claims before the Center that were likely to be rejected on the ground that they had no foundation, or that they had been brought in bad faith. Nevertheless, if a legal right was conferred there was always some possibility of it being used indiscriminately or abused. He thought that the amendment would not weaken the Convention since it would merely enable investors, if they so desired, to seize the Center of a case involving political sub-divisions or instrumentalities of States, while leaving untouched the issue of whether or not it was desirable to conclude contracts with any body other than the central government of a State.

Mr. HERNDL (Austria) observed that the purport of the amendment was not very clear. The text at first sight seemed to mean that there could be consent between an investor and a State agency to bring disputes before the Center. What then would be the situation, as far as international law was concerned, if there had been no violation of a contractual obligation but the investor claimed that the State concerned, by legislative action (e.g. expropriation or fiscal measures prohibiting the export of capital) had violated his rights as an individual under international law? Could the provision enable the individual investor to bring an action against the State on those grounds?

The CHAIRMAN replied in the negative. When it came to an action of the State itself nothing less than an agreement with it for ad hoc submission of the case to the tribunal would suffice. The amendment would be of limited application but had some value for cases where the dispute was one that fell just short of the exercise of sovereign power by the State.

Mr. HELLNERS (Sweden) asked what was the Chairman's view about the consensus reached in the meeting concerning the phrase "legal character" in Section 1. The Scandinavian countries were extremely anxious to have it deleted so as to avoid confusion.

The CHAIRMAN said his impression was that there was no division of opinion as to the purpose of the provision, but only on the drafting. He was aware of the difficulty for Scandinavian countries created by the distinction between law and fact in their legal systems but the wording of Section 1 was not intended to exclude disputes on facts relevant to arriving at a legal determination. He hoped a better draft could now be devised to take account of the discussion and to make it plain that the claim must be based on a contention that some legal right had been denied or legal duty had not been observed but that the issue could turn on some question of fact. The two were surely not incompatible.

Mr. AMMELIE (Norway) said that it had been taken for granted by Norwegian lawyers examining the text that the term "legal disputes" comprised disputes on questions of fact.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) drew attention to the definitions contained in the Geneva General Act of Arbitration of Geneva and to the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (Strasbourg, 1957) listing the kind of issues that might be submitted for judicial settlement.
The CHAIRMAN observed that the latter text followed the wording of the Statute of the International Court of Justice which some Latin American experts had suggested might be used to indicate the kind of disputes that were not excluded from the scope of the draft Convention.

Mr. van SANTEN (Netherlands) said that when the Netherlands Government came to study the text of the draft Convention with a view to signature and ratification its decision would depend on what opportunities the Center offered for the settlement of disputes. His objection to the words "legal character" was not one of language but substance. They seemed to him restrictive in circumscribing the character of the disputes that could be brought before the Center. It must be borne in mind that under Section 3 the tribunal could decide that it lacked competence on the ground that the dispute was not of a legal character, which constituted a most undesirable limitation. Perhaps the wisest course would be to stipulate in Section 1 that any investment dispute might be brought before the Center with the proviso that the signatory States had the right to exclude certain categories of disputes which they might be unwilling to submit to conciliation and arbitration. In principle the Convention should constitute an invitation to States and private enterprise to make the widest possible use of the Center. Thus broad language was needed to define the jurisdiction of the Center, which should be extended to disputes involving political sub-divisions and instrumentalities of States.

The CHAIRMAN said that Mr. van Santen had cogently defended the "open" point of view, but various countries for different reasons were anxious to write certain restrictions into the Convention.

The exchange of views had been most useful.

ARTICLE III - Conciliation

Request for Conciliation (Section 1). Constitution of the Commission (Sections 2-3)

The CHAIRMAN said that as had been pointed out at a previous meeting, the text would need some modification to take account of cases when there had been no previous consent.

Under the provisions of Sections 2 and 3, if the parties failed to agree on the appointment of conciliators, the Chairman would make the appointments from the Panel. The parties themselves were free to choose persons from the Panel or any others they considered suitable to act as conciliators.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) wondered whether it might not be advisable to insert an express provision in Section 2 to the effect that when the commission consisted of three conciliators the third must be its Chairman. That might seem self-evident but perhaps needed saying.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that a provision on those lines might also be desirable in the case of the arbitral tribunal.

Mr. KARELLE (Belgium) wondered whether it might not be wise to stipulate that the request for conciliation should contain a statement indicating the subject of the dispute.
The CHAIRMAN agreed that such a requirement might also be applied in arbitral proceedings, since the Secretary-General of the Center would need the information to give preliminary advice.

Mr. RODOCANACHI (France) wondered whether it was necessary to mention that the Chairman should select conciliators from the Panel: he would have thought that to be self-evident.

The CHAIRMAN explained that at the African regional meeting there had been a considerable amount of discussion on that point. One school of thought was in favor of restricting even the parties to choosing from the Panel while another took the extreme view that both the parties and the Chairman should be entirely free in their selection. The provision to which the expert from France had taken exception because he regarded it as self-evident was perhaps necessary in the interests of clarity.

Mr. GUARINO (Italy) saw no need for a provision regarding appointment by the Chairman of a conciliator if one party failed to appoint one because, in the absence of agreement between the parties, there would be no point in continuing the proceedings. If one side or the other refused to appoint conciliators, the Chairman of the Center had no other course open to him but to record the fact that the conciliation effort had failed.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that there might be cases when the parties themselves might be unable to agree but would be willing to accept nominations made by a third party. The provision therefore did serve a useful purpose since once a commission had been set up the parties would find it difficult not to co-operate in the proceedings.

Mr. HELNERS (Sweden) considered that the provisions contained in Section 3 were necessary because it was conceivable that the parties might agree on constituting the Commission but take no steps to make the actual appointments.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) hoped he was right in assuming that the possibility of there being more than two parties to a dispute was implicit throughout the draft even though express mention were not made of that fact wherever it was applicable.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) asked whether it would be possible under the terms of the Convention for the parties to consent either to arbitration or to conciliation or to both procedures.

The CHAIRMAN replied that the intention of the present draft was to leave the parties free to choose between conciliation, arbitration or a combination of both.

The meeting rose at 12:30 p.m.
ARTICLE III - Conciliation (continued)

Powers and Functions of the Commission (Sections 4 and 5)

The CHAIRMAN said that, at other regional meetings, proposals had been made - with which he himself concurred - to delete the words "and the Commission" from Section 4, thus leaving the parties free to determine whether the Conciliation Rules adopted by the Administrative Council or other rules would apply in the proceedings.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) said he had intended to make a similar proposal.

Mr. RODOCANACHI (France) pointed out that the correct French translation of the term "settlement" in paragraphs (1) and (3) of Section 5 was not "une transaction" (which actually meant a compromise" but "un règlement". In the second sentence of paragraph (2) of the same section, the same French term "une transaction" was wrongly used as equivalent to "agreement"; the accurate French rendering was, of course, "accord".

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) asked whether, in the light of recent experience, the possibility of the Commission stating the grounds on which its recommendation was based should be excluded.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that such a statement of reasons was not excluded by the text of Section 5(3).

Obligations of the Parties (Sections 6 and 7)

Mr. RODOCANACHI (France) suggested that it might be useful for arbitrators or judges who might later have to decide the dispute to know the reasons for the failure of a conciliation effort so as to take those reasons into account in making their decision.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) felt that it might be advisable to delete Section 7 altogether. If, however, it were decided to retain that section, he suggested that a proviso be included to the effect that the parties could give their consent to the use of the material in question in later proceedings.

The CHAIRMAN said that it might indeed be useful to provide for the possibility of the parties waiving the rule embodied in Section 7. However, it was highly desirable to retain that section because sometimes the willingness of one of the parties to endeavor to reach a settlement was invoked subsequently by the other party as in some way implying a doubt as to the correctness of the first party's position.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) favored the retention of Section 7. The parties would be much more inclined to cooperate in efforts to reach agreement during conciliation proceedings if they did not fear that some offer made or views expressed by them during such proceedings might be used against them at a later stage in a court of law or before an arbitral tribunal.
Mr. TROLLE (Denmark) agreed with that view. If conciliation efforts were to have a chance of success it was essential that no proposal made during conciliation proceedings should be in any way binding unless accepted by the other party.

Mr. HERNDL (Austria) favored the retention of Section 7 which underlined the fundamental difference between conciliation and arbitration.

Mr. PEREIRA (Portugal) also favored the retention of Section 7.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) pointed out that in suggesting the deletion of Section 7 he had not wished to imply that the parties should be able to rely in later proceedings on statements or offers of settlement made in the course of conciliation proceedings.

Mr. RODOCANACHI (France) said that his previous remarks did not refer to compromise offers made by the parties during conciliation proceedings. His suggestion had been that where the Conciliation Commission itself (and not merely one of the parties) made a recommendation which had not been accepted by the parties, that recommendation should be known in any other later proceedings. His objection had therefore been directed only at the last clause of Section 7.

Mr. TROLLE (Denmark) said that that suggestion would raise difficulties in practice. Recommendations made by a conciliation commission usually had their origin in offers made by the parties themselves and generally constituted an attempt to induce the parties to take a further step in each other's direction. In the circumstances, it might be difficult to draw a distinction between an offer made by a party and a recommendation made by the Commission.

The CHAIRMAN said that the different views expressed by the various speakers would be duly noted.

Mr. RODOCANACHI (France) said that while he had no objection to the inclusion in the Convention of Article III on conciliation, he did not himself believe in the effectiveness of conciliation unless it constituted a disguised form of arbitration. He recalled that in the fifty-five years that had elapsed between the setting up of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (to the Statute of which over sixty States were members) from 1907 to 1962, out of twenty-eight cases submitted to the Court, only four were cases of conciliation, the remaining twenty-four being cases of arbitration.

The CHAIRMAN said that he could himself recall a case of conciliation which had constituted a disguised form of arbitration. He was thinking of the case between the bondholders of the City of Tokyo and that City in which the World Bank had assisted the parties in reaching a settlement. In that case, the report on the conciliation proceedings had given extensive reasons for its conclusions.

ARTICLE IV - Arbitration

Request for Arbitration (Section 1). Constitution of the Tribunal (Sections 2 and 3)

The CHAIRMAN, introducing Sections 2 and 3, drew attention to the
principle in Section 2(2) of exclusion of national arbitrators. He also recalled that at another regional meeting, it had been suggested that Section 2(1) should provide expressly that an arbitral tribunal should always consist of an uneven number of arbitrators.

Mr. PEREIRA (Portugal) expressed reservations with regard to the principle of the exclusion of national arbitrators. However, in the interests of consistency and in the light of the provisions of Section 12(2) of Article I (which enabled a Contracting State to designate persons who were not its own nationals to serve on the Panel of Arbitrators) the exclusion should be extended to nominees of the two States in question even if they were not nationals of those States.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that such a corollary would logically follow from the principle that had been embodied in Section 2(2).

Mr. GOULD (South Africa) suggested that, in order to cover the case of an investor with plural nationality, a provision excluding arbitrators possessing any of the nationalities of the investor should be included in the second sentence of Section 2(2).

The CHAIRMAN said that the point was probably covered by the use of the indefinite article before "State", but that he would note the point.

Mr. AMBLIE (Norway) pointed out the contradiction between the rule in the first sentence of Section 2(2), to the effect that the arbitrators must be selected from the Panel, and paragraph 13 of the Comment to Article I, wherein it was stated that the parties were entirely free to agree to use conciliators and arbitrators who had not been designated to the Panel.

The CHAIRMAN explained that paragraph 13 of the Comment did not reflect the position correctly and would be brought into line with the text of Section 2(2).

Mr. AMBLIE (Norway) and Mr. HELNERS (Sweden) expressed satisfaction with the text as it stood since they preferred that the arbitrators should be selected exclusively from the Panel.

Mr. SERB (Yugoslavia) opposed the exclusion of national arbitrators which constituted a departure from long-standing practice. An element of conciliation was inherent in all arbitration proceedings and it was precisely the national arbitrator who provided a link between arbitration and conciliation. Moreover, the knowledge and experience of national arbitrators was of great value to the arbitral tribunal, particularly when seeking information on municipal law.

It was not without significance that paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 31 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice made provision for the appointment of an ad hoc judge of the nationality of the party or parties in cases where the Court did not already include upon the Bench judges of the nationality of those parties.

The CHAIRMAN said that it was fully realized that the rule embodied in Section 2(2) constituted a departure from tradition. Since arbitration proceedings were more flexible than court proceedings, arbitrators would be able to obtain information more easily than judges.
Mr. van SANTEN (Netherlands) wished to know the views of the African countries on the proposed innovation.

The CHAIRMAN said that only the UAR representative had voiced any opposition to the proposed rule.

Mr. MELCHOR (Spain) asked what views had been expressed at the Santiago meeting on the point.

The CHAIRMAN replied that no support had been expressed for national arbitrators.

Mr. van SANTEN (Netherlands) said that there would be no objection in his country to the innovation. However, he was eager to find out whether any opposition existed in countries outside Europe because the Convention would be of little use unless it attracted the support of those countries. He urged that Asian views on the subject should be carefully canvassed.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) said that, while he had not reached a final view on the matter, he had been impressed by the Yugoslav representative's remarks on the national arbitrators' knowledge of the municipal law of the States concerned. He also observed that if one excluded the appointment not only of national arbitrators but also of arbitrators who had been designated to the Panel by the States concerned, the range of selection could be rather limited. He recalled that the OECD draft did not exclude national arbitrators. In that connection he thought the Center might be given the right to draw upon the unrivalled experience and large staff of available arbitrators of the International Chamber of Commerce.

Mr. PEREIRA (Portugal) said that the problem of national arbitrators was a very difficult one. Perhaps the best solution would be not to include any provision on the subject and to leave it to the parties to agree to exclude national arbitrators if they so desired.

The CHAIRMAN said that a possible way out of the difficulty was to qualify the rule by means of a proviso to the effect that the parties could agree to appoint nationals as arbitrators.

He asked Judge Trolle whether if he were an arbitrator he would prefer to have experts on municipal law with him on the tribunal, or on the other side of the table.

Mr. TROLLE (Denmark) replied that he would prefer them not to be on the tribunal. In an arbitral tribunal of five arbitrators, however, it might be useful for two of them to be nationals of the parties to the dispute.

The CHAIRMAN said that a system of five arbitrators had been envisaged as an alternative to the exclusion of national arbitrators. The system would follow the pattern of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, which, however, dealt with inter-State disputes. It would, however, be costly and hence suitable only for major cases.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) favored allowing the parties to choose arbitrators from outside the Panel.
Mr. SERB (Yugoslavia) suggested that where the Chairman had appointed an arbitrator the parties should still have the right to substitute their own appointee if they so wished at a later stage.

The CHAIRMAN said that since the parties would be consulted by the Secretary-General before such an appointment was made, the parties' views would, in any event, be taken into consideration.

Mr. van SANTEN (Netherlands) wondered whether the provision requiring the Chairman to consult the parties only through the Secretary-General was not too rigid. Particularly if the Secretary-General were a part-time official it might be useful to permit the Chairman to consult directly with the parties.

The CHAIRMAN replied that it had been suggested at the African meeting that the provision on consultation with the parties might be left to the Rules. He thought that it would be preferable for the Secretary-General to handle preliminary discussions with the parties, but they could always consult directly with the Chairman if they so wished.

Powers and Functions of the Tribunal (Sections 4 - 10)

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that Section 4 dealt with the important question of the law to be applied by the arbitral tribunal. At other meetings, it had been suggested that the reference to international law should be clarified, perhaps by means of provisions along the lines of Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

Mr. BILGEN (Turkey) stressed the need to clarify the term "national law" used in Section 4(1). As it stood, that term could be construed as referring possibly to the municipal law of the capital-exporting country. In fact only the municipal law of the capital-importing country applied.

The CHAIRMAN said that the choice of national law would be a matter for the tribunal to decide in accordance with the appropriate rules of private international law. In most cases, the proper law would indeed be the municipal law of the capital-importing country. However, in certain cases - such as licensing and know-how agreements - there might be a question as to what law applied.

Mr. RODOCANACHI (France) pointed out that the phrase "agreement between the parties concerning the law to be applied" should not be understood to refer only to an agreement on the subject of the choice of law at the time of the compromis, but also to the intention of the parties to a contract, expressed in that contract or to be implied from the circumstances surrounding it.

A dispute would, however, frequently involve questions of international law. It might be claimed that the national law applied in the matter conflicted with some rule of international law. Unfortunately, there were few well-established rules of international law on the subject of investments. It would therefore be of great value if some guidance were to be given to the tribunal on that score. Of course, it would not be possible to provide a complete corpus juris but at least some general code of conduct for both the investor and the host country should be laid down. While he acknowledged that it might be difficult to include such a general code in this Convention, he recalled that certain European projects on the subject of
investment disputes dealt with questions of substantive law, and he stressed that there was no incompatibility between the Convention and those projects.

The CHAIRMAN said that the text under discussion left the whole question of the substantive rules of law to the tribunal.

At the African and Latin American meetings, there had been an unwillingness to provide for submission of questions of the legality of certain measures such as nationalization or expropriation (whether under municipal law or international law) to the tribunal, although there was no objection to having the question of compensation freely determined by the tribunal. After it was pointed out that each country would be free to decide which questions it would agree to submit to arbitration these misgivings were dispelled.

Mr. MELCHOR (Spain) agreed with the remarks by the Turkish and French representatives.

Spanish law, and the law of certain Latin American countries, drew a clear distinction between arbitration under law (in which strict rules of law were applied) and the reference of a dispute to amiables compositors, who had the power to decide ex aequo et bono. In the second case, no problem of choice of law arose. In the former, however, it was necessary to make it clear that the national law to be applied was the municipal law of the host country. The arbitral tribunal must have the power to apply international law, but where national law was concerned, it was not admissible that any municipal law other than that of the host State should be invoked in an investment dispute.

In the light of the case-law built up by the Permanent Court of International Justice in such cases as that of Polish Upper Silesia, the arbitral tribunal should have the power to say whether, in a particular case, any of the following measures had been taken: first, unjustified measures (e.g. expropriation measures which could have been avoided); second, discriminatory measures; or, third, measures contrary to the international public policy or general principles of law.

Mr. GUARINO (Italy) agreed that the question of which law, whether national or international, should be applied was a basic issue. As regards the application of a contract, recourse should be had to national law as stipulated in the contract. However, there were of course cases where national law would no longer be applicable when that law was modified to the detriment of the investor, and that situation was inadequately provided for under international law at present.

He considered that it would be desirable for the draft Convention to specify the fundamental principles of international law which should be applied by the arbitral tribunal, namely, protection against discriminatory treatment and the obligation to act in good faith. He also pointed out that where contracts were involved, traditional international law could be supplemented by general principles of the law of obligations recognized by the laws of the Contracting States. That would give greater protection both to the host State and the investor.

The CHAIRMAN explained that those drafting the proposed Convention had attempted to meet the difficulties by leaving the situation relatively flexible. There would be a great variety of types of cases before the
tribunal, some arising out of contract disagreements and others being ad
hoc cases arising out of past investments. The draft Convention was based
on the assumption that the parties stood to gain from international adju-
dication and that that would, moreover, provide assurances for investors.
Clearly, such freedom did not exclude any narrower definitions where there
was general agreement.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) said that he was in favor of leaving the
rules in as simple a form as possible and was therefore in support of
Section 4(1) as it stood. The arbitral tribunal was of course faced with
a difficult problem in establishing the extent to which international law
would be applicable in a case involving a non-State party. He also pointed
out that a tribunal which had been given the power to decide ex aequo et
bono should not necessarily be prevented from applying rules of law. Some
re-drafting of Section 4 might be required. There was some merit in the
suggestion made by the representative of France that guidelines should be
established regarding where international law should prevail over clearly
applicable national law.

The CHAIRMAN said that experience had shown that international
arbitral tribunals had not in the past encountered insuperable difficul-
ties and had in fact applied international law as if the national govern-
ment of the individual concerned had espoused his case. On balance it
had been considered preferable not to state the position too specifically.

Mr. GOULD (South Africa) believed that the essential advantage of
setting up the proposed tribunal would be the right it gave individuals
within the narrow domain of foreign investments to have access to inter-
national adjudication, on the same footing as his State would have had,
had it espoused his case.

It was to be hoped that the establishment of the Center would hasten
the acceptance by nations of at least minimum rules for foreign investments.

There was no doubt that the present situation under bilateral treaties
was confused. Nevertheless, he wondered whether in fact a multiplicity of
arbitral tribunals would constitute the best possible element to further
the harmonious development of international law. They would, by definition,
deal only with disputes and their awards would only bind the parties. Not
only would these tribunals produce conflicting decisions, but many aspects
of international law, particularly in the field of foreign investment, were
not yet settled.

He wondered whether it would be practicable for the arbitral tribunals
to be granted by the United Nations General Assembly a status equivalent
to that of the specialised agencies so as to enable them to seek advisory
opinions from the International Court of Justice. That might well inspire
greater confidence among prospective litigants and provide for the har-
monious growth of international law.

The CHAIRMAN very much doubted whether the arbitral tribunals would
be authorized formally to seek the Court's advisory opinions. Furthermore,
that proposal, linked as it was with the entire question of foreign invest-
ment, was unlikely to gain unanimous support in the forum of the United
Nations. However, arbitrators would naturally have the power to seek
advice from experts, including legal experts.
The real problem was that there did not as yet exist a standing jurisdiction which was generally accepted. Even the OECD Convention did not provide for a uniform method of settlement of disputes even though it provided for compulsory adjudication.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) expressed the view that, while there was as yet no entirely clear cut distinction between the type of law applicable in respect of the disputes under consideration, it was most important to mention international law in the context of Section 4(1) since it provided additional protection for the private investor and since developments were tending towards the application of international law regarding those types of contracts.

Mr. HERNDL (Austria) believed it desirable to mention both national and international law in Section 4(1) since both were clearly involved. However, the question of the extent to which the parties themselves had a right to determine whether national or international law should be applicable was a delicate one. In those circumstances, it might be preferable to specify that international law could be applied only to the international aspects of the dispute.

Mr. DEGUEN (France) suggested that the words "whether national or international" should be amended to read "national and international" in the penultimate line of Section 4(1).

The CHAIRMAN, referring to Sections 6 and 7, said that a number of alternative drafting points were under consideration in respect of those sections. He noted that there were few objections to the stipulation in Section 7(1) to the effect that the award should state the reasons upon which it was based; that constituted an important point. There was no provision for the recording of dissenting opinions and he thought that that point could be left to the arbitration rules.

Mr. HELMERS (Sweden) wondered what would happen if in a pecuniary claim each of the three arbitrators were to arrive at a different amount.

The CHAIRMAN said that at the African meeting one expert had suggested that in such a case a fourth arbitrator should be appointed with instructions to cast his vote in favor of one of the three solutions. He thought this would be unnecessary as arbitrators were under a duty to deliver an award.

The CHAIRMAN, referring to Section 8(2), said there had been some criticism of the use of the words "appears to be" in the last line. The text could be amended to require the tribunal to be satisfied that the claim was well-founded before rendering an award on the default of one party.

There had also been some objection to the drafting of the section in terms of default of the defendant only. He thought those were valid objections.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) believed that Section 8 regarding judgment by default should be expressed in greater detail. He suggested that on this point it would be desirable to consult the rules of procedure of the Arbitral Commission on Property Rights of interests in Germany.
Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) asked whether, in keeping with a fundamental principle in his own country, provision might be included under Section 8(1) for due notice to be given to the defaulting party and for him to have an opportunity to present his case.

Mr. KARELLE (Belgium) considered that Section 8(1) should also provide for cases where a party was for legitimate reasons prevented from appearing.

The CHAIRMAN, referring to Section 9, said that its provisions had been generally accepted. It had, however, been suggested that it should be made explicit that that provision was in no way intended to extend the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) referred the meeting to Article 63 of the Rules of the International Court of Justice which dealt in greater detail with the question of counterclaims and incidental claims.

The CHAIRMAN, referring to Section 10, said that a number of drafting suggestions had been made at the Santiago meeting. Some experts had felt it desirable to establish criteria for the exercise of the tribunal's power to prescribe provisional measures. The suggestion had been made at the African Regional Consultative Meeting that the words "at the request of either party" should be deleted.

Interpretation, Revision and Annulment (Sections 11 - 13)

The CHAIRMAN, introducing these sections, said that the three types of recourse provided therein were intended to give the Convention a self-contained character. With particular reference to Section 11 on interpretation he recalled that at the previous meetings some experts had suggested that there be a much longer period or no time-limit at all for requests for interpretation, as certain awards might have to be carried out over a long or undetermined period of time.

Mr. AMLE (Norway) compared the provisions regarding the stay of enforcement of the award in the three sections and suggested that that power should be discretionary in Section 11 as well as in the others.

The CHAIRMAN agreed with that suggestion, particularly if in Section 11 on interpretation the three-month time limit were to be removed.

Mr. BILGEN (Turkey) suggested that the words "the date of the award" should be amended to read "the date of notification of the award" in Section 11.

The CHAIRMAN agreed.

Mr. OBERHOLZER (South Africa) believed that Section 12 called for some amplification of procedural detail. He saw a clear distinction between an application for leave to review, for which a prima facie case was sufficient, and the review itself, which required facts to be established.

Mr. RODOCANACHI (France) suggested the deletion of Section 12 on revision of an award. To allow revision of an award over a period of
10 years would deprive awards of their finality. He also thought it unlikely that new facts justifying a revision would be discovered and that setting aside an award 10 years after it had been rendered would be impractical.

The CHAIRMAN said that the period of 10 years suggested in the text had been considered unduly long at the other regional meetings. No objection had, however, hitherto been raised regarding the actual principle of revision of an award.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) said that, while he was open to the majority view, six years would appear to constitute a more practical period.

The CHAIRMAN said that a number of suggestions had been made with respect to the drafting of Section 13. It had been suggested that the ground for declaring an award invalid in Section 13(1)(a) should read "that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction". It had also been suggested that in Section 13(1)(c) the words "a serious departure from the principles of natural justice..." or "a serious misapplication of the law ..." should be added.

Mr. KARELLE (Belgium) considered that the grounds for annulment of an award should be set out in greater detail, and referred to Article 26 of the European Convention on uniform arbitration law.

The CHAIRMAN said that it had been fully recognized that only limited recourse had been provided and that acceptance of the binding character of the award went beyond what was normally expected in respect of an arbitral tribunal. He suggested that the parallel with commercial arbitration should not be drawn too closely because the Convention sought to establish a new jurisdiction. The parallel if any lay with the International Court of Justice rather than with commercial arbitration.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) said that he had no objection in principle to the provisions of Section 13. There might, however, be some risk of frustration of awards in some cases and he was accordingly inclined to make the section more restrictive, for example, saying in paragraph (1): "only on one or more of the following grounds", and in sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph (1): "that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers".

Mr. BILGEN (Turkey) pointed out that if the exclusion of national arbitrators were maintained in spite of the objections of some delegations it would then become necessary to amplify the provisions of Section 13(1)(c) to include also the case where a member of the tribunal had been a national of either of the two States concerned.

The CHAIRMAN said that it would be possible to meet that point.

Mr. GUARINO (Italy) thought it was unusual that the award of one arbitral tribunal should be reviewed by another such tribunal and considered that a decision of principle would have to be taken as to whether an award should be regarded as final and without appeal or whether there should be a possibility of an appeal to the International Court of Justice as had been suggested by the expert from South Africa.
The CHAIRMAN said that any such appeal would of course require the espousal of the case by the State of which the litigant was a national. The procedure was therefore somewhat complicated. Furthermore, the object was to draw up within the framework of the draft Convention a self-contained system.

In reply to a question by Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom), the CHAIRMAN said that in cases of annulment or revision of an award, the decision could contain an order for restitution, and he did not think that new provisions specifically covering the point needed to be written into the draft Convention.

The meeting rose at 5:50 p.m.

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SIXTH SESSION

(Thursday, February 20, 1964 - 9:35 a.m.)

ARTICLE IV - Arbitration (continued)

Enforcement of the Award (Sections 14 - 15)

The CHAIRMAN invited the meeting to consider Article IV, Sections 14 and 15. He pointed out that for the purposes of ensuring compliance with an arbitral award between States, Section 14 would have been sufficient but, since one of the parties to a dispute brought before the Center would be a private individual, Section 15 was necessary to give a State the means of enforcing an award in its favor against an individual. The Article had been included with a view to meeting the possible needs of developing countries in disputes with private investors. It was not intended to affect the domestic law of States with regard to forced execution of awards against a State.

Mr. ARNOLD (Federal Republic of Germany) said that the question of forced execution of awards was a very complicated problem of international law. In the case of States, the acceptance of arbitration and the obligations created by Section 14 should be an adequate guarantee that the award would be regarded as binding and complied with by the Contracting State, but something might perhaps be done in the Convention to strengthen the sense of obligation, e.g. by creating a surveillance committee. With regard to the forced execution of awards against private persons, the Convention provided that awards were enforceable within the State of the domicile of the individual in the same way as a final judgment of the Courts of that State. The system proposed created serious problems and was not altogether comparable with that under the Treaty of Rome. Under that treaty States had surrendered certain of their sovereign rights. The execution of decisions had already created difficult constitutional problems in some countries. Even in a specialized field like that covered by the Treaty of Rome decisions of the European Court were not enforceable unless a writ of execution was issued by the national authorities.

An alternative solution, which he favored would be to consider an award as equivalent to a contract, equally binding on States as on individuals. It should not be difficult to obtain from national Courts a judgment on the basis of the contractual obligations deriving from the
award. This would have the advantage of maintaining equality of treat-
ment between the State and the private party. The system proposed in the
Convention, on the other hand, derogated from the principle of equality and,
although this derogation might not be discriminatory because of the
different circumstances in which States and individuals were placed,
it would be preferable to avoid it.

The solution he had proposed would be in line with the system of the U.N. Convention on enforcement of commercial arbitral awards (1958). The present draft Convention might refer mutatis mutandis to the 1958 Convention. He would be willing to consider reducing the number of possible grounds for attacking the award as compared to the 1958 Con-
vention.

The CHAIRMAN said that Article 192 of the Treaty of Rome referred to by the expert from the Federal Republic of Germany limited enforcement judgments to decisions of the Council against private parties involving financial awards. The second of those two qualifications might be con-
sidered for inclusion in Section 15.

He pointed out that the draft Convention had not established any mechanism for the enforcement of awards pronounced under the auspices of the Center. The Treaty of Rome, however, had set up such a mechanism, and had also established obligations regarding recognition and enforcement judgments which went as far as Section 15. Members of the European Economic Community had renounced certain of their sovereign rights and accepted decisions as binding in the same way as was being attempted by the present Convention. He did not think that the alternative proposal put forward by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany would establish the full mutuality or equivalence between the treatment of States and individuals which it was desired to achieve. The develop-
ing countries had pointed out that a State coming before a tribunal automati-
cally surrendered part of its sovereignty, because it put the decision in the hands of an arbitral tribunal, agreed without qualification to abide by the award, waived any right of appeal and submitted to an autono-
mous system in which immediate sanctions would be incurred if an award against it were not complied with. Apart from legal sanctions based on the revival of the right of diplomatic protection of the investor's State there would be even more serious indirect sanctions because a State which did not comply would fail to meet its obligations not only to the investor but also to the community of Contracting States which would presumably include capital-exporting countries from which the losing State could expect assistance. On the other hand no such sanction would exist against an investor who lost a case. The winning party would be left to sue on the award or to try to obtain an exequatur of the award as a foreign award subject as such to all the limitations contained in the Geneva or New York Conventions which, in any event, were not yet ratified by most future Contracting States.

The present Convention ought to contain a clear statement of the position of a State which had won an award against a private investor brought before the Center. He felt that it was essential in order to obtain the widest possible acceptance of this Convention, particularly by the developing countries, to ensure that a winning State could obtain satisfaction of the rights conferred by the award wherever the investor's property was located without being subject to undue delays and being met by defenses based on local laws.
Mr. PEREIRA (Portugal) pointed out that the problem raised by Section 15 was a direct consequence of granting individuals access to an international tribunal. He stressed the fact that it was the chief exception to the principle of consent on which the Convention was based. He saw no analogy between the system proposed by the Convention and similar agreements establishing different degrees of integration in supranational organizations such as the European Economic Community, etc. The enforcement of awards against States and private parties was in both cases difficult. An award against the citizen of a Contracting State ought naturally to be enforceable in his country, but he queried whether any State would be willing to enforce in its territory an award in a dispute which had been rendered between another State and a national of a third State. He suggested that Section 15 be deleted and a provision included in Section 14 covering the execution within a State of awards rendered against its own nationals, which was the most that appeared to him reasonable and practicable.

Mr. MONACO (Italy) said that the execution of awards in each Contracting State should be effected by the classical system of recognition, which would not be immediately effective, but subject to some review by local Courts, or by some system along the lines of those established by the Treaty of Rome although the degree of political integration achieved through that Treaty made any comparison between it and the present draft not entirely valid. The fact that whenever a foreign judgment or award was enforceable in a national jurisdiction, execution proceedings had to follow the national law, would then be a sufficient guarantee for the State in which enforcement was sought.

A separate problem was whether any difference should be allowed between the procedure for the execution of awards against States and those against individuals. It would be dangerous to try and formulate rules dealing with States' immunities and the answer in this case too might be to specify that enforcement in any Contracting State should follow the normal execution procedures of that State.

The CHAIRMAN said that it was essential to find a link between international decisions and their municipal implementation according to the procedural laws of each country concerned. The question, however, was not so much one of procedural method as of limiting the grounds for attacking awards. Those grounds were limited by the Geneva and New York Conventions and the present Convention sought to limit them still further.

Mr. TROLLE (Denmark) said that Section 15 did not appear to him of much practical importance. Investors were more likely to be suing host States than vice versa. The need for the section was almost wholly political and he suggested that the meeting should not go out of its way to look for technical complications which might be created by it. By becoming party to this Convention States would not undertake greater obligations than they had undertaken by acceding to the Geneva and New York Conventions, since most of the grounds for challenging an award under those Conventions were covered by the provisions of Section 13 of the present Convention.

Mr. DEGUEN (France) said that in certain circumstances awards against investors having property in third countries could have serious consequences. If an investor in a foreign country agreed to reinvest part of his profits in his business there, but was later prevented from doing so by domestic
legislation and the host country sought and won a decision against him, in such a case execution of the award might raise issues of considerable practical importance.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) said that he was prepared to accept Section 15 provisionally, but observed that opinion at a higher level would have to be taken into account. Parliament would certainly have much to say on the question of principles involved. The acceptance of foreign awards without the right to attack them would be a new departure. The choice before them was between leaning towards international or towards private arbitration; the Convention sought a middle course. He personally felt that the trend towards international arbitration was desirable. Some States might regard the issue as a matter of inspiring confidence which was, indeed, the aim of the whole Convention. He felt therefore that the Section should be accepted regardless of the fact that on paper it appeared a strange innovation. The final result would depend on the quality of the awards given; if the awards were good, they would justify the acceptance of the system.

Mr. AMLIE (Norway) wondered whether the bold innovation proposed in Section 15 was necessary. To the best of his knowledge, such a provision did not appear in any international instruments in which enforcement clauses were usually hedged about by certain standard reservations which ought to suffice for the present purpose. He had in mind the discretionary power usually reserved by States entering into treaties on the reciprocal enforcement of judgments to examine the circumstances in which the award had been given before discharging enforcement obligations, to decide whether, for example, adequate notice had been given to a party before judgment was entered on default; whether enforcement would be contrary to public policy; and to ascertain that the arbitrators were not disqualified. If modified in that manner Section 15, which would require legislative action in his country, might not cause much concern.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that as stated by the expert from Denmark most if not all the grounds on which execution could be refused were provided for in the clauses relating to remedies within the framework of the Convention.

The present draft was designed to establish a self-contained system as was found in judicial or arbitral proceedings between States under which there would be no recourse to an outside authority against decisions of tribunals or conciliation commissions; it was something midway between commercial and inter-State arbitration as the expert from the United Kingdom had pointed out. Since one of the purposes of the Convention was to give a greater sense of confidence not only to investors but also to capital-importing countries the latter would expect some assurance that compliance with an award made in their favor would be just as automatic as it would be if they lost the case. If a clause were inserted allowing considerations of public policies as grounds for refusal of execution against an investor, it would be necessary to set forth in detail the other corresponding circumstances in which a State could refuse to comply with an award. The interesting example mentioned by the expert from France turned on the issue of whether an investor had been properly authorized by his national authority to enter into an agreement. If he in fact had such authority it would be for the arbitral tribunal to decide whether a change in legislation of the investor's State was an act of the Prince which could be invoked as a ground for non-compliance. It had been pointed out at previous meetings that if provision were made for situations of the type described by the expert from France a reciprocal clause would be needed requiring the Con-
tracting State of which the investor was a national to offer some guarantee that he would abide by the award.

Mr. MELCHOR (Spain) said that Section 15 was necessary and had its logical place in the whole scheme proposed in the draft and should not cause surprise to practising lawyers. It was normal to provide for enforcement of arbitral awards which in the context must be equated with the final judgment of the national courts of a State. As the expert from Italy had pointed out, enforcement of the award would have to follow national law of execution of judgments.

He was preoccupied by another problem, namely, the possibility that municipal law might conflict with the execution of the award when the State was party to the dispute. If under national law execution of an award against the State could be stayed, could an arbitral award still be enforced? That problem should be taken into account in the final draft of the Convention, but he felt that in any case the principle of the enforcement of the award should be upheld.

Mr. HELLNERS (Sweden) associated himself with the views expressed by the experts from Denmark and the United Kingdom.

Mr. SERB (Yugoslavia) said that Section 15 would create serious constitutional and practical difficulties, particularly in regard to enforcement in third States. This impelled him to think that a solution on the lines of the one offered in Articles 187 and 192 of the Rome Treaty was greatly to be preferred since it differentiated between awards enforceable against States and other types of award. Nor would that course lead to inequality between the parties because States would be compelled to comply with international arbitral awards in order to maintain their standing in the international community which would not be true of private investors.

As there was provision in the draft to cover judgment by default, it seemed impossible to require immediate compliance in Section 14. At least the party in default should be notified of the award and given a reasonable opportunity to raise objections.

The attempt in Section 15 to identify the awards of the tribunal with the final judgment of a national court would need qualification to take into account the procedures that some States had established for execution of judgments against other States.

The CHAIRMAN emphasized that the intention was not to modify the existing law on State immunity. The view had been expressed at the Santiago meeting that Section 15 as now drafted would force a modification in State practice and law on the question of a State's immunity from execution. He thought this view unfounded, but an express proviso removing any doubt as to the intent of the section might be inserted.

Referring to the last point made by the expert from Yugoslavia, he said that there was no problem because by definition the host State would have undertaken to abide by the award and the problem of enforcement in a third State was not likely to arise.

The lack of uniformity in State practice, concerning the immunity of other States from execution had convinced him that it would be prefer-
able to refrain from attempting to legislate either positively or negatively in Sections 14 and 15.

Mr. HERNDL (Austria) considered that as the award of the tribunal was analogous to an award made in commercial arbitral proceedings, the provisions of the New York Convention should apply in order to avoid a multiplicity of international rules on the matter. He thought that Section 15 if it did not modify existing law on sovereign immunity would lead to some injustice because the same award could be enforced in States which allowed enforcement against foreign States but could not be enforced in States following the opposite rule.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) said that the special problem of enforcement in third States was of crucial significance; by a third State he meant a signatory of the Convention which was neither a party to the proceedings nor the State whose national was a party to the proceedings. The consent of the parties to resort to arbitration or conciliation in a concrete case was one of the fundamental principles of the Convention. He doubted whether the obligation of a third State to enforce an award within its territory was in harmony with that principle.

The provision contained in paragraph 7 of the Annex relating to the Statute of the arbitral tribunal in the OECD draft Convention provided not only for arbitration between States but also between States and private individuals and was pertinent to the whole problem of enforcement. It had been argued by several speakers that the position of the State in regard to enforcement of awards would remain largely unchanged under the system envisaged in the draft. As a consequence, since many municipal systems were extremely diverse in that regard, enforcement against a foreign State would often not be possible. Differences in the status of the private individual under municipal systems would be of relatively much less significance and in nearly all instances the judgment of a foreign national court could be executed directly. Some guidance could be sought in the New York Convention on commercial arbitration and perhaps it might be possible to devise a formula that would lead to greater uniformity in means of enforcement by limiting the conditions to those laid down in that Convention.

A provision on annulment had been included in the model rules on arbitral procedure drawn up by the International Law Commission whereby the request had to be submitted to the International Court of Justice. Under the present draft a decision on such a request would have to be taken by an ad hoc committee drawn from the same Panel of arbitrators.

The self-contained system proposed in the draft, if examined in the context of validity of awards, might be acceptable. But this was less true if it were examined in the light of the enforcement provisions.

In conclusion he thought that Section 15 ought to be carefully reviewed and some conditions should be provided for the enforcement of the award along the lines of the New York Convention.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the reason why the International Law Commission's model rules in regard to annulment had not been followed was that the parties could not present their case to the
International Court of Justice unless the State of the investor's
nationality were willing to espouse his cause. Perhaps the only issue
that called for a decision was whether the exceptions or conditions
for enforcement laid down in the New York Convention should be con-
ditions for the operation of Section 15 or whether they should only
be conditions governing the right to seek an annulment. Provision did
exist in the New York Convention for enforcement in third States.

The real stumbling block was whether or not to insert in Section
15 what might be regarded by some developing countries as escape clauses
for private investors. The State itself, having undertaken to accept an
award as final and binding, could not evade the obligation. On the other
hand, refusal by private investor to comply with an award would have to
be taken before a national court and the New York Convention did provide
some grounds for attacking the award.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) pointed out that the State
had no need for escape clauses because its position was in no wise as
vulnerable as that of private individuals.

The CHAIRMAN did not altogether share the previous speaker's concern
about the position of private investors. Clearly some safeguard against
non-compliance by them was needed in the present draft. Failure by a
State to abide by an award would undoubtedly arouse strong reactions by
other States.

Mr. KARELLE (Belgium) supported Section 15 in its present form but
suggested that a clause be added on the lines of Article 197 of the Rome
Treaty. He also suggested that a stipulation be included to the effect
that priority must be given to enforcement of the award against a national
of a State in the territory of that State.

Mr. GUARINO (Italy) said that Section 15 was essential and formed
a logical link in the system, since it enabled a successful party to
seek execution of the award in any Contracting State wherever property
of the losing party could be found, subject only to the local laws and
procedures on execution of judgments including any law on the immunity
of the property of a foreign State from execution.

Mr. AMLIE (Norway) emphasized that the misgivings he had expressed
in his capacity as a legal expert during the discussion should not be
interpreted to mean that Norway would not find it possible to accept the
Convention as it stood in order to contribute to furthering its very
meritorious objectives.

Mr. van SANTEN (Netherlands) welcomed the innovation whereby States
would recognize as final and binding, arbitral awards in proceedings
instituted by private investors and hoped that the wording adopted for
Sections 14 and 15 would be as watertight as possible. There was no need
to allay the fears of States which seemed on the one hand willing to
accept the Convention while at the same time wishing to limit the
enforceability of awards. He therefore urged that any modification of
Sections 14 and 15 introduced to take into account constitutional require-
ments of some Contracting States should not in any way impair the prin-
ciple that awards will be enforceable and enforced. The answer to
States who found such provisions too far-reaching lay in Section 17
according to which the right of espousal would revive and thus bring about an even more disagreeable situation.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) observed that the question at issue was not escape clauses but the possibility of conflict with internal systems of law. Even Article 192 in the Rome Treaty, an instrument that sought to establish what must be regarded as a supranational system provided for execution being governed by the rules of civil procedure in the State where it was to take place. Article VII of the Bank’s Loan Regulations also contained provision of an analogous nature.

Relationship of Arbitration to Other Remedies (Sections 16 - 17)

The CHAIRMAN said that the language used in Section 16 was perhaps somewhat unusual and indirect, but as explained in the comment the purpose was to state a rule of interpretation rather than of substance. The reason for doing so was that it had been felt necessary to widen the scope of the Convention by allowing for three alternatives: arbitration as the sole remedy; arbitration as an optional remedy; or arbitration only after local remedies had been exhausted.

Mr. BILGEN (Turkey) considered that Section 16 needed to be stated in converse terms, in conformity with the generally accepted principle of international law, that the exhaustion of local remedies was a condition precedent for bringing a case before an arbitral tribunal unless the parties had agreed otherwise.

The CHAIRMAN explained that the provision as at present formulated was meant to represent what was the normal interpretation of consent to arbitration. It was intended to apply not to the case of a private investor approaching a government with a claim that he had a moral right to ask it to resort to arbitration, but to that where consent to arbitration had already been given, and the only question at issue was to determine whether that consent had been tacitly qualified by requiring the prior exhaustion of local remedies. It seemed wise to assume that such a reservation did not exist unless expressly stated. The clause contained in Section 16 was emphatically not designed to introduce any change in accepted rules of international law.

Mr. RODOCANACHI (France) did not think the difference between the present formulation and that advocated by the expert from Turkey was very material. States themselves would know whether they needed to make a reservation concerning the exhaustion of local remedies.

It would be interesting to know whether traditional capital-importing countries were in favor of requiring prior exhaustion of local remedies.

The CHAIRMAN did not think that the formula suggested by the expert from Turkey would serve much practical purpose.

But if it were felt that the present draft implied that the prior exhaustion of local remedies was undesirable per se the wording would call for reconsideration.

In reply to the question of the expert from France, he said that some suggestions had been made of the same kind as Mr. Bilgen's on the ground that it was undesirable to deviate from an existing rule of inter-

See Loan Regulations No. 3 and No. 4, dated February 15, 1961 (amended February 9, 1967), Sections 7.03 and 7.04
national law. The expert from Colombia had put forward yet another view to the effect that his country would never consent to have recourse to arbitration except on questions involving denial of justice.

Mr. GUARINO (Italy) pointed out that it was not always desirable to stipulate as a condition precedent, the exhaustion of local remedies; nor was it desirable to require in all cases that the parties resort to arbitration. He therefore suggested that Section 16 be modified by adding at the end the words "if the other party so demands" so that if the plaintiff wished to have recourse to local courts and the defendant did not object the cost and difficulties involved in an international arbitration could be avoided.

The CHAIRMAN explained that one of the reasons for the wording suggested was that Section 16 was intended to deal with two different cases. First the possibility that a government might insist on local remedies being exhausted, second the existence of an option for both parties to resort to other remedies.

At the Addis Ababa meeting some experts had suggested that the draft Convention should lay down a minimum limit on the financial interest in a dispute submitted to the Center and that suggestion had later been modified to apply only to cases where a sum of money was claimed because it was recognized that there might be test cases of principle when the monetary limit was not of great significance.

The CHAIRMAN introducing Section 17(1) said that it could be viewed as a corollary of the principle of direct access of an individual to a State before an international tribunal. To the extent that such access was available to an individual and could be put to effective use, the reason for giving his State a right to afford him diplomatic protection fell away.

Section 17(2) had been inserted as the view had been expressed at meetings of the Bank's Executive Directors that Section 17(1) might have the effect of preventing recourse by the investor's State to machinery for the settlement of disputes set up under bilateral investment agreements. He thought, however, that even in the absence of Section 17(2) such a right of recourse would have been available to the investor's State.

At the African meeting no objections had been raised to the principles contained in Section 17. At the Santiago meeting several experts had remarked that Section 17(2) might be superfluous and Section 17(1) was not only unnecessary but even harmful, because by withdrawing the right of diplomatic protection it implied that that right did exist generally - a proposition unacceptable to a number of Latin American countries.

Mr. KOINZER (Federal Republic of Germany) said that his Government gave qualified support to the clause contained in Section 17(1). He regarded it as justifiable from the psychological point of view if the private investor could effectively utilize the rights conferred upon him by the Convention. In deciding whether this would be achieved one had to take into account Section 16. He would have thought that if an investor was to give up his right to claim diplomatic protection, as a matter of reciprocity, the host State should forego its right to demand

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the exhaustion of local remedies. Otherwise the provision would become unacceptable since the process of exhausting local remedies might be inordinately long.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that as long as local remedies had not been exhausted and no denial of justice had been claimed, under customary international law no right to claim diplomatic protection existed, and the private investor would have no right which he could surrender.

Mr. MONACO (Italy) said that in principle Section 17 was acceptable, but he wondered whether it was expedient to mention diplomatic protection in this context. Diplomatic protection was not a legal remedy and was often extended even while a more formal proceeding was pending. The section excluded diplomatic protection from the moment consent to arbitration had been given. Diplomatic protection could, in fact, play a useful role in the period between the undertaking to go to arbitration and the commencement of actual proceedings, and might in particular cases even obviate such proceedings.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) agreed with the previous speaker. Much depended on what was meant by diplomatic protection. Although he could understand the reason for proposing that a formal claim to protection be waived, he nevertheless considered that the possibility of some contact between the two States concerned at the diplomatic level should not be excluded.

On another point, he said the wording of Section 17(1) appeared to suggest that if arbitration failed the only ground for action by the injured State would be in respect of failure to observe the Convention as though the right in respect of the original injury had somehow lapsed. Such an injury might have been per se a breach of international law, as, for example, in the case of expropriation. It seemed to him that in such a case there would be two causes of action for the injured State, and he wondered whether his understanding was correct.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that in the hypothetical case mentioned by the United Kingdom expert there would in fact be two causes of action for the injured State. The drafting would have to be reviewed.

Mr. MELCHOR (Spain) agreed with Mr. Monaco because some form of diplomatic intervention might be necessary in order to make arbitration or conciliation proceedings possible and the mention of diplomatic protection in the Convention might create difficulties for some countries in South America.

He viewed with disfavor Section 17(2) and the reasons for it contained in the comment, and suggested that both be eliminated.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) considered that Mr. Monaco's comment was very pertinent, in view of the fact that there could be occasions when diplomatic protection could usefully be exercised.

He reserved his comments on Section 17(2) for a later stage in the discussion.

Mr. AILIE (Norway) stated that while he agreed that the
Contracting State should not be allowed to espouse a claim of one of its nationals which had been submitted to arbitration under the Convention, he saw no reason why that State should be debarred from approaching the authorities of the other State through diplomatic channels. The important thing was to secure a settlement and, if a settlement could be achieved through diplomatic channels, the Convention should not make this impossible. He therefore suggested that the reference to diplomatic protection in Section 17(1) be deleted."

The CHAIRMAN thought that the words "diplomatic protection" whose meaning was, in any event, not altogether clear could perhaps be eliminated. He pointed out that governments could not, however, have it both ways. If they had accepted that disputes would be submitted to arbitration that must be interpreted to mean that they preferred such a method to negotiation. Of course there was no reason why diplomatic contacts should be excluded.

The meeting rose at 12:45 p.m.

SEVENTH SESSION
(Thursday, February 20, 1964 - 3:00 p.m.)

ARTICLE IV - Arbitration (continued)

Mr. RODOCANACHI (France), commenting on Article IV, Section 17(1), agreed with the point raised by various members regarding the value of diplomatic protection in the stages preceding the submission of the dispute to the arbitral tribunal. It could, in his opinion, be covered by deleting the words "shall have consented to submit, or" in that paragraph so that diplomatic protection would come to an end once the dispute was submitted to the tribunal and would revive, after the award was rendered if it were necessary to obtain compliance with it.

With regard to Section 17(2), it was essential to avoid any risk of conflict between decisions taken by arbitral tribunals set up under the terms of bilateral agreements on the one hand and by the draft Convention on the other. Accordingly, some system would have to be evolved for the parties to choose between these two possibilities. It was also important to differentiate between existing bilateral agreements and bilateral agreements which would be concluded after the entry
into force of the draft Convention. Existing agreements for the most part provided for arbitration between States, although some agreements did provide for arbitration between an investor and a host State. It would appear that Section 17(2) gave preference to arbitration under the Convention, while he thought that in the case of existing bilateral agreements, they ought to prevail since they provided for compulsory arbitration. However, the possibility should not be excluded of an investor preferring to have recourse to the arbitral tribunals set up under the draft Convention if that were also agreeable to the States concerned. Where a dispute arose between two States, the bilateral treaty would of course prevail as the draft Convention was not intended to cover disputes between States.

The problem with relation to bilateral agreements concluded after the entry into force of the draft Convention was somewhat different. The possibility of access to the Center would not lessen the value of bilateral agreements which would provide substantive rules of conduct for investors and the host State. It would be desirable, with a view to avoiding any contradictory situations, for future bilateral agreements, and possibly multilateral agreements of the type envisaged under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, to provide for compulsory arbitration through the Center. Bilateral agreements could continue to include provision for arbitration between the States concerned, unless specific provision for that were to be included in the draft Convention to the extent considered desirable. It should be clearly stated that any dispute which had already been the object of an arbitral decision under a bilateral agreement should not be submitted to the Center, and vice versa. He was not sure whether Article IV was the appropriate place for the insertion of some reference to that important problem; it might be considered preferable for any provisions to that effect to be inserted in the final clauses of the draft Convention.

The CHAIRMAN said that since Section 17(2) dealt with the relations of one Contracting State with another, it did not cover bilateral agreements which provided for arbitration between the investor and the host State. Accordingly, there would seem to be no conflict of jurisdiction. Indeed, it could be argued that Section 17(2) was not strictly necessary; it had been included out of a possible excess of caution to ensure that the more general terms of Section 17(1) did not exclude the situation covered under Section 17(2). If it were wished to take into account the position raised by the representative of France, there would be a case for inserting an entirely separate provision on that whole subject.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) said that he was in favor of the retention of Section 17(2) in the draft Convention. The risk of a possibility of contradictory decisions would present a greater practical problem if the draft on protection of foreign property of OECD entered into force. It seemed to him, therefore, that the general question raised by the French representative could be held over for the time being.

Mr. van SANTEN (Netherlands), making a general comment on Article IV as a whole, wished to put before the meeting the point of view expressed to him by a large company that a clause similar to the one contained in Article III, Section 6, providing for full co-operation by the parties, should also be included in an appropriate place in Article IV.
ARTICLE V - Replacement and Disqualification of Conciliators and Arbitrators

The CHAIRMAN introducing Article V referred to a significant criticism which had been made in Article V in connection with the inequality of treatment of conciliators and arbitrators appointed by the parties and those appointed by the Chairman with regard to disqualification. He was prepared to accept uniform provisions for both.

Mr. BILGEN (Turkey) considered that the reasons for disqualification of conciliators and arbitrators should be specifically enumerated in the draft Convention. He also suggested that the different treatment accorded to arbitrators and conciliators appointed by the parties and those appointed by the Chairman in regard to disqualification be eliminated.

The CHAIRMAN said that there seemed to be a strong feeling that the question of the qualifications and the disqualification of conciliators and arbitrators should be dealt with in greater detail. The question of how best that could be done called for further study.

Mr. HERNDL (Austria) thought that it would be preferable to include those details under the heading of disqualification rather than, in a more positive form, under qualifications.

ARTICLE VI - Apportionment of Costs of Proceedings

The CHAIRMAN said that the draft followed the general principle of the equal apportionment of costs customary in international proceedings. However, the commission or tribunal was given discretion to depart from the standard rule in cases where proceedings had been instituted frivolously or in bad faith.

Mr. HERNDL (Austria) believed that there would be general agreement that the principle of Article VI, Section 1 was in accordance with international practice. He felt that the draft Convention might well go beyond that and introduce the principle current in many national systems that the losing party would be required to pay all expenses. That might somewhat lessen the risk of actions being brought unnecessarily. If that suggestion were not acceptable he would propose that at least the words "it shall assess" be substituted for the words "it may assess" in the penultimate line of that paragraph.

In reply to a question from Mr. HELNERS (Sweden), the CHAIRMAN said that the intention had been that, where the costs of proceedings were assessed wholly against one party the obligation to pay them would be included in the award, and thus be enforceable under Article IV, Section 15. There was, however, clearly no "award" in the case of conciliation, and he would be glad to have the advice of the experts on how to deal with this point.

Mr. ARNOLD (Federal Republic of Germany) wondered whether the provisions for apportionment of costs (taking into account possible high travel expenses, etc.) might not discourage many small and medium-sized enterprises whose investment in foreign countries it was particularly important to encourage from submitting disputes to the Center. It seemed to him that that aspect of the question should be borne in mind. Possibly, a scale of charges determined by the Administrative Council would meet the situation.
In addition a provision might be included under Article VI, Section 2 for some form of appeal in the matter of the assessment of costs.

The CHAIRMAN said that the question of expenses, fees and charges had given rise to a number of suggestions. The draft already provided for a tariff to be set up by the Secretary-General within the limits determined by the Administrative Council. The inclusion of the words "from time to time" in Section 2 had been deemed necessary since overhead expenses might well change over a period of time and general review thus become necessary. Administrative charges for the use of the Center's facilities would not themselves be very high. Fees and expenses of arbitrators or conciliators, however, might well be high. Some objections had indeed been raised in respect of the freedom given conciliators and arbitrators to fix their own fees and expenses in the absence of agreement between the parties, those objections being based on the interests of small investors and small States. It had been suggested that the Administrative Council should establish some guidelines for fees. The matter required further study in order to arrive at an equitable situation.

Replying to a point raised by Mr. DEGUEN (France), the CHAIRMAN confirmed that the Center would not be responsible for the payment of fees and expenses.

ARTICLE VII - Place of Proceedings

The CHAIRMAN said that, while it had been provided that the place of proceedings should normally be at the seat of the Center or at such other institutions where administrative arrangements could be made, the matter had been left fairly flexible. The possibility had been mentioned, both at the Santiago meeting and at the present one by the Spanish representative that unless there were strong reasons to the contrary conciliation proceedings should be held at the place where the dispute had arisen.

In reply to a question from Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) as to whether the official language of proceedings should be specified, the CHAIRMAN said that the matter might be left to the rules of procedure.

ARTICLE VIII - Interpretation

The CHAIRMAN drew attention to a draft additional section on interpretation (COM/EU/8), which read as follows:

"2. (1) If in the course of any arbitral proceeding pursuant to this Convention a question arises between the parties to the dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention, and the arbitral tribunal is of the opinion that the question has merit and may affect the outcome of the proceedings, the tribunal shall suspend the proceedings for a period of three months.

(2) If within that period the tribunal shall have been notified that the International Court of Justice has been seized of the question by a State party to the dispute, or the State whose national is a party to the dispute, the arbitral proceedings shall remain suspended as long as the question is pending before the International Court of Justice."
(3) If the tribunal shall not have been so notified, the arbitral proceedings shall be resumed at the expiration of the aforesaid period."

Mr. RODOCANACHI (France) suggested that the words "or application" in Article VIII should be deleted in order to avoid any risk of introducing into the draft Convention the notion of recourse or appeal to the International Court of Justice against an arbitral award because it could be argued that there had been a wrong application of the Convention if the tribunal had not taken into account certain rules of international or national law as it was required to do under Section 4 of Article IV.

The CHAIRMAN said that that point called for thorough review in order to avoid any such risk.

Mr. MONACO (Italy) said that he saw no objection to the retention of the words "or application" in Article VIII since that Article referred only to Contracting States and did not therefore affect a particular dispute between an investor and a State.

He wondered, however, whether Article VIII implied that Contracting States were accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and whether it might not be preferable, taking into account the provisions of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, to amend Article VIII to read "... shall be referred by mutual consent of the parties to the International Court of Justice ..."

The proposed addition to Article VIII (Doc. COM/EU/8) was in principle acceptable, but he wondered whether the arbitral tribunal should be given the power to reject a question of interpretation on the ground that it was without merit or could not affect the award. The latter ground in particular would be very difficult to determine.

Mr. KARELLE (Belgium) suggested that it was preferable to amend Article VIII so as to read "shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court of Justice". The amendment proposed by the representative of Italy might well enable one party to prevent recourse to the Court by withholding its consent.

The CHAIRMAN said that it was the feeling of some countries that, in view of the continuing resistance of some States to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice even on narrow issues, it would be desirable to include a proviso for mutual consent, as suggested by the Italian representative. On the other hand, the suggestion of the Belgian expert would make it clear that Article VIII made recourse to the Court compulsory. The final decision would depend on the wishes of the countries interested in the Convention.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) upheld the view that the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice should be compulsory and that reference to it could be made at the request of one party.

He wondered whether the words "any question or dispute" should not, in the present context, be replaced by the words "any dispute", having regard to the doubt whether the International Court could, at the instance of States, determine "questions" without there being a dispute.
He supported the retention of the words "or application", although it might be necessary to specify clearly that that did not imply a right of appeal from an arbitral award.

He supported the suggestion made by the representative of Italy to delete the words "and may affect the outcome of the proceedings" in Section 2(1) of the proposed addition to Article VIII.

Mr. van SANTE (Netherlands) considered it preferable to omit mention of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Article 36, paragraph 1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice governed that situation.

He believed that, in view of the final provisions of Article IV, Section 17(1) which reaffirmed the right of a Contracting State to bring an international claim against another State which had failed to perform its obligations under the Convention, it was necessary to maintain the words "or application" in Article VIII, although it should not be considered as giving a right of appeal against an award.

He commended the proposal contained in document COM/EU/8. It was his view, however, that any signatory of the draft Convention, and not merely the Contracting States directly concerned, should have the right of bringing the matter before the International Court of Justice. Accordingly, he suggested the deletion in Section 2(2) of document COM/EU/8 of the words "by a State party to the dispute or the State whose national is a party to the dispute".

Article VIII was a crucial one and should be retained.

Mr. MELCHOR (Spain) said that his original doubts on Article VIII as it stood had been further strengthened by the draft additional section proposed. He was concerned lest those provisions should constitute interference with the competence of the arbitral tribunals and conciliation commissions. He was in favor of the retention of the words "or application" in Article VIII. He had no objection to a clause on interpretation provided it referred solely to the Convention itself. Any extension of that to cover an interpretation of the Convention in connection with a particular dispute was bound to lead to difficulties, and a suspension of the proceedings of the tribunal, as suggested in the proposed additional section could only aggravate the situation. A position might arise where a contrary decision was given by the International Court of Justice and that might detract from the authority of the arbitral tribunal. He shared the doubts expressed with regard to the retention of the words "and may affect the outcome of the proceedings".

In conclusion he suggested that Article VIII clearly state that it would apply only to general questions of interpretation of the provisions of the Convention and that in an actual dispute the arbitral tribunal would be the one to interpret the provisions of the Convention relevant in the dispute.

Mr. AMELIE (Norway) believed that a large number of questions regarding interpretation and application of the Convention might in fact bear on the competence of the arbitral tribunal. It was therefore essential to ensure that the arbitral tribunal was not relieved of its duty (under Section 3(1) of Article II) to determine its own competence
and it might be desirable to include a reference to that Section in Article VIII.

Mr. HERNDL (Austria) supported the proposal of the Belgian expert that reference should be made to the International Court of Justice at the request of either party. It seemed to him that Article VIII constituted a compromissory clause and ought to be drafted in unequivocal terms. Should the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court be unacceptable to the majority, it would be preferable to delete it as States were always free to have recourse to the Court under a special agreement between them.

The CHAIRMAN noted that there appeared to be a preponderance of opinion at the meeting in favor of making it compulsory that States submit all disputes on the interpretation of the Convention to the International Court.

It had also been agreed that on no account should the provisions of Article VIII become a procedure for appeal against awards. Certainly, no such suggestion was intended in the use of the words "or application".

It was also the consensus of the meeting that the original provisions of Article VIII ought not to affect in any way those of Section 3(1) of Article II which made an arbitral tribunal judge of its own competence.

Lastly, there was no doubt in his mind that the arbitral tribunal would accept any ruling on interpretation given by the International Court. The only real issue was whether that tribunal would have the power - or the duty - to suspend its proceedings pending that ruling, if the States concerned desired to have recourse to the Court.

Mr. MELCHOR (Spain) suggested that if the States concerned had agreed to submit a question of interpretation of the Convention to the International Court, there was no need to provide in the Convention for the suspension of the arbitral proceedings, as the parties themselves would ask for such a suspension. He thought it important, however, to stress that all questions connected with actual disputes should be decided by the arbitral tribunal.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) said that it would be difficult to apply the proposed new Section 2, since there were still doubts as to whether the original provisions of Article VIII made the jurisdiction of the International Court compulsory.

Doubts could also arise regarding the binding character for the arbitral tribunal of an interpretation given by the Court.

Another difficulty was that a private investor who had a dispute with the host State on interpretation might find his own national State unwilling to espouse his case before the International Court; he would thus be in a position of inequality as compared with the host State, which - as a State - always had direct access to the Court, and could delay proceedings at will.

Mr. SERB (Yugoslavia) agreed that the investor's States might be unwilling to espouse his claim and might even share the host State's view on the interpretation dispute.
The interpretation of a treaty being primarily a matter for the Contracting States, he suggested that, in the event of a dispute regarding interpretation in the course of arbitral proceedings the Secretary-General of the Center should be asked by the arbitral tribunal to seek the Contracting States' views on the question of interpretation at issue. If the Contracting States were unanimous there would be no question of interpretation to be decided.

Mr. van Santen (Netherlands) felt that there could be no doubt that Article VIII brought the parties within the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. Nor could there be any doubt that any ruling by the Court on interpretation would be binding upon the arbitral tribunal. Finally he observed that if the State of the investor did not wish to submit to the Court a question of interpretation that had arisen during an arbitral proceeding, or agreed with the State party to the dispute on that question, then after the three-month period provided for in the new Section 2 of Article VIII the arbitral tribunal would have to decide that question according to its best judgment. Although the system of reference to the Court of questions of interpretation incidental to a proceeding might entail some delay, he was in favor of it.

**ARTICLE IX - Amendment**

The Chairman said that the amendment procedure embodied in Article IX had followed the constituent instruments of the Bank and its affiliated bodies, and was intended to permit amendment of the Convention without requiring unanimous action by the Contracting States themselves.

At the Addis Ababa meeting the provisions of Article IX had been regarded as useful. At Santiago, however, there had been some Latin American objections that legislative approval for the Convention was unlikely in some countries if the text included amendment provisions that would make the decision of a majority (however large) binding upon a minority of States. It had been suggested, as an alternative, that a certain majority should be required for a proposed amendment, but that the amendment should enter into force only with respect to those States that accepted it.

Mr. Karelle (Belgium) said that Belgium had signed a number of international agreements which had an amendment clause along the lines of Section 2 of Article IX but the Conseil d'Etat of Belgium had pointed out that in such cases Belgium might become bound by an amendment which had not received the approval of its legislature. The Minister of Foreign Affairs had accordingly stated officially that he would oppose similar clauses in the future.

Mr. Koinzer (Federal Republic of Germany) and Mr. Trolle (Denmark) said that a similar difficulty would arise in their countries.

Mr. van Santen (Netherlands) said that the same was true in the Netherlands, where Parliament would be extremely reluctant to permit a Convention which it had approved to be amended without its further approval.

The Chairman asked whether the system proposed at Santiago would be acceptable to those representatives who had found the proposed amendment procedure difficult to accept.
Mr. RODOCANACHI (France) said that a system under which an amendment to a Convention would apply to some, but not all, the parties to the Convention, would create insoluble problems regarding the legal relationships among Contracting States. For the same reason he thought reservations to the Convention ought not to be permitted.

Mr. AMLIE (Norway) said that if a majority rule were to be introduced for the amendment of the Convention, it should at least be stipulated that the basic nature of the Convention could not be altered, and in particular that there would be no departure from the optional character of the Convention.

The CHAIRMAN explained that, under the provisions of Section 5(2) of Article XI, a Contracting State would have the right of withdrawal and its withdrawal would take effect twelve months after the notice given by it. Since under Section 2 of Article IX, amendments only become effective twelve months after their adoption and would not be retroactive, it was always possible for a Contracting State to avoid being bound by the Convention as amended, if that State felt that the amendments introduced were too radical. This, however, might be regarded as too high a price to pay for having an amendment procedure.

Mr. SERB (Yugoslavia) felt that some further consideration ought to be given to the so-called Latin American system as in practice there were conventions amendments which had not been accepted by all the Contracting States, so that some States were bound by the new text, while the others remained bound by the old.

ARTICLE XI - Final Provisions

The CHAIRMAN suggested that Article X (Definitions) should be considered last and invited the meeting to discuss Article XI.

Entry into Force (Section 1 - 3)

The CHAIRMAN said that, at the other regional meetings, suggestions had been made to replace the concluding words of Section 1 "and all other sovereign States" by a formula along the following lines: "all other States members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies".

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) and Mr. KOINZER (Federal Republic of Germany) expressed strong support for that suggestion.

Mr. KARELLE (Belgium) suggested that a time limit be set for signing the Convention, and provision be made for adherence to the Convention thereafter.

Mr. RODOCANACHI (France) asked why the term "acceptance" had been used in addition to the more traditional one of "ratification".

The CHAIRMAN replied that in recent years certain countries had preferred to adhere to a Convention by way of acceptance rather than ratification for internal constitutional reasons. From the point of view of international law the effect would be the same.

Mr. MONACO (Italy) suggested that the requirement in Section 2 that a State deposit a declaration that it "had taken all steps necessary to
enable it to carry out all of its obligations under the Convention" should be deleted as being unnecessary: a State which deposited an instrument of ratification or acceptance was thereby bound to carry out all its obligations under the Convention. It was not logical that the State in question should be asked to make a separate declaration to that effect.

The CHAIRMAN explained that the sentence in question had been borrowed from the text of the constituent instruments of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In the case of those instruments, there may have been special reasons in view of important financial obligations resulting from membership. He had no strong views on the matter.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) agreed with the proposal of the Italian representative regarding Section 2.

The CHAIRMAN said that it was too early to suggest any definite figure for the minimum number of ratifications required for entry into force. At the present time all that could be said was: first, that the minimum number should not be too high, considering that the Convention established a new procedural system and not new substantive rules of international law; second, that the minimum number of ratifications should include States from both the capital-importing and the capital-exporting groups.

Mr. KARELLE (Belgium) suggested that a provision should be included to the effect that ratifications and acceptances subsequent to the date of entry into force of a Convention would take effect immediately.

The CHAIRMAN agreed with the Belgian expert.

He observed that no provision on the subject of reservations had been included in the draft and the matter would thus remain subject to the rules of international law in force on that subject.

If there were some clearly recognizable problems for States with a federal form of government which might prevent them from accepting the Convention in its present form without reservations, the Convention should make some provision for such reservations and no other.

On the specific question of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice provided for in Article VIII, he said that it would be regrettable if certain countries were unable to join the Convention because they were not allowed to make reservations to that Article. At the same time, it would also be a matter for regret if compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in this limited field could not be accepted.

Territorial Application (Section 4)

The CHAIRMAN said that at the other regional meetings, the suggestion had been made to insert at the end of Section 4 the words "either at the time of signature or subsequently".

At the African meeting, it had been suggested that a provision should be inserted to the effect that if a dependent territory which was a party to the Convention became independent, the Convention would cease to apply
to it; a clause of that type would cover the case where the former metropolitan power failed to exclude the territory before its accession to independence.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) asked whether at the other regional meetings there had been any reaction to Section 4.

The CHAIRMAN said that at the African meeting there had been one statement to the effect that Section 4 represented a relic from the past and that no State should be responsible for the international relations of another nation. The opposite view, however, had prevailed, it being pointed out that a distinction should be drawn between the actual situation and the desirable state of affairs.

**Denunciation (Section 5)**

The CHAIRMAN said that at another regional meeting, it had been suggested that, in Section 5(1), the words "at any time" should be added after "may denounce this Convention".

**Inauguration of the Center (Section 6)**

In reply to a question by Mr. KOENZER (Federal Republic of Germany), the CHAIRMAN said that the arrangements for meetings of the Administrative Council of the Bank were sufficiently flexible to enable any person to be designated to serve upon it.

It was desirable that draft rules of procedure for the Center should be drawn up before the Convention was submitted to governments since the actual rules of procedure would be adopted by the first States to become parties to the Convention.

Mr. van SANTEN (Netherlands) said that it would be desirable to specify in Section 6(1) of Article I that the Administrative Council was entitled not only to adopt but also to amend the administrative rules and regulations of the Center.

The CHAIRMAN said that the intent of Section 6(1) of Article I had been to include the power of amendment in the power to adopt administrative rules and regulations.

**Registration (Section 7). Final Clause**

Mr. KARELLE (Belgium) said that it was necessary to specify that the Bank would have a duty to advise all Contracting parties of the deposit of any instrument of ratification or accession.

He noted that the final clause made no reference to the language of the Convention.

The CHAIRMAN replied that it was intended that the Convention should be signed in three equally authentic texts viz., English, French and Spanish.

The meeting rose at 6:00 p.m.
EIGHTH SESSION
(Friday, February 21, 1964 - 9:35 a.m.)

ARTICLE X - Definitions

The CHAIRMAN invited the meeting to consider Article X on definitions. With regard to the definition of nationals, which had been discussed previously in connection with Article II, he said that the definition was included in the agreement not in order to give rights to investors but in order to allow governments to enter into agreements with them. On the question of dual nationality, he suggested that where one of the person's nationalities was that of the host State, the person should not be excluded on that account from the protection afforded by the Convention, provided firstly that it was stated in the agreement that the host State recognized that the person had or might come to have its own nationality and secondly, that the person must have had foreign nationality at the time of the signing of the agreement as well as having it at the time application was made to the Center for the appointment of a conciliation commission or an arbitral tribunal.

Mr. RODOCANACHI (France) said that as far as physical persons were concerned the conditions suggested by the Chairman would go a long way towards removing the objections he had raised based on the probable reluctance of any State to allow its own nationals to proceed against it before an international tribunal.

Mr. TROLLE (Denmark) pointed out that States might well confer their nationality on persons making investments or working in their country some of whom might thereby acquire dual nationality, perhaps without their even being aware of the fact. The existence of dual nationality should not be an obstacle to the protection afforded by the Convention except when the host State was unaware that a person had its citizenship.

The CHAIRMAN said that his suggestion had been intended to meet a case of the kind cited by the representative of Denmark.

Mr. GOULD (South Africa) said that it was only in connection with companies or corporate persons that problems would be likely to arise over the question of nationality. If the Chairman's suggestion were accepted, it would still be impossible at the time of signing an agreement to foresee what the nationality of a company's shareholders would be at the time of a possible dispute.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) suggested that the best place to deal with most of the difficulties over the question of nationality might be in the comments accompanying the Convention.

Mr. van SANTEN (Netherlands) said that it would be unrealistic to expect nations to recognize the dual nationality of persons living in their territory in order to give those persons the right to sue them. It had to be remembered that in such cases the person's second government would have the right to give him diplomatic protection, whereby the first government would at once lose part of its rights over a resident citizen. Since such cases were likely to be rare, he felt it might be wiser not to mention the question in the Convention in order to avoid frightening possible signatories.
He asked why the second nationality should have to be known at the time of the request for conciliation or arbitration. In his opinion, only the latter date was important.

The CHAIRMAN replied that the right to make a claim before the international tribunal would depend on the recognition of the person's foreign nationality, which would necessarily have to be known at the time consent to arbitration was given.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) suggested that in the first paragraph the words "possessing the nationality of" be substituted by the words "was a national of".

The CHAIRMAN observed that the Convention sought to deal with the problem of defining the nationality of corporate persons by a departure from the generally accepted rules, which defined as a national of a State a company which was a national of that State by virtue of its own laws either because the company has its seat in that country under one system or because it is incorporated under the law of that country under another system. The draft added as a further criterion the element of control so that a company having its seat in country A controlled from country B would have dual nationality. That system had been objected to on the grounds that the question of control should be kept apart from that of nationality. Undoubtedly, a local company's foreign interests ought to come within the scope of the Convention. It had been suggested that the protection afforded by the Convention should be given to foreign holders rather than to companies as such. In that way, a company established in a given country would not have to be described as foreign and the problems raised by the greater or lesser degree of foreign control would be avoided.

Mr. MELCHOR (Spain) said that since the definition of the nationality of juridical persons was a very complex matter, it might be better to study the question of affording direct protection to individual investors rather than to companies whose nationality had to be determined according to the host country's laws. The idea of the Convention was to afford protection not only to companies whose capital was predominantly foreign-owned but also to protect all foreign investors, including minority interests.

Mr. GUARINO (Italy) said that investments could be grouped in three categories: voluntary investments; investments made pursuant to a particular contract with a State, and investments made in reliance on a law of the host country. Persons investing without special incentives in a foreign country did not deserve special protection. In the case of investors who entered into particular contracts with a State, nationality should be determined at the time the contract was made. Where investments were made in reliance on a law of the host country, the nationality of the investor would be that possessed by him at the time he registered the introduction of his capital into the host country. By granting protection on the basis of the nationality at the time of registration of the investment, the problem of the rights of minority holdings in companies would be eliminated.

The section on definitions should include the definition of a State as well as that of a national of a State, since the modern State operated through companies under its direct or indirect control. The definition should comprise the State, local authorities, public corporations and
companies directly or indirectly controlled by the State or by public corporations.

Mr. KOINZER (Federal Republic of Germany) said he was not convinced of the importance of clause (b) of paragraph 1 of Article X. Companies could be nationals of the capital-exporting country, of the host country, or of a non-contracting State. In the first case there would be no difficulty in extending the protection of the Convention to the company. In the case of nationals of the host country it had to be asked whether the company as such would be eligible for protection, or whether the eligibility would not arise from the fact that the individual investors were nationals of a Contracting State. Since nationals would be unlikely to sue their own government it would be more reasonable to formulate the article in such a way as to give the individual investors the right to sue. With regard to companies of a non-contracting State there arose the question whether they were entitled to be covered by the Convention where nationals of a Contracting State had a majority holding of their capital. He thought this latter case ought to be covered by the Convention. It would also be desirable to clarify the meaning of a "controlling interest", which ought perhaps to include not only the owners of a majority holding, but also interests sufficiently important to be able to block major changes in the company.

The CHAIRMAN explained that the second paragraph of Article X meant that as long as a person could be regarded as a foreign investor with the nationality of a Contracting State it did not matter what other nationality he had. However, many experts seemed to feel that the words beginning with "notwithstanding" in paragraph 2 could be deleted and that companies incorporated, or having their seat, in the host country should not be included as such in the Convention, protection being afforded to individual investors in those companies. He suggested that clause (a) be retained, clause (b) be deleted and that the remainder of paragraph 1 of the definition be retained as it solved the difficulties created by the vagaries of different legal systems in attributing juridical personality to various forms of business organizations.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) said that the changes proposed by the meeting introduced a new idea of the investments that would be covered by the Convention and once again raised the question of the definition of "investments". He wished to reserve his position.

Mr. GOULD (South Africa) said that it was necessary to look behind the corporate veil to the shareholders or physical persons affected by adverse action. If that could be done the difficulties raised by such questions as the nationality of the Company and problems created by the existence of holding Companies, nominees, voting arrangements, trusts and various forms of disguised ownership would be eliminated. Careful investigation would be necessary, but in his view that was the only way to afford full protection to the individual foreign persons who had real patrimonial interests in the host country. The suggestion put forward by the representative of Germany that any company recognized by another Contracting State as its national should be acceptable would open the door to abuses and allow nationals of non-contracting States to benefit by the protection afforded by the Convention. With regard to the definition of a "controlling interest", owing to the different classes of shares, with and without voting powers, control defined in terms of shareholders representing 51 per cent of the voting power was
an artificial conception; that control could in fact be acquired by persons holding only 25 per cent of the Company's capital.

The CHAIRMAN feared that the suggestion made by the representative of South Africa would involve an immense amount of investigation in each case and be unduly complicated. He felt that it should be left to the State concerned to carry out at the time of signing the agreement whatever investigations it felt to be necessary. It also had to be remembered that the Convention was based on consent and that the purpose of the definition was to establish the outer limits within which this consent could be exercised.

Mr. GOULD (South Africa) pointed out that the great fear of the underdeveloped countries was neo-colonialism. Those countries needed to establish pioneer and key industries and had to look to former colonial nations for assistance in creating those industries. They were afraid of finding themselves at the mercy of investors. The investor was not necessarily going to be the injured party, since he would have the new countries' economic activities very largely in his own hands.

The CHAIRMAN said that he was fully aware of some fears on the part of underdeveloped countries and that he himself had pointed out that investors as well as States might be defendants in proceedings under the auspices of the Center. Moreover, the Convention had introduced a number of features tending to protect the position of the underdeveloped countries. He did not think, however, that the problem mentioned by the expert of South Africa affected the question of how to determine the nationality of a company.

Mr. RODOCANACHI (France) observed, with regard to the last sentence in paragraph 1, that no State would be able to recognize associations which were illegal under its own domestic laws.

Mr. MONACO (Italy) said that if the definition contained in clause (b) were dropped there seemed no need to retain paragraph 2 of Article X because for purposes of any particular dispute the nationality would be that possessed by virtue of the applicable municipal law. The comment which was not very clear on that point certainly failed to justify the need for paragraph 2.

The criterion of "control" was one of fact rather than law and unless there were compelling reasons to regard it as essential for the application of the Convention, it could be left out.

Mr. ARNOLD (Federal Republic of Germany) said that the definition must be consistent with existing law and practice on nationality. In theory, bodies corporate could not possess nationality in the sense that it was possessed by individuals if at all, the matter was regulated by municipal law.

If some objective criterion were deemed necessary, perhaps Article 58 of the Rome Treaty might provide guidance because it dealt with an analogous problem and did contain a territorial criterion designed as a safeguard against the creation of fictitious companies.

He agreed with Mr. Monaco that the criterion of "control" caused great difficulties and observed that it had for that reason been generally discarded by international lawyers; he therefore agreed with Mr. Monaco.
that in the final draft of Article X account should be taken of the provisions in The Hague Convention on the recognition of the personality of juridical persons. Although that instrument had only been ratified by very few States it had the great merit of reconciling continental and common law concepts of juridical personality.

Mr. TROLLE (Denmark), observing that the Chairman seemed to favor deletion of clause (b), asked whether the effect of that would be to preclude companies set up in a country B whose capital was owned by persons in country A from entering into arbitral agreements under Article II, Section 2.

The CHAIRMAN confirmed that the national company in country B would not be entitled to enter into an arbitral agreement but the foreign holding company in country A could do so and the consequences of deleting clause (b) would be that the local company could not be a party to proceedings.

Mr. TROLLE (Denmark) pointed out that the example he had in mind was that where there was no holding company in country A but the shares were sold in that country.

The CHAIRMAN explained that unless the shareholders in country A could organize themselves into some kind of recognized group, if the criterion contained in clause (b) were dropped there would be no way of their bringing a case before the tribunal. It might simplify matters if that were made possible, but the criterion of control was obviously going to cause difficulties and there was a patent reluctance on the part of a number of capital-exporting as well as capital-importing countries to accept the possibility of instituting international proceedings between a local company and the host State.

On the last point it was of interest that an exception did exist. Many African States, formerly associated with France, had accorded a special regime to companies that had originally been French, by way of compensation for obliging them to change their nationality when the territory in question had become independent.

Mr. TROLLE (Denmark) observed that the only way out in the hypothetical case he had described would be to turn, say, a manufacturing enterprise into a company of the capital-exporting country, or, if that were contrary to the laws of the capital-importing country a holding company in country A might need to be created. All of which would make for perhaps unnecessary complications.

The CHAIRMAN said that greater latitude might have been desirable on that point but clause (b) seemed to be giving rise to considerable opposition in various quarters. Perhaps it should be borne in mind that in most cases the investment would be of a corporate character and not private.

Mr. RODOCANACHI (France) mentioned as a precedent the solution arrived at when the Indonesian Government had enacted a special law some years previously requiring that plantation concessions be given only to companies organized under Indonesian law. The French interests which had previously beneficially owned the concessions through Dutch companies transferred all the Indonesian assets to an Indonesian company whose shares they held. The Indonesian Government had recognized that
France could continue to exercise diplomatic protection in respect of these Indonesian companies.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) said that the observations made by the experts from Denmark and France were extremely pertinent. In his view the definition ought to be simple and should say as little as possible in the interests of devising a convention that could serve as a practical instrument for the settlement of as wide a range of disputes as possible. Though aware that it was impossible to define with precision the concept of "a controlling interest" it would be unrealistic to omit all mention of the concept. After some informal exchanges of view he was now inclined to think that perhaps what was needed was a rule of interpretation to the effect that consent to proceed under the Convention implied recognition by the State concerned of the foreign nationality of the other party. If a solution on those lines were feasible, a definition of nationality would become unnecessary. Of course the issue which had arisen in the course of the discussion belonged to the domain of what the Chairman had aptly described as the "outer limits". In fact every dispute likely to arise must be viewed in the context of consent and at that stage the issue to be determined would be the true status of the company and whether it was eligible to benefit from the provisions of the Convention.

The CHAIRMAN said that the discussion had indicated that the issues were more intricate than had been realized. Perhaps it should be borne in mind that certain political preoccupations were due to a misconception and a failure to appreciate the consensual nature of the Convention. The matter obviously called for further consideration in order to achieve the maximum freedom compatible with certain political considerations.

Mr. OBERHOLZER (South Africa) asked whether the effect of deleting the words, "notwithstanding that such person ... party to the dispute" in paragraph 2 would be as it were to reverse the International Court's criteria in the Nottebohm Case, transferring them from the State to the individual.

The CHAIRMAN replied that he was not quite certain of the exact effect of such a deletion but did not believe that the previous speaker's supposition was justified.

Mr. GUARINO (Italy) said he did not regard the issue of nationality as of capital importance once the host State had accepted the principle of submitting a dispute with a particular investor to arbitration.

Mr. LOVOLD (Norway) asked whether some exchange of views would be possible on the difficult subject of defining "investment" though he had no solution to offer. Although the comment on Article II mentioned the difficulties of definition and stressed the optional character of the scheme envisaged under the draft Convention surely it would be difficult to omit any definition altogether. He had noted the argument put forward in the last sentence of paragraph 4 of that comment but believed that a case could be made for the reverse contention that the total absence of a limit on the category of disputes might open the door to controversies about applicability of the Convention. An example of such a possibility was the much too sweeping assertion made during the discussion, that every capital transfer constituted an investment: many thousands of short-term transactions would never be regarded as coming within the terms of the proposed draft.
The argument in favor of retaining the possibility of subrogation by a State under an export insurance scheme seemed to carry the unwarranted implication that suppliers' credits as such constituted investments. Surely short-term credits for the import of non-durable consumer goods were not the kind of transaction that would require protection though a case could be made for a loan of say twelve years or more for the purchase of capital goods. Some countries recognized that kind of distinction whereby export credits that could be regarded as contributing to the economic development of a country qualified as investment. Perhaps a definition on those lines would be feasible.

The CHAIRMAN questioned whether a definition of a concept generally recognized to be vague would obviate disputes about jurisdiction. There were good reasons for eschewing detailed definitions which was why he had suggested that some examples of what was meant by investment (even though not exhaustive) could usefully be set out in a separate document rather than in the text of the Convention itself.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) said that in mentioning export credit guarantees he had not intended to express any opinion as to whether or not they would fall within the scope of the Convention.

Mr. van SANTEN (Netherlands) thought that definitions should be kept to a minimum in order to avoid unnecessary delays as a result of preliminary objections.

It was for that reason that Article II, Section 3(2), made no mention of investment disputes. If the distinction drawn in that Article between the jurisdiction of the Center and the competence of the tribunal had any meaning at all it was that a request for arbitration pursuant to Article IV would first be processed by the Secretary-General of the Center who would inform the Administrative Council if he thought the claim fell outside its jurisdiction by reason of not being an investment dispute. That would constitute an initial screening process so that when the issue came before the tribunal with the consent of both parties that body would act on the assumption that the dispute was within its competence.

The CHAIRMAN observed that as the expert from the Netherlands would recall, Article II, Section 3(2) as at present formulated, was incomplete. An additional sub-paragraph was needed on the question of disputes not being within the jurisdiction of the Center. The reason for inclusion of that provision was that many capital-importing countries were anxious to leave certain categories of disputes outside the scope of its jurisdiction. It was necessary to include a provision of that kind because the Secretary-General had no power to screen requests for arbitration and to refuse to set the machinery in motion. If the Secretary-General and Administrative Council were to be given the power contemplated by the Netherlands expert that would have to be expressly stated and then a more precise definition of an investment dispute would become necessary. Perhaps it would be expedient to say as little on the subject as possible.

The Preamble

Mr. RODOCANACHI (France) suggested that paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Preamble should be merged; alternatively, the concept of the respect for the sovereign rights of States should be introduced into paragraph 1. He
found that that concept was just as important in connection with the con-
tents of paragraph 1 as it was with those of paragraph 2. It was important
to stress that the scheme proposed would not lead to any results detrimental
to national sovereignty and it would be desirable to state that intern-
tional investments ought to respect the national sovereignty of host
States; there was a persistent fear of "neo-colonialism" in the newly-
independent States and that feeling should be taken into account.

Also in paragraph 2, it was not clear whether the concluding phrase
"in accordance with international law" related to the exercise of
sovereignty or to the settlement of disputes.

Lastly, the question arose whether international law limited the
exercise of sovereignty or guaranteed the sovereignty of States.

The CHAIRMAN said that international law undoubtedly did both.

He thought that the suggestion for the introduction into paragraph 1
of the Preamble of a reference to the respect due to the sovereignty of
States would be helpful.

The somewhat cumbersome language of paragraph 2 had been drawn from
the well-known General Assembly resolution on the subject of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources; "the text of that resolution had
represented an even compromise between the language proposed by the under-
developed countries and that proposed by the industrialized countries,
so that the over-all effect was somewhat confusing.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) noted that paragraph
3 laid too much emphasis on national legal processes. He suggested that a refer-
ence should be introduced to private arbitration, both at the national
level and at the international level through such bodies as the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce.

The CHAIRMAN said that paragraph 3 had been introduced in order to
stress that there was no intention to endeavor to set up an extra-terri-
torial jurisdiction for investment disputes. Hence the stress on the
fact that such disputes would usually be subject to national legal
processes.

Mr. van SANTEN (Netherlands) felt that the use of the words "with-
out prejudice" in the phrase in brackets in paragraph 3 was somewhat
inappropriate. Perhaps the best course was to remove the brackets and
to link, by means of a preposition such as "or" or "and", the idea
contained in that phrase with the one embodied in the opening sentence.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) criticized the use of the word "such"
before "disputes" and "facilities" in paragraph 5. The principle embodied
in that paragraph was of general application and should not be limited
to investment disputes.

With regard to paragraph 6, he said that its contents were a matter
of substance and should therefore be either deleted or transferred to the
Convention itself.

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*United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962*
The CHAIRMAN said that difficulties would be involved if the word "such" were dropped. He suggested that a statement should be introduced into the comment to the effect that the limitation in question had been introduced into paragraph 5 so as to confine the reference to the subject matter of the Convention, and not because the principle was not a general one.

Mr. PEREIRA (Portugal) agreed with the suggestion to delete paragraph 6. As an alternative, he suggested that it should be replaced by a statement recognizing that the basis of authority for conciliation and arbitration was consent.

The CHAIRMAN explained that originally the contents of both paragraph 5 and paragraph 6 of the Preamble had been in the Convention itself. They had been removed from the text of the Convention because they were already implemented by the specific provisions of the Convention. It had been felt, however, that these principles should be reaffirmed in the Preamble.

Mr. LØVOLD (Norway) opposed the suggestion to delete paragraph 6, which embodied an extremely important principle, namely the optional character of the Convention. In fact, he wished to see the Convention include a clear statement of the fact that no amendment of its text could lead to a departure from its essential optional character.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) advocated the inclusion of a reference in the Convention to the need to avoid overlapping with other multilateral and bilateral systems of international arbitration.

Mr. DEGUEN (France) found the language of paragraph 4 unduly strong; it would be a mistake to believe that the setting up of optional arbitration machinery was a matter to which States attached a very high degree of importance.

In the same paragraph, he suggested that the term "establishment" (in French "création") should be replaced by "availability" (in French "existence"), since there already existed other facilities for international conciliation or arbitration.

Mr. van SANTEN (Netherlands) noted that nothing was said in the Preamble on the role of the Bank with regard to the Convention. That omission, in his view, underlined the need - which he had stressed earlier - of a diplomatic conference to discuss the draft and air the views of governments.

He did not think that the cases of the Bank's own affiliates (International Finance Corporation and International Development Association), constituted valid precedents because those organizations dealt with matters which came within the competence of the Bank. As to the proposed Convention on the settlement of investment disputes, it was felt in the Netherlands that it was outside the Bank's competence to draw up such a Convention and to offer it to States on a "take it or leave it" basis.

Mr. RODOCANACHI (France) supported the suggestion for a diplomatic conference to examine the final draft of the Convention prepared by the Bank and to adopt, if necessary, amendments thereto by a majority vote. That procedure would be a good means of ensuring that the maximum
possible number of States became parties to the Convention. A diplomatic conference enabled plenipotentiaries to understand each other's points of view and to make mutual concessions.

After the Bangkok meeting, it would be advisable for the Bank to conduct extensive consultations with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, which had drawn up a draft Convention on Protection of Foreign Property. The purpose of such consultations would be twofold: first, to avoid any possible contradiction between the two texts (and he felt sure that OECD would be prepared to amend its text in order to avoid any such conflict) and second, to enable the two draft Conventions to supplement each other in a logical and constructive manner. It was highly desirable that the two Conventions should receive parallel if not necessarily simultaneous approval from States. There was an impression in many capital-importing countries that the two texts called for a choice. It was essential to stress that, far from being competitive, the two draft Conventions were complementary.

The CHAIRMAN said that no doubts were felt in the Bank regarding its powers to prepare a Convention in a field which was mentioned in the purpose of the organization itself. This view was obviously shared by the member governments, since the Board of Governors had in 1962 authorized the Executive Directors to draft a Convention for submission to governments.

He stressed that so far it had proved impossible for any organization to place before governments even a draft on the subject of the settlement of investment disputes. He felt strongly that a diplomatic conference, apart from the delays which it would involve, would entail the risk of failure of the present attempt to draw up a Convention on the subject.

The Bank was at least in a position to submit to governments a draft approved by its Executive Directors. The Executive Directors would be guided by the comments made at the Consultative meetings and, in addition, would presumably be assisted during the final stages of considerations by legal experts who would be governmental representatives of the countries who had appointed or elected the Executive Directors. Thus the "confrontation" desired by several delegates would take place within the framework of the Bank.

The method of approach which had been adopted by the Bank might be open to question if the Convention were intended to create new substantive rules of international law. However, since its purpose was only to make facilities available on certain conditions (which admittedly would require some changes in national legislation) it was permissible to use the organs of the Bank in order to place a complete draft before governments.

With regard to the consideration of the draft by the nineteen Executive Directors of the Bank, he stressed that on the basis of earlier experience the Executive Directors would not simply rely on the weighted voting system in force in the organs of the Bank. They would not want to present a draft which did not commend itself to a representative number of capital-exporting and capital-importing countries. Nevertheless, the decisions of the Executive Directors would express the view of the Bank as an institution and would not be binding on member governments who could decide whether or not to sign the Convention.

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With regard to the OECD Convention, he had no objection to consultations with that body. As he had already stressed, the present Convention was not intended in any way as an alternative to the OECD Convention on Protection of Foreign Property. In his address to the World Conference on World Peace through Law, held at Athens from 30 June to 6 July 1963, he had expressly recognized the merits of the OECD draft. No attempt should, however, be made to link the two conventions too closely. The OECD Convention was intended to deal with questions of substance and embodied the acceptance of compulsory adjudication of disputes; accordingly, that draft was a much more difficult one for governments to accept than the draft drawn up by the Bank.

Mr. KOENZER (Federal Republic of Germany) said that he did not wish to express a final opinion on the desirability of a diplomatic conference. He had sympathy for some of the points raised by the delegates of the Netherlands and of France, but on the other hand he shared to a certain extent the concern expressed by the Chairman. He felt that the Executive Directors of the Bank, who were normally not lawyers but economists and financiers, were perhaps not ideally qualified to judge all the legal intricacies necessarily involved in working out an arbitration convention. Perhaps some middle course might be found between the procedure suggested by the Bank and the holding of a diplomatic conference, e.g. by adding legal experts of member countries to their Executive Directors. Lastly, he stressed the importance of a co-operation between the Bank and OECD in the drawing up of their respective Conventions.

The CHAIRMAN said that the consultations held at the regional level had already shown the value of obtaining the views of government representatives. The Bank would certainly wish to have the advantages of a diplomatic conference without its drawbacks.

Mr. ALLOTT (United Kingdom) asked when and how the decision would be made with regard to the next step to be taken in connection with the Convention.

The CHAIRMAN explained that the only decision taken by the Bank so far had been to hold the four regional consultative meetings. When those consultations were terminated, it would be for the Executive Directors of the Bank to decide, at their May or June meetings, on the next step.

Mr. HERNDL (Austria) agreed on the need to co-operate with OECD in order to ensure that the two Conventions supplemented each other. He also agreed with the representatives of the Netherlands and France on the desirability of a diplomatic conference. In that connection, he wished to draw attention to the success achieved by the two Vienna Conferences of 1961 and 1963 which had resulted in the adoption of the two Conventions on diplomatic intercourse and consular privileges respectively.

The CHAIRMAN said that one of the drawbacks of a diplomatic conference was its public character, which tended to harden positions and to encourage polemics. In addition, such a conference would be costly and time consuming.

Mr. BERTRAM (Federal Republic of Germany) urged that some inter-
mediate solution should be sought between the process of consultation and that of a diplomatic conference.

Mr. DEGUEN (France) found it surprising that there should be no reference to the Bank in the Preamble.

It was felt in France that it would be regrettable if the preparation of the Convention were to have the effect of reducing the role which the Bank at present played in the settlement of disputes. As was well known, the draft now under discussion had its origin in the largely spontaneous activities undertaken by the Bank and its President in the settlement of investment disputes. It was logical that an attempt should be made to institutionalize that somewhat empirical experience but every effort should be made to avoid doing injury to the activities already being conducted by the Bank in that field. In particular, the question arose whether the proposed new Center would have the same authority as the Bank and its President had. Moreover, there was no doubt that the Bank and its President would continue to play a part in the process of the settlement of disputes. For all these reasons, his Government was anxious that no hasty decision should be taken in the matter.

The CHAIRMAN said that some appropriate reference to the sponsorship of the scheme by the Bank should perhaps be introduced.

Undoubtedly, the creation of the new machinery would not mean that the Bank and its President would henceforth refuse to lend their good offices in appropriate cases. But the Center would provide convenient machinery to which the President of the Bank could refer parties willing to avail themselves of it.

He thanked the representatives for their valuable contributions to the discussion, which had included an unusually large number of new thoughts, both critical and approving, on the subject of the proposed Convention. The results of the discussion would be reported to the Executive Directors and the provisional summary records of the proceedings would be circulated both to the participants and their governments as well as to governments which had been unable to send representatives to the meeting.

Mr. MELCHOR (Spain), speaking on behalf of all the participants, thanked the Chairman for the able and courteous manner in which he had conducted the discussions.

The meeting rose at 1:20 p.m.
EXTRACTS FROM STATEMENT BY MR. SELLA ON THE EUROPEAN REGIONAL MEETING HELD IN GENEVA, SWITZERLAND, FEBRUARY 17-21, 1964; FOR DISCUSSION OF A DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES DATED OCTOBER 15, 1963

The Third Consultative Meeting of legal experts was held from February 17 through February 21 at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. The two previous meetings were held in Addis Ababa last December and in Santiago early this month respectively.

Mr. Broches chaired the meeting, which was attended by thirty-seven experts from seventeen European countries and South Africa. Iceland, Ireland and Luxembourg had declined the invitation, and the expert designated by Cyprus was unable to attend. Observers from the Economic Commission for Europe were also present, and Mr. Velebit, its Executive Secretary, addressed the meeting at its opening session.

There was great similarity between the Addis Ababa and Geneva meetings in two respects. First, there was at both meetings a general acceptance of the basic ideas underlying the Convention and of its most important provisions. The second characteristic which the two meetings had in common was a clear realization that the Convention, in order to be useful, would have to be acceptable to capital importing and capital exporting countries alike. It goes without saying that most of the experts at the Geneva meeting paid particular attention to the position of investors, but without losing sight of the fact that the interests of the host countries had to be carefully considered as well.

The discussions were highly technical, as could be expected from an assembly of people who had had much practical experience with problems of international investment. No new issues were raised, but a number of issues discussed at length at the earlier meetings, such as the enforceability of awards, the criteria for determining the nationality of investors, and the surrender by a state of the right of espousal of its investors' claims were analyzed in detail and, we believe, clarified.

Such criticisms as there were of particular provisions were offered in a constructive spirit in order to improve the text of the draft and to make the proposed settlement mechanism more efficient.

Some experts stressed the importance of avoiding competition or unnecessary overlapping between the Bank convention and the draft convention on the protection of foreign property prepared in OECD. These experts recognized that the two proposals need not be linked, but suggested that the Bank keep in close touch with OECD in order to avoid as much as possible inconsistencies between the two proposed Conventions.

The atmosphere of the meeting was friendly and extremely constructive and, in my opinion, it was the consensus of the experts present that the
proposed Convention could make a substantial contribution to the improve-
ment of the investment climate.

As the Executive Directors know, the last of these consultative
meetings will be held at the end of April in Bangkok with legal experts
from the Asian countries.

SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES
CONSULTATIVE MEETING OF LEGAL EXPERTS
Bangkok, Thailand, April 27 - May 1, 1964
SUMMARY RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

July 20, 1964

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Chairman: A. BROCHES, General Counsel, IBRD

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Participant Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Mr. B.J. O'DONOVAN</td>
<td>Principal Legal Officer, Attorney General's Dept.</td>
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<td>Ceylon</td>
<td>Mr. T.E. GOONERATME</td>
<td>Acting Deputy Secretary to the Treasury</td>
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<td>Mr. R.S. WANASUNDERA</td>
<td>Crown Counsel</td>
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<td>China</td>
<td>Mr. Paul CHUNG-TSENG TSAI</td>
<td>Counsellor, Council for International Economic Co-operation &amp; Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Mr. B.N. ADARKAR</td>
<td>Additional Secretary, Ministry of Finance</td>
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<td>Mr. R.S. GAE</td>
<td>Joint Secretary, Ministry of Law</td>
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Mr. Amin Mohammad HASAN
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Director General, Kuwait Fund for
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Mr. Saad EL-FISHAWY
General Counsel, Kuwait Fund for
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Mr. Raja HIMADEH
Government Commissioner to BCAIF,
Ministry of Finance

Mr. Robert GHANEM
Head, Legislation and Counsel Service,
Ministry of Justice

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NOTE

This document contains a summary record of the proceedings of the consultative meeting of legal experts held at Bangkok on the proposals contained in the Working Paper entitled "Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States" (Doc. COM/AS/1).

Suggestions made by the experts for changes in drafting, for improvement of the English and French texts, and for conforming one text more closely to the other, were noted by the Secretariat but have not been included in this record.

FIRST SESSION
(Monday, April 27, 1964 - 11:00 a.m.)

Opening Address by His Excellency Sunthorn Hongladarom, Minister for Finance of Thailand

The CHAIRMAN invited His Excellency to open the session.

His Excellency Sunthorn Hongladarom, Minister for Finance of Thailand, after welcoming the participants to Bangkok, congratulated...
the Bank on having taken the initiative and continued to play an important role in attempting to resolve problems relating to the settlement of investment disputes. The inherent difficulties involved should not be a deterrent to exploring all possibilities in order to produce a multilateral convention which would be acceptable and satisfactory to both capital-exporting and capital-importing countries.

While most countries had to rely largely on their own resources for their economic development, at the outset outside help in the form of grants, loans and investments was necessary.

A balance should be struck between the natural interest of foreign investors in the safety of their investments and the fear of capital-importing countries of encroachment upon their sovereignty and freedom of action.

He wished the delegates all success and a happy stay in Bangkok.

The CHAIRMAN thanked His Excellency for his statement and invited U Nyun, Executive Secretary, ECAFE, to take the floor.

Opening Address by U Nyun, Executive Secretary, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East

U NYUN welcomed the delegates to the meeting. The countries of the ECAFE region had already benefited from various types of aid including private investment and had, in fact, done much to improve the climate for investment particularly in projects relating to industry, power, irrigation and transport. Investments in the region, which were often negotiated by private enterprises themselves and sometimes by the governments concerned, covered not only the provision of finance but also other related factors such as royalties, charges for technical services, participation of local capital and personnel in the establishment and management of enterprises.

However, a government in implementing its plans for development might take certain measures affecting not only purely national ventures, but also projects financed from abroad, and misunderstandings or disputes could arise regarding implementation of agreements entered into by investors. The Bank considered it desirable to evolve suitable facilities for the settlement of such misunderstandings or disputes, and the task before the delegates was to consider the desirability and practicability of establishing institutional facilities such as those provided for in the draft Convention. He recalled that systems of arbitration and conciliation had already been evolved by governments and private enterprises and that ECAFE had itself actively encouraged the institution of commercial arbitration in that region.

He considered the meeting to be of vital importance. ECAFE had for many years taken a keen interest in measures for financing economic and social development in the region and recognized the need for and the importance of finding a formula whereby the interests of investors as well as the sovereignty of host countries could be protected, and which would take due account of the special needs of those countries in their present state of economic, social and political development.
He expressed his gratitude to His Excellency Sunthorn Hongladarom for his valuable opening address and paid tribute to the Minister's admirable work for Thailand and for ECAFE.

He wished delegates success in their deliberations.

Chairman's Opening Address

The CHAIRMAN welcomed the delegates on behalf of the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. He thanked His Excellency the Minister for Finance of Thailand for his words of greeting and expressed his gratitude to the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East for his statement and for the facilities made available by the Commission. The fact that the Bank was holding the present meeting in ECAFE headquarters was evidence of the good relations and spirit of co-operation existing between the Commission and the Bank in their common effort to promote economic and social well-being in the ECAFE region.

The current meeting was the last of four consultative meetings of legal experts convened by the Bank to discuss informally a draft Convention on the settlement of investment disputes. The discussion at the previous meetings had been constructive and the comments and opinions expressed had been most useful. At the African meeting; most of the countries represented had shown great interest in the proposals and there had been no objection on grounds of principle to the essential features of the draft.

At the meeting in Latin America; a number of participants had expressed their governments' reservations concerning certain innovations which the draft sought to introduce into traditional international law as understood in Latin America. However, other delegates had welcomed the proposals emphasizing the optional nature of the proposed Convention. A number of Latin American experts had also expressed the opinion that the time had come for their countries to re-examine their traditional attitude towards foreign investment.

At the meeting in Europe there had been general support for the proposed Convention, but several delegates had stressed that it would achieve its purpose of encouraging the flow of capital to developing countries only if a sufficient number of these countries found it acceptable. On balance, the Bank had been greatly encouraged by the way in which its proposals had been received at the three meetings.

It was most gratifying that so many governments had agreed to attend the current meeting and that such eminent representatives had been designated.

The fact that the World Bank had taken the initiative in promoting an international agreement in a field which might not be regarded as falling directly within its sphere of activity was due to the fact that the Bank was not merely a financing mechanism but, above all, a development institution. While its activities did consist in large part in the provision of finance, much of its energy and resources were devoted to technical assistance and advice directed toward the promotion of conditions conducive to rapid economic growth, to creation of a favorable investment climate in the broadest sense of the term. To that end, sound technical and administrative foundations were essential, but no less indispensable was the firm establishment of the Rule of Law.
International investment was universally recognized as a factor of crucial importance in the economic development of the less developed parts of the world and had become one of the major features of the partnership between the richer and poorer nations; its promotion was a matter of urgent concern to capital-importing and capital-exporting countries alike. That was particularly true of private foreign investment which, if wisely conducted, could make great contributions to the development of the economies of the recipient countries.

Unfortunately, private capital was not moving in sufficient volume to areas in need of capital, one of the most serious impediments to its flow being the fear of investors that their investment would be exposed to political risks such as outright expropriation, government interference and non-observance by the host government of contractual undertakings on the basis of which the investment had been made.

The Bank had therefore been led to wonder whether, in view of its reputation for integrity and its position of impartiality, it could not help in removing that obstacle to private investment. It had on a number of occasions been approached by governments and foreign investors who had sought its assistance in settling investment disputes and had been encouraged to bend its efforts in that direction by such events as the enactment by Ghana of foreign investment legislation which contemplated the settlement of certain investment disputes "through the agency of" the World Bank. Similarly, Morocco and a group of French investors had entrusted to the President of the Bank the appointment of the President of an arbitral tribunal to settle disputes that might arise under a series of long-term contracts.

The Bank had concluded that the most promising approach would be to attack the problem of the unfavorable investment climate by creating international machinery which would be available on a voluntary basis for the conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes. Some might think it desirable to go beyond that and attempt to reach a substantive definition of the status of foreign property. There was need for a meaningful understanding between capital-exporting and capital-importing nations on those matters. The draft on Protection of Foreign Property, prepared in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, might constitute a useful starting point for discussions between those two groups of countries. At the same time, however, there was need to pursue a parallel effort of more limited scope, represented by the Bank's proposals.

The Convention would make available institutional facilities and procedures to which States and foreign investors could have access on a voluntary basis for the settlement of investment disputes between them. In the opinion of the Bank those facilities and procedures were better suited to disputes between a State on the one hand and a foreign investor on the other than those offered by other existing or proposed institutions. Taken by themselves, however, they could be put into effect by administrative action by the Bank and would not require the conclusion of any inter-governmental agreement.

Such institutional facilities were nevertheless, in his opinion, secondary to other parts of the proposal, which it was necessary to embody in a Convention.

*See OECD Doc. 19607, dated December 1962, revised and reissued as OECD Doc. 23081, dated November 1967*
Those parts comprised, firstly, recognition of the principle that a non-State party, an investor, might have direct access, in his own name and without requiring the espousal of his cause by his national government, to a State party before an international forum. States, in signing the Convention would admit that principle, but only the principle. No signatory State would be compelled to resort to the facilities provided by the Convention, or to agree to do so, and no foreign investor could in fact initiate proceedings against a signatory State unless that State and the investor had specifically so agreed. However, once they had so agreed, both parties would be irrevocably bound to carry out their undertaking and the Convention established rules designed to prevent the frustration of the undertaking and to insure its implementation.

Secondly, while the Convention implied a recognition that local courts were not necessarily the final forum for the settlement of disputes between a State and a foreign investor, it did not imply that local remedies could not play a major role. When parties consented to arbitration, they would be free to stipulate either that local remedies might be pursued in lieu of arbitration, or that local remedies must first be exhausted before the dispute could be submitted for arbitration under the Convention. If the parties to a dispute had not made either stipulation, then and only then did the Convention provide that arbitration would be in lieu of local remedies.

A third and more important feature of the Convention followed from the fact that in traditional international law a wrong done to a national of one State for which another State was internationally responsible was actionable not by the injured national, but by his State. In practice that principle had been superseded in a number of cases in which provision had been made for the settlement of investment disputes by direct conciliation or arbitration between the host State and the foreign investor. The internationally binding character of such arrangements had not, however, been recognized hitherto, and the Convention was designed to fill that gap.

Every international agreement signified the acceptance in one form or another of a limitation of national sovereignty. The proposed Convention was intended to give internationally binding effect to the limitation of sovereignty inherent in an agreement by a State pursuant to the Convention to submit a dispute with a foreign investor to arbitration. As a corollary of the principle of allowing an investor direct and effective access to a foreign State without the intervention of his national State it was proposed - and this was an important innovation - that an investor's national State would no longer be able to espouse a claim of its national. In this way it was sought to ensure that States would not be faced with having to deal with a multiplicity of claims and claimants. The Convention therefore offer a means of settling directly, on the legal plane, investment disputes between the State and the foreign investor and insulate such disputes from the realm of politics and diplomacy.

Fourthly, awards of arbitral tribunals rendered pursuant to the Convention would be recognized by, and enforceable in all Contracting States as if they were final judgments of their national courts, regardless whether the State in which enforcement was sought was or was not a party to the dispute in question. In that connection he wished to make it clear that where, as in most countries, the law of State immunity from execution would prevent enforcement as opposed to execution against a private party,
the Convention would leave that law unaffected. All the Convention would do would be to place an arbitral award rendered pursuant to it on the same footing as a final judgment of the national courts. If such judgment could be enforced under the domestic law in question, so could the award; if that judgment could not be so enforced, neither could the award.

Fifthly, it should be borne in mind that the Convention did not lay down standards for the treatment by States of the property of aliens, nor did it prescribe standards for the conduct of foreign investors in their relations with host States. Accordingly, the Convention would not be concerned with the merits of investment disputes but with the procedure for settling them.

While the Bank believed that private investment had a valuable contribution to make to economic development, it was neither a blind partisan of the cause of the private investor, nor did it wish to impose its views on others. He did not expect or think it desirable that all disputes between foreign investors and host States should necessarily be dealt with by the facilities established under the Convention, nor was it intended to supersede national jurisdiction generally. It should, however, be stressed that there might be instances when recourse to an international forum would be in the interests of the host State as well as in those of the investor.

Two further points needed emphasis. The first was that the Convention was designed to deal with claims by host States against investors, as well as with claims by investors against host States; the second was that the Convention dealt with conciliation as well as with arbitration. As to the latter, it might well be found when the Convention came into operation, that conciliation activities under the auspices of the Center proved more important than arbitral proceedings.

In conclusion he pointed out that the Convention left States and investors free to establish their mutual relations on whatever basis they deemed proper. Its true significance lay in the fact that it ensured that if the parties agreed to have recourse to an international forum, their agreement would be given full effect. This would create an element of confidence which would, in turn, contribute to a healthier investment climate.

The session was suspended at 11:55 a.m. and resumed at 12:15 p.m.

General Comment on the Working Paper

Mr. SERM (Thailand) said that the subject matter of the proposed Convention was of great importance both to developed and to developing countries. The draft should therefore be considered not only from the theoretical point of view but also from the standpoint of the feasibility of applying its proposals at the current stage of international relations.

The Preamble of the draft made it clear that the principle of jurisdiction by consent, generally recognized in settling international disputes, was to be applied, and to that extent the draft Convention was unexceptionable. However, past experience showed that even when jurisdiction was based on consent, judicial machinery for the settlement of international disputes had not worked satisfactorily.
Among the characteristic features of voluntary jurisdiction which unfortunately appeared also in the provisions of the draft Convention, was the fact that no detailed definition was given of the types of disputes which would come under the jurisdiction of the proposed International Conciliation and Arbitration Center. The term "dispute of a legal character" given in Article II, Section 1 could give rise to uncertainty, particularly in view of the fact that a State, in the ordinary course of exercising governmental functions, may have to take various broad measures which could affect the interests of foreign investors e.g. measures required to protect the health, morals and welfare of the community, as well as the security of the nation.

The question regarding the law to be applied by an international tribunal had given rise to much controversy in the past and was raised again by Article IV, Section 4 (1). In the ordinary system of international arbitration or adjudication, the fundamental rule was that the tribunal should apply rules of international law deemed applicable to the case before it, in which process it might take cognizance of the national systems of law not so much with a view to determining the dispute itself but rather in order to determine whether there was an applicable general principle of law recognized by civilized nations.

The draft Convention, however, empowered the Arbitral Tribunal to apply the rules of national or international law "as it shall determine to be applicable". While the national law referred to could and should mean none other than the internal law of the State party to the dispute, it could, however, conceivably include the law of the State of the individual investor party to the dispute, or indeed any other national system of law whatsoever. Such a procedure could give rise to strange results. In the light of the general principles of private international law, the nationality of a party could not justifiably be considered so controlling as to necessitate the application of the national law of that party as the proper law governing the dispute.

Passing to the provisions concerning the enforcement of arbitral awards, he said that the obligations entailed by Article IV, Section 15 were extremely wide and were bound to encounter formidable obstacles in practice. In Thailand, an arbitral award could be recognised and enforced only after either party to the arbitral proceedings had made application to a competent court and that court had entered a judgment in consonance with the award. There could be no automatic enforcement of arbitral awards. The provisions of Article IV, Section 15 went far beyond the normal universal practice of States as evidenced in Article III of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

He expressed doubt whether the establishment of facilities for voluntary conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes would do much to improve the investment climate. A viable and reliable system of settling disputes would be of great interest to prospective investors but it was only one of the many factors which would stimulate the flow of investment.

He stressed that the views which he had expressed were not final and should not be considered as committing the Thai Government in any way.

The CHAIRMAN said that in order to conserve the time of the opening session for statements by delegations, he would defer stating
his own views on the important issues raised by Dr. Serm until the subjects were reached in the article-by-article discussion of the draft.

Mr. QUILL (New Zealand) said that borrowing by New Zealand had not been subject to any restriction as to the application of the borrowed funds and that New Zealand had rarely lent money. As a State it had therefore had no experience in investment disputes of the type contemplated in the draft Convention and could approach the proposals only from a theoretical standpoint. It was, however, familiar with conciliation and arbitration procedures in domestic law, and it welcomed the opportunity of considering the extension of those procedures into the wider field of investment disputes between States and nationals of other States.

Three points which needed discussion and clarification were:

1. whether conciliation as a means of settling investment disputes was useful in disputes of a legal character;

2. whether the proposed machinery to establish conciliation panels and arbitration tribunals was not over-elaborate; and

3. whether the term 'investment dispute of a legal character' was sufficiently clear.

Mr. GOONERATNE (Ceylon) expressed his gratitude to the Bank for its work in convening the meeting and thanked the Chairman for his clear introduction of the points to be discussed.

His country attached very great importance to conciliation and arbitration as methods of settling international disputes and to the establishment of the rule of law in international investment. It is in pursuance of this policy that his country had accepted and ratified conventions relating to Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, International Arbitrations and the Measure of Recognition to be given to Arbitral Awards. However, the establishment of an international rule of law depended on the acceptance of judicial settlement of international disputes; such a legal order should be equitable and acceptable to all States and based on a sympathetic understanding not only of legal concepts but also the economic problems of different countries.

It might be helpful to consider the desirability of declarations regarding the obligations of capital-importing countries to the foreign investor, as well as the foreign investor's responsibility in relation to the economy of the country in which he was making the investment. The ultimate aim was to foster mutual confidence and goodwill which formed the only basis for successful international co-operation. It was therefore essential that the capital-importing and capital-exporting countries should make an attempt to understand each other's point of view with sympathy, without thinking too narrowly of legal rights and obligations which flow from traditional concepts which might appear to them to be universal and fixed but which may quite legitimately have only limited acceptance elsewhere.

It seemed important to bear in mind the achievements made by international organizations in establishing procedures for the settlement of disputes, and to recognize the need to evolve a machinery for the settlement of disputes that would command the unreserved confidence of the disputants. Such confidence was a minimum requirement that any government must be able truly to offer its national Parliament before it could be asked to agree to divest itself of much of its domestic sovereignty in this field of law.
The draft Convention should be considered in as wide a forum as possible, giving particular attention to aspects where departures from accepted international law or practice were involved.

It was important to consider carefully the relationship of the Bank to the Center so that confidence in the Center and its image of independence might not be affected. He added that if the proposal were restricted to conciliation it would not appear removed from the Bank's real function and there would be no danger that the relationship of the Bank to the Center would impair the latter's independence.

A precise definition of the scope of jurisdiction of the Center was vital. Also it should be remembered that in international law and actual practice, there existed certain disputes which were accepted generally as not being justiciable despite the fact that on legal principles alone it might appear that they could be resolved.

Several countries such as Ceylon, newly independent from foreign rule, had only recently been able to regulate the terms of admission of foreign investment. Since the express intent of the Convention was to create a favorable climate for foreign investment in the future, it was important to recognize the validity of a distinction between old and new investment. The status of the capital-importing countries at the time of the foreign investment should also be taken into consideration as otherwise the Convention could be criticized on the grounds that it gave additional protection to existing investment in certain countries without a corresponding increase of investment that could be traced to the Convention.

Mr. LANDAU (Israel) urged that efforts be made to narrow the gap in the standard of living between the developed and developing countries both by unilateral aid by governments and by increasing private capital investment, and he recalled that proposals by his Government for promoting private investment were at present under discussion at the UN Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva. The Convention would help to remove present uncertainties, increasing investors' confidence by providing a forum for conciliation or arbitration. It would be necessary in bringing the Convention into operation to find a formula which would preserve the effectiveness of the arbitration machinery without deterring too many countries from accepting the Convention, which would serve its purpose only if adhered to by a majority of all capital-exporting and capital-importing countries.

More precise definition of some terms in the draft Convention seemed desirable, in particular of the terms "investment dispute" and "of a legal character".

Parties to the Convention would be States whereas parties to arbitration and conciliation would be both States and individuals. It might therefore be preferable to request the individual to obtain the consent of his own State before resorting to international arbitration. Article IV, Section 17, proposing elimination of diplomatic protection by the State whenever its nationals consented to arbitration under the Convention, seemed to foresee a case in which the individual desired his State's protection. It was, however, also possible that an individual might embarrass his State by calling another State to arbitration before an international tribunal without even first exhausting the remedies of
the local courts. Some means should be found of avoiding such a possibility.

The Convention empowered an arbitral tribunal to decide a dispute - in the absence of agreement between the parties on the matter - in accordance with such rules of law as it determined to be applicable. The principle by which these rules of law would be determined required more precise definition.

Mr. PANT (Nepal) thought that sponsorship by the Bank of a mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes would improve the investment climate in developing countries and would add to the incentives already provided in those countries to encourage the flow of private capital. The task of expanding private international investment was not easy. Differences in internal legal systems made the outcome of possible litigation sometimes difficult to anticipate; a judgment obtained in one country might not be recognized or executed in another. Those and other problems hindered the creation of a favorable investment climate. Various efforts had been made to ensure the security of foreign capital, such as the rules on the protection of investments abroad proposed by the International Bar Association in 1958 and the International Convention concerning Guarantees for the Investment of Capital proposed by Switzerland, also in 1958.

Since 1961 a favorable atmosphere for foreign investment had been created in Nepal both by the country's political stability and by the enactment of legislation offering many incentives to investors in industry both local and foreign. Since, however, the existing internal legal system of Nepal did not provide quite adequately for litigation of commercial disputes, the proposed Convention would be beneficial in providing an alternative procedure. Its machinery would promote the flow of private capital to the developing countries by allaying investors' fears of expropriation or of the dishonoring of the terms of an agreement by the host State.

Mr. ADARKAR (India) expressed appreciation of the work of the World Bank, and of the Chairman's elucidation of the document in his introductory statement. In India there were no foreign exchange restrictions as regards remittance of profits or dividends, and in cases of approved investments, investors were free to repatriate their capital, including capital appreciation. If foreign property was acquired by the Government, just compensation was provided. Agreements were entered into with foreign investors, and many of them included clauses for arbitration. India ordinarily would therefore not object in principle to a Convention of the type proposed, but it shared the doubts expressed by the delegates of Thailand and Ceylon.

The basic principles as set out in the Preamble did not, in his opinion, state the problem adequately and failed to bring out the fact that the Convention involved an important departure in international law.

This Convention aimed at setting up a forum where States and individuals were placed on a par. It overlooked an important aspect in the relationship between the State and foreign investor, viz, that corresponding to the duty of the State to give just and equitable treatment to foreign investors, there was an obligation for foreign
investors to abide by national policies and laws of the State. No investor should be able to challenge any measure taken by a State in the lawful pursuance of its national policy unless such measure involved discrimination against a class of investors, or was in conflict with the terms of a contract between the State and an investor.

Although it was true that national laws might not take into account all the difficulties of the private investor, the right course would be to guard against such difficulties by specific contracts or intergovernmental arrangements. If, under a specific contract with a foreign investor a State agreed to arbitration, it placed itself on a par with the investor for that particular purpose. The Convention on the other hand placed the foreign investor and the State on a par regardless of any law, national or international, or the terms of any contract or other arrangements between the State and the foreign investor.

There was also no precise definition of the category of disputes referrable to the Center and that was a fundamental weakness. Only one limitation had been explicitly stated, namely the consent of parties, and thus a tremendous burden was placed on the State. The explanation that a more precise definition would open the door to disagreements was inadequate.

This vagueness would in his opinion increase rather than minimize the likelihood of disputes and would probably expose States to pressure to consent to arbitrate disputes which would not be arbitrable under any international law or understanding.

Section 2(3) of Article II on jurisdiction allowed a party to submit a dispute to the Center even before the State's consent had been obtained, and then to try to use the good offices of the Secretary-General to secure the consent of the State. As a precise definition of disputes within the jurisdiction of the Center was lacking, it would be difficult for the Secretary-General to decide whether he should take the matter up with the State concerned or try to discourage the investor from pursuing his request.

The Convention in fact conferred an additional right on the foreign investor without placing additional obligations on him, and thus the basic principle of reciprocity, fundamental in all international agreements, was not present.

Refusal of consent could cause considerable damage to the reputation of the State for fair dealing if that refusal were to be misinterpreted as being due to an unwillingness on the part of the State to submit to international jurisdiction. Such a refusal might very well be entirely bona fide as where, for instance, the matter concerned national policy, or again if the matter did not involve discrimination between foreign and national investors or conflict with any contractual obligation of the State. In such cases no purpose would be served by submitting it to an international tribunal because an award involving a change in the national law would be unenforceable. If a distinction were not drawn between cases where the dispute itself was not arbitrable according to the principles laid down in the Convention or otherwise internationally agreed upon, and those others where the State was unwilling or unable to submit itself to international juris-
diction, the Convention would either compel every State to agree to conciliation or arbitration in every case for fear of an adverse inference or, alternatively, it would create an unnecessary and unwarranted impediment to the flow of foreign investment instead of promoting it, which was the object of the Convention. In his opinion, therefore, it was essential to clarify the precise scope of an undertaking under the Convention. If an "investment dispute of a legal character" were to be related to a specific contract or agreement between the State and the investor, or to an undertaking given in local legislation, he would have less difficulty.

Assuming, however, that the intent of the Convention was to enforce only those obligations of a State undertaken by it pursuant to any law, specific contract or international arrangement, he was not clear as to how the Convention would improve the existing position. Those instruments normally specified the machinery for settlement of disputes arising out of them, and India had always honored its undertakings in such cases. If, on the other hand, that was not the intent of the Convention, then a clear statement of the kind of circumstances in which an obligation or an "investment dispute of a legal character" could arise without reference to any law or agreement would be needed. In this connection he referred to other international instruments like the Bank's Loan Regulations and the Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, under which arbitral proceedings were available in respect of disputes arising out of specific agreements. The United States agreements in connection with its program of investment guarantees, for instance, provided for settlement on the intergovernmental plane of disputes arising out of such agreements. In general, they covered two or three specific problems which, by their very nature, were not always suitable to be dealt with in contracts with investors, e.g. convertibility, expropriation, and war risk. In addition, while they took account of the particular difficulties of the investor, they did not offend the principle of equality of status between foreign and national investors. While he recognized that the Convention sought to deal with a far wider variety of investment disputes, he was not clear as to why any legitimate investment dispute could not be dealt with on those lines and why it was considered necessary to create a forum where a foreign investor was placed in a position vis-à-vis the host State different to that of the national investor not only with respect to specified aspects of his relationship but with respect to his entire relationship with that State.

Two further points needed clarification. If the Center was meant to function as a judicial body, serious consideration should be given to the propriety of its having links at all levels with the World Bank which was not a judicial body, and in his view, the reasons for those links given in the Working Paper did not justify them. He wished to make it quite clear, however, that he did not thereby imply any criticism of the Bank's impartiality, or its interest in, and its valuable contribution to, the economic development of the developing countries. At the same time it had to be considered whether the link would really operate to the advantage of the Center or to that of the Bank. It had been said on the one hand that the Center would benefit from the Bank's image and reputation for impartiality, and on the other - and this he thought was contradictory - that the Bank would have no influence whatever over the proceedings under the auspices of the Center. If the latter were true he wondered what benefit the Center could possibly derive from its connection with the Bank.

*See Loan Regulations No. 3 and No. 4, dated February 15, 1961 (amended February 9, 1967), Sections 7.03 and 7.04*
A similar problem arose with regard to the Secretary-General. The Working Paper on page 9 emphasized the importance of the Secretary-General's maintaining a position of complete independence vis-à-vis Contracting States as well as the Administrative Council. But he would welcome clarification as to whether, if at all, the Secretary-General might be affected in the discharge of his functions by the fact that he would not be independent of the Bank, and might even be one of its employees.

In conclusion, he expressed support for the Ceylon delegate in urging that the draft receive careful consideration in a somewhat wider forum where there would be an opportunity to receive the benefit of the views of other developing countries in Africa as well as of those in Latin America. He hoped that before the final draft of the Convention was adopted by the Bank and recommended to Governments it would be considered in such a wider forum.

The CHAIRMAN said that he would depart briefly from his announced intention to defer replies to opening statements until the next day because he thought that some of the views expressed by Mr. Adarkar and earlier speakers reflected a possible misreading of the text. As to the Preamble, he said that it did not impose duties on investors nor did it seek to establish standards of fair treatment of investors by host States. On the contrary, all reference to matters of substance of that nature had been avoided, and the Convention limited entirely to the procedural aspects. In that connection he would like to stress that the Convention did not, as had been suggested by Mr. Adarkar, give the investor new rights without corresponding obligations. Indeed it gave the investor no rights whatever but only a procedural capacity in cases where States had consented to proceedings under the Convention.

The question of a definition of the scope of activities of the Center was of obvious importance, and he had heard a variety of views on this point at previous meetings.

Regarding a State's refusal of a request made ad hoc to submit a dispute to the Center, he could not agree that such dire consequences were to be feared, and this point would be taken up in due course as would be the question of the link with the Bank. As to the latter question he could not agree that the statements on page 9 of the Working Paper referred to by Mr. Adarkar were contradictory. Not only were there sound practical reasons for linking the Center to the Bank, but account should also be taken of certain imponderables best exemplified by the fact that in the past, governments as well as private investors had come to the Bank for assistance in settling their disputes - a fact which had given rise to the idea of a Convention in the first place.

On the question of the role of the Secretary-General, he personally felt that, except possibly during the early stages of the Center's existence, the Secretary-General ought to be a full-time official of the Center and should have no connection either with the Bank or with the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The relevant provisions as drafted at present reflected a variety of views - both those of the staff and those of the Bank's Executive Directors.

Mr. HIMADEH (Lebanon) said that the Center as defined would be of considerable assistance in settling disputes connected with international investment and would thus create a more favorable atmosphere for such
investments. He wondered, however, if it would be within the terms of reference of the Executive Directors to add to the principal function of the Center a "preventive" function, viz., to advise on new investment agreements with the object of ensuring clarity of their provisions, full understanding of their implications and fairness of their terms. He was convinced that such a function would not only serve to reduce the number of investment disputes, but would also facilitate their settlement if they did arise. It would also promote international cooperation, since experience had shown that in many cases ill-feelings, which sometimes led to serious disputes, arose from the discovery of adverse implications or unfair terms not understood or perhaps known of at the time the agreement was concluded. In many cases States might not know of qualified consultants or might not have confidence in their advice.

An international organization like the proposed Center would be an ideal channel for this purpose. If it were agreed that such an additional function would further the objectives of the Center, and that it would not be outside the terms of reference of the Executive Directors to give the Center that function, it should not be difficult to implement the proposal. For instance, the Secretary-General might respond for advice by appointing, in consultation with the Chairman of the Administrative Council, a commission of experts qualified in the particular field that was to be the subject of the agreement, to advise the parties on how best to formulate its terms. If the Executive Directors consider, however, that the addition of such an advisory function to the principal function of the Center is not within their terms of reference, they can, if they are convinced of the importance of this addition, recommend to the Board of Governors the adoption of a draft resolution to the effect of including this proposed function in the Convention they have been asked to draft.

Mr. O'DONOVAN (Australia) said that while Australia did make some small capital exports, on a net basis in any year its capital importation was far in excess of its capital exportation.

Australia had a close interest in the Bank's proposals, although the Government had thus far given them only preliminary consideration, and saw an advantage in the idea of creating a scheme of conciliation and arbitration separately from the formulation of a code of substantive rules such as that proposed by the OECD. He pointed out, however, that in practice the remedies provided in Australia by the local courts had to date proved satisfactory to foreign investors and that the current inflow of foreign capital was at a relatively high level. However, he did not think it the function of the delegates at the meeting to express the views of their governments on the desirability or otherwise of establishing the proposed machinery. Rather, in his view, the primary function of the delegates was to examine the draft Convention as lawyers to clarify in their minds the precise purposes of the draft Convention and to make suggestions for its amendment with a view to ensuring that if the draft were to be adopted, it would be capable of convenient operation in practice, having regard to the constitution of and the laws in force in, the vast majority, if not all, of the member States of the Bank.

There were three points to which he would like to invite attention in his opening statement: first, that his main concern was to obtain some clarification of the manner in which it was foreseen that the Convention would apply in relation to a federal State which was predominantly capital-
importing; second, that he had the impression that the draft Convention was concerned not only with investment by foreign investors in consequence of which the investor directly acquired tangible assets in the host country, but also to the borrowing of cash by the host country from foreign private investors; and third, that he wondered whether any particular difficulties might be involved for Australia by reason of the operation of the Financial Agreement between the Commonwealth and the States with respect to borrowings by the Commonwealth and the States. The bank was familiar with the latter agreement, but because its provisions were unique to Australia any possible difficulties that might arise from it were probably of little concern to other delegates.

Finally, he emphasized that the Commonwealth had not until then consulted with the States regarding the proposals embodied in the draft Convention, and he hoped that as a result of the meeting they could obtain a clear idea of the ways in which the Convention might affect the States and so facilitate those consultations.

Mr. NEMOTO (Japan) said he recognized the important role of international investment in the field of economic development and favored in principle the establishment of a new international organization for the settlement of investment disputes such as that proposed in the draft Convention. He expressed his appreciation of the efforts made by the Bank toward inaugurating this scheme since 1961.

With a view to making the scheme acceptable and fruitful both to capital-exporting and capital-importing countries he would invite attention to five points. The first concerned the scope of the activities of the Center, and in particular the term "investment" or "investment disputes". Although he sympathized with the view of the Bank's staff that inclusion of a more precise definition of those terms would involve various difficulties and would not necessarily be useful, some further clarification of those terms - and, therefore, of the scope of the proposed scheme - seemed necessary. Second, the Convention provided that arbitral awards would be binding on and enforceable in all Contracting States. In his opinion this provision would be most effective in protecting investors but would only have the desired result of promoting private investment when the necessary internal measures for enforcement of awards were taken in each State. Third, the functions of the proposed Center seemed to overlap in some fields the functions of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and he considered it desirable that the relationship between the two organizations be re-examined. A fourth point of similar character was the need to consider clarifications and adjustments of the Convention to take account of two other major approaches to the problem of improving the investment climate at present under study by the OECD viz., the draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property and the multilateral investment insurance scheme. Finally, as to future work on the Convention, he requested that after the present meeting the World Bank provide a full opportunity in which each government could express its official views or make official proposals before the draft Convention was finalized.

The CHAIRMAN, referring to the question of the relationship of the proposed Convention to the Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property and to the proposals or studies being made in the field of multilateral investment insurance, observed that the three approaches were, in a sense, parallel and complementary efforts toward increasing the flow of international investments. The OECD Convention
imposed certain obligations on States with respect to a minimum standard of treatment of foreign property and provided for a system of compulsory arbitration. The multilateral investment insurance scheme sought to ensure the investor of a measure of compensation if he suffered loss as a result of unfair treatment by the host State.

The present Convention represented the most modest of the three approaches and was based on the belief that the very establishment of facilities where parties could come together voluntarily would be helpful in improving the investment climate. All three approaches had their value and could be acted on in a parallel manner. In his opinion, the proposals embodied in the Convention under discussion would be the least controversial and, therefore, constitute the most promising approach at the present time.

Mr. GOONERATNE (Ceylon) wondered whether copies of the delegates opening statements, some of which were of considerable importance, could be made available in the course of the meetings or immediately thereafter.

The CHAIRMAN explained that at previous meetings it had been the practice not to distribute any statements, in part to conserve the informal character of the meeting, and in part as a result of practical difficulties resulting from a lack of adequate staff for that purpose. The summary records which would be prepared as soon as possible after the meeting would, however, reflect all the substantive points made as well as the flavor of the discussion. These records would first be sent to the participants in the meeting for correction before preparation of the final version.

The meeting rose at 1:40 p.m.

SECOND SESSION
(Tuesday, April 28, 1964 - 8:30 a.m.)

General Comment on Working Paper (continued)

The CHAIRMAN thought that before opening the discussion on Article 1 a few general remarks on his part, inspired by the discussions at the opening session, might be in order.

The Bank’s purpose in convening regional meetings of experts had been two-fold: to enable experts from member countries to exchange views regarding the Convention among themselves, and to enable them to exchange views with the Bank’s staff. The staff of the Bank - including its President - had, in the light of its assessment of prevailing conditions taken the view that the proposed Convention would benefit the cause of economic development in that it would promote private investment. In doing so it had clearly taken a position on the matter, and one of his functions as Chairman of the meeting would be to explain the beliefs and convictions which underlay that conviction. The Bank had on many occasions in the past taken positions based upon its own judgment, for instance, on certain measures which it believed would foster development, and had actively campaigned for them. These judgments
had invariably been based on professional and non-political considerations. But that did not mean that they were always universally accepted or acclaimed. For some time the Bank had been urging capital-exporting countries to soften the terms of bilateral aid. In that context the Bank was sometimes criticized for allegedly not paying sufficient attention to the financing problems of some of these countries. Again, the Bank's views on how its loanable funds could be allocated so as to produce the greatest effect had sometimes been criticized as having led to an undue concentration of financial transactions in one area or country.

He did not expect that delegates would uncritically accept the Bank's views on the suitability of the proposed Convention but he did suggest that in considering the proposed Convention delegates should bear in mind the fundamental question whether their countries wished to attract private investment - and he thought that most of them did - and, if so, what price they were prepared to pay by way of special concessions and incentives for investors. Most such incentives involved conferring rights on foreign investors, and for that reason he found it difficult to appreciate criticism of the proposals based on the sole argument that they gave investors "additional rights."

Mr. ADARKAR (India) said his country wished to attract private capital and to maintain a favorable investment climate, and for that purpose it was prepared to give the foreign investor the necessary safeguards including additional rights. His criticism, however, had been directed to the fact that the proposals in their present form gave investors additional rights of unspecified scope. In order to make the Convention acceptable to the developing countries, an effort should be made to clarify the precise scope of the benefits it conferred on the foreign investor.

While his country might have no objection to giving the foreign investor additional rights, he believed that such rights should be given by means of specific agreements or understandings, so that the additional rights would be the counterpart of certain additional obligations undertaken by the investor. Under the Convention as it stood the investor enjoyed certain benefits while - as he was himself not a party to the Convention - it placed no obligations upon him. He felt, however, that this criticism could be met by appropriate modification of the text despite the fact that the investor would not be a party to the Convention.

ARTICLE I - International Conciliation and Arbitration Center

The CHAIRMAN proposed that the meeting take up Article I of the Working Paper.

Establishment and Organization (Sections 1 - 3)

Mr. O'DONOVAN (Australia) suggested that consideration be given to modifying Section 2(2) on arrangements with the Bank and Section 2(3) on arrangements with the Permanent Court of Arbitration so as to place them on a par with respect to the use by the Center of the offices, administrative services and facilities of the two organizations.

The CHAIRMAN said it had been felt that a distinction should be made between treatment of the two organizations; since the Bank could signify its approval of the scheme proposed it was somewhat easier to use uncon-
ditional language than in the case of another institution over which the Bank had no influence.

While there had as yet been no formal contact with the Court, he had had informal talks, and had the impression that the Court would welcome arrangements with the Center. The Court had been referred to by name since it was in existence and had publicly announced its wish to make its services available in disputes between States and private parties. Thus while the Center would have its seat in Washington it would have a base in Europe through arrangements with the Court. The reference to "other public international institutions" in Section 2(3) took account of the fact that at some future time parallel arrangements might be made with suitable institutions in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Referring to the link between the Center and the Bank the CHAIRMAN observed that two issues were involved. The first was the question whether there should be a link at all, and the second was the specific way in which this link would be evidenced. A link with the Bank had been thought useful since in the past both host States and investors had sought the advice of the Bank as being an institution in which both parties had confidence. Again, experience had shown that some governments found it easier to have conciliation or arbitration proceedings under the auspices of an institution of which they were members rather than under the auspices of an institution like the International Chamber of Commerce. He realized, however, that other governments had used the services of the I.C.C.

As to the specific manifestations of the proposed link, the Bank might be able to provide administrative assistance by way of staff and office facilities. The Administrative Council could meet at the time of the Bank's annual meeting so that accommodation and facilities for the Council's meeting would be available without additional expense. Such essentially practical considerations had led to the view that an administrative link was desirable. Other aspects of the link, which would be discussed in due course, were those connected with the appointment of arbitrators and designation of persons to the Panels.

Mr. GAE (India) referring to the link between the Bank and the Center said he did not think it desirable that the Center, one of whose organs - the Panels - would have judicial functions, should be linked to the Bank, which had administrative functions. Reference had also been made to the "use of the Bank's facilities." As this might be taken to mean that confidential material in the possession of the Bank would be made available in connection with the functions of the Center, an express prohibition against release of such information ought to be included in the Convention. His delegation would like to see the Center established as a fully independent institution.

Section 2 provided that "The seat of the Center shall be at the headquarters of the Bank," while Section 6(vi) gave the Administrative Council power to move the seat of the Center from the headquarters of the Bank by a 2/3 majority of the votes of all its members. To avoid any apparent inconsistency between these provisions, and to make it clear at the outset that the seat of the Center need not always be at the headquarters of the Bank, some phrase like "subject to the provisions of Section 6(vi)..." might be included in Section 2.
The CHAIRMAN referring to Mr. Gae's last point said that while some of the Executive Directors had taken the view that the Center should not necessarily have its seat at the headquarters of the Bank, no Director had objected to having it there initially. However, the way in which their views had been expressed in the draft lacked elegance and might well be improved.

The phrase "use of the Bank's facilities" referred to the Bank's administrative facilities as was clearly stated in Section 2(2) of Article I. He would note Mr. Gae's concern regarding a possible leakage of confidential information in the possession of the Bank, e.g., through a Bank official who was also an official of the Center. He agreed that officials of the Center should not be able to use information they had acquired in any other capacity.

He failed to see what disadvantages lay in the various aspects of the link with the Bank. While officials of the Bank might also be officials of the Center, they would have no connection whatever with actual conciliation or arbitration proceedings. Even the Secretary-General would at most act as friend of the parties to the dispute in the manner in which the President of the Bank might act at present. The Panels were lists of names from which persons would be selected by the parties to function as conciliators or arbitrators. Those persons would act in accordance with their conscience and would certainly not be influenced by the Bank, much less controlled by it.

Mr. WANASUNDERA (Ceylon) recalled that his delegation had, in its opening address, suggested that it might be preferable to confine the Convention to conciliation, had stated that it was not in agreement with some of the provisions of the draft which were of a fundamental nature, and had questioned the need for and the desirability of having a Convention on arbitration at all. While they would like to participate as fully as possible in discussion of the technical aspects of the proposals, any observations they might make should not be understood to indicate a change in their basic position.

With regard to Sections 1-3, of Article I, his delegation was against the proposed close link between the Center and the Bank save for administrative purposes. Should the Convention eventually cover both conciliation and arbitration, he would suggest that the seat of the Center should be away from the Bank, preferably at a place like The Hague.

Administrative Council (Sections 4 - 7)

Mr. TSAI (China) referred to Section 6(v) which empowered the Administrative Council to adopt Conciliation Rules and Arbitration Rules not inconsistent with any provision of the Convention, and to Section 13(1)(c) of Article IV which permitted an award to be challenged on the ground that there had been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure including failure to state the reasons for the award. The legal systems of States would differ as to what was covered by the term "the fundamental rules of procedure," and for that reason he would make a comment on the latter provision at the appropriate time.

The CHAIRMAN said he would like at that point to invite attention to an ambiguity in the wording of paragraph 7 of the Comment on page 6 the
last sentence of which was to the effect that the Conciliation and Arbitration Rules to be adopted pursuant to Section 5(v) would become binding on the parties to a dispute "only with their consent". It might perhaps have been clearer to say that those rules would be binding "except as the parties otherwise agree" - which was the wording used in Section 4 of Article III and Section 5 of Article IV to which reference was made in that connection.

Mr. EL-FISHAWY (Kuwait) would like to raise another point in that connection. Section 4 of Article III and Section 5 of Article IV stated that the time at which the Conciliation and Arbitration Rules respectively applicable in proceedings would be determined was the time when consent became effective. That was not necessarily the same time as that when consent had been given, and there might be an interval between these two points in time. During that interval the applicable rules might have been changed by the Administrative Council so that the consent of the parties would not in fact relate to the rules of which they were aware and had accepted as applicable at the time they gave their consent. In his opinion, therefore, it would be preferable to state that the rules applicable to the proceedings were the rules prevailing at the time consent was given rather than those prevailing at the time when that consent became effective.

Mr. ADARKAR (India) asked why Section 4 of Article III differed from Section 5 of Article IV in the matter of applicable rules of procedure. In the case of conciliation, if the parties wished to depart from the Conciliation Rules adopted by the Administrative Council, then not only agreement of the parties but also of the commission was required, while in the case of arbitration, for any departure from the Arbitration Rules, only the agreement of the parties was required.

The CHAIRMAN said that the reason for the distinction was that since conciliation was an informal proceeding, it had been thought that conciliators ought to be given more influence on the procedural rules. However, experts at previous meetings had also criticized the distinction referred to, and he had been convinced that it would be better to take away a Conciliation Commission's power in effect to veto the agreement of the parties.

Mr. UL ISLAM (Pakistan) thought that the formulation of Conciliation and Arbitration Rules ought not to be left to a body like the Administrative Council which might even find it impossible to reach agreement upon such rules as a result of the conflicting interests represented by the capital-exporting and capital-importing countries. It would be preferable to incorporate rules of procedure in the Convention, so that they might be adopted at the same time as the Convention, and, therefore, reflect the consensus of all signatory States.

The CHAIRMAN said that the rules of procedure had been left out of the Convention in part to limit its scope at this stage of the deliberations and in part for the reason that rules of procedure should have a greater flexibility than would be afforded through incorporation in the text of an international agreement. However, he was convinced that it would be desirable to have model rules of procedure ready in some form before the Convention was put up for signature. While it would be impractical to incorporate detailed rules in the Convention since that would make them as rigid - as far as amendment was concerned - as the Convention itself, they could be included in an annex subject to change by the Administrative Council. This might to some extent meet the concern which had been expressed at this and other meetings that there might be a split of opinion between the capital-importing and capital-exporting
countries on the question of the substance of the rules of procedure. It should be remembered, however, that if the Convention achieved even moderate success a 2/3 majority could only be obtained with the support of the capital-importing countries since they were by far the more numerous.

Mr. UL ISLAM (Pakistan) elaborating upon his earlier statement said that in his opinion the main rules of procedure should be annexed to the Convention, and should be capable of amendment only in the manner prescribed for amendment of the Convention itself. On the other hand minor detailed rules should be left to the tribunal or commission so that those rules would reflect the agreement of the parties concerned. To leave the framing of such rules to the Administrative Council - which would act by majority vote - might be regarded as infringing the traditional principle of sovereignty of States.

The CHAIRMAN saw certain difficulties in providing for three tiers of rules viz., those in the Convention, those in the annex or protocol, and those left for formulation by the tribunal or commission. Many minor rules would be of a non-controversial nature, and it might impose an unfair burden on a commission or tribunal to require it to formulate rules in each case. It would be simpler if such rules could be adopted by the Administrative Council which, it should be remembered, was composed of representatives of States and not mere officials. It was true, however, that decisions of the Council were subject to the majority rule, and the whole matter would be given further thought.

Mr. TSAI (China) supported the view of the delegate of Pakistan that the fundamental rules of procedure should be included in the Convention either in an annex or as an integral part of it. In the first place, the Convention was intended to offer investors a procedural safeguard, and should, therefore, itself contain the relevant procedural rules. Second, the Convention provided that an award could be invalidated on the ground of a "departure from a fundamental rule of procedure", and in the interests of clarity it seemed necessary that such rules form part of the text.

The CHAIRMAN, while agreeing that the question of rules of procedure should be subjected to further review, pointed out that the term "fundamental rule of procedure" contemplated in Section 13(1)(c) of Article IV should be understood as having a wider connotation than that of concrete rules to be adopted by the Administrative Council. "Fundamental rules" would comprise, for instance, the so-called principles of natural justice e.g. that both parties must be heard and that there must be adequate opportunity for rebuttal. At a previous meeting it had been suggested that the term in question should be replaced by "fundamental principles of justice".

Mr. O'DONOVAN (Australia) wished to make three points. (1) The second sentence in Section 5 which read: "During the President's absence or inability to act and during any vacancy in the office of President of the Bank, the person who shall be the chief of the operating staff of the Bank shall act as Chairman," did not effectively cover the case where the President of the Bank retained his office and functions as chief of the operating staff, but was still unable to act. (2) As the Convention could continue for a long period and as the business of the Center might in time be quite substantial, some provision should be included which would enable a meeting of the Administrative Council to take place apart from the meeting of Governors of the Bank, if, for some reason, such an arrangement were more convenient. (3) The delegate from Kuwait appeared to have taken the
view that consent to arbitration or conciliation under the auspices of the Center included also consent to submit to the rules of procedure adopted by the Administrative Council. He was himself of the opinion that consent to the jurisdiction of the Center was independent of the question whether the parties would agree to the Council's rules of procedure, and that the latter would be dealt with perhaps not at the time consent was given, but at the time when a dispute did in fact arise.

The CHAIRMAN said it was quite possible that the parties would expressly leave open the matter of procedure to be determined at a later time. If no such provision was made, then the resulting gap in the agreement between the parties would be filled through operation of the residual clauses in Section 4 of Article III and Section 5 of Article IV which provided that in the absence of a contrary agreement between the parties, the rules adopted by the Administrative Council and in force at the time when consent was given would apply.

With regard to the possible need to hold meetings of the Administrative Council at times other than the occasion of the annual meeting of the Bank, he pointed out that provision for such meetings had been made in Section 7(1).

Mr. GHANEM (Lebanon) invited attention to an apparent inconsistency between Section 7(5) which stated that members of the Administrative Council and the Chairman would serve "without compensation from the Center," and Section 20(2) which exempted from taxation the salaries or emoluments paid by the Center to the Chairman and members of the Administrative Council.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that the provisions quoted appeared to contradict one another and that several experts at previous meetings had proposed that the text be clarified. The contradiction was, however, only apparent, as while the Chairman and members of the Administrative Council would not receive "salaries" from the Center, they might nevertheless receive other payments such as reimbursement for travel expenses, and subsistence allowances which, in some countries were in principle subject to taxation. It might be possible by adding a few words to make it clear that the term "salaries" in Section 20(2) had no application in relation to the Chairman and members of the Administrative Council.

Mr. GAIE (India) said that if the Administrative Council were to be composed of such important persons as those who acted as Governors of the Bank, it might be difficult for it to convene at short notice between annual meetings of the Bank. He would, therefore, suggest that an Executive Committee be constituted which could perform some of the functions of the Administrative Council during such an interim period. For instance, the power to nominate the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General could be given to such a Committee. Where action was taken by the Committee on important questions, their decision could be subject to ratification by the Council. He thought the Bank's Executive Directors might well act as such a Committee, and noted that a similar function was entrusted to the Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce.

Referring to the second sentence of Section 5, he asked whether "the person who shall be the chief of the operating staff of the Bank" could mean anyone other than the President, since Article V, Section 5(b) of the Articles of Agreement of the Bank provided that "The President shall be the chief of the operating staff of the Bank."
Section 6 which enumerated the powers and functions of the Administrative Council might be interpreted as being exhaustive, and it might, therefore, be desirable to add to it a residual clause which would enable the Council to perform such other functions and exercise such other powers as it might consider necessary with a view to giving effect to the Convention.

In connection with Section 7 on meetings of the Administrative Council, he suggested that a provision be included empowering a specified number of members, say 1/5 or 1/10 of the members of the Council, to convene a meeting by declaration.

In conclusion he urged that consideration be given to resolving the inconsistency between Section 7(5) and Section 20(2) referred to by the expert from Lebanon.

The CHAIRMAN said that Mr. Gae's suggestion to provide for an Executive Committee of the Administrative Council, and that the Bank's Executive Directors might well act as such a Committee, had been made at a previous meeting as well. In his opinion, however, it would be better to give such a Committee only powers of recommendation coupled with a provision which would enable the Administrative Council to vote by mail, following the precedents of the International Monetary Fund and of the Bank and its affiliates. As to the use of the phrase "the chief of the operating staff of the Bank," Mr. Gae was correct in stating that the Bank's Articles of Agreement did not designate any person to act in that capacity as deputy to the President. It was precisely in order to fill that lacuna that Section 5 provided in effect that if the President of the Bank were unable to act, the person who, though he lacked the title "President" was nevertheless for the time being chief of the operating staff of the Bank, should act as Chairman of the Council. He was himself in favor of Mr. Gae's suggestion to add a clause to Section 6 giving residual powers to the Council but would like to hear comments on the point from the other experts. He was also in agreement with the suggestion that some provision be included requiring that the Council convene at the request of a specified number of its members.

Finally Section 7(5) would be amended to make it clear that, while it prohibited payment of "compensation" to the Chairman and members of the Council, that provision did not exclude reimbursement of their reasonable expenses, and was thus not inconsistent with Section 20(2).

Mr. WANASUNDERA (Ceylon) said that the question whether the President of the Bank should ex officio be Chairman of the Council depended on whether it was thought desirable to have a very close link between the proposed Center and the Bank. He himself would prefer that the link be a loose one, and that Section 5 be modified accordingly. This suggestion in no sense cast a reflection on the impartiality or the integrity of the President of the Bank but was motivated by considerations of principle.

While he associated himself with the comments of other delegates on Section 6(v) on the adoption by the Council of rules of procedure, he would, in addition, like to see the required majority increased from 2/3 to 3/4.

Finally he suggested that the application of the second sentence of Section 7(1), which empowered the Council by regulation to establish a procedure whereby the Chairman might obtain a vote of the Council on a
specific question without calling a meeting, be confined to matters of a purely administrative nature.

Mr. LAZO (Philippines) referring to Section 6(iii) on the power of the Administrative Council to approve the annual budget of the Center, enquired what would be the source of income of the Center. The Convention ought to specify how the charges for the use of its facilities would be allocated among Contracting States and how States would be required to make contributions.

The CHAIRMAN recalled that under Section 16 of Article I Contracting States would be required to bear the expenditure of the Center in proportion to their subscriptions to the capital stock of the Bank. It could be assumed that in practice the Bank would bear the overhead cost of the Center and he was aware that the President was prepared to make a recommendation on those lines to the Executive Directors. Further thought would be given to including more detailed provisions on the allocation of charges, payment of contributions, and the steps to be taken on default of payment.

The Secretariat (Sections 8 - 10)

Mr. GAE (India) asked whether the power vested in the Administrative Council by Section 9(1) to appoint the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretaries-General also gave the Council the right to remove those officials. If so, the grounds on which they would be removed from office should also be stated expressly. With regard to Section 9(2) he thought that the concurrence of the Chairman should not be required for a decision on the compatibility of other employment with the offices of Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General, which should be a matter for the Council alone.

The CHAIRMAN thought it might be necessary to consider further the implications of specifying the grounds for removal of the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General though in principle he agreed that the Council should have the right to remove these officials too. He further agreed that the requirement of the Chairman's concurrence in a decision on the compatibility of other employment with the offices of Secretary-General and Deputy Secretaries-General might be deleted.

Mr. MANSOURI (Iran) stressed the desirability of precluding the Secretary-General from exercising any political function whatever. Section 9(2) which implied that the Administrative Council could in certain circumstances permit these officers to exercise political functions should, therefore, be modified accordingly.

The CHAIRMAN said that Section 9(2) had been drafted so as not to exclude altogether persons who held such minor and completely non-controversial political offices as, for instance, membership of a local education board.

Mr. GOONERATNE (Ceylon) thought that while employment by the Permanent Court of Arbitration might be compatible with these offices, employment by the Bank might not, and that the reference to the latter ought to be deleted together with the requirement of the Chairman's concurrence in the Council's decision on compatibility of employment.

Mr. O'DONOVAN (Australia) saw no objection to retaining in Section
9(2) the provision permitting employment by the Bank. With respect to Section 10(2) he thought the Secretary-General should be required to determine, at the time of his appointment, the order in which his Deputies would act for him.

Mr. HOAN (Viet-Nam) thought that Section 9(2) which required the concurrence of the Chairman in a decision of the Council on the compatibility of other employment seemed to contradict Section 5 which provided that the Chairman would have no vote except a deciding vote in the case of an equal division.

The CHAIRMAN observed that in any event there had been a consensus regarding deletion of the provision requiring the concurrence of the Chairman in Section 9(2).

Mr. TSAI (China) suggested that nationals of non-member States of the Bank should not be appointed either to the offices of Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General, or to the Panels. His government would be unwilling to submit disputes to arbitration before a tribunal whose membership would not be limited to nationals of Contracting States and consequently might include nationals of unfriendly nations.

The CHAIRMAN thought the situation contemplated by Mr. Tsai was unlikely to arise. It was improbable that the nominating authority would nominate to the tribunal, say an umpire, who was persona non grata with one of the parties.

Mr. MANSOURI (Iran) suggested that the powers of the Secretary-General be specified in the way that the powers of the Administrative Council were specified in Section 6.

The CHAIRMAN said he could not see much advantage in describing the powers of the Secretary-General in detail. The precise character of that office could not yet be determined. It could remain purely administrative, or grow to be of greater significance, depending on the attitudes of States and investors, as well as the incumbent's own personality. If necessary, details of his functions could be spelled out in the Rules to be adopted by the Administrative Council in the manner in which the functions of the Registrar of the International Court of Justice were spelled out in the Rules of the Court.

Mr. GOONERATNE (Ceylon) proposed that the requirement in Section 9(1) that the Chairman nominate the candidate for Secretary-General be deleted as being unduly restrictive of the powers of the Administrative Council.

The CHAIRMAN said that the scheme proposed formed part of a general system of checks and balances. In the first place, each Contracting State had one vote in the Council and, as most Contracting States would be importers of capital, they would command a majority in the matter of appointment of the Secretary-General. On the other hand, the power to nominate a candidate lay in the Chairman who was neutral and would undoubtedly make every effort to nominate persons acceptable to both capital-importing countries and capital-exporting countries. Under this system, however, while there would be a deadlock where the Chairman nominated a person not acceptable to the capital-importing countries, where the Chairman nominated a person acceptable only to the capital-importing countries, the capital-exporting countries would have no remedy.

Mr. ADARKAR (India) thought it would be better to regard the Chairman's
power to nominate the Secretary-General as a device merely intended to facilitate the Council's search for a candidate in whom all its members had confidence, rather than a means to achieve a balance of political interests. For the successful working of the Center it was essential that it remain an independent institution. He asked whether there were any precedents in other international agreements for this particular procedure for appointing the principal officer of an organization.

The CHAIRMAN said he doubted whether there was any precedent for such a procedure. On the other hand, it was important to recognize that the Center was itself unique in that neither in the case of the International Chamber of Commerce, nor that of the Permanent Court of Arbitration were there associated with the organization in the public mind, two distinct groups of potential litigants. In the case of the Center it was quite clear that there were two such groups with divergent interests - both, however, quite legitimate. He therefore believed that some device such as the present one was desirable to insure confidence in the person chiefly responsible viz. the Secretary-General.

Mr. ADARKAR (India) wondered why it was necessary to provide checks and balances in the procedure for appointment of the Secretary-General if he were to function as a non-political and purely administrative officer or "registrar" performing routine functions e.g. explaining to States and investors the facilities available under the auspices of the Center, and the rights and obligations associates with them, the documents to be filed in proceedings, etc.

The CHAIRMAN said that the answer to that question would depend on what rôle was envisaged for the Secretary-General, and in this connection recalled that there had been a tendency, dating from the initial discussion of the proposals, to build up the position of the Secretary-General at the expense of that of the Chairman of the Administrative Council. Since the Secretary-General might come to be regarded as reflecting the "image" of the Center he thought there was a need for checks and balances in the matter of his appointment.

Mr. HIMADEH (Lebanon) suggested that Section 9(1) be modified to provide that the Council appoint the Secretary-General from a list of candidates submitted by the Chairman, on the lines of the system for appointment of Executive Directors of the Bank.

The CHAIRMAN said that while that idea was a useful one, it would be difficult to find candidates willing to have their names put forward at the risk of their being rejected. In the case of appointment of the Bank's Executive Directors it was a question of appointing candidates proposed by countries and as such resembled election to political office more than did appointment to the office of Secretary-General which was a staff post.

The meeting was suspended at 11:00 a.m. and resumed at 11:30 a.m.

The Panels (Sections 11 - 15)

The CHAIRMAN introducing Sections 11-15 listed some suggested changes in the provisions on the qualifications of persons to be designated to the Panels which had received wide support at previous meetings: (1) that the prescribed qualifications include independence and a capacity for independent judgment, (2) that the qualifications required be stated at some earlier
point in this group of Sections so as to apply to all designations to the Panels and (3) that the second sentence of Section 15(1) which, though not mandatory, directed States to seek the advice of certain institutions before designating their members, was superfluous and ought to be deleted.

Mr. TSAI (China) observed that while the Convention was explicit as to the qualifications of persons to be designated by States, the Chairman in designating persons was only required to pay due regard to the importance of assuring representation on the Panels of the principal legal systems of the world and of the main forms of economic activity. While he had no objection to the Chairman being required to take the latter aspect into account, he thought that the Chairman should also be required to consider the other qualifications stipulated e.g. high moral character.

The CHAIRMAN agreed and observed that Mr. Tsai's point would be met if, as had earlier been proposed, the qualifications of Panel members were stated first and as being generally applicable regardless of who might designate them.

Mr. TSAI (China) recalled that he had previously suggested that the Secretary-General and all persons designated to the Panels be nationals of Contracting States. If such a suggestion were not acceptable he would propose that it be provided that if an official like the Secretary-General or an arbitrator was regarded by the State party to the dispute or by a State whose national was a party to the dispute as persona non grata (regardless of whether he were a national of a Contracting State or not), such State should at least be permitted to veto the appointment of the official or arbitrator, since it would be embarrassing for it to have to grant to such persons any prescribed status under the Convention e.g. to accord them privileges and immunities, including travel facilities.

The CHAIRMAN thought it would be extremely difficult to include such a provision in the Convention. The problem could usually be avoided in practice by not selecting for the proceedings a location where either the parties or the members of the commission or tribunal would not be admitted. However, if the proposed veto were written into the Convention it could be used in all cases in which a State wished to interfere with the immunities that it was obliged to grant under the Convention. The problem could best be resolved as far as the parties were concerned if, on entering into the arbitration agreement, they were to consent to be bound by such restrictions.

Mr. HOAN (Viet-Nam) agreed with the delegate of China that a Contracting State should be able to veto the appointment of an official or member of a Panel whom it regarded as persona non grata. In the case of appointment of the Secretary-General, at least the by-laws of the Administrative Council should include a provision giving a member the right to veto the appointment.

Mr. EL-FISHAWY (Kuwait) referred to the freedom given to parties under Section 1 of Article III and Section 1 of Article IV in the first instance to agree upon constitution of a commission or tribunal in any way they wished, and by appointing persons from the Panels or from outside. Paragraph 13 of the Comment seemed to imply that this would be the normal case, and thus that the Panels would have only limited significance. However, since in most cases it could be expected that there would be no agreement on constitution of a commission or tribunal, the later provisions of Articles III and IV on appointment of conciliators and arbitrators respectively would be the most frequently applicable, and these restricted the choice of the parties
to the Panels. He was in favor of allowing the parties to choose conciliators and arbitrators from outside the Panels in all cases and would propose that that principle be adopted for two reasons: (1) the parties were precluded from appointing an arbitrator who was a national of the State party to the dispute or of the investor's State, and therefore their choice ought not to be further restricted to the nominees of other States on the Panel; and (2) appointment to the Panel was for the duration of four years and the dispute might take place at a time when the Panels failed to offer a person whom they regarded as acceptable.

The CHAIRMAN recalled that a large number of experts at previous meetings had felt that it would be very desirable to give the Panels a certain significance, at any rate more significance than had hitherto been enjoyed by, say, the Panels of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

Mr. GAE (India) recalled that Section 11(1) and Section 12(1) provided that the Panels should consist of "qualified persons" and that Section 15 spelled out the qualifications required. In his opinion it would be desirable to delete Section 15 and to leave it entirely to the discretion of Contracting States not only whom they appointed to the Panels but also whom they should consult in making such appointments. In any event, were Section 15 to be retained, paragraph 2 should be clarified, particularly with respect to what area was covered by the expression "the main forms of economic activity."

The CHAIRMAN said that the expression "the main forms of economic activity" in Section 15(2) covered such sectors of the economy as banking, industry, agriculture and the like. He thought that if Section 15 were deleted - and he would be in favor of doing that - the qualifications could be tested in Sections 11 and 12.

Mr. GAE (India) would have no objection to that solution.

Referring to Sections 11(2) and 12(2) which permitted Contracting States to designate to the Panels not only their own nationals but also those of other States, he felt that the use of the term "nationals" in that context might not be entirely appropriate since as used in the Convention that term covered both natural and juridical persons. He suggested that the term "citizens" be used in these Sections and that it be made clear that only natural persons could be designated to the Panels.

Section 13(1) required Panel members to serve for four years. Authority to designate to the Panels should carry with it the discretion to terminate the appointment, and the position might be clarified if Section 13(1) were to be amended so as to provide that members would serve "subject to the pleasure of the Contracting State or the Chairman as the case may be."

Section 13(2) provided that "in case of death or resignation of a member" of either Panel the authority which appointed him - a Contracting State or the Chairman as appropriate - had power to fill the vacancy for the balance of the member's term. That procedure should, however, be applied not only in cases of death or resignation of members, but in any instance of what might generally be termed a "casual vacancy," or vacancy occurring other than by expiry of a stipulated term of office.

The CHAIRMAN referring to Mr. Gae's remarks on the use of the term "nationals" in Sections 11(2) and 12(2), confirmed that it was intended that
only natural persons should be eligible to serve on the Panels, and that in this particular context the term "citizens" might be more appropriate.

He saw no objection to modifying Section 13(1) on the term of service of Panel members so that it would provide that they serve at the pleasure of the designating authority. It should, however, be understood that once the member had been selected to serve on a commission or tribunal, it would no longer be within the discretion of the designating authority to terminate the Panel member's appointment.

As to the suggestion that Section 13(2) should cover not only designation in the event of a Panel member's death or resignation but all types of "casual vacancy," he was not sure whether that phrase was regarded as a technical term outside countries with a legal tradition linked to that of the United Kingdom. If the other instances which Mr. Gae had in mind were insolvency and general incompetence, his point might be met through the provision which had seemed to receive support, viz., that Panel members would serve at the pleasure of the designating authority. Thus, if for instance, a member became insolvent and did not resign it would be open to the Contracting State which appointed him to withdraw his name from the Panel and fill the resulting vacancy.

Mr. TSAI (China) said he had understood that once a person had been designated to a Panel he could not be removed and would cease to be a member only if he had resigned or died. If Panel members were to serve during the pleasure of the appointing authority, it might be difficult to persuade persons of the required stature and repute to accept nomination. The wisdom of thus modifying Section 13 ought to be reconsidered.

The CHAIRMAN emphasized that a member could not be removed by the designating authority if he was serving or had been appointed to serve on a specific commission or tribunal. He recalled that at a previous meeting one expert had asked what would happen if the regular period of four years expired during the pendency of a case. It was generally acknowledged that in such a case the Panel member would continue to function in the case in which he was engaged, but would not be eligible for appointment to a new commission or tribunal.

Mr. GOONERATNE (Ceylon) referring to the proposal to delete Section 15, said he would like to see retained in some form that part of paragraph 2 which required the Chairman in designating members to the Panels to pay due regard to the importance of "assuring representation on the Panels of the principal legal systems of the world."

The CHAIRMAN agreed.

Mr. LAZO (Philippines) supported Mr. Gae's proposal, and suggested that the requirement might be added to Section 12.

Mr. ROOSE (Malaysia) referred to Section 14(2) whereby, in the event of multiple designation of a Panel member, he would be considered to have been designated by the authority which first designated him. In view of the fact that parties to a dispute were precluded from nominating to an arbitral tribunal nationals of either State concerned, he did not see why it would be of significance to know that a particular State had nominated a particular Panel member. In his view, it would be appropriate merely to record the names of the various States nominating the member.
The CHAIRMAN said that the Convention provided that each State nominate a certain number of persons to the Panels (tentatively six) so as to ensure that a wide variety of Panel members would be available for selection. If more than one country should nominate the same person, the number of members and therefore that variety would be reduced.

Mr. O'DONOVAN (Australia) said he assumed that the rules to be adopted by the Administrative Council under Section 6 of Article I would make provision for machinery for the designation by Contracting States of members of the Panels. He foresaw that if no rules were established a State might in the first instance designate three members, and then when a dispute seemed imminent, it might designate three more who were rather more favorably disposed and perhaps even a little biased in favor of the State. He thought it would be desirable that appointments be made once every four years, or in the event of a vacancy occurring by death or any other contingency provided for.

The CHAIRMAN thought it would be difficult to fill all the possible loopholes. Nor would failure to do so be of serious significance if the provision of Article IV excluding national arbitrators were accepted.

Mr. TSAI (China) asked how the number "12" had been arrived at in connection with the number of persons that the Chairman was authorized to designate to each Panel.

The CHAIRMAN said the number was purely tentative and had been chosen arbitrarily as being a small number relative to the number of persons designated to each Panel by States, which, assuming that all members of the Bank became parties to the Convention, would be in the region of 600. He would be glad, however, to receive other suggestions as regards the number of members to be designated by the Chairman.

Mr. GHANEM (Lebanon) referring to the qualifications stated in Section 15(1) asked why, in addition to legally trained persons, persons competent in the fields of commerce, industry or finance should also be designated. Since it was made clear in Section 1 of Article II that only disputes of a "legal character" would be submitted to arbitration, he wondered how such persons could be qualified to sit on a tribunal.

The CHAIRMAN thought that there was no inconsistency between limiting jurisdiction to disputes of a legal character while stipulating that the arbitrators should have a particular knowledge in a field of activity other than the law. The juridical tribunals of a number of States included persons who were not lawyers, and so did the Panels of the International Chamber of Commerce. The fact that the jurisdiction of the Center was limited to legal disputes did not exclude a dispute regarding the facts essential to a determination of legal rights and obligations, and it would be an advantage to have on the Panels persons capable of appreciating the factual situation arising in a particular sector of economic life which was relevant to a determination of legal issues.

Mr. EL-FISHAWY (Kuwait) thought it would be useful in order to give Panel members greater independence, to give them immunity against removal for the period of their designation, especially since in most cases States would appoint to a tribunal members designated to the Panel by other States.

The CHAIRMAN said he would welcome the views of other delegates.
on Mr. El Fishawy's suggestion as well as on Mr. Gae's proposal that Panel members serve during the pleasure of the designating authority.

**Financing the Center (Section 16)**

The CHAIRMAN recalled that he had earlier stated that the overhead expense of the Center would be borne on a pro rata basis by Contracting States in proportion to their subscriptions to the capital stock of the Bank and, in the case of Contracting States which were not members of the Bank, in accordance with rules adopted by the Administrative Council. Provision for other sources of income viz. "charges for the use of its facilities" and "other receipts," referred respectively to charges in connection with actual conciliation or arbitration proceedings (to be discussed more fully in connection with Article VI), and to the possibility that the Bank might underwrite the overhead of the Center as distinguished from expenditures incurred in connection with specific proceedings. As to the latter possibility he said that the President of the Bank would be willing to recommend this arrangement to the Executive Directors, since it might serve to avoid excessive administrative complexity while insulating the Center from the effects of delay by Contracting States in paying their contributions.

There was no comment on Section 16.

**Privileges and Immunities (Sections 17 - 20)**

The CHAIRMAN introducing Sections 17-20 said that these provisions had been adapted, to the extent possible, from the provisions on privileges and immunities from the Charters of the Bretton Woods institutions for the reason that it should be easier for Governments to accept them, having accepted them before in relation to those institutions. He recalled that at a previous meeting it had been suggested that immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed in an official capacity granted by Section 18(i) should be extended to arbitrators and conciliators who would be more likely to need that protection than the Chairman and members of the Administrative Council.

It had also been suggested that the standard of treatment required by Section 18(ii) viz. treatment "accorded by Contracting States to the representatives, officials and employees of comparable rank of other Contracting States," would be difficult to apply as no real basis for comparison existed between, say, the officials of the Center and those of a Contracting State. It might thus be more appropriate to adopt as a standard the privileges and immunities of the specialized agencies of the United Nations, and to include in Section 18(ii) a reference to the Convention dealing with that subject.

Mr. O'DONOVAN (Australia) thought that the protection of Section 18(i) should be extended not only to arbitrators and conciliators following the suggestion referred to by the Chairman, but also to persons appearing as parties, representatives of parties, agents, counsel and experts or witnesses in proceedings.

The CHAIRMAN said that while some delegates at the Geneva meeting had been prepared to go that far, other delegates had felt that experts and
witnesses were not likely to be in need of such protection.

In reply to a question from Mr. Gae, he said the wording of the Section 20(2) would be re-examined together with Section 7(5) with a view to eliminating any appearance of inconsistency between those provisions.

Mr. TSAI (China) said he would like to see written into the Convention an assurance that a Contracting State would not be required to grant privileges and immunities to an individual whom it considered persona non grata.

Mr. EL-FISHAWY (Kuwait) said he could agree with the extension of immunity proposed by the delegate of Australia only in so far as counsel or agents of parties were concerned. To extend it to witnesses, for instance, would in his opinion go too far, and it might be best to leave the extent of immunity to the local legal system applied in each case.

Mr. SHIRATORI (Japan) observed that while the provisions concerning privileges and immunities were generally patterned after those of the Bank, the Bank's privileges and immunities were also covered by the detailed provisions of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies (1947). As the latter Convention could not be applied to the Center, he wondered whether it might not be necessary to set out the privileges and immunities of the Center in greater detail on the lines of the Specialized Agencies' Convention.

The CHAIRMAN, while agreeing that that might be possible, observed that governments had shown a reluctance to accept innovations in the field of privileges and immunities. To grant to the Center (which was not a specialized agency) privileges and immunities on the pattern of those of the specialized agencies might be difficult. On the other hand, the Specialized Agencies' Convention went little further than the Bank's Charter. The only significant points of difference were that the Specialized Agencies' Convention gave tax immunity even to local nationals, and included provisions on waiver of immunity in accordance with post-war usage in the matter of immunities. While Mr. Shiratori's proposal would be considered, he thought that any attempt to redraft Sections 17-20 at this stage might give rise to considerable controversy.

ARTICLE II - Jurisdiction of the Center

The CHAIRMAN introducing Article II observed that the term "jurisdiction" had been used in the text to denote the scope of activity of the Center, as had been done in The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 with respect to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. As several experts at previous meetings had pointed out that the term could be read as implying an element of compulsion which was quite inconsistent with the character of the Convention, he had tentatively concluded that it might be advisable to abandon the term in favor of some phrase like "scope of activity." Such a term, while consistent with the optional character of the proposed machinery, also indicated that what was attempted here was a definition of the peripheral limits of the Center's activities.

The jurisdiction of the Center was limited in several ways viz. as to (1) the type of proceedings - conciliation and arbitration, or both consecutively; (2) the type of dispute - investment disputes of a legal character, and (3) the parties - a foreign private investor and a State.
In connection with the latter it should be noted that under the parenthetical clause in Section 1, the investor's State could appear in proceedings before the Center when subrogated in the rights of the investor.

It had been proposed at an earlier meeting to extend the jurisdiction of the Center to disputes between an investor on the one hand and an agency or political subdivision of a Contracting State on the other, and document COM/AS/6 contained the following tentative text giving effect to that proposal.

"Section ... Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1 of Article II the jurisdiction of the Center shall extend to any dispute between a political subdivision or instrumentality of a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State, where such political subdivision or instrumentality and such national have consented to the jurisdiction of the Center in respect of such dispute, and such political subdivision or instrumentality has given its consent with the approval of the Contracting State concerned."

It was important to bear in mind in the course of the discussion that the jurisdiction of the Center was always subject to the over-all limitation that the express consent of the parties to the dispute was required before a dispute could be brought within the jurisdiction of the Center.

Finally, he suggested that discussion of the term "national of another Contracting State" which appeared in Article II and was defined in Article X should be postponed until discussion of the latter Article.

Mr. GRANEM (Lebanon) observed that as "investment" was an economic concept and did not correspond to any European legal concept, it was essential to clarify it before it could be incorporated in a legal instrument. To begin with, the concept should be analyzed in the way in which it was applied by investors and States. Thus in his view the ways in which capital was invested in a country, could be exemplified by three hypothetical cases:

1. An investor might acquire all or part of a local private enterprise or conclude a contract with it. The host State was then outside this legal bond, and could not, therefore, be held to any special obligation vis-à-vis the investor that would permit recourse to arbitral procedure. The investor would, in such a case, have the same status vis-à-vis the State as that State's nationals.

2. An investor might enter into a contract with the host State but on the terms and according to the rules that would have governed a contract between the States and one of its own nationals. The State was clearly a party to the agreement, but the foreign investor should not be able to count on any form of jurisdictional privilege not enjoyed by the nationals of that State. In this case as in the previous one, the Contract as a whole could only be governed by the internal laws of the host State.

3. The investor might have invested only because of a legal arrangement, quite outside the ordinary law, between him and the host State. Such an agreement could only be valid because it had been concluded by the government of the host State which had the power to make such a contract binding. The State was, therefore, not
only a party to the contract but, in the very exercise of its sovereign power by virtue of which it concluded the investment agreement, would have given an implicit guarantee to the investor that it would not use that sovereign power to alter the terms of investment unilaterally.

Only in the third case could the possibility of inserting a clause compromissoire be considered.

On the basis of this analysis he proposed inclusion in the Convention of the following definition of the term "investment":

"For the purposes of this Convention "investment" shall mean the commitment of capital by the national of a Contracting State in the territory of another Contracting State on the basis of an agreement concluded between the latter and the investor, in accordance with a special procedure for which no provision is generally made in the contracts concluded by that State."

The CHAIRMAN noted that the proposal sought to restrict the scope of the Convention, as far as the type of dispute was concerned, to investment disputes arising from investment agreements in which clauses compromissoires were included. Ad hoc submission of disputes was, therefore, excluded.

Referring to the meaning of the term "dispute of a legal character" he thought it might be defined as:

"any dispute concerning a legal right or a legal obligation, or concerning any fact relevant to the determination of such right or obligation."

Mr. ADARKAR (India) agreed with the delegate of Lebanon that the term "investment" needed definition, and recalled that it had been found necessary to define it in similar documents e.g. the United States' Mutual Security Act.

The term "dispute of a legal character" also needed clarification. Paragraph 4 of the Comment suggested that that expression should be read in the light of the general understanding reflected in the Preamble. However, the relevant part of the Preamble viz. paragraph 2, merely referred to the broadest terms to disputes in connection with international investment arising between a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State, and was not, therefore, of significant assistance. He was not sure - as seemed to be implied in paragraph 4 of the Comment - that it was really possible to distinguish between political, economic and commercial disputes on the one hand, and legal disputes on the other, since each of the former categories of disputes might in fact have a legal basis. Nor would it be very helpful to try to cover only disputes which were "purely legal."

While it was true that a foreign investor had special problems arising out of his presence in another country, it was necessary to scrutinize any suggested solution of those problems, and to be satisfied that any special regime created for him was really designed to resolve those special problems and no more. It would not always be appropriate to place a foreign investor in a favorable position in relation to some particular problem when the very same problem confronted the local investor as well. For instance, to grant any special facility to foreigners to challenge at will local laws designed to protect moralities and health or the security of the State would run
counter to the aims of justice.

Nor could all these difficult problems be resolved merely through reliance on the optional character of the jurisdiction of the Center, because that would amount to placing too heavy a responsibility on the States concerned. States should have some guidance as to what disputes they would be expected to submit to arbitration, as well as in what circumstances it would be considered unreasonable for the foreign investor to challenge local law.

He was not sure whether the definition of "dispute of a legal character" proposed by the Chairman would meet the point at issue, since it remained a matter of doubt whether the "legal right or obligation" derived from a specific agreement, law or understanding whereby the State had voluntarily accepted a limitation on its sovereignty. If it was agreed that these were the only rights and obligations upon which arbitration before the Center was possible, then the phrase "legal right or obligation" would be defined beyond dispute. That, however, did not appear to be the case. Under the Bank's Loan Regulations and Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, as well as in the practice of his own government the class of disputes in respect of which arbitral machinery was available was clearly defined, e.g. disputes concerning the interpretation, validity or implementation of the specific agreement. That practice had the effect of relieving a State of the possible embarrassment of having to refuse to submit to an international jurisdiction in cases in which it genuinely believed that the dispute was not arbitrable.

Referring to paragraph 6 of the Comment he pointed out that the phrase "reciprocal performance of obligations which arise out of the application of the Convention" had little meaning in the context. The relationship covered was not that between States but one between a State and a private investor, and he failed to see in that case any basis for reciprocity, since the investor did not have obligations under the Convention but only rights. If such obligations did in fact exist they should be spelled out; if not, he would like to see established within the scope of the Convention a device whereby not only the host State but also the other party to the dispute would be subject to obligations under the Convention. He had in mind an arrangement whereby investment disputes would be transformed from the level of State-investor relations into a dispute where the parties would be the States concerned. The delegate of Japan had earlier observed that a situation approaching reciprocity could be achieved if, in the event of a dispute between a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State, the State whose national was a party to the dispute could somehow be brought into the picture. In that case the investor's State would be saved the embarrassment of seeing one of its nationals in dispute with another State, and a straining of political relations averted. The dispute arising could be referred eventually to arbitration without violating certain fundamental principles of international law viz. (1) that the claim of a State and that of an individual were on different planes and could not be placed on par with each other and (2) that international law governed relations between States and could not deal with relations between a State and a foreign private individual. This device would, however, be subject to the one exception noted by the delegate of Lebanon viz. the case where the host State itself, in the exercise of its sovereignty, entered into an investment agreement with the foreign investor pursuant to which it undertook to submit disputes with the foreign investor to international adjudication. In that instance reciprocity would be assured as the investor would
himself have undertaken certain obligations under the agreement.

The CHAIRMAN observed that Mr. Adarkar had made a very clear distinction between the definition of "investment", and the definition of "dispute of a legal character" which he would like to be understood in the sense of a dispute eligible for settlement under the Convention. Previous speakers had pointed out that "investment" had been defined in the legislation of certain States, but a precise definition of that term was only part of the problem, as, in the view of those speakers, in order to be eligible for settlement under the auspices of the Center, the dispute should, in addition, arise out of some contractual relationship between the investor and the host State. While that type of case would account for 90-95% of the disputes which parties might want to bring before the Center, he thought it was nevertheless essential to provide in addition for those cases where a dispute arose without any previous agreement. Mr. Adarkar had urged that in the case of ad hoc recourse to the Center, even though consent of the host State would be required, a refusal of that consent might create an embarrassing situation. He could not, however, agree with that conclusion.

As to the attempt in paragraph 4 of the Comment to distinguish disputes of a "legal character" from political, economic or commercial disputes, he agreed that the wording might not adequately convey the distinction, and that further precise clarification was necessary.

On the question of reciprocity and the existence of obligations not only on the part of the host State but also on that of the investor (paragraph 6 of the Comment) particular emphasis had to be placed on the fact that the host State was a "contracting" State and that the investor was also a national of a "contracting" State. There were reciprocal obligations both as between the investor and the host State as well as between the investor's State and the host State. The Convention established one very important obligation for all Contracting States viz. to recognize awards and to take such steps as were necessary under their own law, to make such awards enforceable through local channels. The Comment was intended to distinguish that case from the situation which would arise if the Convention were to permit proceedings between a Contracting State and a national of a non-Contracting State. Assuming that the assets of the national were in his own State that State would have no obligation to recognize an award granted by a tribunal under the Convention, nor would that national be bound indirectly by the Convention to abide by the award or indeed to abide by the clause compromissoire.

As to the suggestion that disputes between an investor and a host State should be lifted to the level of inter-State disputes, it would, of course, be possible to work out such a system, which would be consistent with traditional concepts of international law. The present draft, however, sought to do just the opposite in the belief that not only investors but States also would prefer to deal with each other directly (in the manner accepted by Mr. Adarkar for those cases which were covered by investment agreements) and that to translate a dispute between the investor and a State into the realm of inter-State relations might be undesirable. He thought that this progressive development of international law might be especially valuable in cases where smaller States had to deal with investors from larger countries, and the likelihood of successful inter-State negotiations was somewhat reduced. The Convention proceeded on the assumption that in the stated situations, States would be willing to have direct dealings with investors, and he did not believe that this would be in any way inconsistent
with the practice of Mr. Adarkar's government provided the situations were those which it considered appropriate.

On the issue of embarrassment of States raised by the delegate of Japan and referred to by Mr. Adarkar, it had to be considered that while a State might be embarrassed to see one of its nationals in a dispute with another State, it might be equally embarrassing were the national concerned to request his State to espouse his claim. In addition, if his State, having studied all the aspects of the claim decided that while the claim was good it should not be pursued in the light of the greater national interest, the investor himself might be prevented from obtaining any relief. Similarly, it could lead to embarrassment were the Convention to give an investor a right to proceed directly against a host State, but make the exercise of that right subject to the approval of his own State. That would place an undue burden on the investor's State as its action in giving the consent might be regarded by the host State as an unfriendly act.

The meeting rose at 1:40 p.m.

THIRD SESSION
(Wednesday, April 29, 1964 - 8:40 a.m.)

ARTICLE II - Jurisdiction of the Center (continued)

Mr. TSAI (China) said that, although there was a need to limit the scope of the jurisdiction of the Center which, as stated in the Convention, was too broad, it would be quite difficult, in his opinion, to provide a clear-cut definition of the word "investment".

"Investment" was a term whose content varied according to the different economic or political backgrounds or points of view of the various countries. For the purpose of the Convention, however, it should be possible to find guidelines for a definition which would be sufficiently clear when a particular state and an investor consented to the jurisdiction of the Center.

The purpose of the Convention was not to protect foreign property, but rather to give procedural safeguards to foreign investors. Capital-importing countries would join the Convention in order to attract foreign investment and not foreign property as such. This would provide a first guideline to define what was meant by "investment".

Secondly, the foreign investor usually based his investment on a foreign investment law, if there was one, or on a special contract entered into with the local government. If the word "investment" was defined in that law or in that agreement, no difficulty would arise, even without a specific definition in the Convention.

Thirdly, one should remember that a foreign investor's main concern was the fear that his investment would be exposed to certain risks such as expropriation without compensation, or war risk, or deprivation of his right to repatriate his capital or profit. These risks were normally defined in insurance or investment guarantee agreements between states and the subject matter of disputes could be limited to those risks.
With those three guidelines in mind, it would be possible to reach a certain agreement as to the investment disputes of a legal character which could be submitted to the Center.

The definition of "investment" therefore did not pose a serious problem but there might be some difficulties about the subject matter of a dispute. He was inclined to think that such subject matter ought to be limited to those risks that were most feared by foreign investors. He thought that, for instance, investment guarantee programs of the kind which many countries had agreed upon with the United States Government covering investors against expropriation, war risk, and non-convertibility could provide an example of arbitrable questions. Alternatively, a provision could be inserted in the Convention limiting the subject matter of a dispute to the rights or obligations provided by the foreign investment law of the host country or by the specific contract entered into between the investors and the host government.

He also thought that the Convention should also require a minimum amount of investment. In a previous draft, there had been a minimum amount of $100,000. In the present draft, the comment stated that, as some disputes could not be valued in terms of money and parties might want to have a test case to decide questions of principle, it was desirable not to have any limit.

He thought that a limit should be set not with reference to any specific claim but, rather, on the basis of the investment as a whole with respect to which the claim arose. What countries wished to attract were large investments. If a limit was set on the amount of the investment rather than on the value of the dispute, the number of requests for arbitration could be usefully limited.

With regard to the question of subrogation by the investor's State, he was inclined to think that if a government was subrogated in the rights of its national investor and if the investor had consented to the jurisdiction of the Convention, then the government should be bound to submit the issue to the Center, while the Convention seemed to leave the subrogee government a choice in the matter.

The CHAIRMAN said that he saw no reason to have inflexible provisions on the subject of a minimum limit. If a country felt that it did not want to use the facilities of the Center for small investments, it could so state in advance and would not be criticized by anybody, while if one tried to provide for it under the Convention serious difficulties would arise in attempting to define such a limit, whether based on the monetary value of the claim or of the investment. He thought therefore that the matter could better be left to the determination of the parties.

Mr. HETH (Israel) said that a clear definition of "jurisdiction of the Center" was indispensable if the machinery proposed by the Convention was to attain success. Without a definition, even countries that agreed to the principle of arbitration and conciliation embodied in the Convention might hesitate to adhere to it; and the Convention itself, even if accepted by states, might not prove to be a source of confidence to investors who would want to know in what matters disputes arising in connection with an undertaking to arbitrate would actually be subject to arbitration.
He agreed with the views of the delegate of India that only disputes arising out of contracts or agreements or understandings in the nature of contracts should be subject to the jurisdiction of the Center.

Matters relating only to the interpretation of municipal laws, such as tax laws or social security laws, should be left to the domestic courts. Only after the exhaustion of local remedies could the matter conceivably be submitted to international arbitration on grounds such as denial of justice or discrimination.

In case of an expropriation of a foreign investor's property as a consequence of nationalization of basic industries, could the right of the state to expropriate, or only the amount of the compensation to be paid be subject to international arbitration? If, as he thought, only the second issue would be arbitrable, this should be clarified in the Convention.

He also thought that while pecuniary value was not always a sufficient criterion, the Convention should provide for the elimination of insignificant matters from the jurisdiction of the Center, at least by requiring an individual to obtain the consent of his State before referring the dispute to international arbitration.

The voluntary nature of the machinery proposed by the Convention was not sufficient to eliminate the need for a clear definition of the jurisdiction of the Center for, once the Convention was adopted, the State would not be at complete liberty to withhold its consent to arbitration on subject matters that could be within the jurisdiction of the Center.

The Convention was designed to impose on States certain obligations, in consideration for which the Convention offered the possibility that the better investment climate would contribute to the acceleration of the flow of investment capital to a developing country. Whereas the obligations imposed were clearly discernible, the benefits to be derived were imponderable, and he would wish at least to minimize the unknowns relating to the scope of jurisdiction of the Center.

With reference to Section 3 of Article II, he thought it preferable not to mention specifically the grounds for preliminary objections. The list of grounds for objection mentioned did not seem to him exhaustive, and the statement that the tribunal would be the judge of its own competence was sufficient basis for entertaining preliminary objections on matters of jurisdiction.

By enumerating a closed list of preliminary questions, the Convention eliminated some grounds that were generally recognized by international law, such as the exhaustion of local remedies, which seemed to him too fundamental not to be mentioned specifically.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the scope of the Convention and the question of local remedies were two separate problems. The Convention allowed complete freedom for the parties in their agreement either to provide for the exhaustion of local remedies or to exclude them and this point would be discussed in connection with Article IV.

On the question of the scope of the Convention, he thought that at all the meetings capital-exporters and capital-importers alike had
expressed the view that a more precise definition was required, although only a few specific suggestions had been made while a certain limitation of the jurisdiction of the Center was certainly desirable, he thought that certain types of limitation, e.g. those related to the size of the investments, could be usefully left to the consent of the parties.

On the question of the substance of the issues involved in a dispute, taxation, social security, labor laws had been mentioned. In those cases it seemed clear to him that, unless they had been the subject of an investment agreement, there was no reason why a State should agree to have any such issues submitted to international arbitration except in the case mentioned by Mr. HETH, where after normal court procedures it was alleged that there has been discrimination or some other acts which were cognizable in international law.

He felt, however, rather strongly on the suggestion that the consent of the investor's State be also required because that State would be placed in a very difficult position if it had to approve of an action which one of its nationals took pursuant to an earlier agreement with another State.

He recognized that the present draft seemed to permit an investor to apply to the Center without the previous consent of the host State but, as he had mentioned earlier, the final draft could exclude such possibility which was based only on analogy with the provisions of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

Referring to the concern expressed that States would hesitate to sign the Convention without knowing clearly what they might be asked to do, and to the fear expressed by some delegates that to sign a Convention of such a broad scope as provided in the present draft might raise false expectations in the minds of investors with attendant criticism of the host State if in a specific case it did not consent to go to arbitration, he pointed out that, in searching for a solution, one should keep in mind that States in different parts of the world dealt with foreign investors in different ways. Some dealt with them strictly on the basis of investment promotion laws, others concluded specific agreements with foreign investors, others again had neither special laws nor agreements.

There were countries, for instance in Latin America, which were not prepared to accept arbitration in advance of a dispute in agreements with investors, but would consider going to arbitration only in certain cases after a dispute had arisen. Those countries could conceivably sign the Convention but publicly state at the same time that they would consent to go to arbitration only in certain cases which in their opinion were arbitrable and raised questions of international law.

In order to accommodate the different methods of dealing with foreign investors and at the same time avoid the danger of creating false expectations, the Convention should first state the scope of the jurisdiction of the Center in broad terms and exclude only the kinds of disputes on which there was agreement that they fall outside the subject matter with which the Convention sought to deal; and then allow each State to state in advance, if it so wished, which types of disputes it would or would not consider submitting to conciliation or arbitration under the auspices of the Center.

Mr. EL-FISHAWY (Kuwait) thought that the term "investment" required
more definition also from the point of view of the capital-exporting
countries because in the case, for example, of a contractor from such a
country building roads or installing power stations in another country
the question would arise whether that would be considered an investment
and whether a dispute arising out of such contract would accordingly
be within the potential jurisdiction of the Center or not.

He also wanted to express his support for the proposal to extend
the jurisdiction or the scope of activity of the Center to disputes
which had as a party not only Contracting States but instrumentalities,
autonomous agencies, or political subdivisions of those States. Such
an extension would no doubt further the purposes of the Center.

Mr. GHANEM (Lebanon) remarked that there were three main types
of foreign investment. Foreign investors could invest in a private
enterprise of the host country or enter into a normal business contract
with the host State itself or finally invest in a particular country on
the basis of an agreement stipulated with the host State in accordance
with special procedures not generally available for the State's business
transactions. Only in the last case would a foreign investor expect
protection against unilateral change in the term of his agreement
with the State and be encouraged to invest if any dispute under that
agreement could be brought before an international jurisdiction. As
obviously the drafters of the Convention had not intended to create a
special jurisdictional regime for all foreign investors similar to the
old system of "capitulations" he suggested that the Convention could
usefully specify that only disputes arising out of the third type of
investment would come under the jurisdiction of the Center.

The CHAIRMAN confirmed that the main concern of the Bank and of the
drafters has been indeed with the third category of investments mentioned
by the delegate of Lebanon and in that respect the draft brought something
new, for it assured investors that, when a government assumed certain
undertakings, these undertakings would be honored.

He agreed with Mr. Ghanem that the draft did not attempt to revive the
system of capitulations or provide extra-territorial jurisdiction for foreign
investors generally. As he had stressed in his opening address, he did not
expect or think it desirable that every dispute between a foreign investor
and a host State should be solved through the mechanisms of the Center.

If the Convention were limited to disputes arising out of investment
agreements with governments, perhaps 95% of possible disputes would be
covered. The reason why the draft went beyond the case of investment agree-
ments, in a permissive sense, was to take account of different situations
prevailing in different parts of the world and, specifically, to permit
ad hoc submission of disputes, which he thought was very important.

Mr. WANASUNDERA (Ceylon) suggested that the application of the Con-
vention be limited to disputes arising from investments made after its
entry into force, since the object of the Convention was to create a
favorable climate for new investments.

Secondly, it was necessary to formulate a precise definition of
"investment dispute" taking into account the fact that there were issue
which were generally recognized as non-justiciabilia. There were conflicts
that governments were reluctant to submit to compulsory adjudication not
because it would be impossible for a judge to decide them on the basis of existing legal rules, but because their highly political significance made them unsuited for settlement on the plane of legal debate.

He pointed out that the provisions of the Convention would make arbitration compulsory after an initial consent to arbitrate future disputes had been given. He realized that the drafters had wished to prevent frustration of undertakings to arbitrate, but he wanted delegates to consider carefully the consequences of these provisions. Developing countries were not in a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis capital exporters and could hardly resist a request by a prospective investor for inclusion of an arbitration clause. Once a country was bound by its consent to arbitrate all future disputes arising from an investment agreement, and in the absence of a precise definition of "investment dispute", that country would be bound to submit to arbitration (perhaps many years later) disputes involving factors which, had they been foreseeable by the country at the time of its consent would have resulted in its excluding such disputes from arbitration. This introduced an element of compulsion, whereas traditionally international arbitration was founded as far as possible on the real express consent of the parties, which implied knowledge at the time of signing of the precise nature of the issues being submitted to arbitration.

He also remarked that a novel and unique development introduced by the draft Convention was to give the individual the standing to enforce his rights against a State before an international tribunal, although the individual was not a party to the Convention and would not be bound by it. While the State as a contracting party and a member of the community of nations would assume direct obligations, the individual who was given a new international status assumed no obligations. If an investor obtained an award against the State he would have no doubt obtain satisfaction. If the award was against the investor, the State would not have the same certainty of obtaining satisfaction from an investor who might, for instance, become insolvent or dispose of his assets before they could be reached. This placed the individual in a position superior to that of the State and (as the Convention dealt almost solely with the difficulty of certain investors and not with a field like that of human rights) represented an unwarranted departure from accepted concepts.

He had no objections of principle against third-party adjudications, but the law to be applied should still be local law and not international law. Raising the relationship between investors and host States from the level of municipal law to that of international law would permit the supremacy of the legislature to be challenged thus inhibiting the legislative power vested in the parliament of a sovereign State. In his country at least, this would require amendment of the constitution and he doubted that it would be feasible at this time.

If his delegation found it difficult to accept the present draft it was not for the reason that they were opposed to arbitration in principle or that they had failed to comprehend the problems involved. While they were willing to make all reasonable concessions, they still found unbridgeable the gap between the proposals and what his government would be willing to accept.

The CHAIRMAN suggested that perhaps the delegate of Ceylon had not fully taken into account the distinction between the procedural and the
substantive issues. The Convention did not call for the application of any specific law. It left the determination of the applicable law up to the tribunal in the absence of an agreement between the parties. A State when entering into an investment agreement could well provide that the agreement would be governed by its own laws as they prevailed from time to time. In that case, no other law could be applied and no complaint could be made of changes in that law. In many cases, however, States gave specific undertakings in offering incentives to investors. In that case, of course, the investor had a right to ask for, but would not necessarily obtain, assurances that those incentives would not be changed.

With reference to the suggestion that, under the Convention, obligations were established only for the State without corresponding obligations for the investor, the Chairman remarked that it was true that the State was directly bound to carry out the award and that if at any stage of the proceedings the State party failed to cooperate in the proceedings, machinery had been devised to prevent frustration of the arbitration, but exactly the same applied to the private investor. If the private investor refused to appoint his arbitrators, it would be done for him. If he failed to appear in the proceedings, an award by default would be rendered against him. Finally, if he failed to comply with the award, that award could be enforced in any State which had adhered to the Convention.

Mr. UL ISLAM (Pakistan) suggested the omission of the words "of a legal character" from Section 1 of Article II and the introduction of a definition of "investment dispute" in the following terms: "Investment dispute means a disagreement on a point of law or fact or the conflict of legal views or of interest in respect of an investment."

If it were so desired, the word "investment" could also be defined and the general consensus of opinion seemed that such definition was necessary.

He also suggested that a minimum value of the subject matter of a dispute be included in the draft because in the absence of any such provision refusal by a State to consent to the jurisdiction of the Center might be subjected to severe criticism by the investors.

Referring to the draft provision for an extension of the jurisdiction of the Center to disputes involving political subdivisions and instrumentalities (Doc. COM/AS/6), he questioned the expression "political subdivision and instrumentalities of the State". He presumed that "political subdivision" meant a component part of a Contracting State and he suggested the use of that term. If the term "instrumentalities" meant statutory corporations set up by different countries for financing industries and other things, then the dispute, even if the approval of the State was required, would ultimately resolve itself into a dispute between two private nationals of two Contracting States.

The CHAIRMAN replied that the terminology of the additional provision (Doc. COM/AS/6) would be reviewed on the basis of the comments made at the several meetings and that an attempt would be made to find terms that were more or less universally understood.

As regards "instrumentalities", which might possibly include statutory corporations, the drafters had in mind public bodies which had...
been entrusted with certain public functions and powers. The requirement of the approval of the Contracting State concerned was intended to provide a screening process, so that governments could withhold their approval where the "instrumentality" should really not be considered as a governmental agency but an ordinary company.

Mr. ASKARI (Iran) observed that the purpose of the Convention as stated in the Preamble was to settle disputes between States and nationals of other States; therefore the clause in parenthesis in Section 1 of Article II on subrogation should be deleted and investors should not be permitted to transfer their rights under the Convention to their national State.

He also thought that existing disputes should be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Center as present investors had made their investment without expecting any relief from the proposed Center.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that when a State was subrogated in the rights of its national, it had no more rights than the national and would appear in the proceedings not in its capacity as a State, but merely as the successor of the private national.

There could be no question of a transfer of rights under the Convention to a State, in its capacity as such, since the Convention provided that, once an investor had the possibility to go before the arbitral tribunal, his State was specifically prohibited from espousing his case and making an international claim on his behalf.

The clause on subrogation had been introduced, at the suggestion of some capital-importing countries and at least one capital-exporting country, to cover the case where a national had been insured under some scheme and his State, rather than taking the matter up on the diplomatic level, was willing to have the matter adjudicated by an arbitral tribunal under the Center.

Mr. HOAN (Viet-Nam) referring to Section 3(3) of Article II wondered whether it was necessary to require the Minister of Foreign Affairs to issue a certificate of nationality and whether it would not be preferable to allow evidence of nationality to be furnished in other ways. The intervention of the Foreign Minister could, however, be properly required if he would be given the power to screen the request and to refuse it for political, diplomatic or economic reasons.

The draft had not provided for a minimum limit for disputes, thus relying on the consent of the parties which could, however, have conflicting views on the importance of a particular dispute. The Foreign Minister of the investor could perhaps be given a useful role to play in deciding whether a particular dispute was important enough to be brought before the Center.

The CHAIRMAN said that he had doubts about Section 3 as it stood on two grounds:

In the first place not in every country was the Minister of Foreign Affairs the suitable authority to give certificates of nationality.

Secondly it was felt in many quarters that a certificate from what-
ever competent source it came should have no more value than that of prima facie evidence of nationality and that a commission or arbitral tribunal should also in that respect be the judge of the facts placed before it, including facts relating to the capacity of the parties.

Mr. ADARKAR (India) recalled that the Chairman had expressed the view that 95 per cent of the cases intended to be dealt with by the Convention might be covered if it were limited to disputes arising out of investment agreements entered into by host States.

If that was the case, he wondered whether, from a practical point of view, 95 per cent of the objective of the proposal could not be obtained, if not the whole of it, by limiting the scope of the Convention in that way. This would solve many of the practical difficulties that had been mentioned, e.g. in respect of investments inherited from the past, which should not be covered by the Convention but should be dealt with somewhat differently.

He thought that the most fruitful approach to the question of jurisdiction of the Center would be to try to define as clearly as possible the kinds of disputes that would be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Center even where there was agreement between the parties.

The other approach suggested by the Chairman, viz. to permit Contracting States to state in advance the kinds of disputes for which they would not avail themselves of the facilities of the Center did not seem acceptable as it would be inconsistent from a practical angle with the objective of promoting investments. For States to say, without being confronted with any definite investment proposition which caused them difficulty, that there was a certain category of disputes for which they would not use the Center might provide an unnecessary discouragement to the inflow of private foreign capital.

Referring to the explanation given of the term "investment dispute of a legal character" as being a dispute concerning a legal right or obligation or facts relating to such a legal right or obligation, he wondered whether this would cover any dispute concerning what an investor might regard as his legal right.

If a foreign investor argued that he had a legal right to the ownership, control and the management of a particular investment in a foreign country and the State of that country passed a law affecting, for instance, the social security legislation or the taxation legislation or exercised its powers to direct a particular industrial undertaking to sell its output to the State for security reasons or for better enforcement of the regulation of prices, could such a measure be challenged on the grounds that it affected the legal right of that investor to the ownership, control or management?

Likewise, if the State were to expropriate, would the right of the State to expropriate be called in question or would only the quantum of compensation? He had not been able to find an answer in the draft as it stood.

On the question of the applicable law, the Convention said that unless the parties otherwise agreed, the tribunal would determine the
applicable law. He suggested that in the absence of any special privileges granted to a foreign investor by an agreement, it should be made clear in the whole understanding of the proposed scheme that a foreign investor must comply with the national law of the host State and that the law to be applied was that national law, unless it was otherwise agreed by that State. The foreign investor should also be expected to exhaust the national remedies unless it was otherwise agreed.

The CHAIRMAN answered that, on the assumption made by the delegate of India as to the desirable scope of the Convention, viz. disputes arising out of agreements, the only legal questions that could be submitted to the Center were legal questions arising out of the agreement.

If the agreement provided for an undertaking not to expropriate, then the question of expropriation would be a valid question. If the agreement did not deal with expropriation at all, then that question would not arise out of the agreement and could not be dealt with by the arbitral tribunal. Nor could the question of compensation be dealt with by the arbitral tribunal unless there was an agreement to compensate.

Mr. ADARKAR (India) said that the Chairman’s answers would be satisfactory on the assumption that the jurisdiction of the Center were limited only to rights and obligations arising out of agreements entered into by the State with an investor.

But if the Convention was also to provide for proceedings pursuant to an ad hoc submission by the parties or a prior undertaking in broad terms to have recourse to conciliation and arbitration pursuant to the terms of the Convention he would like to raise two questions.

The first arose from paragraph 9 of the Comment on Article II where it was stated that a party was free to include such limitations on the scope of a particular undertaking as might seem to it appropriate provided that those limitations were not inconsistent with the obligations derived from the Convention as a whole. That proviso was not part of the text and he wondered where it came from and whether it would be the subject of one of the preliminary questions to be dealt with in arbitration.

Secondly he would like to know whether the legal effect of limitations in a prior undertaking would be to limit the jurisdiction of the Center to only the matters covered by that undertaking, or rather to limit only the scope of the consent?

The CHAIRMAN answered that since jurisdiction was based on consent the purpose of paragraph 9 of the Comment merely was to stress that while parties were entirely free in an undertaking to say that they were willing to have recourse in cases of, say, expropriation of approved investments or cases of issues of compensation with respect to expropriation of approved investments, they could not say that their undertaking would be revocable in the midst of an arbitral proceeding or that they would not abide by the award.
The words "prior written undertaking", covered two cases. The first case was the customary arbitration clause in an agreement. The second would be a unilateral statement by a government in an investment law or by some other means in which it would undertake in advance that whenever there was an approved investment under the provisions of that law, to arbitrate certain specified issues. By thus limiting its undertaking, i.e. its consent, it would at the same time limit the jurisdiction of the Center. Since jurisdiction was based on consent, a limitation of the latter necessarily meant a limitation of the former.

As regards exhaustion of local remedies, the only reference in the Convention to this subject was a rule of interpretation in Article IV, Section 16, which provided in substance that, when a State or a private investor agreed in writing to resort to arbitration, that agreement would be interpreted, in accordance with the ordinary canons of interpretation, as meaning arbitration in lieu of any other remedy and without the requirement of the prior exhaustion of local remedies. It was purely a rule of interpretation.

Where there was no prior arbitration agreement, the Convention left an investor free to address himself to a State and to suggest arbitration proceedings even without having exhausted his local remedies, but a provision could be added to make it perfectly clear that a State would be fully justified in requiring the prior exhaustion of local remedies, since the drafters had no intention to change, in this respect, existing international law.

The question of the applicable law was more difficult because it depended on the circumstances of the case. He fully agreed with the proposition that foreign investors had to comply with local law. But that did not necessarily answer the question. A dispute between a State and an investor might arise out of a licensing or know-how agreement requiring performance both in the host State and in the investor's national State, and while international law might not be involved at all, the applicable local law would have to be found by the application of normal rules of conflict of laws or private international law. There was no reason to assume that the situation would necessarily be governed by the local law of the host State. In other cases, where all the points of contact were centered on the host State, the applications of conflict rules would point to that State's law as the proper law.

Mr. ADARKAR (India) stated that in his view there should be an implicit understanding that the national law of the host State should apply in all investment disputes except with regard to matters specifically covered by an agreement, in which case the agreement should apply.

The CHAIRMAN said that he understood the problem raised by the delegate of India but could not offer a quick solution because whatever one provided in the Convention should be applicable to a large number of different situations. This point would, however, be given further consideration.

The meeting was suspended at 11:00 a.m. and resumed at 11:25 a.m.
Mr. GAE (India) referring to the draft provision on extension of jurisdiction of the Center to disputes involving political subdivisions or instrumentalities of States (Doc. COM/AS/6) asked first whether the words "any dispute" referred to disputes of the nature referred to in Article II, Section 1 of the draft Convention.

Secondly he asked whether the term "political subdivision" was intended to mean a component part of a Contracting State. If that was so, the text ought to be clarified to that effect.

Thirdly he asked what was meant by the expression "instrumentality of a Contracting State". If that expression meant some body which was not a separate, independent entity but which acted as an agent of the State, he would have no further comments to make on the matter. However, in some countries, the expression "instrumentality" was sometimes used in a very wide sense to indicate also a government-owned company, which the law treated as a legal entity, quite distinct and separate from the Contracting State or government concerned, and he thought that such a company should not be covered by the expression "instrumentality of a Contracting State", since this would unduly widen the scope of the Center's jurisdiction.

The CHAIRMAN replied that the term "dispute" in the additional draft provision meant a dispute that would be otherwise within the scope of the Convention.

By the term "instrumentality", the drafters intended to include only governmental agencies. Normally these governmental agencies were legally part of and indistinguishable from the government, but in some countries they were legally separate entities which were nevertheless entrusted with governmental functions, as distinguished from the government-owned companies to which Mr. Gae had referred.

Mr. GAE (India) referring to Section 3, Subsection 2, which empowered the commission or tribunal to deal with four types of claims as preliminary questions, pointed out that enumeration of specific issues might be construed as excluding all others. He suggested that at least an additional provision be added to the effect that any other issue which the commission or the tribunal permitted to be raised as preliminary issue should be dealt with as a preliminary issue.

The CHAIRMAN replied that he would have no objection either to removing the specific enumeration of preliminary issues or to adding a residual clause. He also thought that the words "shall be dealt with" in Section 2(2) should be changed to "may be dealt with", because a tribunal ought to have the power of appreciation also in that regard.

Mr. GAE (India) remarked that Section 3(3), which specified that a certificate of nationality issued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of a State whose nationality was claimed by the party would be treated as conclusive proof of the facts stated therein, implied that, in the event of a certificate being issued, no further questions on the issue as to whether the party to the dispute was or was not a national of a Contracting State would be allowed to be raised before a commission or a tribunal.

It was quite possible that a Minister of Foreign Affairs of a
State might not be the most suitable authority to give a certificate in certain cases but, under the wording of the Convention, the national of a Contracting State or the State party to the dispute would be precluded from giving evidence that such certificate was not a proper certificate or from offering other evidence on the question as to whether he was or was not a national of a State of whose nationality he claimed.

He therefore suggested that the Convention state that such certificate may be treated as \textit{prima facie} evidence of the facts stated therein.

The CHAIRMAN said that he agreed with the suggestion made by Mr. Gae.

\textbf{ARTICLE III - Conciliation}

The CHAIRMAN, introducing Article III, pointed out by way of clarification that a party in coming to the Center would be expected to submit to the Secretary-General evidence of the agreement of the two parties to have recourse to conciliation, and that the same should apply to Section 1 of Article IV, dealing with arbitration.

The Secretary-General would not be the judge of the adequacy of that evidence, but such requirement would be a proper safeguard against parties setting the machinery in motion without having satisfied at least the officials of the Center that there was a document in existence which constituted \textit{prima facie} evidence that there was an agreement to submit to conciliation or arbitration.

The decision on any dispute regarding consent would of course be left to the commission or to the arbitral tribunal in accordance with the rule that the commission or the tribunal was the judge of its own competence.

Mr. GHANEM (Lebanon) expressed his agreement with the Chairman’s suggestion that evidence rather than a mere statement of consent of the other party be required of the party applying for conciliation or arbitration.

Mr. QUILL (New Zealand) addressing himself to the question of conciliation generally, said that he found some difficulty in appreciating how an investment dispute of a legal character could usefully be the subject of conciliation. The process of conciliation implied the accommodation of the differing viewpoints of the parties. Of its essence, it was a procedure to accommodate conflicting interests generally rather than conflicting views on legal issues.

He recalled that the Chairman had stated that his experience with conciliation had caused him to appreciate the value of this method and he asked whether the disputes which were thus resolved by conciliation were of the kind which would have fallen within the scope of the Convention.

The CHAIRMAN answered that in a number of disputes of a legal nature the Bank had been asked to assist by mediation, good offices
or conciliation. In one case the legal issues were examined with the lawyers for the two parties. The Bank concluded that further discussion of these issues was likely to be unproductive and suggested that the parties seek a practical compromise through negotiations with the assistance of the Bank. In the event, the parties reached agreement.

In another case the Bank played a more formal role. The two parties asked the President of the Bank to act as a conciliator and draw up a plan. There were a number of legal issues involved which the President took into consideration in framing his plan, but at the same time he gave weight to the known views of the parties which he tried to reconcile to the extent possible. The parties accepted the plan drawn up by the President. The reason for limiting conciliation to disputes of a legal character was the strong feeling on the part of some countries that the scope of the activities of the Center should be so limited. He would be happy to remove this limitation if there were a consensus that this would be acceptable.

Mr. TSAI (China) referring to Section 1, remarked that if "request" was equivalent to the submission of a case to the Center, it might be possible according to Article II that the other party would not yet have consented when the other party first submitted the case to the Center. To avoid any contradiction he suggested that the second sentence of Section 1 be redrafted as follows: "He shall state whether the other party has consented to the jurisdiction of the Center".

The CHAIRMAN acknowledged that there was an inconsistency between the language of paragraph (iii) in Section 2 of Article II and the second sentence of Section 1 of Article III. There had seemed, however, to exist a consensus in favor of deleting the possibility provided for in Section 2(iii) of Article II which, in any event, was not very important or very likely to occur in practice. In that case, the sentence in Section 1 of Article III would be correct.

Mr. TSAI (China) referred to Section 3(ii) of Article III, dealing with the appointment of conciliators, and the similar provision in Article IV concerning the appointment of arbitrators and pointed out that, as the Comment indicated, the nationality of the Chairman was not considered relevant with regard to the selection of the conciliator or arbitrator; so that if the Chairman happened to be of the same nationality of either of the parties, he could still act.

In his country the practice had been to provide that when, for instance, the President of the International Court of Justice had been chosen as the person who would designate arbitrators or conciliators, he would withdraw in favor of the Vice President if he happened to be of the same nationality as one of the parties and if the Vice President was in the same position then the Judge of the highest seniority would make the selection. The question was more serious as regards the selection of arbitrators than of conciliators and he wondered whether the Convention should not follow a similar practice.

The CHAIRMAN said that within the Center itself there would be no available substitute for the Chairman. Obviously, the Convention might provide for the Secretary-General of the United Nations or the President of the International Court or some other outside official, as a substitute, should the Chairman be of the same nationality as one of the parties.
Mr. EL-FISHAWY (Kuwait) thought that the parties should have complete freedom to select conciliators and arbitrators outside of the Panel.

The third arbitrator or conciliator who would be appointed either by agreement of the two parties or by the Chairman could be well selected from the Panel, which had been set up under the Convention.

Mr. ASKARI (Iran) proposed that Section 2 of Article IV be amended to provide that where the parties failed to agree on the choice of the third arbitrator, he would be selected by drawing lots among the members of the Panel.

Mr. SHIRATORI (Japan) asked why Section 5 of Article III provided that the report of the conciliation commission should not include the terms of settlement.

The CHAIRMAN replied that the Bank had been told that frequently both governments and private investors would feel embarrassed by publication. Some delegates at other meetings had suggested that recommendations of the commission should not be included in the report if they had been rejected, and others that on the contrary accepted recommendations should be excluded from the report.

He had no very strong feelings in the matter and would be guided by whatever countries felt to be most appropriate.

Mr. O'DONOVAN (Australia) referring to Section 4 asked why it should be necessary that the parties and the commission should agree in order to preclude the application of the conciliation rules of the Center. He also asked what was meant by the expression "date on which the consent to conciliation became effective", which had not appeared in the preceding Sections of the Convention.

The CHAIRMAN replied to the first question that on reflection he did not think it desirable to require the concurrence of the commission to a departure from the established conciliation rules, and he would like to remove the words "and the commission" from Section 4.

On the second question, he said that the expression "consent became effective" had been introduced to take account of the fact that the agreement embodying the consent might not become effective immediately upon signature. One of the other delegates had previously asked whether the criterion in time for the application of the rules should not be the date when the consent was given rather than the date when the consent became effective since the purpose of this provision was to insure that the rules which would be applicable were rules that were known to the parties when they made their agreement. The point was well taken and he was in favor of making the date of consent the sole criterion in Article III as well as Article IV.

Mr. ADARKAR (India) asked why in conciliation proceedings the disqualification of a conciliator on the grounds that he was a national of a State party to the dispute had not been included as in the case of arbitration.

The CHAIRMAN answered that the inclusion of nationals of the parties in either conciliation or arbitration proceedings had both advantages
and disadvantages. It was generally claimed that the advantage of having nationals was to ensure that knowledge of the position and the views of the parties would be represented on the commission or tribunal as the case might be. The argument against was that nationals were less likely to be impartial, or might appear to be partial and for that reason should be excluded.

He thought there was a case for arriving at different conclusions in the case of conciliation and in that of arbitration. In conciliation the main task of the conciliators is to bring the parties together and for that purpose the familiarity of at least two of the three members of the commission with the particular views of the parties might be helpful rather than harmful.

In the case of arbitration the balance would in his view go the other way. As for familiarity with law or factual conditions, the arbitral tribunal was in the position, if it felt it desirable, to seek information not only from the parties but also from experts in the field. On the other hand, he thought that it would not be desirable in a three-man arbitral tribunal (which was provided for as the normal rule) to have two out of three members identified at least by nationality with the interests of the parties. That threw a very heavy burden on the umpire.

ARTICLE IV - Arbitration

Request for Arbitration (Section 1). Constitution of the Tribunal (Sections 2 and 3). Powers of the Tribunal (Sections 4 to 10)

Mr. GHANEM (Lebanon) asked with reference to Section 4 of Article IV how the scope and limit of a particular dispute to be submitted to arbitration would be defined. If such definition were left entirely to the plaintiff, the defendant might claim that the dispute as so defined exceeded the scope of his consent. He suggested that a pre-arbitral phase in the proceedings be devised in which the parties would agree on a compromiss defining the scope of the dispute. If a party refused to enter into such compromiss, then the other party's claim would be accepted in its entirety.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the dispute could come before the tribunal either on the basis of a compromissory clause in an agreement or on the basis of an ad hoc submission. In each case there would be a definition of the scope of the consent.

It had been the experience of courts, as well as arbitral tribunals, that parties were not always very careful in drafting their agreements, and in many cases, both before regular courts and even more so before arbitral tribunals, a dispute arose between the parties as to the definition of the dispute they had consented to submit. He believed that there was no other practical solution than to let the tribunal decide that question, in most cases by way of a preliminary decision.

Mr. GHANEM (Lebanon) asked whether in that case a plaintiff could not modify his claim or even bring a new claim after the tribunal had been established, without going through the Secretary-
General: the plaintiff, for instance, after having initially asked for the specific performance of a contract, could later claim instead damages or restitution.

The CHAIRMAN recognized that the subject had not been dealt with in the Convention and that it might be desirable to have a rule in the Convention, rather than in the arbitration rules, that a party could not change the nature of its claim.

Mr. GHANEM (Lebanon) referring to Sections 6 and 7 suggested that the dissenting arbitrator be permitted to state the reasons of his dissent and make it known to the parties who could make use of it in deciding whether to ask for revision of the award.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that there was no universally accepted practice either requiring or permitting dissenting opinions. He would be in favor of leaving it to the dissenting arbitrator either merely to state his dissent or to give reasons for his dissent which would be part of the award, or which would be appended to the award. He would like to hear the opinion of other delegates.

Mr. GHANEM (Lebanon) asked with reference to Section 10 how the award would be notified to the parties and what was the significance of such notification, since all time references in the Convention were to the date of the award rather than the date of notification.

The CHAIRMAN observed that since the Working Paper had been printed he had become convinced that notification of the award should be made an essential requirement of the procedure because the parties, who would come from different parts of the world, might not in fact be present at the time when the award was issued. Then in the relevant provisions of the Convention the date when the award was notified to the parties would be substituted for the date when it was rendered.

Mr. GHANEM (Lebanon) remarked that it would perhaps be useful to have a specific provision requiring the arbitrators to keep the secrecy of their deliberations until an award was rendered in order to avoid interference by the parties in the just decision of the case.

The CHAIRMAN said that he would consider the point.

Mr. TSAI (China) pointed out with regard to the nationality of arbitrators that in the traditional form of arbitration national arbitrators were usually allowed while the umpire would, of course, not be a national of either party. The Convention proposed a deviation from the conventional arbitration in this respect and the main reason given was the burden that national arbitrators would impose on an umpire. But the umpire would presumably be a capable man who would be adequately remunerated for his work and his burden. The Convention should be more concerned with the problems of the signatory governments who must think in terms of the interest of their countries.

He was therefore inclined to think that, unless there was a stronger reason to the contrary, the Convention should follow the traditional practice of allowing national arbitrators.

The CHAIRMAN said that opinions had been divided on this issue.
at previous meetings. He thought that there had been a slight pre-
ponderance in favor of the exclusion of national arbitrators but he
could not distinguish any dividing line between the countries that
were for retaining national arbitrators and those that were against. Those
in favor of the exclusion of national arbitrators felt that the exclusion
would insure adjudication rather than a negotiation.

He added that, in order to be consistent, if one followed the
system proposed in the draft Convention it would be necessary to exclude
also panel members designated by a State which was a party to the dis-
pute, or the national State of a private investor who was a party to the
dispute, because the Convention permitted Contracting States to designate
persons to the Panel who were not of their own nationality.

Mr. DAJANI (Jordan) noting that the exclusion of national arbi-
trators introduced a significant innovation recalled that the Chairman
had, at the previous session, stated that the Chairman of the Center
could be relied upon not to appoint arbitrators who were personae non
gratae or hostile to one of the States involved. He wondered why in the
case of nationality there was an express prohibition, whereas in the
other case the matter was left to the discretion of the Chairman. He
thought that in order to avoid partisanship or decisions given on
grounds of hostility, an arbitrator who was persona non grata should be
excluded as well as a national of one of the States concerned.

Mr. TSAI (China) referred to the question of applicable law in
connection with Section 4(1). When a foreign investor made an invest-
ment it seemed obvious to assume that the act of making an investment
in the host country would imply that the investor had consented to the
jurisdiction and application of the law of the host State in all res-
pects, unless there was a written and explicit declaration to the con-
trary. Under such a situation a proper rule of interpretation with
regard to the applicable law would not permit the application of inter-
national law in the absence of an agreement to the contrary.

He therefore proposed an amendment to Section 4(1) which would
then read as follows:

"In the absence of agreement between the parties concerning the
law to be applied, unless the parties shall have given the tri-
unal the power to decide ex aequo et bono, the tribunal shall
decide the dispute submitted to it in accordance with such rules
of law, whether national or international, as it shall determine
to be applicable; provided, however, that the act of investment
implies the investor's consent to the application of law of the
host country in the absence of a written declaration to the con-
trary made prior to the investment."

The CHAIRMAN thought that Mr. Tsai's proposal would give rise to a
number of problems.

While he agreed that the entry into a country in general implied
submission to local law, and that in the absence of an agreement on a

* The proviso proposed by Mr. TSAI is underscored.
special position for the investor most disputes regarding actions of the
government would be determined by local law, he did not think it necessary
to have an express provision for these cases.

Moreover, he could think of two cases where the proposed language
would not help solve the problem of applicable law. As had been men-
tioned by the delegate of India there might be special agreements between
investors and governments which, in accordance with the laws of those
governments, would give special treatment to the investor not provided
by local law. In such cases the contract should prevail, since it would be
pro tanto the law between the parties.

Another example would be a public bond issue placed abroad. At
another meeting a delegate had suggested that it might be useful for his
country and other countries, in borrowing in foreign markets, to include
an arbitration clause referring to the arbitration facilities under the
Center. Bond issues sometimes did not contain an applicable law clause
but there was general agreement that in the case of a bond issue made
in, say, Switzerland where all the aspects of the transaction were linked
with Switzerland (where the contract was signed, the underwriting
bankers were, and the bonds were payable), even in the absence of a
clause stating the applicable law, Swiss law would apply.

There was no doubt that a foreign bond issue by a country con-
stituted an investment by the foreign investors in that country but
it would not necessarily be governed by local law.

Mr. TSAI (China) said that the instances which were mentioned
by the Chairman indicated that there might be controversies about
applicable law. The question under discussion was whether the choice
of law should be stated in the Convention as it was. The rule of inter-
pretation in Section 4(1) was that national law, international law, or
whatever the tribunal might see fit, would apply. What he had just
suggested in his amendment was that national law would first apply in
the absence of an agreement to the contrary.

As in his mind the scope of the Center was to be limited to those
rights that were exclusively conferred by the laws or by agreement on
foreign investors it would hardly be possible to apply foreign law or
any law, other than national law, in such cases. When a government
approved an investment or entered into a contract or an agreement with
an investor, it was presumed to do so in accordance with its own
national law. That presumption would be reflected in the rule of inter-
pretation that he had suggested but there would be no restriction on the
power of the investor or the government to agree otherwise.

The CHAIRMAN said that Section 4 had been drafted as a substan-
tive rule rather than as a rule of interpretation. He would consider
whether the Section could be redrafted in the form of a rule of inter-
pretation, in which case some of the objectives mentioned by Mr. Tsai
might be achieved.

Mr. ADARKAR (India) supported the observations made by the
delegate for China, and wondered whether the cases described by the
Chairman, particularly government bond issues placed abroad did not
represent cases where the total investment in all its aspects was
governed by the law of the country of placement.
The Convention, however, should cover the majority of cases where most of the aspects of investment were really intended to be governed by the law of the State where the investment was located. In that case the national law of that State should prevail, except to the extent to which a contrary declaration had been made.

The CHAIRMAN said that he would consider the point.

Mr. TSAI (China) referred to the form of the award. Article IV, Section 7(1) stated that the award must be in written form and that reasons must be given. This did not seem sufficient to him. The date of the award was essential as various provisions referred to that date. A statement of the facts and of the particular law applied was equally important.

Finally, the fundamental rules of procedure should also be part of the Convention, especially on questions whether a dissenting opinion should be included, whether the deliberations should be secret, and so forth, as the violation of these fundamental principles of procedure might constitute grounds for invalidating the award.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the statement that an award had to be motivated clearly implied that it must enable the reader to follow the reasoning of the tribunal both on points of fact and of law, including the applicable law. He saw some danger in trying to go into too much detail, especially on those subjects on which there was no real disagreement and he thought that an instrument of the kind of the Convention ought to limit itself as much as possible to those points on which there might be doubt, and to clarify obscure points.

Mr. TSAI (China) referring to Section 10 which gave authority to the tribunal to prescribe any provisional measures necessary for the protection of the rights of the parties, thought that the provision as it stood was too broad, even after taking into consideration that the parties could by agreement limit its scope. If such provisional measures related to matters like execution and attachment of property they would encroach upon the jurisdiction of the local courts and thus create more obstacles to the acceptance of this Convention.

The CHAIRMAN stated that at the other meetings questions had also been asked about this provision. In international practice authority to prescribe provisional measures was left to the appreciation of the tribunal, presumably because it was difficult to foresee the types of situations that might arise. If a dispute was properly before the arbitral tribunal, it would seem reasonable to empower it to order the parties not to take action which would make it impossible to comply with a later award.

Mr. TSAI (China) asked whether the wording of the provision should not be modified to allow the tribunal to recommend rather than prescribe provisional measures, particularly against the State party to the proceedings whose government might have to take particular actions for reasons of necessity on national policy. If the government failed to conform to such recommendations and the award was in favor of the other party, it would, of course, have to pay damages.
There would be very few, if any, cases of irreparable damage, because disputes would concern investments and investments could always be valued in terms of money.

The CHAIRMAN replied that there were two reasons why the provision of Section 10 ought not to be taken as constituting any danger. The first was that while provisional measures might be ordered, there was no way for a private investor to obtain specific enforcement of them against the government.

The second was that experience indicated that arbitral tribunals were extremely loath to order provisional or interim measures and one should have some confidence in the self-restraint which tribunals would impose upon themselves.

Mr. TSAI (China) suggested that there might be instances where the government would rather take the action that a tribunal had provisionally forbidden and pay the damage in case of a favorable award to the investor. While submission of an issue by a government to the tribunal was evidence of its confidence in the tribunal, the tribunal on its part should also have confidence in the same restraint and spirit of fairness on the part of the government.

Mr. ASKARI (Iran) stated that he agreed with the delegate from India on the need to apply in the first instance the laws of the host State.

With reference to the rendering of the award, he suggested that the tribunal be required to render its award within a specified time limit, after which, if no award had been rendered, another tribunal would be appointed. If also the second tribunal did not announce its decisions within the prescribed time, further recourse to the Center would require a new agreement of the parties. An award delivered after the prescribed time ought to be considered void.

Mr. GAE (India) referred to Sections 6 and 7 of Article IV and observed that Section 7 provided that an award had to be signed by the majority of the tribunal. He suggested that, even though the award might not be a unanimous award, it should be signed by all members of the tribunal, including those who dissented from the decision, in order that it could be fully understood, particularly since it would have to be enforced in all Contracting States. A dissenting member could set forth the reasons for his dissent, but should be required to sign the award.

The CHAIRMAN said he could agree with the suggestion if a proviso were added that in case an arbitrator refused to sign the award the other members would record that fact; an arbitral award should not become inoperative because one of the arbitrators refused to sign it.

Mr. GAE (India) was in favor of Section 10 on the provisional measures necessary for the protection of the rights of the parties and suggested that power should be expressly given to the arbitrators to make an interim award at a particular stage in the proceedings if the facts and circumstances of the case before them so warranted; otherwise in some cases arbitral proceedings might be unduly protracted.

The CHAIRMAN thought that this was a very useful suggestion.
Interpretation, Revision and Annulment (Sections 11 - 13)

Mr. GAE (India) referring to Section 11(1), suggested that it be made quite clear in connection with time limits within which remedies could be exercised that the date of the award should be understood to mean the date on which the award was communicated to the party concerned.

Mr. GHANEM (Lebanon) questioned the expression "exces de pouvoir" in the French text of Section 13. The expression had a very precise technical meaning in Lebanese as well as French law and referred to an executive act which had been issued by an incompetent authority, or without respecting the forms legally prescribed for such act, or in violation of a provision of the law, or for a purpose which was actually different from the apparent one. He assumed that the drafters had meant something else in Section 13, viz. the case of a tribunal which had decided beyond the scope of the claim. He therefore suggested that the expression ultra petita be used instead of "exces de pouvoir".

With reference to the six months period specified in Section 13 for requesting the annulment of the award on the grounds of corruption, of a member of the tribunal, he suggested that the draft make clear that such period would run from the time the interested party had discovered such corruption.

The CHAIRMAN agreed with the second point made by Mr. Ghanem.

On the first point he confirmed that the drafters had intended by the words "exces de pouvoir" to refer to the case where a decision of the tribunal went beyond the terms of the compromis or compromisory clause and that the French text would be reviewed to avoid any misunderstanding on that point.

Mr. GAE (India) referring to Section 12 suggested that in view of the long period allowed for revision of an award and the possibility that the award might have been already enforced, some provision be made to restore the status quo ante so that the parties may ask to be compensated, if it is possible, for the damage already done.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that some provision should be made to that effect.

Mr. GAE (India) on Section 13(1)(c) suggested that the expression "departure from a fundamental rule of procedure" be clarified so as to exclude deviations from the ordinary arbitration rules and to be limited only to those breaches of procedural rules which would constitute a violation of the rules of natural justice. The award should not be challenged solely because conventional procedural rules had not been fully observed.

The CHAIRMAN stated that the point would be clarified.

Mr. TSAI (China) referring to Section 13(1)(a) suggested that the clause "the tribunal exceeded its power" could be improved if the words "including failure to apply the proper law" were added. As the parties were entitled to agree on the applicable law, failure of the tribunal to apply that law would frustrate that agreement.
Mr. LAZO (Philippines) observed that the point raised by the delegate from China seemed to be covered by Section 13(1)(c) which provided for annulment of the award in case of failure to state the reasons for the award.

The CHAIRMAN remarked that the draft Convention did not provide for an appeal against the award and in his opinion a mistake in the application of the law would not be a valid ground for annulment of the award. A mistake of law as well as a mistake of fact constituted an inherent risk in judicial or arbitral decision for which appeal was not provided.

Mr. GHANEM (Lebanon) observed that if the parties had agreed to the application of a particular law and the tribunal had in fact applied a different law, the award would be ultra petita and could therefore be validly challenged.

Mr. TSAI (China) stressed that he had had in mind the case just mentioned by the delegate from Lebanon and not merely a mistake in the interpretation or application of the applicable law.

The CHAIRMAN thought that in the case mentioned by the delegate from Lebanon the award could be properly challenged on the ground that the arbitrators had gone against the terms of the compromis.

Mr. TSAI (China) called the attention of the Chairman to the fact that while in Section 10 the arbitral tribunal was given power to prescribe provisional measures, in Section 13(5) the committee which would consider a request for annulment was given the power to recommend provisional measures. He wondered whether the term "recommend" should not be used also in the case of an arbitral tribunal under Section 10.

The CHAIRMAN noted that there was an inconsistency in Section 13(5) between the French text which said "prescribe" and the English text which said "recommend". The matter would be further considered.

Mr. SHIRATORI (Japan) suggested that requests for interpretation under Section 11 and applications for revision under Section 12 should be made to the Chairman or to the Secretary-General, rather than to the tribunal which in the meantime might have ceased to exist.

Mr. O'DONOVAN (Australia) referring to the proviso in Section 12(1) remarked that the draft did not specify how it could be established that the decisive fact upon which an application for revision was based was unknown at the time the award was rendered to the tribunal and to the party requesting revision and that such ignorance was not due to the negligence of said party.

The CHAIRMAN replied that there would probably be a presumption of absence of knowledge and that the burden of proof would be on the party that resisted the application for revision on the ground that the tribunal or the other party had had such knowledge.

The meeting was adjourned at 1:45 p.m.
FOURTH SESSION
(Thursday, April 30, 1964 - 8:35 a.m.)

ARTICLE IV - Arbitration (continued)

Enforcement of the Award (Sections 14-15)

The CHAIRMAN said that Section 14 which declared that the award shall be final and binding on the parties was of crucial importance. In its present form it required that the parties "abide by and comply with the award immediately", followed by the saving clause "unless the tribunal shall have allowed a time limit...". The intent of the provision could, he thought, be clarified and its text simplified by requiring compliance with the award "in accordance with the terms there-of", which would take care of the time within which the award was to be complied with, followed by a saving clause to take account of the unusual cases where the enforcement of the award was to be stayed.

Mr. UL ISLAM (Pakistan) said that as he understood it, Section 14 implied that an award would not be liable to challenge by way of appeal in any forum. On the other hand, Section 13 allowed the award to be challenged before the Center on the ground that it was invalid. Under general law it might be open to a party to challenge an award as well in the local court in which execution was sought on the grounds that the award was invalid. He would, therefore, suggest that the Convention expressly require all Contracting States to take steps to prevent challenges of awards in their courts. While he recognized that Section 2 of Article XI contained a general requirement that a State at the time of ratification declare that it has taken the steps necessary to carry out its obligations under the Convention, he would prefer to include specific provisions requiring each State to set up machinery for the execution of the award as a judgment of the highest court of appeal of that State.

The CHAIRMAN, introducing Section 15, said that it dealt with two problems. The first was the obligation of each Contracting State to recognize an award of the tribunal as binding. In that connection he felt that the word "accept" might express the intent of the provision better than the word "recognize" appearing in the text. What was contemplated in this part of the sentence was the force of the award as res judicata as a valid defence in resisting an action, say, in the ordinary courts of a State, on a matter already determined in arbitral proceedings before the Center. The second part of the sentence dealt with the obligation to enforce the award within the territories of the Contracting State and here, on reflection, he thought the intent of the provision might be better expressed if the words "recognize... and enforce it" were substituted by "recognize as enforceable."

It had been pointed out that there was a considerable jump between action by the international arbitral tribunal and action by the national enforcement authorities. It might be possible to rely on provisions such as those suggested by Mr. Ul Islam and require States to take steps to adapt their machinery in a manner necessary to achieve that result. On the other hand it might be desirable to spell out in some detail what those steps might be, and in that connection he thought that the relevant provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome) might be interesting as an example of how international
awards could be translated into effect through domestic procedures. Article 192 of the Treaty of Rome (reproduced in COM/AS/7)*/, after stating that certain types of decisions were enforceable, declared first that "forced execution shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure in force in the State in whose territory it takes place", thus making it clear that no change was implied in the types of execution or remedies available under the procedural law concerned. Second, it laid down guidelines for the way in which the execution proceedings were to be started. Each member State was to designate an authority - it might be the Minister of Justice or a similar official - who would issue the writ of execution after having done no more than verify the authenticity of the award. From then on there was no distinction between the execution of a judgment of the courts of that State and of the arbitral award.

In his opening remarks he had alluded to another important point not expressly stated in Section 15 but connected with it, viz. the question of immunity of States from execution. In his view it was not necessary to provide for forced execution against States under this Convention since the Convention imposed a direct obligation on States to carry out the award. While the investor was also under an obligation to comply with the award, there was no direct sanction under the Convention for his failure to do so. It was, therefore, provided that where the State was the winning party it could obtain a writ of execution, whereupon the process of execution would run the normal course in the country concerned.

While those who objected to the principle of State immunity had argued that it ought to be eliminated from the Convention, the majority view was that forced execution should not lie against a State and the rule would, therefore, remain untouched. Equally, in countries where under certain circumstances execution against the State was permitted, e.g. where a State had acted in a capacity similar to that of a private person rather than jure imperii, the law would remain untouched. In other words the Convention would not change the principles (including the limitations on those principles) applying in Contracting States to enforcement of final judgments against States.

*/ "Decisions of the Council or of the Commission which contain a pecuniary obligation on persons other than States shall be enforceable.

Forced execution shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure in force in the State in whose territory it takes place. The writ of execution shall be served, without other formality than the verification of the authenticity of the written act, by the domestic authority which the Government of each Member State shall designate for this purpose and of which it shall give notice to the Commission and to the Court of Justice.

After completion of these formalities at the request of the party concerned, the latter may, in accordance with municipal law, proceed with such forced execution by applying directly to the authority which is competent.

Forced execution may only be suspended pursuant to a decision of the Court of Justice. Supervision as to the regularity of the measures of execution shall, however, be within the competence of the domestic courts or tribunals."
Mr. UL ISLAM (Pakistan) recalling that a State, being a party to the Convention, was bound directly under it to comply with the award, while the investor was not, again emphasized his earlier proposal that States be expressly required to enact legislation for the enforcement of an award against an investor as if the award were a judgment of its highest appellate courts.

The CHAIRMAN agreed and said that in his opinion provisions along the lines of Article 192 of the Rome Treaty would, together with Section 15, give expression to Mr. Ul Islam's idea.

Mr. ABAS (Malaysia) thought that the provisions of Section 15 were adequate and that no more detailed provisions were needed. That Section imposed a definite obligation on a State to enforce the award and if it did not provide the machinery necessary to enable it to do so, it would be in breach of the Convention.

Mr. GAE (India) said he had reservations regarding the adequacy of Section 15. Under general principles of law, the award of an arbitral tribunal was binding only as between the parties concerned. Section 15, however, imposed on every Contracting State the obligation to give effect to the award as if it were a final judgment of the courts of that State irrespective of the general law of the State regarding other types of arbitral awards.

In some countries an internationally binding award could not be implemented immediately and automatically as was required by Section 15, and the defendant was entitled to take advantage of any procedural safeguards available to him under the law of the State concerned. In his view, therefore, express provision ought to be made in Section 15 requiring each Contracting State to enact legislation to enable the award to become enforceable as a final judgment of its courts, unless such legislation already existed. A provision like that in the Treaty of Rome which read: "forced execution shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure in force in the State in whose territory it takes place", though welcome, would by itself be inadequate in the absence of implementing local legislation.

Under general principles of municipal law execution of international arbitral awards was subject to certain exceptions, viz. (i) where the dispute was not of a kind arbitrable under the law of the State concerned, and (ii) where enforcement of the award would be contrary to its public policy. He would accept these exceptions in relation to awards rendered pursuant to the Convention. Similar provisions were already incorporated in Section 2 of Article V of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards signed at New York on June 10, 1958.

Finally, he suggested the inclusion of more detailed provisions of steps to be taken to secure recognition or enforcement of the award such as were contained in Article IV of the New York Convention. In particular the award and the agreement to arbitrate, or certified copies thereof, ought to be submitted together with any application for recognition or enforcement of the award.

The CHAIRMAN agreed with the delegates of India and Pakistan that Section 15 ought to be elaborated so as to contain provisions requiring Contracting States to enact appropriate legislation despite the fact
that the Convention in Section 2 of Article XI already in general terms required Contracting States to take all internal steps to enable them to carry out their obligations. While too much detail should be avoided, States could be given guidance as to what minimum steps should be taken under Section 15.

On the question of exceptions to implementation of the award, it was important to note one difference between Section 15 and the corresponding provisions of the New York Convention, viz. that under the latter there exists what might be termed a limited form of appeal to local courts whereas the present Convention created a self-contained system. Some of the grounds which could give rise to an "appeal" (in a non-technical sense) to local courts under the New York Convention, would here have to be dealt with under the heading of "revision". However, it was true that two other grounds, namely public policy and non-arbitrability, were not covered by the Convention. He himself had urged in reply to arguments raised by capital-exporting countries that, from the point of view of capital-importing States, the more unconditional the binding force of an award, the better.

Mr. DAJANI (Jordan) pointed out that Section 15 went beyond internationally accepted practices in requiring enforcement of awards by States not parties to the dispute. The Comment to this Section envisaged a situation in which the State would want to enforce an award against an investor. In his view a State would have no difficulty in taking action locally to enforce the award. He had in mind, however, the problems which could arise in the converse case where an investor sought enforcement against a State; where, for compelling reasons, the State party to the dispute found itself unable to comply with the award it would be embarrassing for third States to have to enforce that award within their own territories. He would therefore prefer to return to the prevailing practice whereby the award was enforceable only within the States concerned in the dispute.

The CHAIRMAN recalled that arguments similar to those of Mr. Dajani had been made at previous meetings for the most part by capital-exporting countries. Since, in most States, it was impossible to enforce a judgment or an award against a foreign sovereign, he did not think that the question of embarrassment would ever arise.

The reason for extending the enforceable character of the award to countries other than the State party to the dispute and the investor's State had been to make it possible for the winning party to pursue assets of the losing party wherever they might be. While it was true that in a normal case there would probably be sufficient assets within the territory of the host State to satisfy any award against the investor, it was urged by some of the capital-importing States that that might not always be the case, and that for that reason they would like to see a wider enforceability of the award.

Finally, he observed that it would not be quite accurate to say that it was unusual in international arbitration to provide for such wide enforceability because the New York Convention of 1958 and, to a lesser extent, the Geneva Convention of 1927 did exactly that with respect to international arbitral awards between private citizens. Those two Conventions were in many respects similar to the present draft, one point of difference being that the draft, in excluding certain review procedures,
took enforceability one step further.

Mr. EL-FISHAWY (Kuwait) thought that the enforceability of the arbitral award as envisaged in Section 15 was too broad, and also that it would be more in keeping with the consensual character of the Convention that the test of enforceability of the award should be the extent to which that award would be enforceable as a judgment of the highest court of, say, the party asking for the enforcement of the award, rather than of the State where the award was to be executed. He also suggested that, as it did not seem to have been intended in Section 15 to vary in any way the recognized rule that a judgment is only binding on the parties, the words "on the parties" should be added after the word "binding", in Section 15 to make the position clear.

Mr. O'DONOVAN (Australia) asked whether it was intended that provisional measures prescribed by a tribunal would be enforceable as an award.

The CHAIRMAN said that this was still an open question. At previous meetings some experts had argued that interim measures - and especially what one of the delegates to the present meeting had called an "interim award" - should be treated on the same footing as the final award with respect to enforceability. Others had wanted to leave provisional measures outside the ambit of Section 15. He agreed, however, that the Convention should contain precise provisions on the point.

Mr. O'DONOVAN (Australia) thought that provisional measures ought not to be prescribed unless absolutely necessary in the circumstances, and that if pecuniary compensation would be adequate in lieu of some preliminary measure, then no preliminary measure ought to be prescribed. On that basis, such measures ought to be included in the enforcement provision. That might also have the effect of discouraging tribunals from prescribing preliminary measures save in the most exceptional cases.

Mr. PARK (Korea) asked whether compensation or indemnification would be provided for where, for instance, it was discovered say ten years after the rendering of the award that the decision was incorrect in fact or in law and action was taken under the provisions for revision or annulment. He suggested that some provision be made to compensate or indemnify the State or the investor for the loss or harm which had resulted from the previous incorrect decision.

The CHAIRMAN thought that the Tribunal or the Committee which reviewed the award or declared it invalid respectively would certainly have the power to order restitution or to make such other disposition as it deemed appropriate, and that that decision ought to have the same degree of enforceability as the original award. Appropriate provision to that effect would be made in the draft.

Relationship of Arbitration to other Remedies (Section 16-17)

Mr. GHANEM (Lebanon) said that Section 16 seemed to make possible a contradiction between decisions of international tribunals and those of domestic courts. In his opinion, if that provision were applied it would endanger the authority of even the highest national courts and cause litigation to drag on indefinitely. In particular, it would place
the State in a position of inferiority vis-à-vis the investor. If the host State were condemned in its own court, it would not challenge the decision; but if it won the case, the decision of its court could still be contested by the investor before an international tribunal. The possibility of international arbitration after recourse to local remedies should be eliminated and he, therefore, suggested that Section 16 be deleted.

The CHAIRMAN said he could not appreciate Mr. Ghanem’s objection to Section 16 unless that provision could be understood in a manner entirely different from what he thought was its meaning and what should have been clear from the Comment. All that Section 16 did was to state a rule of interpretation of the agreement whereby the parties consented to the jurisdiction of the Center viz., where there was an agreement to go to arbitration and no reservations had been made in that agreement, it would be presumed that no reservations were intended. It would always be open to the parties, however, to include an express reservation e.g. as to the need to exhaust local remedies.

Mr. GHANEM (Lebanon) agreed with the position stated by the Chairman but thought that the language of Section 16 did contemplate the possibility that an investor would first try his chance before the local courts and, if he lost, would then resort to the international jurisdiction. This possibility was, in his opinion, highly unadvisable.

Mr. ADARKAR (India) said that, in keeping with the flexibility provided in the present text, the parties to a dispute ought not to be left with only one remedy through exclusion of all other remedies whenever arbitration had been agreed upon. Some agreements entered into by his government had provided that any dispute arising out of the agreement was to be submitted to arbitration in the manner provided. Other agreements provided that any dispute was to be "finally settled" by arbitration. In the first type of case other remedies were automatically excluded. In the second, other remedies were open to the parties but an arbitral award, when rendered, would be final and binding upon them.

The CHAIRMAN said that he did not think the expert from Lebanon had meant to object to the degree of flexibility of Section 16 but rather to the possibility of interpreting its present language in a way which would enable an unsuccessful investor to go to arbitration after the courts of the host State had ruled against him.

Mr. DAJANI (Jordan) thought there were definite advantages in requiring, as a general rule, that both the Contracting State and the investor before resorting to international arbitration seek local remedies even where - as in most investment agreements - there was an unqualified arbitration clause. In his opinion that would be more within the normal pattern of practice than to reach international arbitration in one step.

The CHAIRMAN emphasized again that Section 16 contained only a rule of interpretation of an agreement, and did not express a preference regarding any conditions which might be included therein. If necessary that could be made clear in a separate comment. If a State wished to make its consent to international arbitration subject to the prior exhaustion of local remedies, it was free to do so, and there was no intention whatever of changing the rule of international law generally accepted, viz. that in the absence of a contrary agreement international...
claims could not be brought until local remedies had been exhausted. The language of the section would, however, be reviewed in order to remove any suggestion that exhaustion of local remedies would not be a normal requirement.

Mr. GHANEM (Lebanon) agreed that the language of Section 16 should be reviewed and made absolutely clear in that respect.

Mr. WANASUNDERA (Ceylon) suggested that the draft expressly include provision for recourse to local remedies as part of the scheme for settlement of a particular dispute which led up to international arbitration. Thus, parties dissatisfied with municipal courts might be given the right to go to arbitration at a certain stage. In his opinion, the opposite principle was embodied in Section 16 which seemed virtually to exclude local remedies.

The CHAIRMAN said it was possible in this respect to distinguish two groups of countries. Some found it quite acceptable for an international tribunal to over-rule their own courts provided the latter had first taken cognizance of the dispute. Other countries would stipulate a choice between their own courts and international arbitration, but would not permit an appeal to arbitration from a decision of their courts. For that reason it was essential to retain flexibility.

Section 16 contained nothing more than a rule of interpretation, and the preceding discussion had indicated that such a rule of interpretation might be useful in view of the lack of agreement on whether, for instance, consent to arbitration referred to arbitration (i) as an alternative to local procedures, (ii) as a final procedure for settlement, or (iii) as the sole mode of settlement of the dispute.

Mr. TSAI (China) thought the principle embodied in Section 16 was a fair one. Exhaustion of local remedies was usually the prerequisite for a government to espouse the claim of its national. If the government gave up this right of espousal, then it would be reasonable to expect waiver by the State party to the agreement of its right to request exhaustion of local remedies. The expert from Lebanon, however, had raised a significant point, viz. the propriety and wisdom of subjecting the decisions of a court to review by an international arbitral tribunal as permitted by Section 16.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that several delegates - particularly at the Santiago meeting - had found such a procedure desirable, and had indeed expressed the view that it would be the only acceptable way in which to submit to international arbitration. He could not, therefore, share the view that the situation envisaged by Mr. Tsai was necessarily undesirable. It was possible that ambiguity in the Comment might have given rise to some misunderstanding. It would be made clear that mutuality and consent were always necessary before any conditions in the agreement could be binding on the parties, and he felt that when the Comment was redrafted to reflect this view accurately, most objections to Section 16 would fall away.

Mr. GAE (India) said he failed to appreciate the difficulties referred to by the expert from Lebanon. In his view, the parties when concluding an agreement had a choice as to whether they would stipulate the prior exhaustion of local remedies. If the agreement contained no
such stipulation, the general presumption would be that they thereby precluded themselves from taking the dispute to a court of law. If, in spite of such presumption in favor of arbitration as the sole remedy, one party went to a domestic court, as was the case in the example in paragraph 10 of the Comment, the other party could ask the court to stay proceedings.

Mr. HETH (Israel) said that under the present rules of international law, the exhaustion of local remedies must precede recourse to international arbitration unless the parties expressly agreed otherwise. Section 16, by providing that recourse to local courts would be blocked when international arbitration was contemplated in, say, an investment agreement unless explicit provision to the contrary were made, reversed that principle. Under the rule in Section 16, the tribunal would entertain a variety of arguments that could have been dealt with by local tribunals, whereas in the traditional procedure only certain arguments, e.g. denial of justice, discrimination or non-compliance with a most-favored-nation clause, could have been entertained. The international tribunal would not then appear in the character of an appellate court ruling on issues on which local courts had passed final judgment.

The CHAIRMAN agreed with Mr. Heth that when a tribunal had sole jurisdiction the scope of the issues before it would be different from those with which it might have to deal in review proceedings, and that questions of fact would not be reopened. However, he could not agree that Section 16 changed the rule of international law requiring the exhaustion of local remedies. It merely said that when the parties to an agreement consented without qualification, say, that all disputes arising out of or in connection with the agreement "shall be settled by arbitration", it would mean what the great majority would understand it to mean viz., "shall be settled by arbitration in lieu of any other remedy."

Mr. ADARKAR (India) pointed out that the discussion of Section 16 had so far been only in the context of cases where there had been an agreement. On the other hand, paragraph 9 of the Comment on page 34 of the Working Paper covered cases where consent was given even where there had been no prior agreement to go to arbitration - a situation which he found generally unacceptable. However, the particular case stated was one where the foreign investor sought the consent of a State ad hoc, and that State in giving its consent unilaterally attached conditions, e.g. exhaustion of administrative processes. He could agree to the particular formulation of paragraph 9 of the Comment which left the State free to impose conditions unilaterally when its consent was sought ad hoc and did not require mutuality of the parties in such cases.

Mr. GHANEM (Lebanon) said that perhaps at the Santiago meeting a different approach to the question of prior exhaustion of local remedies had been put forward. As for him, he wanted to stress again that the possibility of international adjudication after the domestic courts had reached a final decision was unacceptable.

Mr. EL-ISHAWY (Kuwait) said that it had been mentioned that under Section 16 an arbitral tribunal would not - if it were stipulated that local remedies were to be exhausted - review domestic decisions as would
an appellate court but would only examine such questions as denial of justice or discrimination. However, as it stood, the text might lead to the misunderstanding that arbitral tribunals had broader jurisdiction, including power to review the judgments of local courts from every point of view.

The CHAIRMAN thought that it would depend on the terms of the compromiss or compromisecy clause which would usually deal with the matter. In the absence of specific terms of reference the arbitral tribunal would have the limited rights normally accepted in international law.

The CHAIRMAN, introducing Section 17(1), explained that one of the purposes of the Convention was to remove disputes from the atmosphere of inter-State relations, and, in order to do so, it had conferred on the investor the capacity to be a party to international proceedings. It had been felt that as a consequence the traditional right of espousal of his claim by his State should disappear in such cases, so that the host State would not be faced with the possibility of having to meet a plurality of claims, e.g. a claim before an arbitral tribunal and another made through diplomatic channels or before the International Court of Justice.

There was one exception to the proposed rule viz., the case where the other Contracting State failed to perform its obligations under the Convention - which in essence meant failure to comply with an award. The investors State's right of espousal, which disappeared on the assumption that the investor had a remedy under the Convention, revived when that remedy was frustrated.

Mr. SHIRATORI (Japan) asked whether if a State enacted an investment law including a provision for submission to the Center of any dispute arising from an investment, and if an investor obtained a license under that law, it would automatically mean that the investor had consented to submit the dispute to the Center, and that he thereby gave up his diplomatic protection.

The CHAIRMAN thought it would be desirable in a law of that character to insert a provision which would make clear what the situation would be in such a case. It might, for instance, provide that the investor to whom a license had been granted would thereby be deemed to have accepted the procedure for settlement of disputes under the Convention, or the law could make it a condition of the license that the investor expressly accept the jurisdiction of the Center. In the absence of such a provision it could, at least, be argued that until the investor had actually availed himself of the offer contained in the law there would be no agreement to accept the Center's jurisdiction. Consequently his State would not be debarred from espousing his case and bringing an international claim.

The CHAIRMAN, introducing Section 17(2), said that where an arbitral tribunal set up under the Convention rendered a decision in a specific dispute or a dispute arising out of a specific act under an investment agreement between the investor and the host State, that decision would be final. On the other hand, where the subject-matter of the dispute also formed the basis of a dispute between States covered by an inter-governmental agreement which provided for arbitration of such
disputes, it had been felt that the two States ought to be free to proceed under the latter agreement, but should do so only to secure a decision on the question in the abstract without affecting in any way the specific award rendered by the arbitral tribunal. The decision rendered in the inter-State arbitration would, though interpretative of the inter-governmental agreement, be of necessity merely declaratory and without effect on a particular investor.

Mr. TSAI (China) asked for clarification of Section 17(2) with respect to a case where the investor's State was subrogated to the rights of the investor in a dispute covered both by the Convention and by a bilateral agreement setting up an investment guarantee program. Would the investor's State be free, after an arbitral tribunal constituted under the Convention had rendered an award, to prefer a claim under the bilateral agreement? If the investor's State were to be precluded from doing so, a specific prohibition to that effect ought to be included in the text.

The CHAIRMAN said that in his opinion the investor's State could not make such a claim under the bilateral agreement and that the impact of subrogation on Section 17(2) would be revised to make this clear. Although before the Center the State had acted not qua State but merely in place of the investor and only with such rights and obligations as he had possessed, it might give rise to confusion if a State were thus permitted to act in two capacities in cases covered by bilateral investment guarantee agreements.

Mr. ADARKAR (India) shared the doubts expressed by Mr. Tsai and hoped that further thought would be given to the way in which relationships under investment guarantee agreements between States would be affected by the Convention. Unless action by the investor's State as subrogee under the bilateral agreement were excluded, a foreign investor who had insured his investment under an investment guarantee agreement might first take advantage of the Convention in the hope that he could thereby obtain for himself a higher benefit than he expected to get under the bilateral guarantee agreement. If he were dissatisfied with the award under the Convention, he might then proceed under the bilateral agreement.

He also pointed out that the effect of the Convention might be to supersede investment guarantee agreements, if not with regard to past investments, at least with regard to the future. Host countries would have to decide whether they should approve any more investments under bilateral agreements, and whether by doing so they would give the foreign investor a double remedy, viz., through proceedings under the Convention, as well as by way of insurance. He inquired how other governments had viewed this question. Would those governments which now provided investment insurance cease to rely on investment guarantee agreements if the present Convention were to enter into force? Which course of action did foreign investors themselves prefer?

The CHAIRMAN in reply said that Section 17(2) had been included on the suggestion of one capital-exporting country which had entered into a series of investment promotion and protection agreements, but had since found favor with a number of countries both capital-exporting and capital-importing. The position of the capital-exporting countries on the issue, however, was not very clear. Nor did he think they had as
yet looked at this provision in the context of its offering a dual remedy in cases covered by investment guarantees. Experts from another capital-exporting country which had a system of investment guarantees had indicated informally that the Convention could offer a convenient way of settling questions between governments, as well as an alternative to, or substitute for, the dispute settlement provisions now incorporated in bilateral guarantee agreements. He agreed entirely with the previous speakers that Section 17(2) called for further careful analysis.

ARTICLE V - Replacement and Disqualification of Conciliators and Arbitrators

Mr. GHANEM (Lebanon) referring to Section 2(2), suggested that the words "shall resign" in the third line before the last, be replaced by the words "shall be dismissed".

He also felt that the provisions of Section 2 should be made more specific, lest proceedings be protracted indefinitely by successive challenges of arbitrators. It was not clear, for instance, on what grounds a party might propose disqualification, or whether a party might only propose disqualification of a conciliator or arbitrator appointed by him or whether he could also propose disqualification of a conciliator or arbitrator appointed by the other party.

The CHAIRMAN said that Section 2 was broad enough to allow a party to challenge a conciliator or arbitrator appointed by the other party, and that that had, in fact, been the principal intent of the provision. As to the grounds for challenge of an arbitrator or conciliator, these were stated in general terms similar to those of the corresponding provision in the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure adopted by the International Law Commission. A closer definition of those grounds might be desirable.

It was to be noted that Section 2 established a distinction between conciliators and arbitrators appointed by the Chairman and those appointed by the parties in that the right of challenge in regard to the former was more restricted. Several experts had suggested that that distinction might offend the sensibilities of parties and ought to be removed.

Mr. GAE (India) suggested that a provision should be included in Article V to the effect that, where a vacancy occurred after proceedings had commenced, the proceedings should continue from the stage that had been reached at the time the vacancy occurred, subject to the right of the newly appointed conciliator or arbitrator to require that oral proceedings be commenced de novo.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that that would be a reasonable solution.

Mr. GHANEM (Lebanon) also supported that suggestion. Its applicability, however, would depend on what rules of procedure governed the proceedings. If the proceedings were oral it might be necessary to start proceedings de novo when the vacancy was filled; if the proceedings were in writing the provision described could be applied. It should, however, be left to the commission or tribunal to decide how the proceedings should continue after a vacancy had been filled.

Mr. EL-FISHAWY (Kuwait) pointed out that no provision had been made for the case where a conciliator or arbitrator resigned without
the consent of the other members of the commission or tribunal before proceedings had started. As the proceedings would not then be hindered or delayed there seemed no objection to the vacancy being filled by the method used for the original appointment rather than by the Chairman as was now required in all cases by Section 1.

The CHAIRMAN replied that a suitable provision to that effect might be inserted.

Mr. TSAI (China) said that to empower the Chairman to fill any vacancy occurring on disqualification might not be appropriate where more than one such vacancy had to be filled. Another aspect of the matter was that it might be inconsistent with the basic principle of exclusion of national arbitrators to allow the Chairman to fill such vacancies when he himself possessed the nationality of one of the parties.

Referring to Section 2(1) he pointed out that while both sub-sections dealt with disqualification subsequent to constitution of the commission or tribunal, no time limit was prescribed within which disqualification had to be proposed. Could a party, for instance, propose disqualification even after an award had been rendered? In this connection he drew attention to the possibility that even the party who had appointed the arbitrator could presumably propose his disqualification.

The CHAIRMAN thought that the Chairman of the Administrative Council would rarely, if ever, have to fill more than one vacancy. As to the Chairman's nationality in relation to his power to appoint under Section 1, there did not seem to be an alternative to this procedure since there was only one Chairman.

In his opinion it would be contrary to established international or commercial practice to permit disqualification after rendering of the award, although there seemed to be no objection to proposing disqualification at any time before that date.

Mr. GOONERATNE (Ceylon) pointed out that under Section 1, if in a three-man tribunal an arbitrator appointed by one of the parties was disqualified and the resulting vacancy was filled by an arbitrator appointed by the Chairman, the tribunal would consist of two members appointed by the Chairman and one member appointed by one of the parties. In such a case the party whose arbitrator had been disqualified should at least be consulted by the Chairman who might, in the alternative, fill the vacancy from the Panel by lot. He would suggest, however, that where an arbitrator had been disqualified there was no reason for his successor to be appointed by the Chairman (a procedure which might be reasonable in cases of resignation without consent), and that the phrase "and consequent upon a decision to disqualify him pursuant to Section 2(2) of this Article" be deleted from Section 1.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that the phrase should be deleted.

The meeting was suspended at 11:05 a.m. and resumed at 11:35 a.m.

Mr. PARK (Korea) referred to an extreme case where a tribunal or commission was composed of five persons and disqualification of four of them was proposed. In such a case, under Section 2(2) it would be left to the decision of the single other member whether to disqualify them.
ARTICLE VI - Apportionment of Costs of Proceedings

Mr. EL-FISHAWY (Kuwait) suggested that provision be made in Section 1(b) to the effect that all charges should be assessed against a party who had denied the rights of the other party in bad faith.

The CHAIRMAN agreed, and suggested that that could be done by inserting the words "or resisted" after the words "has instituted," thus taking account of bad faith not only on the part of the plaintiff but also on the part of the defendant. Further consideration would, however, be given to how the text could best be amended.

Mr. EL-FISHAWY (Kuwait) asked why the system in Section 1(b) had been adopted in preference to requiring each party to bear at least the fees and expenses of the members of the commission or tribunal appointed by him.

The CHAIRMAN replied that it had been thought best to provide for equal sharing of the expenses of the umpire, and that unequal payment of members of the tribunal be generally avoided, as that could tend to establish the wrong kind of relationship between the arbitrators and the parties. To that end it had also been proposed in Section 3 that a commission or tribunal would fix its charges in consultation with the Secretary-General. At previous meetings it had been suggested that some guidelines ought to be laid down, say, in the form of a tariff established by the Administrative Council, as to the limits within which commissions or tribunals could fix their charges.

Mr. EL-FISHAWY (Kuwait) thought Section 3 referred only to cases where there was no agreement between the parties and the members appointed by them. He had referred to cases where, in an agreement between a party and, say, an arbitrator appointed by him, the fees of the arbitrator would be specified.

The CHAIRMAN said that while the language of Section 3 was ambiguous that section was intended to cover only those cases where there was an agreement between the commission or tribunal as a whole and the two parties acting together.

Mr. HIMADEH (Lebanon) thought that the term "its own expenses" in Section 1(a) should be clarified. He also suggested that in Section 3 the requirement of consultation with the Secretary-General be substituted by the requirement that the Secretary-General approve the fees and expenses of arbitrators and conciliators.

The CHAIRMAN said that the phrase "its own expenses" in Section 1(a) would include the fees and expenses of lawyers, experts or agents, and in fact all other expenses except the charges payable for the use of the facilities of the Center, and the fees and expenses of the commission or tribunal.

Mr. HIMADEH (Lebanon) suggested that provision for the expenses covered by Section 1(a) might best be made in a final subsection to the effect that the rest of the expenses would be borne by each party.
ARTICLE VII - Place of Proceedings

There was no comment on Article VII.

ARTICLE VIII - Interpretation

The CHAIRMAN, introducing Article VIII, explained that it had been intended to give the International Court of Justice jurisdiction over questions and disputes regarding interpretation of the Convention without the necessity for a special agreement. Consequently any Contracting State could start proceedings before the Court by application, and in order to remove any doubt on the point, it might be advisable to state expressly that any such question or dispute "may be submitted to the Court by any party by application."

He then referred the meeting to Doc. COM/AS/B which contained a tentative draft of an additional provision on interpretation as follows:

"1. ....  

2. (1) If in the course of any arbitral proceeding pursuant to this Convention a question arises between the parties to the dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention, and the arbitral tribunal is of the opinion that the question has merit and may affect the outcome of the proceedings, the tribunal shall suspend the proceedings for a period of three months.

(2) If within that period the tribunal shall have been notified that the International Court of Justice has been seized of the question by a State party to the dispute, or the State whose national is a party to the dispute, the arbitral proceedings shall remain suspended as long as the question is pending before the International Court of Justice.

(3) If the tribunal shall not have been so notified, the arbitral proceedings shall be resumed at the expiration of the aforesaid period."

At an earlier meeting the question had been raised whether some procedure might be provided for having the International Court pronounce on questions of interpretation which arose, not between members, but between the parties to a dispute in the course of proceedings. Since only States could be parties before the Court the text provided for stay of proceedings during which the States concerned could take up the question with the Court if they so desired. If within the limited period - three months was suggested - the States did not bring the matter before the Court, the proceedings would continue and the tribunal would have to decide the question of interpretation along with the other questions submitted to it.

Mr. QUILL (New Zealand), referring to the proposed additional section, thought it might have been a further advantage if the tribunal could, of its own motion, place a matter of interpretation arising during
arbitral proceedings, before the International Court.

The CHAIRMAN in reply said that while it would only be possible for States to place the matter before the Court, it might be feasible to provide that the tribunal suspend proceedings if it felt that there was a question of interpretation on which it wished to have the views of the Court. The tribunal could then inform the Secretary-General, who in turn could notify the Contracting States who might, if they so desired, take the matter up.

Mr. QUILL (New Zealand) thought it would be useful to add some provision along the lines suggested by the Chairman.

Mr. GHANEM (Lebanon) asked whether the International Bank and its affiliates could request advisory opinions of the International Court and, if so, whether the Center might not be given a similar power.

The CHAIRMAN said that while he had considered the matter of the advisory jurisdiction of the International Court, requests for advisory opinions could only be made by the United Nations and the "specialized agencies". While the latter term as defined in the UN Charter included institutions like the Bank and the International Monetary Fund, he doubted whether the Center would qualify as a "specialized agency". He also doubted whether the Bank itself could request advisory opinions on issues arising before the Center, as such questions might not be regarded as arising out of any operation or function of the Bank.

Mr. MANSOURI (Iran) asked whether the application of Article VIII was restricted to cases where States confronted each other in proceedings, as when the investor's State was subrogated to the rights of the investor.

The CHAIRMAN replied that the provision was stated in general terms, and that no limitation of that nature was implied. He thought the type of dispute contemplated under the original provisions of Article VIII would normally arise, not in connection with a particular proceeding, but on such questions as whether a Contracting State was giving effect to the privileges and immunities provided for, or whether it had provided the necessary facilities for enforcement or recognition of arbitral awards. It might be argued that precisely because the provision was generally drawn no addition was needed, and that all that was required was a mechanism for bringing to the attention of the Contracting States the existence of a dispute or question regarding interpretation so as to enable them, if they so desired, to refer it to the International Court as a question or dispute of their own.

Mr. NEMOTO (Japan) recalled that Section 3(1) of Article II was explicit in stating that any commission or tribunal would be the judge of its own competence. Was it, therefore, intended that matters concerning the competence of the commission or tribunal, or the jurisdiction of the Center, were to be excluded from the operation of Article VIII?

The CHAIRMAN thought that under Article VIII as it stood, such matters would be covered. However, questions of competence would generally arise in relation to a specific proceeding, and if the tribunal wanted guidance - not on its decision but on the interpretation of some provision of the Convention - it might try to solicit an
opinion through the indirect way suggested in his reply to the delegate of New Zealand.

The tribunal would still be the judge of its own competence and no diminution of its powers was intended. If, however, before it reached a decision one of the provisions of the Convention which would be relevant to such a decision were interpreted by the International Court, then the tribunal would regard itself as bound by the decision of the Court as to the meaning of the Convention and would proceed on the basis of that interpretation.

Mr. UL ISLAM (Pakistan) shared the doubts expressed by the expert from Japan and suggested that if it were the intention that the commission or tribunal retain the power to judge its own competence it should be specifically stated in Article VIII that its provisions were subject to Section 3 of Article II.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that such a modification would be useful.

Mr. HETH (Israel) asked whether the present wording of Article VIII precluded the possibility that after the arbitral tribunal had decided the matter of its own competence, the parties could later ask the International Court of Justice for the proper interpretation of the Convention.

The CHAIRMAN said he did not think that that would be permitted. This could be made clear through the modification of the text proposed by the expert from Pakistan.

The CHAIRMAN in reply to Mr. LAZO (Philippines) agreed that the decision of the tribunal on its own competence would be final and not subject to review by any other Court.

ARTICLE IX - Amendment

The CHAIRMAN, introducing Article IX, said it was customary for agreements which consisted of the constitution of a new organization (e.g. the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund) to contain an amendment procedure. In general, amendments were to be adopted by a specific majority - here tentatively fixed at 4/5 - and once such an amendment was adopted it would be binding on the minority. Thus Contracting States which were unwilling to accept the amendment would have a choice between living with it or withdrawing from or denouncing the Convention. In that connection it was to be noted that the amendment would not become effective until 12 months after its adoption, and that an identical period was specified within which a State could effectively cease to be a Contracting State following denunciation.

Mr. GHANEM (Lebanon) thought it was strange that the right to denounce the Convention was extended under the terms of Section 5 even to those members who had voted for the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the right of denunciation was unconditional and that a Contracting State could at any time denounce the Convention by written notice and without giving any reasons. There was no essential link between the right of denunciation and the adoption
of amendments. The only link provided was that the periods of time had been established in such a way that a member wishing to withdraw could do so with effect from the time when the amendment would become effective.

Mr. MANSOURI (Iran) referred to Section 7(1) of Article I which stated the general rule that the decisions of the Administrative Council would be taken by a simple majority, and inquired why it had been thought necessary to stipulate a 4/5 majority in connection with amendment of the Convention.

The CHAIRMAN in reply said he thought the requirement of a 4/5 majority was justified as the decision was an important one, might affect members' obligations and would be binding on the minority.

He recalled that at the other meetings it had been asked whether it was desirable to have an amendment procedure at all since some delegates thought that they might not be able to obtain parliamentary approval of an agreement which provided for the possibility of amendment without unanimous approval. Other delegates had felt that they could get such legislative approval while still others suggested that while provision for a qualified majority decision should be retained, provision should be made for at least one exception, viz., that the optional or consensual character of the Convention could not be changed without a unanimous vote.

Mr. ADARKAR (India) thought the required majority of 4/5 was too high. He would prefer a procedure whereby amendments would have to be adopted by a certain majority, but would become binding only on those who expressly accepted it. It might, however, be provided, in addition, that other Contracting States if they so desired could require dissenting States to withdraw from the Convention.

The CHAIRMAN recalled that a 4/5 majority was required for amendment of the Charters of the Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It was difficult to discover a prevailing custom in the matter of amendment of multilateral agreements and the drafters had here followed a system of requiring a high majority for adoption, and then declaring the amendment to be effective for all Contracting States. An opportunity was, however, provided for dissenting States to withdraw from the Convention.

The expert from India had suggested a second system (which he did not think would be appropriate in the context) whereby the amendment would be effective only for those States which had accepted it, while giving the accepting States the right to require the withdrawal of dissenting States. A third system would declare the amendment to be binding only on those who had accepted it. Those countries which did not accept the amendment could not then claim any benefits or rights under it, but by the same token would not be subject to any obligations it imposed. The disadvantage of the system was that it would create groups of States with different obligations. Finally, one might remove the amendment procedure completely, which would mean in effect requiring unanimous approval of any change in the Convention. There had been support for each of the four possible approaches without any clear preponderance of one over the other.
ARTICLE XI - Final Provisions

Mr. EL-FISHAWY (Kuwait) asked why it was necessary in Section 5 to provide a certain period after which denunciation would become effective. The purpose of prescribing an identical period in Article IX on amendment was to avoid binding any State which did not approve of the amendment for the period during which it could denounce the whole Convention. However, a State which did not denounce the Convention for, say, two or three months after it had made up its mind, might find itself bound for a like period by an amendment approved by the majority. He would therefore suggest that the denunciation take effect immediately after it had been notified.

Mr. GHANEM (Lebanon) thought that the Convention had failed to indicate clearly the scope of its application in time, so that it could conceivably apply to disputes covering investments made prior to the Convention. As the fundamental purpose of the Convention was to create a favorable climate for future investment, it would not be fair to apply it to old investments, particularly those made when the host State was not master of its own destiny. He therefore suggested that Article XI include an additional provision specifying the scope of the Convention in time and that Article II be amended to exclude existing investments.

The CHAIRMAN thought it would be going too far to say that treatment of old investments was irrelevant to the investment climate for future investments. Investors considering an investment in a country would be guided, at least in part, by the experiences of old investors. He was aware that the political aspects of that question were probably more important than the legal ones, and that several delegates might not find the Convention acceptable if the capacity conferred by it on investors were extended to disputes arising out of investments made either before the date of the Convention or some other specified date.

The answer to that was the optional nature of the Convention - an answer which some delegates accepted, and others, who did not want to be in a position of having to refuse recourse to the Center in a particular case, did not. If, however, the limitation on the scope of the Convention proposed by the expert from Lebanon were to be included, the proper place for it would be in Article II.

Mr. LAZO (Philippines) disagreed with the expert from Lebanon and urged that the Convention be open to use in connection with investments already made. The Convention was based upon the consent of the parties, and if the parties agreed that they could take advantage of the facilities it offered, he saw no reason to deny them the use of these facilities. His delegation would like to go on record that they would like to see the Convention kept open for all such investors as had invested funds in other States, to use it or not as they chose.

Mr. SHIRATORI (Japan) referring to Section 5(2) said that while it was reasonable in case of a voluntary denunciation by a State to terminate its rights arising out of undertakings given prior to the date of notice, he could not agree that denunciation following inability to accept an amendment should have the same effect. He thought it would be important, especially for the protection of private investors, that both the rights and obligations arising out of such undertakings be preserved.
The CHAIRMAN agreed that reference should be made in Section 5(2) not only to obligations but also to the rights of the denouncing State. He would even go so far as to say that both the rights and obligations of a State should be preserved irrespective of the motive for the denunciation.

Mr. ASKARI-YAZDI (Iran) suggested that Section 1 might be revised to read simply "this Convention shall be open for signature on behalf of all sovereign States", as this would obviously include Bank members.

The CHAIRMAN recalled his earlier statement that after hearing a number of experts at previous meetings he had been convinced that it would be desirable to replace the words "to all sovereign States" by "all members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies".

Mr. TSAI (China) said that in the view of his government signature should be open and limited to members of the Bank, instead of to those of any other organization or to "all sovereign States".

Mr. HIMADEH (Lebanon), referring to Section 5, said that the rights and obligations to be kept alive on denunciation were not only those of the State concerned, but also those of a national of that State, and suggested that the section be amended accordingly.

The CHAIRMAN agreed.

ARTICLE X - Definitions

The CHAIRMAN, introducing Article X, recalled that at this and other meetings at least two additional definitions had been proposed, viz. definition of "investment" and of "dispute of a legal character". As to "investment" he had heard a number of proposals drawn from local legislation none of which had proved entirely satisfactory when considered in relation to practical questions. One thought had been to have an agreed list of transactions that would be regarded as investments, and then to have either some general residual clause or else language like "any other transaction which is regarded as an investment under the laws of the host State." Thus both investors and host States would know in advance a certain number of transactions characterized as investments, while with the latter type of clause it would be open to both to include other transactions provided the host State was willing to treat them as investments under its investment legislation.

As to the two definitions at present included in Article X, he explained that the test of nationality of companies was a dual one, viz. the test of nationality under its domestic law, and the control test. A complication occurred when a company though established under the law of one country was controlled by citizens of another. In such a case a company might, for the purposes of the Convention, have dual nationality.

Mr. O’DONOVAN (Australia) raised two points regarding the definition of a "national of a Contracting State". First, the date on which the nationality of the investor was to be ascertained was the date on which consent to the jurisdiction of the Center became effective. On the assumption that there might be a considerable lapse of time between that date and the date of the award during which the nationality of the investor could have changed, it seemed desirable to provide that immediately before
any award was made a certificate should be issued by the appropriate authority of a Contracting State to the effect that the party concerned was at that time a citizen of that Contracting State. It would otherwise be open to a party to change his nationality in the course of proceedings to that of a non-Contracting State, in which event there would be no means by which the host State could execute an award against the investor, whereas the investor, notwithstanding that he was not open to any action by the host State could, if the award were in his favor, take action against the host State to enforce the award.

Second, he did not think it desirable to extend the definition of the term "company" to any mere association of natural persons, as it was unlikely that, for instance, unincorporated partnerships would make the sort of investment covered by the Convention. Problems of nationality in the case of unincorporated associations could be very great, particularly where some of the partners were nationals of Contracting States and some were not.

The CHAIRMAN recalled that it had earlier been agreed that the date relevant in determining nationality should be the date on which consent to arbitration "was given" rather than the date on which it "became effective". With regard to natural persons, he would agree that they should also possess the nationality of a Contracting State at a later time, but would be reluctant to go further than the date on which proceedings were instituted. He had more difficulties in applying a similar principle to companies, as he thought it unlikely that under the present state of the law a company could become incorporated in a second country without losing its identity.

As to Mr. O'Donovan's second point, the definition sought to treat a partnership as having juridical personality for the purposes of the Convention irrespective of whether it would be so regarded under its domestic law. Its nationality might then have to be determined by the control test. He did not, however, think it necessary to include more detailed rules on the matter in the Convention as it could be left to be worked out by a tribunal in practice.

Mr. TSAI (China) thought there was no justification for applying the control test as it would always be open to individual foreign shareholders to receive protection as natural persons. In any event the term "controlling interest" was very vague and would give rise to controversy. For instance 51% of the shares might not be controlling because it would not necessarily mean 51% of the voting power. For the purpose of a loan by the United States Government to an American company, 25% was regarded as a controlling interest, while for investment guarantees 15% was sufficient. If there were no real need for protection on this basis it ought to be excluded. Similarly in the case of partnerships the individual partners could enjoy protection as natural persons if they were foreigners and there seemed no need to extend protection to those associations.

While he was in favor of continuity of nationality he would not go so far as to require possession of the identical nationality, but only that the party be a foreign national of some Contracting State.

Section 2, which extended protection to those with dual nationality one of which nationalities was that of the host government, was acceptable to him provided it was restricted to natural persons. It should not apply
to companies as it could open the way for evasion of the control of domestic law by a company which was substantially a domestic company.

Recalling that Section 3(3) of Article II treated as conclusive on the question of nationality a certificate from the Foreign Minister issued "for the purpose of those proceedings", he said he was not sure whether a State would be willing to issue certificates to investors who were not nationals in other respects, e.g. for the purpose of tax payments, allegiance to the government, etc. but only for the purpose of receiving the protection of the Convention.

The CHAIRMAN said that earlier in the meeting it had been agreed to change the term "national" in Section 3(3) of Article II to "citizen". That might remove the difficulties to which Mr. Tsai had alluded in connection with his last point.

As to the more general observations regarding the definitions, it was necessary to bear in mind the essential flexibility provided through the consensual character of recourse to the Center. It was always open to a State to choose which investors it would regard as foreign for the purpose of conferring on them the capacity to institute proceedings before the Center. Nor would a refusal of consent to jurisdiction give rise to the "adverse inference" which had been earlier discussed, where a State chose to regard a company as its national despite the fact that it was eligible under the definitions.

On the other hand, a State might, if it found some advantage in so doing, treat a company which had dual citizenship under the control test, as a foreign company. At previous meetings and also at the present one, it had been suggested that some of the problems of determining nationality in such a case might be removed if the host State were to enter into an agreement not with the company as such but with the foreign investors in the company. Here again, however, practical difficulties might arise where the shares were held in varying amounts by a large number of persons.

Mr. EL-FISHAWY (Kuwait) referring to the date relevant for determining nationality, said he was in support of the draft as it stood. As the consent of the parties was fundamental, the most relevant date was that on which consent had been given. He did not see why an investor, after having agreed with a host State to go to arbitration, should be deprived of his contractual right simply because his nationality had changed.

Mr. WANASUNDERA (Ceylon) suggested that the definition of "national of a Contracting State" be given further consideration, since the extended definition of "company" appeared to be inconsistent with the principal definition. With reference to Section 2 he said that where matters were arbitrated against a background of dual or multiple nationality, it was essential that all questions of nationality be finally resolved prior to or during arbitration, so as to avoid a multiplicity of claims arising thereafter.

Mr. PINTO (Secretary) referred to two solutions to the problem of nationality suggested at earlier meetings. It had been recognized that Article X did no more than define, from the standpoint of nationality, those types of entity which a host State could - but was not bound
to regard as being qualified to enter into an investment agreement with it. Some delegates had therefore suggested that reliance should be placed on the consensual nature of the agreement and that the definition should be very simple: an investor would be regarded as a national of another Contracting State if the host State chose to regard him as such when entering into an investment agreement with him.

Another delegate proposed a solution by way of the practical steps necessary to enter into an investment agreement. Thus when concluding an agreement, the investor would stipulate his nationality as a material condition, and should his nationality change thereafter, the agreement would have to be renegotiated or come to an end.

FIFTH SESSION
(Friday, May 1, 1964 - 8:30 a.m.)

Chairman's Summary of Discussion

The CHAIRMAN said that before opening the discussion on the Preamble and calling for the closing observations of delegates he would, in response to an informal request to do so, try to assess the character of the present meeting and compare it with the previous consultative meetings, and attempt a summary of the discussion up to that point.

In his view, the principal point of difference between the present meeting and previous meetings was that here there had been a preoccupation with matters of policy which had led to a close analysis of the political impact of the Convention as such on the position of capital-importing countries vis-a-vis investors or capital-exporting countries, and less discussion of specific provisions of the text.

The chief points of significance raised thus far related to Article II on the jurisdiction or scope of activity of the Center. Several delegates had had difficulty with the phrase "investment dispute of a legal character". Those delegates had felt that from a technical point of view that phrase needed clarification. Other delegates who were more concerned with the policy implications of that term had argued with some insistence that the jurisdiction of the Center should comprise only one category of investment dispute viz, disputes arising out of specific agreements with investors, including disputes in connection with investments made in reliance on incentives offered in investment promotion legislation. The proponents of the latter view, while acknowledging that adherence to the Convention did not imply any legal obligation in the State (or the investor) to use the facilities of the Center in the absence of express consent to do so, had nevertheless felt that a State's refusal of consent could possibly lead investors to draw an adverse inference, and that a government would, therefore, find it difficult to refuse to use the Center in a specific case. To provide for ad hoc recourse to the Center would open the door to requests by investors for such recourse in a variety of disputes which the host State might not regard as arbitrable and was, therefore, undesirable.

In the opinion of the majority of experts at this and other meetings - an opinion shared by the staff of the Bank - those fears were unfounded, and there was no reason to limit the scope of activity of the Center in the manner proposed, since the clearly established consensual nature of the
mechanism established by the Convention offered adequate protection against the possibility of an "adverse inference". The understanding reflected in the Preamble e.g. the recital in paragraph 3 to the effect that local remedies would in most cases be adequate and would be the normal way of dealing with investment disputes, could be regarded as further emphasizing that the element of consent to jurisdiction was regarded by the drafters as an essential feature of the mechanism. At a previous meeting some experts had suggested that if a State adhered to the Convention nearly all new investors would probably wish to obtain from the host State agreement in advance to submit disputes arising out of investment agreements to the Center. Those experts had felt that while their countries might not be able, legally or politically, to include an arbitration clause in their investment agreements, they might be prepared to accept ad hoc arbitration of a particular dispute. Nor were they in any way apprehensive regarding the possibility that refusal by the State of an ad hoc request for arbitration might give rise to an adverse moral judgment on the part of the investor.

It had been suggested during the meeting that the problem of the "adverse inference" might be obviated (1) through inclusion of a provision in the Convention emphasizing in unequivocal terms that adherence to the Convention did not give rise to any duty legal or moral to submit disputes to the Center in a given case and (2) through a provision which would enable States to make declarations at the time of their adherence to the Convention as to the specific areas in which they would be willing to consider having recourse to the facilities offered by the Convention, and he would welcome the views of the delegates on those proposals. In his view it would be a sufficient reply to investors requesting recourse to the Center ad hoc that not only was the State under no moral or legal duty to consent, but also that the dispute was clearly outside the area in which the State had declared it would consider recourse to the Center.

Apart from this basic question as to the scope of the Convention he had noted that at least two delegates had doubts whether the best method of settling investment disputes was, in part, to remove them from the sphere of intergovernmental relations and on to the purely legal plane where State and investor would meet on equal terms. In the view of those delegates, it appeared preferable to encourage governmental investment guarantees and to maintain any ensuing investment dispute in the intergovernmental sphere, thus making governments responsible for the flow of all foreign investment as well as for settling any possible difficulties which might arise. In that connection he noted that in Africa, where there was great interest in investment guarantees either by capital-exporting States under bilateral agreements, or by a multilateral guarantee fund, no delegate had disapproved from the view that it would be advantageous to remove disputes from the intergovernmental sphere. On the contrary, they had expressed a preference for the approach embodied in the Convention.

Finally, he referred to the proposal of Mr. MADER (Lebanon) that the Bank or the Center, or possibly some other institution, might provide capital-importing countries with expert guidance in drafting investment agreements and arbitration clauses. While it might be a matter for consideration whether the Center or the Bank should give such advice, that proposal correctly emphasized the imperative need for technical skill in drafting investment agreements containing a provision for submission of disputes to the Center, as well as in drafting other types of investment agreements, economic cooperation agreements, concession agreements and the like.
The CHAIRMAN invited the meeting to consider the Preamble and to make such general observations as they might think desirable regarding the Convention as a whole.

Mr. SHIRATORI (Japan) referred to the need to clarify the definition of "investment disputes". For instance, could questions arising out of outstanding and deferred payments be brought before the Center? He did not think it appropriate for a meeting of an expert group, such as the present one, to reach a conclusion on such issues and felt that the precise scope of the Center's activities ought to be discussed in a wider forum where the official views of both capital-exporting and capital-importing countries could be exchanged.

He asked the Chairman whether he would care to comment on the merits of introducing a new mechanism for conciliation and arbitration in addition to the existing organizations in that field.

The CHAIRMAN thought that the two transactions mentioned by the delegate from Japan would come within the term "investment" in its broadest sense, but agreed that it would be difficult for the present meeting to reach any conclusion on questions of definition.

As to the distinction between the Center and existing mechanisms for settlement of disputes he pointed out that the principal feature of the proposed mechanism was that it was accompanied by a set of rules whereby undertakings made and awards rendered under the Convention were internationally binding - a feature lacking in other mechanisms such as the International Chamber of Commerce or even the new Rules (1962) drafted by the Administrative Council of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. In addition, the Panels of the Center would be composed of persons believed to be specially competent in matters arising out of investments, whereas those of, for instance, the Permanent Court of Arbitration were composed of distinguished jurists in the field of public international law.

Mr. PANT (Nepal) recalled that in his opening address he had given support to the principles and concepts underlying the Convention, the need for which he had categorically endorsed. The draft seemed to him to have taken due account of the legitimate interests of the capital-importing countries as well as those of investors. He thought that there would be a definite advantage in adopting a Convention of this type rather than including detailed provisions on the settlement of disputes in each individual investment agreement. The Convention would provide a much better and swifter remedy which would, in the long run, offer a better incentive to prospective investors. Some countries, however, might find difficulty in adopting the draft in view of their municipal or constitutional laws which would therefore have to be changed.

With regard to the specific provisions of the Convention he recalled that the delegate from India had rightly pointed out that no investment or commercial dispute could be devoid of legal character. However, in the particular context he thought the expression "legal character" did help to convey the intent of Section I of Article II. On the other hand, he associated himself with the general consensus of opinion regarding the need for a more elaborate definition of "investment dispute".
As to Section 3 of Article II he thought it would be better not to enumerate the categories of defenses to be decided as preliminary questions, but rather to provide that whenever a party to a dispute claimed that a commission or tribunal lacked competence, that claim would be dealt with as a preliminary question. With particular reference to Section 3(3) of Article II he agreed with the view that a certificate of nationality granted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs should not be treated as conclusive proof but only as *prima facie* evidence of nationality.

Finally he said that in the opinion of his delegation, the foreign investor should be required to abide by the national laws of the country where he had made his investment, except where special privileges had been granted to him under the terms of a specific agreement, and he should not be allowed to claim unlimited general immunity from the laws of the land. Consequently, the investor ought to be required to exhaust all his local remedies before he could avail himself of international conciliation or arbitration facilities such as those provided by the Center.

Mr. LAZO (Philippines) asked whether the provisions of Article II on subrogation of the investor's State were intended to cover subrogation of that State prior to recourse to the Center by the investor. If so, was it intended that in such a case a dispute between States could come within the jurisdiction of the Center?

The CHAIRMAN observed that Section 1 of Article II dealt not with assignment or transfer of a claim in general, but only with the particular type of transfer by operation of law known as subrogation. That would occur only after the dispute had arisen, but regardless whether or not the dispute had been referred to the Center. As the investor State would then stand in the shoes of the investor it would only possess the same rights and be subject to the same obligations as those of the private investor, and would not be acting as a sovereign State. To permit the investor State to appear in this manner would not, therefore, be inconsistent with the Convention.

Mr. TSAI (China) said that his government had in the past taken several measures to promote foreign investment, and that foreign investors were by law given protection against expropriation, the right to repatriate not only profits and interest but also capital, facilities to acquire land and the like. Nor did his government object to giving foreign investors further incentives in the form of the procedural safeguards contemplated under the Convention, which brought disputes within an international jurisdiction. His government was receptive to the many new ideas in that Convention; he felt, however, that the proposal made several times by delegates from other countries that an instrument of such significance ought to be discussed in a wider forum than that offered by a regional meeting, deserved serious consideration by the Bank.

With regard to the substance of the Convention, he felt that the scope of activity of the Center should be restricted to disputes arising in cases where special rights and obligations accrued to a foreign investor under an investment promotion law or a special agreement with the investor concerned. For instance, if a tax holiday was allowed to foreign investors only, then disputes concerning such tax holidays might be regarded as "investment disputes" and as being within the jurisdiction of the Center. But if national investors also enjoyed tax holidays, then such disputes should be excluded
from the jurisdiction of the Center. Referring to the proposal of the
delegate from Lebanon that the Bank provide expert legal guidance in the
drafting of investment agreements or arbitration agreements, he wondered
whether the Bank would also consider sponsoring seminars or training courses
at which legal experts could be trained in these subjects.

Finally referring to the apprehensions expressed by some delegates
that there might be too close a link between the Bank and the Center he asked
whether the Chairman could summarize briefly the principal aspects of such a
link.

The CHAIRMAN said he was aware of the need for advice to developing
countries in the field of investment promotion, in particular regarding the
drafting of specific investment agreements. The Bank's role thus far had been
limited to giving informal advice in a few cases, and in others to urging
countries to seek expert guidance and assisting them to secure competent
advisers. On the broader question of training legal experts it was a matter
for consideration whether it would be possible to institute a program of
the type suggested within the framework of the Economic Development Institute.

The various aspects of the link between the Center and the Bank evi-
denced in the present Draft could be dealt with under three headings, viz.
General, Powers and Functions of the President of the Bank as ex officio
Chairman of the Administrative Council, and Powers and Functions of the
Secretary-General - the latter being included because the Secretary-General
could not be appointed without first having been nominated by the President
of the Bank.

General

1. The seat of the Center would be at the headquarters of the Bank
(Article I, Section 2(1)).

2. The Center might make arrangements for use of the Bank's offices
and administrative services and facilities (Article I, Section 2(2)).

3. The President of the Bank would be ex officio Chairman of the
Administrative Council (Article I, Section 5).

4. The Governors of the Bank might act ex officio as members of
the Administrative Council (Article I, Section 4(2)).

5. The annual meeting of the Administrative Council would be held
in conjunction with the Bank's annual meeting (Article I, Section 7(2)).

6. Employment by the Bank would not be incompatible with the
office of Secretary-General (Article I, Section 9(2)).

7. The possibility that the Bank might bear the overhead costs
of the Center (implicit in Article I, Section 16).

Powers and Functions of the President of the Bank as ex officio Chairman
of the Administrative Council

1. To call meetings or obtain a vote of the Administrative Council
(Article I, Section 7(1)).
2. To cast a deciding vote in the case of an equal division in the Administrative Council (Article I, Section 5).

3. To nominate the candidate or candidates for the office of Secretary-General (Article I, Section 9(1)).

4. To designate persons to the Panels of conciliators (Article I, Section 11(3)) and arbitrators (Article I, Section 12(3)).

5. In the absence of a contrary agreement between the parties, to appoint conciliators (Article III, Section 3) or arbitrators (Article IV, Section 3) in cases of failure by either party to do so.

6. To appoint a person to fill a vacancy occurring upon resignation of a conciliator or an arbitrator without the consent of the other members of the commission or tribunal, or upon disqualification of a conciliator or an arbitrator (Article V, Section 1).

7. To take a decision on a proposal to disqualify a single conciliator or arbitrator (Article V, Section 2(2)).

Powers and Functions of the Secretary-General

1. To be the principal administrative officer of the Center (Article I, Section 10(1)).

2. On the instructions of the Chairman to consult with parties in order to assist the Chairman in appointing conciliators (Article III, Section 3(1)) or arbitrators (Article IV, Section 3) when that function was assigned to the Chairman.

3. To fix the charges payable by the parties for the use of the facilities of the Center within the limits fixed by the Administrative Council (Article VI, Section 2).

4. To be available in certain circumstances for consultation with a commission or tribunal in the matter of fixing the fees and expenses of conciliators and arbitrators (Article VI, Section 3).

5. To determine the place of proceedings after consultation with the parties and with the commission or tribunal concerned, in cases where the parties have been unable to agree to hold proceedings in Washington or The Hague (Article VII, Section 1) and to be available for consultation with a commission or tribunal when it has been asked to approve a place for holding proceedings agreed upon by the parties (Article VII, Section 2).

From the foregoing summary it would be clear that while the link between the Bank and the Center had certain administrative advantages, it could not enable the Bank to influence the proceedings which would take place under the auspices of the Center.

Mr. ROOSE (Malaysia) said his country had taken steps toward eliminating the fears of foreign investors that their investments would be exposed to non-commercial risks both at a Federal as well as State level. In keeping with that policy, his government had, after preliminary consideration of the Convention, decided to give its support in principle
to the proposal to set up an international conciliation and arbitration Center. In his opinion the terms of the Convention were fair and reasonable, and he had no doubt that his government would accept the proposals after further consideration subject, however, to the solution of the problems discussed at the present meeting.

Mr. UL ISLAM (Pakistan) recalling some of the factors which might be said to contribute to the formation of a country's investment climate, said that the Convention represented a genuine attempt to develop an international institution which, if successful, would dispel much of the apprehension of foreign investors regarding the security of their investments, and would lead to a greater participation by them in the development of the less developed countries. The proposals appeared to strike a balance between the traditional idea on State sovereignty on the one hand and recognition of individuals as the subject of international law on the other, both of which concepts had undergone substantial change in recent years. The Convention represented a charter of investment both for the capital-exporting as well as the capital-importing countries, and he was in agreement with the general principles embodied in them.

Mr. MANSOURI (Iran) requested that consideration be given to his proposal that disputes arising in connection with existing investments be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Center.

Mr. ADARKAR (India) paid tribute to the Chairman for the way in which he had dealt with the questions raised in the course of the meeting and for his summary of the discussion up to that point.

In the course of the meeting he had expressed certain doubts regarding the extent of the jurisdiction of the Center. He had not thereby wished in any way to minimise the Bank's efforts to promote the free flow of foreign private capital to countries in need of it, nor should there be any misunderstanding as to India's readiness to accept international jurisdiction in appropriate fields. India had in the past provided for arbitration in agreements entered into by the government with foreign investors, and had also unilaterally given assurances to investors through several general policy statements.

He had raised several issues of policy; and that he thought was inevitable having regard to the nature of the Convention itself. On the other hand, his delegation had not confined itself to issues of policy but had gone on to suggest improvements of the text - some of which might even be inconsistent with the basic premises his delegation had put forward.

He also wished to make it clear that his preference for settlement of investment disputes at the intergovernmental level had not been expressed in general terms, and was only intended to cover particular types of problems not suitable for being dealt with in specific contracts between States and investors.

Concluding, he pointed out that his views on the policy implications of the Convention had been given in virtual ignorance of the views expressed by other developed and developing countries. In his opinion, in order to mould world opinion on these important proposals which introduced a new concept in intergovernmental relations and international law, discussion of the draft in a somewhat wider forum than a regional meeting would be helpful.
The CHAIRMAN agreed that it would be useful to have a discussion in a somewhat wider forum. The exact manner in which this should be achieved, however, would be a matter for further consideration by the Executive Directors of the Bank and by the Governments they represented, after they had had an opportunity to study the summary records of the four consultative meetings.

He welcomed the clarification of Mr. Adarkar's views on the question whether investment disputes ought to be removed from the intergovernmental sphere, or should be dealt with in that sphere.

He had not intended, in assessing the character of the present meeting in relation to earlier consultative meetings, to seem critical or to express any value judgment. In response to requests from several delegates he had merely sought to indicate certain points of contrast, one of which was undoubtedly the emphasis placed by delegates at the present meeting on broad policy issues.

Mr. LAZO (Philippines) paid tribute to the Chairman for his successful conduct of the meeting and the way in which he had dealt with the various questions raised. His delegation had concluded that the draft Convention was a sort of charter establishing the processes of conciliation and arbitration. While it did not spell out all the procedural details, it did contain fundamental principles which were based on the spirit of friendship and goodwill, and imbued with good faith. While the draft was not perfect, he felt sure it would, in time, be improved taking into consideration the several suggestions made at the meeting. His delegation was in full accord with the underlying principles of the Convention, and his government, as a capital-importing country, welcomed the proposals believing that they would improve and encourage the flow of capital into the country. The legislature was now considering several measures on foreign investment and might take into account the principles embodied in the Convention, in particular, submission of investment disputes to an international body in order to avoid protracted litigation in the local courts.

Mr. HOAN (Viet-Nam) said his country recognized that, in order to encourage the flow of foreign capital, certain measures were necessary and his government had already taken certain of those measures, e.g. it had guaranteed foreign investors against nationalization, guaranteed the transfer of profits and repatriation of capital, etc. While, to the local investor, those measures might seem discriminatory in favor of the foreign investor, the government had been firm enough to take them. His government welcomed the Convention which he believed to be a means of encouraging and facilitating the flow of capital into developing countries. While he supported the many innovations it sought to introduce into international law, including the principle that an individual would be considered on a par with a State, he hoped that any resulting restrictions on State sovereignty would be kept at a reasonable level. He doubted whether the principle of State-investor equality would be entirely satisfactory when it came to judging whether a dispute was of sufficient importance to bring it before the Center. A dispute would not have the same importance for a State as it would have for an individual, and he requested that that aspect of the matter be reconsidered with a view to including in the Convention some provision on the value of the dispute, which should not be a matter for the parties to decide.

To open the Center to "all sovereign States" (Article XII) might change
it into a political forum, and he would, therefore, prefer to see membership restricted to the member countries of the Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Mr. GOONERATNE (Ceylon) said he wished to emphasize some of the issues which had been raised in the course of the meeting:

1. Any definition of the jurisdiction of the Center should take into account that in international law there were some disputes which were regarded generally as not justiciable, although strictly such disputes might appear capable of settlement on the basis of legal principles.

2. Some delegates were apprehensive that too close a link between the Bank and the Center might impair confidence in the Center and the measure of its independence. In that connection his delegation had suggested that one of the ways of meeting the difficulty might be to restrict the Convention to conciliation.

3. As the object of the Convention was to create a favorable climate for future investments, some delegates had urged that there was neither a political nor legal basis for including within the jurisdiction of the Center investments made at a time when many Asian countries had not been independent and, therefore, unable to control the conditions under which foreign investment could enter. His country, for instance, had recently entered into an investment protection agreement with a capital-exporting country which expressly provided that it would be applicable only to investments made after signature of the agreement.

4. It had been urged that the Convention imposed obligations on capital-importing States without at the same time creating corresponding obligations for capital-exporting countries toward the economies of capital-importing countries.

5. Viewed in its broadest aspect the Convention appeared to contain an element which would enable pressure to be brought to bear on the developing countries thereby impairing their national dignity and self-respect. Such an element could result in an atmosphere of suspicion and ill will between countries and so tend to subvert the aims of the Convention.

In a Convention of this type it was impossible to separate the political from the technical legal aspects, and despite the fact that the Chairman had with great skill conveyed the views expressed at other meetings, that could not be a substitute for a frank exchange of views between capital-exporting and capital-importing countries on all the issues involved. He, therefore, joined those delegates who had urged that the Convention be discussed in the widest possible forum.

The CHAIRMAN said that in his view the applicability of the Convention to past investment was not wholly irrelevant to the question of the investment climate, for the reason that investors, in looking to the future, inevitably took account of the experience of the past. In doing so, investors and their governments would, however, be likely to take into consideration the time at which, and the conditions under which, certain investments were made as well as the corresponding necessity in some cases to adjust established legal relationships to new political, social and economic realities.
As to investment protection agreements of the type referred to by Mr. GOONERATNE, such agreements laid down certain rules of substance governing investments and investors, and could, therefore, be distinguished from a purely procedural instrument like the Convention. It would not be illogical for a party to an investment protection agreement to agree that, even though the provisions of that agreement did no more than refer to principles of law which it felt already existed, the substantive rights and obligations "codified" in the agreement should apply to future investments only. However, in distinguishing the Convention from investment agreements covering rules of substance, he did not mean to imply that the Convention itself could not in its application by parties be limited to future investments.

Mr. HASAN (Jordan) believed that while foreign investment should be encouraged and protected by the host State, yet there was no compelling reason for establishing institutional facilities for the settlement of disputes concerning them. Remedies obtainable under the existing rules of international law, the laws of the host State, or the provisions of bilateral agreements, might be adequate if observed in good faith by all the parties concerned. In his opinion, the main concern of an investor was the political stability of the country in which he sought to invest, rather than any lack of adequate machinery for the settlement of disputes.

Assuming, however, that the establishment of such facilities was thought by other delegates to be desirable and practical, their scope should not be such as to encroach seriously upon the sovereignty of the host State and should not extend beyond the limits of what was absolutely necessary. The present Convention seemed to exceed those limits and to place a foreign investor in a better position than the local investor, which could result in a situation under which it would become advantageous to the nationals of the capital-importing countries to export their capital and invest it abroad. His delegation would prefer to see the Convention restricted at the present stage to conciliation.

As to specific provisions, he would prefer the operation of Section 15 of Article IV on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards to be confined to the host State, the foreign investor and the State of that foreign investor, rather than bind all Contracting States. In drawing up a final draft due regard should be paid to the several comments made by the delegates to the meeting.

Mr. QUILL (New Zealand) said that while some important points of principle remained to be reconciled, there was a sufficient measure of agreement as to the shape and content of the document to encourage the Bank to continue its efforts toward the conclusion of a Convention which would be generally acceptable.

Mr. SERM (Thailand) after recalling that his delegation had stated its position at the first session paid tribute to the Chairman for his conduct of the meeting and expressed his appreciation to the Bank for its efforts to find ways and means of promoting the flow of investment to countries in need of it.

Mr. ABAS (Malaysia) said that the principles underlying the Convention were acceptable to his government which was doing everything possible to promote foreign investment in the country. The week's discussion, at which important questions of policy had been discussed, had
been very profitable. He was, however, in support of the proposal that those issues be discussed eventually in a wider forum.

The greatest merit he could see in that Convention was its consensual nature; on the other side of the line was the question of the innovations the Convention sought to introduce in the existing rules of customary international law. The desirability of those innovations would have to be carefully weighed by each government. On the question of the jurisdiction of the Center he associated himself with the proposal that jurisdiction be limited to disputes which might arise in the future, and should not extend to existing disputes. In his view, the enforceability of awards rendered pursuant to the Convention should be limited to the State where the investment was made, and the State of the foreign investor and ought not to be required in third States.

Mr. OBAID (Saudi Arabia) said his government, which was mobilizing all its efforts to accelerate economic growth, recognized fully the greater role which would be played by foreign investment. The week's discussions had helped considerably to clarify the problems which might arise in connection with such investments. He believed that the Convention would be of great assistance in establishing a favorable investment climate, and when a final draft was formulated after due consideration of the problems raised by delegates to the meeting, the proposals would achieve their goal, via. the accelerated economic growth of the developing countries.

Mr. O'DONOVAN (Australia) said it was not the practice in Australia to give any extensive undertakings to foreign investors who were generally treated in the same way, received the same benefits and were under the same obligations as local investors. While the government always permitted repatriation of capital it had undertaken no obligations to do so. In accordance with the government's obligations as a member of the International Monetary Fund, it also permitted repatriation of profits.

While he was not, therefore, greatly concerned about disputes arising out of specific undertakings he would like clarification whether two particular types of dispute would come within the meaning of the term "investment dispute of a legal character" viz: disputes concerning (1) expropriation, and (2) a decision by the government not to permit repatriation of capital. As to expropriation, Section 51 of the Australian Constitution empowered the Commonwealth to make laws with respect to the acquisition of property on "just terms": what "just terms" were was for the most part and in the absence of agreement by the parties to the contrary decided by the local courts, the Commonwealth being subject to the jurisdiction of those courts.

His main concern was the situation where the foreign investor sought approval to repatriate capital and was refused. In such a case, in the absence of any specific undertaking by the capital-importing country, would there be an "investment dispute of a legal character"? If the matter were dealt with according to national law, the decision would be entirely within the discretion of the local authorities. On the other hand, if international law were applied the matter might be more complicated particularly as the rules of international law on the question were not clear.

As to the Preamble, he suggested that paragraph 6 would be an appropriate place in which to emphasize that a country adhering to the
Convention would be under no legal or moral obligation to consent to the jurisdiction of the Center in any particular case.

On the draft provision on extension of the jurisdiction of the Center contained in Document COM/AS/6° which sought to cover agreements between investors and the political subdivisions of a State or a State agency, he saw no reason why it ought not to be acceptable. The matter would, however, be one that the Commonwealth itself would have to take up with the States in due course.

The CHAIRMAN said that the answer to the question whether refusal by the Commonwealth to permit repatriation of capital in the case described by Mr. O'Donovan would be an "investment dispute of a legal character" would probably be in the affirmative because the dispute would presumably be based on the contention by the investor either that the Commonwealth had not lived up to its own laws on foreign exchange remittances and repatriation of capital, or that refusal to permit that export of capital would violate some rule of international law either customary (as for instance being discriminatory) or conventional (as being, for instance, in breach of a treaty provision). However, the express consent of the State would be required before such a dispute could be brought before the Center.

He thought Mr. O'Donovan's proposal for adding emphasis to the idea embodied in paragraph 6 of the Preamble might be helpful.

Mr. PARK (Korea) said his country had taken several measures to encourage foreign investment. Local laws provided several safeguards for foreigners and hitherto, in some one hundred instances of foreign investment, there had been no disputes at all. However, he would not deny the necessity for an institution like the Center which would be of use in settling disputes that might arise in the future.

Without going into detail he would like to suggest that consideration be given to (1) the scope of disputes which could be brought before the Center (Article II); (2) the provisions on the binding force of awards (Section 15 of Article IV); (3) providing expressly in Article V for disqualification of conciliators and arbitrators on grounds of general unfitness or personal prejudice; and (4) limiting participation in the Convention to certain countries and not leaving it open to accession by all sovereign States as was now provided in Section 1 of Article XI.

Mr. MANSOURI (Iran) said that his country needed foreign investment and welcomed any measures which would encourage the flow of capital into the country. The present draft needed to be modified in order to make it acceptable to the capital-importing countries, and he felt sure that in doing so the Bank would take into consideration all reasonable views on the matter.

Mr. TSAI (China) recalled that the delegates from Malaysia and Ceylon had urged that the jurisdiction of the Center be limited to future investment disputes, while the delegate from the Philippines had urged the desirability of including existing investment disputes within the Center's jurisdiction. The text of Article II was not clear as to whether existing or future investment disputes were covered, or whether the reference was to disputes regarding existing or future investments. If it were

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10 See p. 11 of this document
intended to cover disputes regarding existing or future investments the text would be acceptable to his government and he would like to associate himself with the views of the delegates from the Philippines. He could think of no principle of law or justice against giving such benefits retroactively to an investor.

The Chairman had mentioned that the formula in Section 1 of Article XI might be changed to "members of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies". He pointed out that some States not members of the United Nations might still be members of a specialized agency like the Universal Postal Union. Nor would it always be clear what was meant by the term "sovereign State" - a political decision better left to some organ like the General Assembly of the United Nations. He would propose that membership be limited to States members of the Bank, and that if non-member States were to be permitted to accede to the Convention, certain procedures be established whereby the Administrative Council unanimously or by a 4/5 majority would pass on the admission of those States.

Mr. LAZO (Philippines) welcomed the Chinese delegation's support for his proposal that it be open to States and investors to bring disputes regarding existing investments before the Center. Such disputes should not be expressly included or excluded, but under the proposed system, which was based on the consent of the parties, the parties themselves should be free to use the Center for the settlement of such disputes.

Mr. GHANEM (Lebanon), addressing himself to the Preamble, said that it accurately reflected the fundamental principles governing the Convention. He would like to suggest only one modification. In order to meet the wishes of those host governments which would like to limit the scope of their use of the Center to disputes arising out of future investments, he suggested that the phrase "and especially with respect to existing investments" be added after the words "in any particular case" in paragraph 6.

He expressed his gratitude to the Bank for the promising initiative it had taken in the fields of law and economics and congratulated the anonymous draftsmen for having prepared a carefully balanced text. The drafters had succeeded in demonstrating the need for an entirely new institution based, however, on techniques already well known to jurists. With great flexibility they had adapted the system of arbitration, as known in relations among individuals and among States, to direct relationships between States on the one hand and private persons on the other. The standing given in the Convention to private persons was kept within eminently reasonable limits which were in no way revolutionary when compared with the great role which natural law accords to the individual in international law. In his opinion the draft, standing by itself and regardless even of its eventual ratification by States, would prove to be an outstanding doctrinal contribution to international law and one of the prime innovations of recent decades.

Mr. HETH (Israel) said that it was right that a discussion of the policy aspects of the Convention should precede analysis of its technical aspects, as policy would be the determining factor when the Convention came up for ratification. As for the consensual nature of the Convention, if the drafters foresaw recourse to international arbitration only in exceptional cases - and he agreed with that interpretation - then the Convention should contain express provisions that would ensure that only
matters of sufficient importance would come within the jurisdiction of the Center. It was with that end in view, and not because he was opposed to making individuals subjects of international law, that he had suggested that an individual should be able to resort to international arbitration only with his State's consent. He agreed with the Chairman that the requirement of the consent of the investor's State might be a two-edged sword, and would therefore welcome other proposals which would achieve the same result.

On the question of the jurisdiction of the Center he maintained that some limitation through a meaningful statement of the attributes of a dispute which might be brought before the Center was a prerequisite for the mutual confidence upon which the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism would depend.

Foreign investors could broadly be classified into (1) small and medium-sized investors who would have no contractual relations with the government, and (2) major investors, who would in many cases conclude direct agreements with the government. He believed that disputes involving the first category of investor should be dealt with first in the local courts, and only after local remedies had been exhausted should the disputes be referred to international arbitration if their importance justified such action. Only in cases of disputes involving major investors could international arbitration be considered a substitute for adjudication before local courts.

Concluding, he pointed out that in assessing the need for special safeguards for foreign investors, it should be remembered that their best safeguard was the constant need of developing countries to import capital.

The CHAIRMAN expressed his gratitude to the Thai government for its hospitality and to the Minister of Finance for having addressed the meeting at its first session. The Minister had set the tone for the meeting by saying that the aim of the discussions would be to find the right balance between the interests of developing countries and industrialized countries. The discussions had done much to clarify the various aspects of that balance in the context of the common goal of promoting economic development. As several delegates had pointed out it was quite proper that questions of policy relating to the Convention should have been discussed at the meeting. Now that those issues had been clearly stated it would be easier to deal with them in a manner reasonably satisfactory to all countries.

Concluding, he expressed his appreciation to the delegates for their cooperation, and to the Executive Secretary of ECAFE for his opening address and for having made available to the meeting the facilities of the Commission.

The meeting rose at 11:40 a.m.
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES

1. Now that the series of regional consultative meetings regarding the draft Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes has been concluded, I propose that the Executive Directors resume their study of the proposal and consider what further action should be taken.

2. The Summary Records of the Addis Ababa and Geneva meetings were circulated to the Executive Directors on May 14, 1964 (SID 64-1) and June 2, 1964 (SID 64-2) respectively. The Summary Record of the Santiago meeting is being reproduced and will be circulated shortly. The Bangkok Summary Record is still being prepared. There is also being prepared for circulation to the Executive Directors a report summarizing the principal points raised at the four meetings. I would not expect the Executive Directors to reach any conclusions before they and their governments have received, and have had an opportunity to study, that report as well as the four Summary Records. Several Directors, however, have expressed the wish to be informed as soon as possible of my own views on the matter. I am therefore setting them out in this memorandum.

3. As the Executive Directors will recall, the purpose of the consultative meetings was twofold. First, as an exchange of views between the Bank staff and legal experts from member countries. This educational effort we hoped would be useful for both sides. Second, as a method of gauging the reactions and opinions of those countries which had formed at least a preliminary opinion on the proposal, either at the technical or political level. On the basis of the reports which I have received from Mr. Broches, I have no hesitation in saying that the meetings have served both ends well and have been extremely valuable. In my invitation to the governments I stressed that the meetings would have an informal character and that the participants would not be regarded as committing their governments. Nevertheless, quite a few of the participants were in a position to give us, in greater or lesser detail, views of their governments on the proposal.

4. The four meetings were attended by experts from 86 countries. While it is difficult because of the nature of the meetings to make a precise estimate of the attitudes of the countries which had sent delegations, I think I can state that only a relatively small minority had objections of principle to the basic idea of establishing facilities for international conciliation and arbitration through inter-governmental agreement. Opinions among the large majority which found the basic idea acceptable ranged from strong support for the draft as it stood, subject only to technical amendments, to more or less strongly felt reservations about one or more substantive features of the draft. On an analysis of what was said at the four meetings, Mr. Broches feels that the differences of opinion expressed are negotiable and he is confident that the text of an agreement can be worked out which would both accomplish the purpose sought to be achieved, and meet the reservations of all countries.

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1 See Doc. 29  
2 See Doc. 27  
3 See Doc. 29  
4 Doc. 31  
5 Doc. 33
but those which have fundamental objections to any form of international conciliation and arbitration proceedings directly between States and foreign investors.

5. It would seem that the regional meetings have broadly confirmed the preliminary assessment which could be made on the basis of the meetings of the Executive Directors sitting as a Committee of the Whole. It is my view that the Executive Directors can now conclude that there is adequate support for the basic features of the proposal and that steps should be taken to formulate an inter-governmental agreement providing for the establishment of institutional facilities sponsored by the Bank for the settlement through conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between States and foreign investors.

6. At the 1962 Annual Meeting the Board of Governors adopted the following resolution:

"That the Executive Directors are requested to consider the desirability and practicability of establishing institutional facilities, sponsored by the Bank, for the settlement through conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between governments and private parties and, if they conclude that such action would be advisable, to draft an agreement providing for such facilities for submission to governments."

7. If the Executive Directors share my view, they would report to the Board of Governors that they are satisfied as to the desirability and practicability of the proposed institutional facilities. The Board of Governors' resolution further asks them to consider whether it would be advisable to draft an inter-governmental agreement for submission to governments and, if so, to draft such an agreement. The language of the resolution of the Board of Governors leaves open the question whether the draft agreement to be prepared by the Executive Directors would be submitted to governments for signature or for further discussion. I am of the opinion that the Bank should follow the example of what it did in connection with the establishment of IFC and IDA and that the Executive Directors, assisted in this case by legal experts in the manner indicated below, should constitute themselves both a negotiating and drafting body which would prepare a draft in final form. This draft would then be transmitted to governments for signature and ratification or acceptance. As in the case of IFC and IDA, the approval of the text of the Convention by the Executive Directors would be an action of the Bank and would not commit the governments they represent. The text would therefore be transmitted to governments ad referendum.

8. In expressing this opinion I am aware of alternative suggestions which have been made at some of the regional meetings. A number of experts, some of them speaking personally, others representing governmental views, felt that an inter-governmental agreement of the kind involved here should be prepared by a diplomatic or inter-governmental conference convened for the purpose and that the Executive Directors should do no more than prepare a draft which would form the basis of discussion at such a conference. The principal arguments in support of this view were that the subject matter of the Convention was outside the particular expertise of the Executive Directors as a body, and that it would be important for the success of the Convention to make certain that differences in governmental

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4 Doc. 11
views, especially as between the capital-importing and capital-exporting countries, should be aired in direct confrontation. I do not think that either of those arguments is persuasive. Moreover, I think that such a conference might unnecessarily delay and impede progress toward an objective which has broad support in the Bank's membership.

9. It is clear that the proposal raises broad political and economic issues as well as legal issues of both a theoretical and practical nature. It appears to me that the Executive Directors are eminently qualified to deal with the broad policy questions and that the composition of the Board is such as to permit the "confrontation" of the views of capital importers and exporters. While it may be admitted that the Executive Directors, as a body at least, are not particularly equipped to deal with some of the legal issues raised by the proposals, these issues would in any event require consideration by technical experts. It would seem to me that the Executive Directors might obtain the necessary technical guidance and advice through the establishment of a legal subcommittee on which each Executive Director might appoint legal experts from as many of the countries represented by him as wished to be more directly associated with the preparatory work on the Convention.

10. It is true that the 102 members of the Bank are represented by only 19 Executive Directors, and that some Executive Directors represent a number of countries not all of which may have the same views on the proposals, but I believe that the disadvantage of not giving every member country an opportunity to participate directly in the final process of formulating the text of the Convention can easily be over-estimated. Moreover, it could be largely overcome by the presence of the legal experts who, to the extent desired by their governments, could act on their instructions and would be available to express their governments' views on policy issues as well. This, together with the very full documentation on the views expressed at the regional consultative meetings and the record of earlier discussions in the Committee of the Whole of the Executive Directors, would serve most if not all of the purposes of an inter-governmental meeting.

11. It seems to me, therefore, that the Executive Directors, assisted by legal experts in the manner indicated above, would be a particularly suitable forum for the study and discussion of the proposal and for the formulation of the final text of a Convention for submission to governments. If this view is accepted, as I think it should be, it would be appropriate for the Executive Directors to recommend to the Board of Governors that the Board instruct the Executive Directors to proceed on this basis.

George D. Woods  
President
Regional Consultative Meetings
Of Legal Experts
On Settlement of
Investment Disputes
Chairman’s Report
on
Issues Raised and Suggestions Made With Respect to
the Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States

July 9, 1964

Introduction

1. The proceedings of the four meetings of legal experts held at
Addis Ababa (December 16-20, 1963), Santiago de Chile (February 3-7,
1964), Geneva (February 17-21, 1964) and Bangkok (April 27-May 1, 1964)
have been recorded in Summary Records (Docs. Z-7; Z-8, Z-9 and Z-10-
Provisional), which were sent to the Executive Directors and to the
participants in the meetings.

2. The purpose of this Report is to present for the convenience of
the Executive Directors an account of selected issues raised and sug-
gestions made with respect to the Preliminary Draft of a Convention which
constituted the working paper for the meetings (hereinafter called the
Working Paper). The selection has been based on the substantive impor-
tance of the subject-matter as well as on the political significance
which participants appeared to attach to certain points.

3. Not all subjects are treated in the same manner in this Report.
Where the issues are well-known or require no explanation, the Report
does no more than record the views expressed. With respect to some of

1 Doc. 25
2 Doc. 27
3 Doc. 29
4 See the definitive summary record, Doc. 31
5 Doc. 34
the more complex issues it has been thought useful to add explanatory
remarks intended to place the views expressed in a clearer context and
to enable the Executive Directors to assess the likelihood of recon-
ciling conflicting views.

4. In this Report views expressed by participants are attributed
to "delegations". This uniform terminology is being used for the sake
of convenience only and is not intended to indicate that the views
expressed were governmental views. In accordance with the terms of
the invitation by the President of the Bank to member governments,
the legal experts participating in the meetings were not regarded as
speaking on behalf of their governments unless they expressly stated
otherwise.

5. In order to facilitate consultation of the Summary Records on
points discussed in this Report, the identifying symbols (I), (II),
(III) and (IV) are used to indicate that particular statements or
views were made or expressed at Addis Ababa, Santiago de Chile, Geneva
and Bangkok respectively.

6. In keeping with the consultative character of the meetings
there was no need for every delegation to express its view on every
 provision of the Working Paper. The purpose of the meetings also
tended to elicit questions, comments or criticisms rather than state-
ments of support or non-objection. The number of delegations partici-
pating in the discussion of a specific provision or issue was normally
small. Frequently, a question by one delegation and a reply from the
Chair, or statements of their views by two or three delegations were
regarded as having adequately elucidated the problem. It was only when
delegations felt strongly about some point, or in response to specific
requests from the Chair or from a delegation for expressions of opinion,
that a larger number of delegations participated. In this Report refer-
ces to "some" delegations indicate three or four delegations, whereas
"several" denotes five or more delegations.

7. The record of comments of delegations on specific issues reflects
the general reception of the Working Paper at the meetings. In this
Report no attempt has been made to summarize or tabulate general state-
ments made by delegations. They will be found in the Summary Records,
generally in the reports of the opening and closing sessions. In many
cases these general statements, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
proposals, were substantially qualified during the article-by-article
discussion. In order to make the record complete it must, however, be
noted that some delegations at the Santiago meeting expressed themselves
as fundamentally opposed to the idea of international adjudication of
investment disputes, and did not actively participate in the discussion
of the provisions of the Working Paper. In addition, two delegations
at Bangkok expressed serious doubts as to the wisdom of the proposals
without participating in the detailed discussion of the Working Paper.

8. This Report is not intended to be a substitute for the Summary
Records which must be consulted for an account of the discussions and
the general atmosphere of the meetings.
This Article in particular reflects the link between the Bank and the Center and its discussion offered an opportunity for the expression of general views on the desirability of the proposed link as well as for specific criticisms or suggestions with respect to particular aspects of that link.

The proposed link between the Bank and the Center met with only few objections of a fundamental nature. One delegation expressed the view that it would be undesirable that the Center, one of whose organs, namely the Panels, would have judicial functions, be linked to the Bank which was an administrative institution (IV). Another delegation expressed itself as opposed to a close link with the Bank "save for administrative purposes", unless the activities of the Center were limited to conciliation (IV). A third delegation, although agreeing that the link with the Bank would give the Center the required prestige, wondered whether the link could not be weakened in some respects (I). As against these views several delegations specifically endorsed the proposed link between the Bank and the Center (I, III) and others even considered this link essential for the success of the Convention (III).

In response to a question put at the Bangkok meeting, I gave a survey of the various aspects of the link between the Bank and the Center as evidenced by the Working Paper. This survey is attached hereto as Annex 1.

Establishment and Organization (Sections 1 - 3)

One delegation thought that provision for having the seat of the Center at the Bank's headquarters should be permissive rather than mandatory (II), while another thought that the seat should be away from the Bank, preferably at a place like The Hague, if the Center were to deal with arbitration as well as conciliation (IV). Some delegations, while agreeing that the seat of the Center should be at the headquarters of the Bank, urged the desirability of allowing proceedings to take place in the country where the dispute arose (I, II, III). I pointed out that the Working Paper already permits this.

One delegation, which opposed a close link between the Bank and the Center, expressed concern that use by the Center of the Bank's facilities, as contemplated in the Working Paper, might in some way enable the Bank to influence proceedings of conciliation commissions or arbitral tribunals by making available its confidential archives (IV). In reply I pointed out that the Working Paper clearly referred to administrative facilities only.

Administrative Council (Sections 4 - 7)

Several delegations addressed themselves to the provision permitting the Administrative Council to transfer the seat of the Center away from the Bank's headquarters with a two-thirds majority of the total
votes. One delegation thought that the required majority was too high and proposed that the vote of two-thirds of the members of the Council present and voting should suffice (I). Two delegations expressed themselves opposed to any transfer of the seat of the Center (III), whereas another delegation thought it desirable to define the circumstances in which the seat of the Center could be transferred and to specify the alternative locations (I).

15. Several delegations addressed themselves to the provision making the President of the Bank ex officio Chairman of the Administrative Council. Four delegations declared themselves opposed to this provision (II, IV). Two of these delegations proposed that the Chairman of the Administrative Council should be elected from the membership of the Council on the analogy of the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Bank (II). The opposition of two of the delegations seemed based in large part on the fact that the Chairman of the Administrative Council was given the right by the Working Paper to designate persons to serve on the Panels of conciliators and arbitrators (II). Some delegations expressed themselves strongly in favor of the provision making the President of the Bank ex officio Chairman of the Administrative Council (III).

16. I stated as my personal view that while I thought that it would be useful to permit the Chairman to designate Panel members, the right to do so was not essential and might be dropped if there were strong feelings against it.

17. Two delegations suggested that the rules of procedure were of such importance that they should preferably be incorporated in the Convention, rather than leaving their adoption to the Administrative Council (IV). Another delegation, also attaching great importance to the rules of procedure, suggested that a majority of more than two-thirds be required for their adoption by the Administrative Council and even suggested the possibility of requiring unanimity (III), while yet another proposal was to increase the required majority from two-thirds to three-quarters (IV). As against this, another delegation argued that all important matters should be dealt with in the Convention and that the rules of procedure, being of less importance, should be adopted by the Administrative Council by an ordinary majority (III).

18. With respect to voting in the Administrative Council, one delegation suggested that since the great majority of the Contracting States would in all likelihood be capital-importing countries, two groups of countries might be distinguished, as in the Charter of IDA, and a majority of both groups required for important decisions (III).

19. One delegation suggested that since it was contemplated that the Administrative Council would be composed of Governors of the Bank or similar important officials, it might be desirable to establish an Executive Committee (the Executive Directors of the Bank might act as such) to act between meetings of the Administrative Council and to be charged, for instance, with the nomination of a candidate for Secretary-General. On important matters the decisions of the Executive Committee would be subject to ratification by the Administrative Council (IV). Another delegation suggested that the Chairman of the Administrative Council should be able to consult informally with the Executive Directors of
the Bank (III). Both suggestions seem worthy of further consideration.

**The Secretariat (Sections 8 - 10)**

20. Two delegations suggested that the appointment of the Secretary-General should be entirely a matter for the Administrative Council and that its autonomy might be compromised if nomination of a candidate by the Chairman were to be required as a first step (II, IV). Two other delegations suggested that the Chairman should present the Administrative Council with a list of nominees for the office of Secretary-General, from among whom the Administrative Council could make its choice (II, IV). In reply to the latter suggestion I expressed the view that it would be difficult to find qualified people willing to offer themselves for nomination in these circumstances.

21. One delegation suggested that the Convention should state the qualifications for the office of Secretary-General, his term of office and the grounds on which he could be removed from office (II).

22. There was considerable discussion of Section 9(2) which declares the office of Secretary-General to be incompatible with the exercise of any political function, and with any employment or occupation other than employment by the Bank and the Permanent Court of Arbitration, except as the Administrative Council, with the concurrence of the Chairman, may otherwise decide.

23. Several delegations emphasized that it was essential to ensure that the Secretary-General would be able to perform his functions with complete independence and that he should in no way be regarded as a subordinate of the Administrative Council, the Bank or any other entity. Eight delegations expressed themselves strongly in favor of constituting the Secretary-General from the outset as a full time official of the Center (I, III, IV), although several of these delegations were prepared to accept, for practical reasons, that in the early days of the Center's operations the Secretary-General might also be an official of the Bank or of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (I, III). Two delegations did not think that employment by the Bank was incompatible with the office of Secretary-General (I, IV), one delegation wanted to exclude employment both by the Bank or the Permanent Court (III), while another delegation wanted to delete the reference to compatibility of the office of Secretary-General with employment by the Bank but was not opposed to simultaneous employment by the Permanent Court (IV).

24. At each of the four meetings some of the delegations questioned the need for the concurrence of the Chairman in a decision of the Administrative Council regarding the compatibility of a particular occupation or employment with the function of Secretary-General. I stated as my own view that such concurrence was not needed and could be dispensed with. One delegation thought that the exercise of a political function should never be regarded as compatible with the office of Secretary-General (IV).

**The Panels (Sections 11 - 15)**

25. With regard to constitution of the Panels one delegation suggested that no Contracting State should designate more than three persons (I), whereas another delegation suggested a limit of four (III). With respect
to the provision authorizing the Chairman to designate persons to the Panels a variety of views was expressed. Two delegations were opposed to this provision (II, III), another would prefer to see it deleted (I), while another questioned the need for the provision (III). As against this, some delegations strongly supported the Chairman's right to designate Panel members and one of these delegations expressed the view that the Chairman should not only have the right but the duty to make the designations (III). Two delegations proposed that the Chairman designate no more than two or three members of the Panels (I, II) and one delegation thought it desirable to specify that the persons designated by the Chairman should come from different countries (II).

26. With respect to the term of office of Panel members, one delegation suggested six years (III), another a minimum of four years (III). One delegation proposed that Panel members serve at the pleasure of the States designating them (IV), a suggestion which was opposed by two other delegations (IV).

27. There was considerable discussion at all the meetings concerning the provisions seeking to define the qualifications of persons to be designated by States to the Panels and concerning the relationship between these provisions and the later provisions dealing with disqualification of conciliators and arbitrators, but there did not appear to be any serious differences of opinion regarding substance.

28. It was generally agreed that, as States might be presumed to know where to seek advice before a designation, the second sentence of Section 15(1), which was in any event merely exhortatory, ought to be deleted. One delegation felt that in order to secure a balanced composition of Panels as between the various fields mentioned in the first sentence of Section 15(1), States might be requested to seek the advice of the Secretary-General before making their designations (I). In the opinion of another delegation, it would be advisable to empower the Administrative Council to screen persons designated to the Panels, and to accept or reject them on a consideration of their qualifications (I).

Financing the Center (Section 16)

29. Four delegations expressed the hope that the Bank would finance the overhead of the Center (I, III).

Privileges and Immunities (Sections 17 - 20)

30. Several delegations pointed out that reference to immunities and facilities "accorded by Contracting States to the representatives, officials and employees of comparable rank of other Contracting States" (Section 18(1)(ii)) did not afford an easily applicable criterion by which States could be guided. I consider this a justified criticism. It would be more practical to adopt as a criterion the treatment by States of international organizations and their officials under the relevant international agreements.

31. Several delegations expressed the view that Section 18(1)(i), which provides immunity from legal process with respect to official acts, should be made applicable to conciliators and arbitrators as well as to officials of the Center (II, III, IV). I share this view.
One delegation wanted to extend the immunity also to parties, counsel and witnesses (IV). Two delegations did not think that witnesses should be included (III, IV).

32. One delegation, while appreciating the reasons which had led the drafters to pattern the provisions on privileges and immunities in the Working Paper after those of the Articles of Agreement of the Bank, suggested that it might nevertheless be preferable to be guided by the most recent practice in this field as reflected in the Vienna Codification Conventions (III).

ARTICLE II

Jurisdiction of the Center

33. At all of the consultative meetings a great deal of attention was devoted to Article II entitled "Jurisdiction of the Center" and in particular to Section 1 of that Article reading as follows:

"The jurisdiction of the Center shall be limited to proceedings for conciliation and arbitration with respect to any existing or future investment dispute of a legal character between a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State (or that State when subrogated in the rights of its national) and shall be based on the consent of the parties thereto."

In fact, it was the only provision of the Working Paper to which possibly as many as one-third of the delegations addressed themselves.

34. What Section 1 of Article II seeks to do is to define the outer limits of the activities of the Center, which for all practical purposes is equivalent to saying the scope of the Convention. It is important to note in that connection that Section 1 of Article II establishes what might be regarded as a dual system of limitations or conditions. The overriding condition is consent. Unless the parties to a dispute consent to have recourse to the facilities of the Center, none of the provisions of the Convention become operative with respect to such a dispute. But even with the consent of the parties, the facilities of the Center will not be available except within the framework of a second set of limitations, viz.:

(i) The proceedings for the settlement of such a dispute are either proceedings for conciliation, proceedings for arbitration or proceedings for conciliation followed by arbitration;

(ii) The parties to the dispute must be a Contracting State on the one side and a national of another Contracting State on the other (or that State when subrogated in the rights of its national);

(iii) The dispute must be an "investment dispute of a legal character".

35. Type of proceedings. Two delegations questioned the useful-
ness of conciliation as a method for settling disputes and in the view of one of these delegations conciliation should be regarded as no more than a first stage, to be followed automatically by arbitration in case the conciliation effort should fail (I, III). As against this, two other delegations suggested that in order to secure widespread agreement to the establishment of the proposed Center, the proceedings under its auspices should be limited to conciliation (IV), whereas some delegations noted that the constitutional problems which the proposed Convention raised for their countries would disappear if its scope was limited to conciliation (II).

36. **Parties to the dispute.** Two delegations found unacceptable the provision which permitted a State to appear as a party to proceedings under the auspices of the Center when subrogated to its national (III, IV). Other delegations expressly supported the provision (III, IV). Some delegations thought that, in addition to States, a multilateral investment guarantee fund should be given the capacity to be a party when subrogated in the rights of investors (I).

37. Two delegations saw no reason for limiting access to the Center to nationals of Contracting States (I, III) and one delegation thought international organizations should be permitted to be parties to proceedings (II).

38. A proposal, made in Addis Ababa, and receiving support at the other three meetings, would extend the scope of the Center's activities by including political subdivisions and instrumentalities of a Contracting State as potential parties to proceedings under the auspices of the Center, provided they had obtained the consent of the State. This proposal was based on the consideration that in many cases such political subdivisions or instrumentalities, rather than central governments of States, deal with investment questions. The proposal, with which I am in full agreement, was objected to by one delegation principally on the ground that the State could interfere with the performance by the political subdivision or instrumentality of the substantive provisions of the investment agreement (III). In my opinion this objection is addressed to the desirability of entering into investment agreements with subordinate organs rather than with the central government, but does not detract from the usefulness of the proposal in those cases in which an investor has in fact concluded an agreement with such a subordinate organ of the State.

39. **Investment disputes of a legal character.** There were two distinct lines of criticism regarding the category of dispute covered by the Convention. At each of the four meetings there were some delegations which felt that reliance on a general understanding as to the meaning of the word "investment" reflected in the Preamble - the approach advocated in the Comment - would, on balance, create more controversy regarding the jurisdiction of the Center than would a more precise definition. Several suggestions were made for a definition of "investment" based on definitions contained in domestic legislation or bilateral agreements, but all of these suggestions appeared to be open to criticism. This led some delegations to conclude that the approach of the Working Paper - omitting a definition of investment - was preferable and others that a definition, if included, should be of a non-exhaustive character, listing the principal types of "investment" followed by a residual clause referring to "other transactions of a
like nature, or some such expression. This problem clearly needs further consideration.

40. Several delegations had difficulty in understanding the term "of a legal character" (I, III, IV). This difficulty may have been caused in part by the somewhat unfortunate phraseology of the Comment which distinguishes "disputes of a legal character" from "political, economic or purely commercial disputes". As was rightly pointed out, the latter classes of disputes may well involve legal issues. Other delegations proposed the deletion of the term as being unnecessary and carrying a possible connotation that issues of fact which might have a bearing on legal issues would be outside the Center's jurisdiction. I expressed as my own view that it would be useful to retain a qualification designed to limit the jurisdiction of the Center to disputes which, as one delegation expressed it, are in principle suitable for determination by a semi-judicial body. I believe that this objective can be met, and the doubts which were expressed removed, by the definition of a dispute of a legal character as a dispute "concerning a legal right or obligation or concerning a fact relevant to the determination of such a legal right or obligation". One delegation made an alternative suggestion intended to achieve the same purpose, viz. to eliminate the words "of a legal character" in Section 1 but to define investment dispute as "a disagreement on a point of law or fact or the conflict of legal views or interests in respect of an investment" (IV).

41. All the foregoing questions, criticisms and suggestions were addressed to the problem whether the terms used in the Working Paper were sufficiently clear to avoid frequent controversy about the scope of the Convention. They must be carefully distinguished from a second group of questions and criticisms, coming from delegations which raised the question whether all "investment disputes of a legal character" (assuming that term to be clear enough or, if necessary, clarified) should be within the jurisdiction of the Center, or whether some types or classes of disputes, although admittedly "investment disputes of a legal character", should be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Center even when the parties to such disputes wished to make use of the Center's facilities.

42. The following are typical examples of suggested exclusions:

(i) The jurisdiction of the Center should be excluded in case of disputes arising out of investments made prior to the entry into force of the Convention or some other specified date;

(ii) The Center should not deal with any disputes other than those arising out of investments made pursuant to an investment agreement with the host State or in response to special investment promotion legislation;

(iii) Same as (ii) but with the additional restriction that there must have been agreement at the time the investment was made that recourse would be had to conciliation and/or arbitration pursuant to the Convention;

(iv) There should be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Center disputes regarding the legality of acts of expropriation or nationalization, as distinguished from disputes regarding the adequacy of the compensation to be paid;
(v) No recourse should be had to the facilities established under the Convention until all local remedies, administrative as well as judicial, have been exhausted;

(vi) Proceedings under the auspices of the Center should be limited to questions of "denial of justice".

43. In reply to suggestions of the kind enumerated above, I pointed out that since the jurisdiction of the Center is limited by the overriding condition of consent, the exclusions desired by the one or the other delegation could be achieved by a refusal of consent in those cases in which in their view there was no proper case for use of the facilities of the Center. Refusal of consent would be an adequate safeguard for host States which did not want to become involved in proceedings sought to be excluded under (i), (ii) and (iii) above. With respect to the points mentioned under (iv), (v) and (vi), it was to be noted that agreements to have recourse to the facilities of the Center could be entered into either before or after a dispute had arisen. In both cases the parties had the fullest freedom to define the dispute which they regarded as "justiciable", the conditions to be fulfilled before access to the Center could be had and the law to be applied by the tribunal. With particular reference to nationalization, the question of the validity of an act of nationalization could only be dealt with by the tribunal if a host State had agreed not to nationalize or, in the absence of such an agreement, had specifically consented that the validity of this act could be examined by the tribunal.

44. The purpose of Section 1 is not to define the circumstances in which recourse to the facilities of the Center would in fact occur, but rather to indicate the outer limits within which the Center would have jurisdiction provided the parties' consent had been attained. Beyond these outer limits no use could be made of the facilities of the Center even with such consent. The question might be asked why, if consent is required and can be refused, the Convention need put any limit at all to the jurisdiction of the Center whether as to parties, subject-matter or otherwise. The answer to this question is that the jurisdiction of the Center should be limited in accordance with the purposes sought to be achieved by the Convention, that is, to provide new procedures for the settlement of investment disputes between States and private parties. Admitting this, some delegations maintained their view that further limitations were justified on the ground that refusal of consent might place Contracting States in an invidious position and would leave them open to "adverse inference" and criticism by the investing community (IV). These delegations pointed out, in that connection, that Section 2(iii) of Article II indicated that an investor could initiate proceedings against a host State without having obtained the latter's consent. While the host State could refuse its consent, in which case the proceedings could not continue, the fact that the machinery of the Center had been set in motion could cause serious damage to the reputation of the host State. On reflection I agreed that Section 2(iii) could have that effect, which had not been intended by the drafters, and that it should therefore be deleted. For the rest, I felt that there was no basis for the fear expressed by these delegations that refusal of consent would give rise to damaging "adverse inferences". Several other delegations shared my view and felt that the reluctance of some States to submit particular classes of
disputes to arbitration was no reason to narrow the scope of the Convention for all Contracting States many of whom had no objection to its present scope (IV). The consensual nature of the Convention enabled each Contracting State to apply it within the scope it thought appropriate. I believe that this essential element can be further underscored by strengthening the language of Clause 6 of the Preamble and by permitting Contracting States to make declarations under the Convention in which they could define in advance, if they so desired, the scope within which they would be willing to consider, always subject to specific consent on their part in any specific case, making use of the facilities of the Center.

45. One further point should be mentioned in connection with the discussions on the jurisdiction of the Center. Several delegations addressed themselves to the problem of avoiding access to the Center in insignificant cases. In a draft preceding the Working Paper; a lower limit ($100,000) had been fixed for the subject-matter of the dispute. That provision had not been retained in the Working Paper, because disputes involving small amounts could be important as test cases, whereas there would be other cases in which it would be impossible to place a pecuniary value on the subject-matter of a dispute. One delegation felt that a lower limit for the value of the subject-matter of the dispute should nevertheless be retained in order to avoid frivolous claims (I). Another delegation proposed that the limit be expressed in terms of the value of the investment with respect to which the dispute had arisen (IV). It was also suggested that the lower limit should apply only with respect to pecuniary claims (I). Still another suggestion would not express a limit in the Convention, but would give the Chairman of the Administrative Council or the Secretary-General discretion to refuse access to the Center with respect to insignificant disputes (I). Another delegation thought that insignificant disputes could be kept from the Center by requiring the investor to obtain his government's consent before seeking access to the Center (IV).

46. Preliminary questions. Some comments of a technical nature were made regarding Section 3(2) at all the meetings. It was thought by some that the list of questions of jurisdiction to be dealt with by a commission or tribunal in preliminary proceedings was incomplete and ought to be supplemented, while others pointed out that this provision should be redrafted to make it clear that the list was not exhaustive. In this connection it was suggested that it might be best (a) to avoid listing specific questions, and to substitute a provision empowering commissions and tribunals to decide questions of jurisdiction in preliminary proceedings and (b) not to compel commissions or tribunals to decide questions of jurisdiction as preliminary questions, but to leave it to them whether to do so, or whether to join such questions to the merits of the dispute.

47. The comments made on Section 3(3) will be taken up in connection with the subject of Nationality under Article X.
ARTICLE III

Conciliation

Several comments and suggestions were made about the provisions of this Article, which will be useful in redrafting the Working Paper but no issues of policy arise except with respect to the constitution of conciliation commissions and the adoption of conciliation rules. Comments on those two subjects are reported below under Article IV, Sections 2 and 3 and Article IV, Section 5.

ARTICLE IV

Arbitration

Request for Arbitration (Section 1)

The comments reported below apply equally in relation to requests for conciliation (Article III, Section 1).

50. Some delegations pointed out that there was an apparent inconsistency between Section 1 and Article II, Section 2(iii). The latter provision appeared to contemplate that an investor or a State might address a request for arbitration to the Secretary-General before the other party had given its consent to the proceedings, whereas Section 1 provides that the party making the request "shall state that the other party has consented to the jurisdiction of the Center" (I, IV).*

51. Several delegations expressed the view that the party requesting arbitration should submit to the Secretary-General evidence of the consent of the other party (I, II, IV). In my opinion such a requirement would be a useful safeguard against a party setting the machinery of the Center in motion without having satisfied the Secretary-General that there was at least prima facie evidence of consent to the jurisdiction of the Center.

Constitution of the Tribunal (Sections 2 - 3)

52. The two principal issues discussed under this heading concerned the circumstances (if any) in which arbitrators could be selected from outside the Panel and the exclusion of national arbitrators.

53. The Working Paper, although the drafting is not wholly clear on the point, intended to give parties freedom to choose arbitrators from outside the Panels only when they were in agreement on all matters relating to the constitution of the tribunal. In all other cases arbitrators would have to be selected from the Panel. Some delegations would have preferred that arbitrators should without exception be selected from the Panel (I, II, III). One delegation felt, on the other hand, that in the interests of flexibility even the Chairman should be empowered to make a selection from outside

* See, however, the comments on the desirability of Article II, Section 2(iii) in paragraph 44 above.
the Panel (II), and some delegations considered that at least the parties should be free in their selections to go outside the Panel (I, IV).

54. The discussion on the constitution of conciliation commissions (Article III, Sections 2-3) showed a similar variety of views.

55. The Working Paper excludes arbitrators who are nationals of the State party to the dispute or of a State whose national is a party to the dispute. Several delegations found this innovation an improvement over the traditional system of "national" arbitrators or stated that they had no objections (I, II, III). Two delegations pointed out that since States were permitted to designate foreigners as well as their own nationals to the Panel, the exclusion should extend as well to arbitrators designated to the Panel by the State party to the dispute or by the investor's State (I, III). Some delegations objected to the provision in the Working Paper and suggested a return to the traditional practice of appointing "national" arbitrators (I, III, IV). Two delegations expressed the view that parties should be protected against the possible designation of arbitrators who might be personae non gratae on political grounds, whereas one delegation would have the third arbitrator appointed by a drawing of lots among Panel members (IV).

56. In connection with the discussion on Article III, Sections 2-3, it was noted that while the Working Paper excluded "national" arbitrators, "national" conciliators were permitted. In explaining the reasons which had led the drafters to distinguish between conciliation and arbitration in this regard, I stated that the issue was essentially one of weighing the relative advantages and disadvantages of participation in the proceedings by "nationals". The advantage claimed for having "nationals" participate was to ensure that knowledge of local conditions and laws and familiarity with the views of the respective parties would be represented on the commission or tribunal. The alleged disadvantage was that "nationals" would be less likely to be impartial or to be so regarded. In my view there is a case for arriving at different conclusions in the case of conciliation and that of arbitration. In conciliation the main task of the commission is to bring the parties together and for that purpose the familiarity of at least two of the three members of the commission with the respective views of the parties may be helpful rather than harmful. In the case of arbitration the balance would in my view go the other way. As for familiarity with local conditions and laws, the arbitral tribunal could seek expert information and advice. For the rest, the tribunal's task is to decide disputed questions and I do not consider it desirable that in a three-man tribunal (which would be the rule) two out of the three members should be identified at least by nationality with the interests of the parties.

Applicable Law (Section 4)

57. This provision of the Working Paper drew comments from several delegations. In order to give relief to some of the comments made, it may be useful to recall the purpose and meaning of the provision.

58. Section 4(1) is based on the premise, which is in keeping with the consensual character of the Convention and generally accepted in international arbitration, that the parties can control the rules by
which an arbitral tribunal is to arrive at a decision of the dispute
which they have submitted to it. If the parties have agreed on the
law to be applied by the tribunal, or have agreed that the tribunal
shall decide the dispute ex aequo et bono, the tribunal is bound by
that agreement. The rule stated in Section 4(1) is accordingly
qualified by the words "in the absence of agreement between the parties
concerning the law to be applied, and unless the parties shall have
given the tribunal the power to decide ex aequo et bono". When these
qualifications do not apply, the tribunal must decide the dispute in
accordance with rules of law, and it must determine the law which is
applicable, "whether national or international". If the tribunal is
faced with a choice between several national laws, it will choose the
"proper law" by the application of generally accepted principles of
the Conflict of Laws or Private International Law, as it sometimes
is called. In some cases the tribunal may be faced with a claim that
international law should prevail over national law, e.g., where one
of the parties claims that a particular action taken under national
law, or a particular provision of national law, violates international
law.

59. Several delegations spoke in support of the text as it stood.
Several other delegations, while in agreement with the substance of
the provision, offered comments and questions. Two delegations asked
whether "agreement" between the parties regarding applicable law
meant an agreement entered into for the specific purpose of determining
the law applicable in the arbitral proceedings, or whether that term
would include an implicit agreement which could be deduced from the
facts and circumstances of the relationship between the parties (I,
III). On being informed that the drafters understood the term in the
latter, broader sense, it was suggested that the wording might be
clarified. One delegation pointed out that a tribunal which had
been given the power to decide ex aequo et bono, thus being permitted
to decide without reference to rules of law, should not necessarily
be prevented from applying rules of law. If there were any doubts
on this score, the text might be clarified (III). Two delegations
thought it might be desirable to give a tribunal the power to decide
ex aequo et bono of its own motion (II), and one of these delegations
suggested the desirability of including in the provision a definition
of "international law" along the lines of the U.N. International Law
Commission's Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure. Some delegations
suggested the desirability of including in the Working Paper some
basic rules of international law which should be applied by arbitral
tribunals, such as prohibition of discriminatory treatment, the
obligation to act in good faith, and prohibition of measures contrary
to international public policy or general principles of law (III). I
expressed doubt as to the wisdom of trying to include in the Convention,
which was a procedural document and should be kept flexible in order to
meet the needs of a great variety of possible cases, specific substan-
tive rules of general international law.

60. Two delegations asked whether, where a dispute arising out of
nationalization was submitted to arbitration and the parties had not
previously agreed on the applicable law, the tribunal could test the
legality of the sovereign act of nationalization against international
law standards (I). I replied that if the parties had agreed that the
tribunal could look into the legality of the act of nationalization
(as distinguished from the question of compensation) the tribunal would
be free to apply international law. One delegation suggested that the
Working Paper should specify that, regardless of the agreement between
the parties, a tribunal should apply international law only to the
international aspects of the dispute (III). Two delegations expressed
the view that where national law was to be applied, this had to be the
law of the host State (III). I pointed out in reply that while the
national law of the host State might be applicable in most cases there
might well be situations in which other national laws governed all or
part of the questions in dispute; a mandatory provision declaring the
law of the host State to be always applicable unless the parties had
otherwise agreed, would be at variance with normal practice.

61. One delegation had objections to the provision as stated in
the Working Paper (IV). In the opinion of that delegation the act of
making an investment in a host country normally implied that the
investor had consented to the jurisdiction and application of the
law of the host State in all respects. Therefore, a tribunal should
apply the law of the host State and should not be permitted to apply
international law in the absence of a specific agreement empowering
it to do so, and the Working Paper should contain provisions sub-
stantially to this effect. This view was supported by one other
delegation on the ground that the Convention should contain provisions
which covered the majority of cases and that in the majority of cases
most of the aspects of the investment were in fact intended to be
governed by the law of the host State (IV).

62. Although the overwhelming majority of delegations addressing
themselves to Section 4(1) found the provision fundamentally acceptable
as drafted, it may be useful to state why the proposal of the two
delegations referred to above would not be acceptable. Where a choice
has to be made between different national laws, there are rules of
law to guide the tribunal. There is no reason to require the parties
specifically to authorize the tribunal to do something that every
court and arbitral tribunal is called upon to do in every case
involving an international transaction. As regards the issue of national
vs. international law two points should be noted. In the first place,
the basic feature of the Working Paper is the establishment of an inter-
national jurisdiction and it is reasonable to provide that an international
tribunal will have the power to apply international law, unless specifically
restricted. Secondly, even an international tribunal would in the first
place have to look to national law, since the relationship between the
investor and the host State is governed in the first instance by national
law, and it would only be in those instances in which national law was
in violation of international law that the tribunal would, in the applica-
tion of international law, set aside national law. Therefore, it can be
said with justification that the rule stated in Section 4(1) in fact
covers not just a majority but all the cases which may be submitted
for arbitration under the auspices of the Center.

Rules of Procedure (Section 5)

63. Section 4 of Article III and Section 5 of Article IV provide,
respectively, that the conciliation rules and arbitration rules to be
applied (in the absence of a contrary agreement between the parties)
are the Rules adopted by the Administrative Council under Section 6(v)
of Article I. Under Article I, Section 6 above this Report has recorded
the views of delegations on the majority which in their opinion should be required for the adoption by the Administrative Council of conciliation and arbitration rules. Some delegations proposed that the rules of procedure be stated in the Convention or an Annex thereto, rather than left to be adopted by the Administrative Council (II, IV). I expressed serious misgivings about these proposals on the ground that they would impart an undesirable and possibly impracticable degree of rigidity. The Working Paper as it stood already dealt nearly exclusively with procedure. If delegations felt that specific points were so important as to require inclusion in the Working Paper, those points should be considered on their merits. The purely operational details of proceedings did not, however, in my opinion require this treatment. It would nevertheless be useful if draft rules of procedure would be available by the time a definitive text of the Convention was considered and I undertook to have such a draft prepared.

64. One delegation suggested that tribunals should be given the power to hold inquiries and require production of documents (I). Such powers are provided for, e.g., in the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure adopted by the International Law Commission. If this suggestion found general support, such powers should be specifically provided for in the Convention.

**Decisions; Awards (Sections 6 - 7)**

65. Several delegations addressed themselves to Section 7. They were in general agreement that the award should state the reasons on which it was based, that all arbitrators (including those dissenting from the majority decision) should sign the award, although refusal of a dissenting arbitrator to sign should not invalidate the award, and that dissenting arbitrators should be permitted to file a dissenting opinion (I, II, IV). A number of drafting suggestions were made regarding these points as well as with regard to notification of the award to the parties. In that connection it was noted that the date of such notification rather than the date of the award should be the relevant date for purposes of calculating periods of time within which certain action in connection with the award must be taken (Article IV, Sections 11 to 14) (IV).

**Procedure on Default (Section 8)**

66. Several delegations suggested that Section 8 should be expanded to assure that parties receive due notice of proceedings and to provide safeguards for parties who fail to appear without fault on their part (I, II, III).

67. Several delegations correctly pointed out that Section 8 was drafted in terms of a default by the defendant only, and that it should be redrafted to take account of default by the plaintiff (II). Some of these delegations also suggested that Section 8(2) as presently drafted goes too far and that the words "appears to be well-founded" should be changed to "is well-founded" thus requiring the tribunal to weigh the evidence presented (II). I agree with this suggestion which would bring the provision in line with the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure prepared by the International Law Commission.

68. Two delegations thought that the default procedure was a
departure from the consensual nature of the Convention, but several other delegations strongly opposed this view, pointing out correctly that the default procedure would only operate in the context of a voluntary agreement between the parties to have recourse to arbitration (II).

Incidental Claims; Counterclaims (Section 9)

69. In reply to a question whether Section 9 was intended to extend the competence of the tribunal I explained that this was not the intention, that no issue could be brought before a tribunal unless the parties had agreed that it could be submitted to arbitration and that the drafting would be clarified (I). One delegation suggested that the power given a tribunal by Section 9 should be possessed by it only if the parties had agreed to confer that power on the tribunal rather than, as provided in the Working Paper, in all cases except those in which the parties had excluded that power (II).

Provisional Measures (Section 10)

70. Several delegations addressed themselves to the question of provisional measures. The Working Paper gives an arbitral tribunal the power, unless the parties have otherwise agreed, to prescribe provisional measures at the request of either party to the proceedings. One delegation thought that the tribunal should, in addition, have the power to prescribe provisional measures of its own motion (I).

71. Two delegations saw a danger in provisional measures which might be in conflict with local law (I, IV) and one of these delegations suggested, therefore, that a tribunal ought only to have power to "recommend" rather than "prescribe" provisional measures (IV). I expressed as my own view that there is no reason to distinguish between the final award and provisional measures, as regards a possible conflict with local law. Two other delegations, agreeing with the substance of the provision in the Working Paper, suggested that it be made clear that a decision prescribing interim measures (or, as one delegation would have described it, an "interim award") was enforceable on the same basis as a final award (II, IV). I agree with these suggestions.

72. The provision in the Working Paper defines the measures which a tribunal may prescribe as those which are "necessary for the protection of the rights of the parties". Several delegations thought the criterion might be spelled out in more detail (by specifying such matters as avoidance of frustration of an eventual award, irreparable damage and urgent necessity and clarifying the term "rights of the parties") and an indication might be given in general terms of what the provisional measures would be (II, IV). While the latitude given to arbitral tribunals by the Working Paper is in accordance with generally accepted custom, I undertook to examine whether the provision could be given more precision.

Interpretation, Revision and Annulment of the Award; Final and Binding Character of the Award (Article IV, Sections 11 - 14)

73. The examination of these provisions of the Working Paper gave
rise to a considerable number of detailed suggestions of a technical character. Since no controversial issues of policy appeared to be involved, they will not be discussed in this Report.

Enforcement of the Award (Section 15)

74. Article IV, Section 14 of the Working Paper provides that the award shall be final and binding on the parties and that each party shall abide by the award and comply with it. If the Convention had dealt with disputes between States, no further provision on enforceability of the award would have been necessary, since the parties to a dispute would be directly bound by the Convention and could be expected to comply with their obligations thereunder. In any event, the relationships established would be entirely in the sphere of public international law. However, the proposed Convention deals with disputes between States, or State agencies, on the one hand, and investors on the other. It was therefore felt essential to include in the Working Paper a provision regarding the binding force and enforceability of awards in the municipal sphere. Such a provision would, moreover, be justified as establishing equality not only of rights, but also of obligations, between State and investors. If a State lost an arbitral proceeding it was under direct international obligation to comply with the decision; if a State won in a proceeding against an investor, it should be able to secure compliance by the investor who was not a party to the Convention.

75. Section 15 seeks to achieve the objective outlined in the previous paragraph. It provides in substance that an award shall be recognized as binding in each Contracting State, whether or not it was a party to the dispute, and that it shall be enforceable as if it were a final judgment of the courts of that State. Various aspects of the provision were extensively discussed at all four meetings.

76. A first group of comments was addressed to the question whether the provision as drafted would achieve its purpose, with which the delegations making the comments were in full agreement. Several delegations pointed out that implementing legislation would be required on the part of Contracting States and opinions differed on whether the Working Paper should contain more detailed provisions as to the specific measures to be taken by the Contracting State, or whether it was sufficient to rely on the obligation of States expressed in Article XI, Section 2 to take all necessary action to carry out their obligations under the Convention. A majority was inclined to the former view. I offered the suggestion that provisions along the lines of Article 192 of the Rome Treaty might offer an effective and precise means for the enforcement of awards through domestic procedures of each State.

77. Some delegations expressed concern about the legal and political effects of the enforcement provisions on the position of "third States", i.e. States which neither directly, nor through their nationals, had any connection with the dispute. They wondered why any obligations should be imposed on such States in connection with awards rendered regarding disputes to which they were strangers. I replied that recognition of awards in third States was not basically new since it was already provided for in the Geneva (1927) and New
York (1958) Conventions on the recognition of foreign arbitral awards. The Working Paper admittedly went further than those Conventions, by excluding a number of grounds of attack on the award permitted under the earlier Conventions, but this was a difference of degree rather than of kind.

78. A third group of comments dealt with the effect of Section 15 on existing law with respect to sovereign immunity. I explained that the drafters had no intention to change that law. By providing that the award could be enforced as if it were a final judgment of a local court, Section 15 implicitly imported the limitation on enforcement which in most countries existed with respect to enforcement of court decisions against Sovereigns. However, this point might be made explicit in order to allay the fears expressed by several delegations. One delegation felt that consent to submit a dispute to arbitration should carry with it a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to the enforcement of the award (II). Another delegation felt that failure by a State to comply with an award should expose that State to possible sanctions by the Security Council by analogy with Article 94 of the United Nations Charter (I).

79. A fourth group of comments dealt with the problems which might arise if local procedural law did not provide the type of enforcement measures which might appear to be required in order to give full effect to the award. The answer given by some delegations, with which I agree, is that, once again on the lines of the Rome Treaty, the Working Paper should provide explicitly that enforcement will be governed by the rules of civil procedure in force in the State in whose territory it takes place.

80. In addition, the following miscellaneous comments may be mentioned. Several delegates felt the need to prevent conflicts between decisions of arbitral tribunals and local law and suggested that exceptions to enforceability ought to be provided for in those cases (II, III). Some delegations were willing to accept that awards would not be enforceable if they violated the public policy of the country where enforcement was sought, or if they concerned issues which under the law of that country were not arbitrable (II, IV). One delegation suggested that although awards should be enforceable in all Contracting States, enforcement should first be sought in the States which, or whose nationals, were parties to the proceedings (III).

Interpretation of Consent to Arbitration (Section 16)

81. Section 16 attempts to set forth a simple rule of interpretation. While some delegations had no difficulty in understanding and agreeing with the provision as drafted, several delegations found the provision unintelligible without reference to the comment or read it as reversing the existing rule of international law on the exhaustion of local remedies, which is the opposite of what the drafters intended (II, III, IV). It is my impression that the intention of the provision is generally acceptable, but its text (and possibly its location in the Working Paper) need to be reconsidered.
Consent to Arbitration as Excluding Diplomatic Protection and International Claims (Section 17)

82. Section 17(1) of Article IV of the Working Paper provides that where an investor has agreed with a host State to have recourse to arbitration for the settlement of a dispute, his national State may not give him diplomatic protection, or bring an international claim, in respect of that dispute, unless the host State fails to perform its obligations under the Convention, e.g. if it refuses to comply with the award of the arbitral tribunal.

83. Several delegations, while agreeing that it was reasonable to require waiver of the right of the investor's State to bring an international claim, suggested that the reference to "diplomatic protection" should be deleted (III). "Diplomatic protection" was a broad concept which would cover any State-to-State communication with respect to the dispute and these delegations thought that diplomatic contacts might be helpful in connection with arrangements for the arbitration proceedings.

84. Some delegations felt that Section 17(1) was superfluous, since it was self-evident that no Contracting State whose national had agreed to have recourse to arbitration could espouse the case of that national, unless the State party to the dispute had failed to abide by the arbitration agreement (II). Two of these delegations pointed out that in many countries in the Western Hemisphere diplomatic protection of foreign investors was accepted only in case of denial of justice, and that Section 17(1) which proceeded on the assumption that a more general right of diplomatic protection or espousal existed, might be offensive to public opinion in such countries. One delegation thought that Section 17(1) would be useful provided it was amended to make clear that its provisions did not mean a limitation of the sovereign right of each State to include in its Constitution provisions prohibiting foreigners from having recourse to their States for the purpose of making claims through diplomatic channels (II).

85. Section 17(2) deals with the case in which the same facts give rise at the same time to a dispute between an investor and a host State and between the investor's national State and the host State. The example which the drafters had in mind was a dispute arising under an investment agreement between an investor and a host State on the one hand and under an inter-governmental agreement on the other. For that case Section 17(2) declares that the investor's national State may proceed against the host State notwithstanding the fact that the investor and the host State have agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration under the Convention. However, as between the investor and the host State the decision of the arbitral tribunal under the auspices of the Center prevails. The provision was included in the Working Paper at the suggestion of one of the European capital-exporting countries in order to avoid Section 17(1) being construed as excluding proceedings under the inter-governmental agreement. In that connection it may be noted that Section 17(1) deals with the right of espousal, i.e., the right of a State to bring an international claim based on an alleged injury done to that State in the person of its national, whereas Section 17(2) contemplates a situation in which a dispute arises with
respect to one of the rights or obligations of the State itself under the inter-governmental agreement. Although from the wording of Section 17(2) it could be implied that it was intended as an exception to the general rule in Section 17(1), Section 17(1) in fact deals with an entirely different case. The rule in Section 17(2) might be regarded as self-evident and the specific provision as unnecessary.

86. Several delegations thought that the possibility of two proceedings regarding the same facts, with the attendant risk of conflicting decisions, was undesirable (I, II, III, IV). Some of these delegations foresaw difficulties especially in the case of investments which were covered by investment guarantees (I, IV). These difficulties ought properly to be solved in the context either of specific inter-governmental agreements or the particular arbitration agreements between investors and host States. Section 17(2) does not by itself solve these difficulties. Moreover, the discussions at the consultative meetings have indicated that Section 17(2) could give rise to widespread misunderstanding. Since the provision has had the positive support of only one delegation, I believe that it would be wiser to drop it.

ARTICLE V - Replacement and Disqualification of Conciliators and Arbitrators

ARTICLE VI - Apportionment of Costs of Proceedings

ARTICLE VII - Place of Proceedings

87. All comments on these Articles were of a technical nature and did not raise any major issue of policy.

ARTICLE VIII

Interpretation

88. Some delegations remarked that, if Article VIII was intended to give compulsory jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice, several States might be unwilling to accede to the Convention (I, III) and two of those delegations suggested that recourse to the International Court be left to the mutual agreement of the parties (I, III).

89. Several delegations, however, expressed themselves strongly in favor of making it compulsory for Contracting States to submit all disputes on the interpretation or application of the Convention to the International Court, unless they had agreed on another mode of settlement (I, III).

90. Two delegations pointed out that while Article VIII provided for international adjudication by the International Court of all disputes or questions on the interpretation of the Convention arising between the Contracting States, no provision had been made to permit an individual party to arbitral proceedings under the Convention to have
a question of interpretation of the Convention brought before the International Court (I).

91. The Secretariat prepared a tentative draft of an additional provision which would permit an arbitral tribunal under the Convention, should a question of interpretation of the Convention itself arise during arbitral proceedings, to suspend the proceedings in order to permit the interested Contracting States to bring the matter before the International Court if they so wished (Doc. COM/AF/6, reproduced on page 52 of the Addis Ababa Summary Record, and distributed at the three subsequent meetings).

92. Several delegations welcomed the additional provision as being in line with the basic principles of the Convention (I, II, III and IV).

93. Some delegations, on the other hand, felt that the proposed amendment would have the consequence of permitting dilatory proceedings by the parties or to exclude from the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal its primary function of interpretation of the international instrument under which it would have been established (I, II, III and IV). Some delegations also wondered whether a decision of the International Court would be binding upon an arbitral tribunal (I, III and IV).

94. I replied that in practice one could be sure that an arbitral tribunal would feel bound to follow a decision of the International Court on a matter of interpretation of the Convention.

95. One delegation criticized the additional provision as likely in fact to permit an appeal against arbitral awards (I). Some delegations also criticized the additional provision as drafted, because it would permit the arbitral tribunal to pre-judge, as it were, the matter to be brought before the International Court by deciding whether the question "had merit and might affect the outcome of the proceedings" (I, III).

96. Several delegations stressed that, if the additional provision were adopted, the Convention should make it absolutely clear that the arbitral tribunal would not be relieved from its duty to be the judge of its own competence (III, IV).

97. One delegation strongly opposed the additional provision and, to a less extent, the original Article VIII because, in its opinion, it ran contrary to the spirit and purpose of the Convention which was to insulate investment disputes from the level of inter-State disputes (III).

98. Several delegations offered suggestions to improve and clarify the language of Article VIII and of the additional provision.

99. Some delegations asked whether the Center, directly or through the Bank, could not be allowed to obtain advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice (I, IV). I pointed out that under the present Charter of the United Nations, it seemed unlikely that the Center itself or the Bank on behalf of the Center could obtain such advisory opinions.
ARTICLE IX

Amendment

100. The Working Paper permits amendments of the Convention by action of the Administrative Council taken by a majority of four-fifths of the members of the Council and dissenting States may withdraw from the Convention before the amendment becomes effective.

101. One delegation suggested that, in view of the administrative character of the Council, any amendment ought to be approved or ratified by the Contracting States themselves (I).

102. Several delegations expressed their reluctance to accepting the possibility of an amendment of the Convention by a majority vote and indicated that such a system might be constitutionally or politically unacceptable in their countries (I, II and III). Some of those delegations proposed that, although an amendment could be adopted by a qualified majority of the members of the Administrative Council, it should not be binding on the dissenting Contracting States or, alternatively, these States could make reservations to the amendment (I, II and III). On the other hand, some delegations expressed their strong support for maintaining flexibility in the Convention so as to introduce the necessary changes if some provisions were found in practice unworkable (II).

103. One delegation pointed out that to permit reservations to amendments would create a very complicated legal situation since different provisions would apply to different Contracting States (III). An intermediate proposal was made by one delegation, which would permit reservations by dissenting Contracting States to an amendment adopted by the majority vote of the Administrative Council but the other Contracting States might require the dissenting States to withdraw from the Convention (IV).

104. In my opinion, the only practical alternatives are either to permit amendments by majority vote of the Administrative Council (or approval by a majority of the Contracting States) on the one hand, or to exclude the possibility of amendments except by unanimous action of all Contracting States on the other hand.

ARTICLE X

Definitions

105. Nationality. The nationality of the investor is significant within the framework of the Convention in that the capacity to bring disputes to the Center is confined to Contracting States and their nationals. It was recognized that a State would be likely to agree to assume obligations in relation to other States only if it or its nationals were to have an effective means of implementing awards through the procedural machinery of a Contracting State, and if the principle of reciprocity could be relied upon as an additional safeguard. It should be noted (I) that the nationality of the investor
is not here of significance in the traditional sense of the link
confering the right of protection on his State — a right withheld
in any event by Section 17(1) — and (2) that consequently the
definitions in Article X are of "national of a Contracting State"
and "national of another Contracting State", and not of the essence
of nationality itself — a matter left to be determined as a rule
by the tribunal in the light of domestic and international law.

106. The definitions cover both private individuals and "com-
panies" broadly defined to include private companies and wholly or
partially government-owned corporations. The method of definition
used is that of indicating examples of entities which a State could
if it so desired, agree to treat as foreign investors for the pur-
poses of the Convention. It must be emphasized that the definitions
do not compel Contracting States to recognize any and all the
entities within the definition as having the capacity to bring
Contracting States before the Center, although such an interpretation
of Article X was proposed by one delegation (II).

107. The Convention implicitly recognizes the principle that the
relationship between the Contracting State and its own nationals is
entirely a matter for regulation by that State alone, and excludes
from the jurisdiction of the Center disputes between the Contracting
States and its own nationals. That rule is, however, subject to the
exception provided for in paragraph 2 of Article X that a Contracting
State is expressly permitted (but not required) to regard one of
its nationals as a "national of another Contracting State" for the
purposes of the Convention where he at the same time possesses the
nationality of some other Contracting State; that paragraph also
permits a Contracting State to regard a national of a non-contracting
State as a "national of another Contracting State" were he to possess
concurrently the nationality of a Contracting State.

108. There was considerable discussion of Article X at all four
meetings. Most of the criticism seemed to result from confusion
regarding the significance of nationality in the context of the
Convention, the type and purpose of the definitions, as well as
of the fundamental consensual nature of recourse to the Center.
For instance, some experts objected to paragraph 2 which, in their
opinion, could have a variety of undesirable results. Thus, com-
panies with the nationality of the host State as well as that of
another Contracting State might take advantage of their foreign
nationality to bring the host State before the Center (I, III).
It was also suggested that recognition of a local company as
possessing foreign nationality as well, could give some sort of
advantage to the foreign State whose nationality was claimed (I,
III).

109. In answer to the first question I pointed out that it was
entirely within the discretion of the State, taking into account
all the relevant legal and political factors, to decide whether to
treat the investor as a foreign national and to agree to have
recourse to the Center, or to treat the investor as its own national
and as being subject to its local courts alone. As to the second
question, Section 17(1) would operate to prevent the foreign State
from affording diplomatic protection or bringing an international
claim in respect of the dispute so that a claim of nationality by
the investor could hardly give the foreign State any advantage in that respect.

110. Notwithstanding these explanations, the delegations which had raised the first question felt that in the case of private individuals to provide, in effect, that a host State might agree to have recourse to the Center with a person whom it considered as its own national (regardless of any other nationality that person might possess) would be hard to justify politically. Moreover, a situation in which a host State would wish so to agree was so unlikely to arise in practice, that the provision could be dropped without significant practical effect.

111. With respect to companies the Working Paper recognizes "control" by foreign nationals as conferring foreign nationality, thus opening the possibility that a company which was a national of the host State under its law might concurrently possess foreign nationality by virtue of foreign control. One group of delegations felt that many States would be opposed to recognizing that possibility (I, II). Another group pointed out that host States frequently required foreign-owned companies to be locally incorporated. If such companies could not be treated as "foreign", a large and possibly growing proportion of foreign investment would be kept outside the scope of the Convention (I, II).

112. Other delegations expressed dissatisfaction with the criterion of "controlling interest" because they felt that it was insufficiently precise besides being virtually impossible to apply in practice without complicated and inevitably protracted investigation of the ownership of shares, nominees, trusts, voting arrangements and other forms of disguised ownership (I, II, III, IV). In this connection it was suggested that the "control" test should be eliminated since the Convention would in any event permit a Contracting State to enter into an investment agreement with foreign individuals having an interest in the company, rather than with the company itself - thus avoiding the many complicated problems connected with internal corporate relationships (I, II). Some delegations, however, while admitting that this would be a workable solution where a company incorporated in the host State is owned by a holding company incorporated abroad, pointed out that this would not cover the case where the company in the host State was owned by a large number of individual foreign shareholders. They therefore urged that the "control" test be retained (III).

113. At all four consultative meetings Article X gave rise to considerable confusion and on reflection it would appear that the terms "national of a Contracting State" and "national of another Contracting State" may be used without further elaboration in the Convention and consequently that the definitions in Article X could be deleted without serious disadvantage. Each State may be relied upon to ascertain to its own satisfaction whether an individual or association of individuals (incorporated or unincorporated) is (a) one which from a legal and practical point of view is capable of assuming and discharging contractual obligations and (b) one which should be treated as a national of another Contracting State. In this way the element of freedom of contract obviates the need to lay down in the Convention detailed rules for treatment of problems.
like dual nationality, nationalities of convenience, effective nationality, minority shareholders nationality, etc. One delegation suggested that all that was needed was a rule of interpretation to the effect that consent to proceed under the Convention implied recognition by the host State of the foreign nationality of the other party (III).

114. Certification of nationality. Article II, Section 3(3) of the Working Paper, which provides that a written affirmation of nationality by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State whose nationality was claimed by the investor would be regarded as "conclusive proof" of nationality, was criticized by several delegations at all four meetings. Some delegations urge that as this provision left the issue of nationality entirely in the hands of the investor's State, it was weighted too heavily in favor of the investor (I), besides encouraging investors to assume nationalities of convenience so as to enable them to bring the country of their effective nationality before the Center (III).

115. On the technical side some delegations thought (1) that the complex legal nature of the status of nationality and the amount of investigation required to support it might make it difficult if not impossible in some cases to reach a definite conclusion on the issue and, therefore, to grant a certificate of this type (III); (2) that the certificate ought to relate to "citizenship" which was an internal status which the authorities of a country could be expected to verify, rather than "nationality" which was a status having international legal implications (IV); (3) that the nationality of a party might be relevant in determining the law applicable in the dispute, and, therefore, ought not to be determined by the unilateral act of one interested party (I); and (4) that in any event this provision ought not to specify the Minister of Foreign Affairs as being the one authority who could issue the certificate, since in some countries other authorities might be designated as competent in that respect (II, III).

116. There seemed to be a consensus at all four meetings that the certificate of nationality should be regarded merely as prima facie evidence rather than "conclusive proof" and that it should be left to a tribunal ultimately to decide questions of nationality. While I agreed that, on balance, it would be preferable to regard such a certificate as prima facie evidence of nationality, it should be noted that the significance of nationality in traditional instances of espousal of a national's claim should be distinguished from its relatively unimportant role within the framework of the Convention. In the former case, the issue of nationality is of substantive importance as being crucial in determining the right of a State to bring an international claim, while under the Convention, it is only relevant as regards the capacity of the investor to bring a dispute before the Center.

117. When nationality is to be determined. Under the Working Paper nationality is to be determined at the time when an agreement to submit dispute to the Center was concluded. Fixing of nationality at the time consent to jurisdiction became effective was intended to minimize the possible unjust results of involuntary changes of nationality - either to the nationality of the State party to the dispute or to that of a non-contracting State. Some delegations, however,
felt that on balance the possibility that injustice might be caused in such cases was of relatively less weight in comparison with the danger, inherent in the rule as stated, that an investor earlier recognized as foreign might later voluntarily change his nationality to that of the host State and still be at liberty to bring that State before the Center as his "foreign-ness" at the time of contracting would prevail. In this connection one delegation proposed that the Convention should require proof of foreign nationality both at the time of contracting as well as immediately prior to the award (IV).

118. Two delegations suggested procedures which might serve to avoid controversies regarding nationality: the investor might stipulate his nationality at the time of contracting, and if for any reason he changed his nationality thereafter, the agreement would be terminated unless re-negotiated between the parties concerned (II); where the investment was made in reliance on a law of the host State, the nationality of the investor would be that possessed by him at the time he registered the introduction of his capital into the host country under that law (III).

ARTICLE XI
Final Provisions

119. The main substantive issue raised during the meetings concerned Section 1 which provides that the Convention would be open to members of the Bank and "all other sovereign States". Several delegations suggested that the Convention, in accordance with the recent practice, should instead refer to "State members of the United Nations or specialized agencies" (II, III). One delegation suggested that only members of the Bank should be permitted to sign the Convention (IV).

ANNEX 1

Survey of Aspects of the Link between the Center and the Bank

General
1. The seat of the Center would be at the headquarters of the Bank (Article I, Section 2(1)).

2. The Center might make arrangements for use of the Bank's offices and administrative services and facilities (Article I, Section 2(2)).

3. The President of the Bank would be ex officio Chairman of the Administrative Council (Article I, Section 5).

4. The Governors of the Bank might act ex officio as members of the Administrative Council (Article I, Section 7(2)).

5. The annual meeting of the Administrative Council would be held in conjunction with the Bank's annual meeting (Article I, Section 7(2)).
6. Employment by the Bank would not be incompatible with the office of Secretary-General (Article I, Section 9(2)).

7. The possibility that the Bank might bear the overhead costs of the Center (implicit in Article I, Section 16).

Powers and Functions of the President of the Bank as ex officio Chairman of the Administrative Council

1. To call meetings or obtain a vote of the Administrative Council (Article I, Section 7(1)).

2. To cast a deciding vote in the case of an equal division in the Administrative Council (Article I, Section 5).

3. To nominate the candidate or candidates for the office of Secretary-General (Article I, Section 9(1)).

4. To designate persons to the Panels of conciliators (Article I, Section 11(3)) and arbitrators (Article I, Section 12(3)).

5. In the absence of a contrary agreement between the parties, to appoint conciliators (Article III, Section 3) or arbitrators (Article IV, Section 3) in cases of failure by either party to do so.

6. To appoint a person to fill a vacancy occurring upon resignation of a conciliator or an arbitrator without the consent of the other members of the commission or tribunal, or upon disqualification of a conciliator or an arbitrator (Article V, Section 1).

7. To take a decision on a proposal to disqualify a single conciliator or arbitrator (Article V, Section 2(2)).

Powers and Functions of the Secretary-General

1. To be the principal administrative officer of the Center (Article I, Section 10(1)).

2. On the instructions of the Chairman to consult with parties in order to assist the Chairman in appointing conciliators (Article III, Section 3(1)) or arbitrators (Article IV, Section 3) when that function was assigned to the Chairman.

3. To fix the charges payable by the parties for the use of the facilities of the Center within the limits fixed by the Administrative Council (Article VI, Section 2).

4. To be available in certain circumstances for consultation with a commission or tribunal in the matter of fixing the fees and expenses of conciliators and arbitrators (Article VI, Section 3).

5. To determine the place of proceedings after consultation with the parties and with the commission or tribunal concerned, in cases where the parties have been unable to agree to hold proceedings in Washington or The Hague (Article VII, Section 1) and to be available for consultation with a commission or tribunal when it has been asked to approve a place for holding proceedings agreed upon by the parties (Article VII, Section 2).
1. There were present: omitted

2. Mr. Wilson invited attention to the two documents before the Committee relating to the settlement of investment disputes viz. SID/64-3 dated June 10; a memorandum from the President on further action to be taken on the proposal, and SID/64-6 dated July 10; a report by Mr. Broches summarizing the principal points raised at the four regional consultative meetings. Mr. Broches would introduce the subject.

3. Mr. Broches recalled that, in addition to the two documents mentioned by Mr. Wilson, there had been distributed during May and June summary records of the proceedings of four regional consultative meetings. These summary records (Z7; Z8; Z9; and Z10 - Provisional) together with the Chairman's Report referred to, formed the background for Mr. Woods' memorandum. A decision on the matter had been deferred last year pending the regional meetings and it was now time to formulate definitive views. In his memorandum, Mr. Woods had taken the view that the Executive Directors should, in response to the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors in 1962; recommend to the Board of Governors that the Executive Directors be instructed to formulate a final text of the Convention with the help of legal advisers from member countries; taking into account the comments made at the various meetings and the views of governments; that text should then be submitted to governments as a proposal of the Bank for such action as governments would wish to take. In the course of the Committee's discussions of these documents, he would try to find appropriate language for the resolution which Mr. Woods hoped could be submitted to the Board of Governors at its Tokyo meeting.

4. He thought that it would be useful to bear in mind that the subject for discussion at the present series of meetings of the Committee of the Whole was the procedure for further consideration of the proposal rather than the draft Convention itself. He had, however, begun a review of the draft in the light of discussions at the regional meetings and hoped within the near future to produce a revised draft which would serve as the working document for further consideration of the proposal which would take place after the Annual Meeting.

5. Mr. Chen said that his government would continue to support in principle the proposal to establish an Arbitration and Conciliation Center for the settlement of investment disputes between governments and private investors. He believed that the Center, if established, would encourage private investors or stimulate the import of foreign capital into developing member countries of the Bank. The summary records of the four consultative meetings, which represented the considered opinions of legal experts from 36 member countries of the Bank, were very useful and constructive, and it now remained to crystalize those opinions into a working formula and to draft an agreement for submission to governments as requested by the Board of Governors at its Annual Meeting in 1962.
6. In his memorandum of June 10, 1964, Mr. Woods, while rightly pointing out that the language of the resolution of the Board of Governors left it open whether the draft agreement to be prepared by the Executive Directors would be submitted to governments for signature or for further discussion, had expressed the opinion that the draft should be transmitted for signature and ratification or acceptance. However, he favored a more cautious approach and believed that the spirit of the resolution implied that the agreement should be submitted to governments for further discussion. For that reason, while he fully supported Mr. Woods' proposal to establish a legal subcommittee to give technical guidance and advice for the preparatory work on the Convention, he felt that the resulting draft should be referred to governments not for signature or ratification, but for further discussion. That procedure could produce a perfect agreement which would be satisfactory and acceptable to the greatest number of member countries.

7. Mr. Broches pointed out that it was precisely because the Board of Governors' resolution in 1962 was not clear as to what further action should be taken that one had now to consider how to proceed, and Mr. Woods' proposal was intended to solicit a new decision by the Board of Governors that the Executive Directors, after further consideration of the proposal assisted by legal experts, adopt a draft which would then be submitted to governments not for further discussion, but as the last stage. Thus, the final decision would be taken within the Bank rather than at an intergovernmental conference. That did not mean, however, that the decision would be taken in a hurry or in order to meet a particular deadline. In any event, governments would be entirely free to sign the Convention or not as they wished.

8. Mr. Chen asked for further information regarding the terms of reference of the proposed legal subcommittee.

9. Mr. Broches said that no attempt had as yet been made to work out any detailed terms of reference pending the discussion of the matter by the Committee of the Whole and by the Executive Directors. He envisaged that the subcommittee would meet in Washington and would assist the Executive Directors in working out a draft which would represent the widest possible consensus, but that it would act as an advisory body rather than constitute a conference in its own right. For instance, the subcommittee might be asked to deal with a particular article or section which was the subject of controversy and to report their conclusions to the Executive Directors who would decide questions of policy.

10. Mr. Garland asked how large the subcommittee would be.

11. Mr. Brochas said that, as Mr. Woods had indicated in his memorandum, that would be a matter for the membership of the Bank to decide. He thought that each member of the Bank which wished to be associated directly with the drafting of the Document should have an opportunity to be represented on the subcommittee. While, in theory, this might mean that the subcommittee could consist of some 102 experts, in practice the number would probably be much smaller. Since the membership of the Bank was represented by only 19 Executive Directors, they and their constituents might feel easier if, during preparation of the draft, they were to have ready access to legal experts from the countries whose views they wished to canvass.
12. However, the approach to the composition of the subcommittee should remain flexible. Some countries might not be interested in participating directly, and might be satisfied that a legal expert from another country in their group would adequately represent their general views.

13. Mr. Chen said he would like to clarify his statement in which he had given his support to the idea of a legal subcommittee. He did not favor a subcommittee of representatives of all member countries, which would prove to be unwieldy, but would support the idea of having a small group of not more than, say, 25 persons charged with formulating a draft for submission to the Executive Directors and eventually to the Board of Governors.

14. Sir Eric Roll recalled that when the proposal under review was first made several Executive Directors and members of the Board of Governors had concluded that here was the germ of a very good idea. His reading of the records of the consultative meetings had convinced him that the idea was in fact a very good one and if brought to fruition would prove a very useful contribution to international economic development. As Mr. Brookes had clearly pointed out during the regional meetings, the proposal did not seek to impose a new legal structure and stringent legal obligations on member countries, but to provide a facility available to countries which wished to use it. He was sure it would be used in course of time, and that it would be highly conducive to facilitating capital investment and thereby, indirectly, the work of the Bank and its sister institutions.

15. While there had been a favorable response to the idea of such a facility, the task of actually creating it was beset with many difficulties, and could easily be frustrated by perfectionism. It would be simple, for instance, for the perfectionist to attack, say, the proposal for a legal subcommittee by referring to various complicated questions of composition, organization and efficient management. But those same problems would arise whatever further steps were taken, and it would be a pity to allow the trap of perfectionism to lead to complete frustration of all further action.

16. The one way to avoid such a trap would be for the Directors to act without excessive regard to political issues or individual predilections of Governors, treating the proposal as a matter to be decided within the Bank. The alternatives before the Directors were for them (1) to take the risks and attendant responsibility of proceeding along the path outlined by Mr. Woods - organizing the next steps primarily through the Bank but with the advice of several legal experts who would represent a kind of link with the wider community of the Bank's membership - or (2) to hand the proposal to governments to proceed by way of an intergovernmental conference. While he was not against intergovernmental conferences per se, the organization of such a conference was a formidable undertaking, and while the Bank might render every assistance as far as preparatory work was concerned, the outcome would, in his opinion, be very much in doubt.

17. For those reasons he would suggest that if it were still felt that the proposal was worthwhile and ought to be pursued without regard to its ultimate success or failure, the Bank should retain the initiative
regarding its implementation. To do so, it should secure the support of a sufficient number of countries through the method outlined in Mr. Woods' memorandum. This method was probably less fraught with risk to the ultimate objective than any other he could visualize.

18. He wished to make two further points: (1) governments might feel less committed if the Bank were to proceed in the way proposed, taking upon itself the task of preparing a convention which it would be open to governments to accept or reject, rather than by way of elaborate diplomatic consultations which, if organized on the initiative of one country or group of countries, would immediately create hesitation in others; and (2) it would be entirely open to governments even after the Convention had been submitted to them by the Bank on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, if there was a fairly widely felt need, to make the Convention at that stage the subject of intergovernmental discussion in the manner suggested by Mr. Chen.

19. Mr. Mejia-Falacio said that before discussing how to proceed with implementing the proposal he would welcome clarification of the answers to three questions. (a) The first was whether there was a general consensus on the desirability of establishing machinery to settle investment disputes. The answer to that seemed to be in the affirmative, and he himself had always urged that the Bank establish such machinery immediately. (b) The second question was whether the machinery had to be established by intergovernmental agreement. He would answer that question in the negative and suggest that it would be sufficient for the Bank itself to establish machinery which countries could use or not as they wished. (c) The third question was whether the Executive Directors possessed the authority under the Articles of Agreement of the Bank to set up a system of international conciliation and arbitration. He would answer that question in the negative, and if the Directors were eventually to establish such a system, they would to that extent be acting not as Executive Directors of the Bank, but as a group of distinguished citizens. If the latter interpretation were accepted, however, the weighted voting system prescribed in the Bank's Articles ought not to be applied, and each member of the group should have only one vote.

20. Mr. Brochas said that as to the question whether the machinery should be established by intergovernmental agreement or by corporate action within the Bank, he himself had raised the issue at all four consultative meetings. In that connection he had pointed out that while the Executive Directors could conceivably establish the institutional framework of the Center that facility would not be of real value unless certain other aspects of the system were capable of implementation through a binding intergovernmental agreement. While a few delegates had opposed the entire idea of facilities for conciliation and arbitration of disputes between governments and private investors, none that he could recall had taken the view that if the facilities were to be established that should be done by corporate action and not by way of an intergovernmental agreement. From this it would be fair to deduce substantial support both for the establishment of facilities and for their establishment within the framework of a Convention.

21. On the question of the Bank's power to deal with a proposal of the kind under review, he thought the Bank had that power, and that the Bank's powers were not limited to the specific transactions enumerated...
in its Articles of Agreement. He recalled that the majority of the Executive Directors (not just those exercising the majority of the voting power) had felt very strongly that it was entirely appropriate for the Board to sponsor IFC and IDA as being important steps in the promotion of economic development, and the interest of the Executive Directors in the present project was similarly oriented.

22. On the other hand, if the Executive Directors met qua Executive Directors and not as a committee, the only voting rules applicable would be those laid down in the Articles. In practice, the difference between applying those rules and the one-member-one-vote rule would be more apparent than real, as it would be difficult to conceive that a small group of Directors exercising the majority of the voting power would use that power in the face of strong opposition from the numerical majority to set up facilities which would be completely valueless without the participation of other member countries.

23. Mr. Garland asked whether the voting rules laid down in the Articles applied to voting in committee, or whether a committee could make its own voting rules.

24. Mr. Broches supported by Mr. Mendels pointed out that no vote was ever taken in committee, where the practice was to ascertain either a consensus or a balance of views. Opinion polls were, however, taken from time to time.

25. Mr. Garland thought that Mr. Mejia's fears might to some extent be allayed if, in the discussions of the detailed provisions of the draft in committee, polls could be taken of the views of the Directors and the final draft prepared on that basis. That draft could then be submitted to the Executive Directors for decision.

26. Mr. Wilson recalled that that procedure had been followed when drafting and adopting the Charter of IDA.

27. The meeting adjourned at 11:25 a.m.

SID/64-8 (August 4, 1964)
Memorandum of the meeting of the Committee of the Whole, July 23, 1964, not an approved record.
Continuation of the discussion started in Document 34

1. There were present: omitted

2. Mr. Woods welcomed Mr. Belin, General Counsel of the U.S. Treasury, as temporary alternate to Mr. Bullitt, and invited him to speak.

3. Mr. Belin wished to associate his government in the strong support of Mr. Woods' proposal (document SID/64-3 of June 10, 1964) for further development of the draft Convention on the settlement of investment disputes. From his experience as an expert at the Santiago meeting, he...
thought it extremely doubtful that a multilateral diplomatic conference could deal effectively with a Convention of such scope and complexity. Notwithstanding the care and skill that had gone into preparation of the draft, a number of troublesome problems still remained and it would be exceedingly difficult to deal with them properly in a diplomatic negotiation. On the other hand, Mr. Woods' proposal that the draft be considered by the Executive Directors assisted by a subcommittee of legal experts (which could be flexible enough to include anybody) seemed to him the most appropriate way to make progress toward a Convention while still giving full scope for discussion of the problems, questions and reservations that various countries might have.

4. Mr. Lieftinck said he was fully in favor of the recommendations contained in Mr. Woods' memorandum. After numerous discussions of the draft Convention by the Executive Directors as well as by legal experts at the regional meetings, it was clear that a large majority of the Board and of the legal experts were in favor of taking action in the matter. The course of action proposed in the memorandum would have the full support of himself and his government. He had on many occasions expressed support not only for establishing a Center for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes, but also for its establishment by means of a Convention. However, bearing in mind the possible delay in securing ratification of the Convention he had suggested that the Center be established even without a Convention which would cover the rights and obligations of participants. The majority of Executive Directors had now concluded in favor of setting up the Center by means of a Convention, and he was strongly in favor of the procedure recommended by Mr. Woods which sought to reduce delay, viz., to constitute the Executive Directors both a negotiating and a drafting body which would prepare a draft Convention in final form for submission to governments.

5. It would not be too difficult for the Executive Directors to obtain sufficient instructions, and he believed they were better equipped than a diplomatic conference for resolving the more technical problems involved in a Convention of this type. He would restrict the advisory group to legal advisers and perhaps to other experts designated by governments for specific purposes. Beyond designating their experts, governments ought to leave further deliberations in the hands of those whose primary purpose was to reach proper conclusions on the technical problems. In the circumstances he was in favor of all the recommendations contained in Mr. Woods' memorandum and hoped that after the conclusions of the Executive Directors had been reported to the Board of Governors at its meeting in Tokyo, the Executive Directors would, as early as possible, undertake the task of preparing a definitive text.

6. Mr. Illanes recalled that he had on previous occasions expressed himself as being in favor of a mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes through a facility for conciliation and arbitration, He had not, however, been in favor of establishing that facility by means of a Convention. That approach involved some issues that were still matters of controversy in international practice, and most Latin American countries would find it difficult to have such a Convention approved by their legislatures.

7. While most Latin American countries offered incentives to private
investors, such as special benefits in the matter of taxes, foreign import duties, amortization and transfer abroad of dividends, they had taken no initiative regarding submission of disputes to international adjudication for two important reasons, viz., (1) it was a basic principle in these countries that any claim of a foreign private party must, prior to submission to an international tribunal, be brought before the national courts, i.e., that local remedies must be exhausted, and (2) to offer a foreign investor a forum which would not be available to local investors would run contrary to the principles established in the constitutions of these countries guaranteeing equal treatment to nationals and non-nationals alike. In that connection he recalled that at the Santiago meeting some delegations had expressed themselves as fundamentally opposed to the idea of international arbitration of investment disputes, and he had the impression that most of the delegates there had indicated that their countries would find it difficult in the near future to overcome that attitude, which, deriving as it did from precedent or tradition, was firmly anchored in the national mentalities of these countries.

8. Two courses of action had been open to the Board: the first which was simple, practical and non-controversial, was for the Bank to establish immediately a mechanism for conciliation and arbitration which would permit the parties themselves to apply their own rules and procedures and which would allow the parties to seek the cooperation or the advice of the Bank if they desired it; the second was to create the facilities by a Convention approved by parliaments of member countries. In his opinion the latter procedure would in Latin American countries prove long and difficult and perhaps not completely successful. Moreover it had to be borne in mind that even if the parliaments of these countries were to approve the Convention they would eventually find that their constitutions did not permit them to submit disputes to the Center.

9. Mr. Illanes recalled that he had earlier urged that the idea of creating a Center be separated from that of establishing it by means of a Convention, and that the Bank should itself establish the Center by corporate action. While it now appeared that the consensus of the Board was in favor of a Convention and that his point of view was that of the minority, he would still urge that the two views were not so far apart, and proposed that the Bank establish the Center and, concurrently pursue the idea of a Convention.

10. Mr. Broches referring to Mr. Illanes' statement that there existed in Latin American countries constitutional provisions (or at the very least a strong tradition) requiring that all local remedies must be exhausted before there could be any question of international proceedings, pointed out that that position was not at all inconsistent with the Convention which left parties entirely free to require the previous exhaustion of local remedies.

11. On the question of equal treatment for foreigners and citizens alike, it was to be noted that the constitutions not only of Latin American countries but of other countries as well guaranteed such treatment to foreigners. In Latin American countries that constitutional provision had sometimes been given a special meaning in that it was held to prohibit grant of special privileges to foreigners. However, as Mr. Illanes had pointed out, quite substantial privileges were in fact given to foreign investors in the form of tax benefits, immunity from...
import duty, etc. so that the prohibition seemed to be applied only to any possibility of special treatment for foreigners in the field of claims and of international settlement of disputes generally. While this was admittedly the view of some Latin American countries at the present time, a number of delegates at Santiago had recognized that view as unfortunate and welcomed the opportunity afforded by discussion of the Bank's proposal to re-evaluate their traditional attitude. While these delegates had realized that their governments might not at the moment be able to ratify the Convention, and that if they did, that they might not be able to make very active use of the Center, they welcomed the fact that such a Convention was in the process of being worked out.

12. As to the distinction made between establishing the Center by action of the Executive Directors and making its creation dependent on the conclusion of a Convention, he agreed that one ought not to lose sight of the fact that the Center could (although in a much less satisfactory way) fulfill some function in the absence of a Convention. The feeling had already been expressed in the Board that if sufficient action were not taken on the Convention for two or three years, it would at such stage be useful to consider the desirability of establishing the Center by corporate action within the Bank pending receipt of the ratifications needed for bringing the Convention into force. But he had difficulty in accepting Mr. Illanes' characterization of the proposal to establish the facilities as non-controversial, and of the proposal to have a Convention as controversial. Public opinion in some Latin American countries was opposed not merely to the idea of a Convention but to the very notion of international adjudication of disputes between investors and States, and he could not see how the political opposition envisaged by Mr. Illanes could be reduced through establishing the Center (whose functions would be repugnant to those segments of Latin American public opinion) through corporate action rather than by a Convention.

13. Mr. Illanes said that in his view if the Center were established immediately by corporate action within the Bank, its existence would encourage some Latin American countries to submit to it their disputes with private investors under rules and procedures agreed upon between them. By this means it would also be possible to avoid to some extent the delays inherent in adoption of a Convention as well as the political opposition - based on traditional or constitutional grounds - which a Convention of the type proposed would arouse.

14. Mr. Broches pointed out by way of clarification that even under a Convention it would be open to the parties to a dispute to agree upon their own rules and procedures.

15. Mr. Hudon said that the issue before the committee was whether the Board, with the help of legal advisers, should proceed to draft a convention and submit it to governments for signature or other action, or to draft a convention which would be discussed at some kind of intergovernmental meeting. As between these two alternatives he favored the former for the following reasons. Most of the controversial issues had been identified in the course of extensive discussion in the Board and at the regional meetings, and the task of resolving those issues and formulating articles of a convention could be left to General Counsel who would receive the help of the Board and such advisers as might be invited to participate in the preparatory work. Questions such as whether
or not to establish a Center, whether recourse to the Center should be on a voluntary basis, or again whether an agreement to have recourse to the Center should be binding on the parties, were in a sense so simple that they were not susceptible to solution in terms which could be formulated in compromise language, and were thus not questions which a large intergovernmental conference could resolve. Another consideration was that a large intergovernmental conference would entail unnecessary delay and would in effect prevent those countries which were satisfied with the provisions of the Convention from signing it. Finally, the Bank was familiar with the field of investment disputes, and the Board as a result of its discussions of the draft Convention had become increasingly acquainted with it, so that it seemed to him that the Bank and the Board were best equipped to carry on further work on the subject.

16. However, he had some misgivings about the size of the advisory group now contemplated. In theory the group might consist of 102 representatives, but a realistic estimate of attendance might be nearer 50-75. While he felt that even that number would be unwieldy it might, in the circumstances, be difficult to reduce it.

17. Mr. Donner said that his government shared Mr. Woods' opinion that it could now be concluded that there was adequate support for the basic features of the proposal to establish an arbitration and conciliation Center. While he was aware that a number of governments still had difficulties with the proposal, and that there still remained issues requiring clarification, he supported Sir Eric's view that a search for perfection in matters of substance and a desire to counter every foreseeable risk ought not to be allowed to become obstacles to progress. In his opinion it was clear that the project could be brought to a successful conclusion and that the time had come to invite governments to instruct the Board to prepare a draft Convention.

18. After weighing the merits of possible alternative courses of action, his government had concluded that the draft Convention should be worked out by the Executive Directors with the help of legal advisers, and should be presented to governments for acceptance or such other action as they might deem appropriate. However, such a course would not, as Sir Eric had pointed out, prevent governments from deciding subsequently that they should themselves establish the text of the Convention. His government had, in part, been led to this conclusion by the emphasis placed in Mr. Woods' memorandum on the advice to be obtained from the committee of legal experts. Due weight should be given to the views of the legal experts on whom the Board should rely not merely for opinions but for definite conclusions on the many issues involved, and the Board should be slow to decide important controversial issues over the heads, so to speak, of the experts. He was aware that it was not the practice in the Board to ram decisions through by a majority of the voting power but on the contrary to try to achieve a consensus on any issue, and he felt confident that the Board would in this cooperative effort with the legal experts adhere to its normal practice in this regard.

19. Mr. Broches agreed with Mr. Donner's characterization of the role of the legal experts.

20. Mr. Mirza said that most member countries might be expected by now to have given careful consideration to the Bank's proposal and he doubted
whether any further intergovernmental or other discussion of the subject outside the Board would be likely to throw further light on the issues involved. The idea behind establishment of the Center, viz., that developing countries, if they wanted to inspire confidence among foreign investors, had to create the proper atmosphere, had been appreciated by a majority of the members of his group and, subject to any special points of view they had expressed at the regional meetings, been accepted by them.

21. He felt that it would now be reasonable to assume that member countries had given their agreement in principle to the idea, and to proceed further on the basis of that assumption. While certain issues still remain outstanding, those could be settled through discussion in the legal committee to be convened as envisaged in Mr. Woods' memorandum. Although he had not obtained the reactions of all the countries in his group, as far as he could see, every one of them would wish to be represented on the committee and he could see no objection to permitting this. He hoped that the legal experts would be regarded as travelling on the business of the Bank and treated in the same way as were experts designated to attend the regional meetings.

22. Mr. Woods referring to Mr. Mirza's last point, said that if the Board were in favor of having legal experts from every country attend, one way to assure this would be to pay their expenses. As to the facilities for holding the meeting the Eugene R. Black Auditorium seemed well suited to the purpose.

23. Mr. Broches said he had not reached a conclusion as to a desirable number of experts to form the committee. While it was to be hoped that all 102 members might not feel it necessary to be represented, it would not be possible to discourage particular countries from attending. On the other hand, it was clearly desirable that attendance be limited as far as possible to experts who planned to make a contribution. He thought that after the Committee of the Whole had reached decisions on questions of principle they might work out some schedule of the desirable number of advisers per group of countries, and take up the question of remuneration of experts.

24. Mr. Woods agreed that the question of remuneration of experts might be left until the end of the discussion.

25. Mr. Garland said that in general his countries regarded the Bank's proposal and its objectives as desirable. Much had been achieved on the technical side through investigation and full discussion, and the remaining problems might be dealt with by a widely representative committee of legal experts as now contemplated. While he was in agreement with the strategic objectives, he was, however, concerned about the tactics to be employed at this particular time in implementing the Bank's proposal.

26. In the past in order to bring about an international agreement, voluntary agreement on certain issues and preliminary discussion had served to build up the essential impetus toward the desired conclusion. He did not feel that sufficient impetus had as yet been achieved for the Bank's proposal even though a vote in the Board would show an overwhelming majority in support of it. It was important, however, to determine whether that would represent balanced support for the proposal. It appeared to him that while the capital-exporting group would support it, the capital-
importing countries - which the proposal was designed to benefit - were divided on the issue. Mr. Illanes' comments, for instance, had seemed to him to echo the doubts that had been expressed in Santiago and Bangkok.

27. While paragraph 4 of Mr. Woods' memorandum suggested that there had been general support for the proposal at the policy level, it had to be recognized that this view was based on the regional meetings which had been attended by legal experts who had discussed questions mainly of legal interest. It did not follow that those experts were briefed to express their governments' agreement to the proposal.

28. In the absence of broader and more enthusiastic support for the proposal, in particular from the capital-importing countries, he would be reluctant to place before the Board of Governors a memorandum which suggested or carried the implication that member governments had decided that the procedure now proposed was practical and desirable at this stage. He would, on the other hand, prefer the more cautious approach of first doing more canvassing of countries at the policy level and then reconsidering the position. Considerable time had thus far been devoted to study and discussion of the proposal, and he felt that as a matter of tactics it would be best to take a little more time to persuade countries to support the proposal.

29. Mr. Woods said he could not agree with Mr. Garland's view on how to proceed. It was abundantly clear that quite a fair preponderance of the Bank's membership felt that it would be desirable to set up the facilities. The Board was not required, in order to go ahead, to determine that any particular percentage of the membership held that view, and it was certainly not necessary to have anything approximating unanimity (however desirable that might be) in order to create the facilities. It was important to bear in mind that no member country, capital-exporting or capital-importing, would be bound to participate in setting up the machinery. The proposal was to create a facility; governments would be entirely free to decide whether, and if so when, they would make use of it. The comments of Mr. Illanes to which Mr. Garland had referred related not to whether it was generally considered desirable to set up the facilities, but rather to the question whether the facilities ought to be set up immediately (as urged by Mr. Illanes) or established within the framework of a convention.

30. Mr. Garland said that in his view it would be desirable to postpone a decision on the matter for a few months in order to try to obtain approximate unanimity in support of the proposal.

31. Mr. Woods saw no indication that anything approaching unanimous support could be achieved within the next few months. He agreed with Mr. Mirza's view that nothing could be gained by further discussion of the basic elements of the proposal.

32. Mr. Garland asked whether the attitudes of governments were fairly well known.

33. Mr. Broches replied that the attitudes of governments were in fact well known. It was quite clear that a number of delegates to the regional meetings had been under instructions from their governments, and this was
particularly true of delegates from governments that had hesitations regarding the proposal. As the discussions at the meetings had not been limited to mere approval or rejection of particular provisions but had covered broad issues of policy as well, it was likely that the Board had heard all the objections that were to be raised.

34. Mr. Garland had referred to the creation of impetus as being the way in which the Bank normally sought to bring about an international agreement, and he would like to point out that that was precisely the method now being followed. After the first mention of the subject in the President’s address at the Annual Meeting in 1961, the Executive Directors had discussed the general principles of the proposal. Subsequently the Executive Directors had again discussed general principles and the policy aspects of the proposal on the basis of a draft prepared by the staff; one of the main objectives being to decide whether the proposed machinery was desirable. Throughout those discussions governments had been aware of the basic principles of the proposal. Finally, the subject had been discussed at a series of consultative meetings, and he agreed entirely with Mr. Mirza when he said that the Board had now ample knowledge of the issues involved. While he agreed with Mr. Garland that it was desirable to proceed with caution and to create an impetus, he believed that the objective should be to achieve not unanimity but merely the greatest possible support and consensus. It was also important to remember that an excess of caution might serve to stifle impetus.

35. In his view the only way to compel governments to come to grips with both the policy and the technical aspects of the proposal would be to do as Mr. Woods had proposed in his memorandum and have the Board consider the draft with the advice of legal experts. Governments could then, if they so desired, take a position on the matter and thereby make their attitude clear if they had not already done so through the Executive Directors or through their delegates at the consultative meetings.

36. Mr. Garland asked Mr. Broches whether in the light of his knowledge of the views of various governments he could estimate the number of capital-importing countries which would accede to the Convention.

37. Mr. Broches said that while he could not answer that question, he could say that there was a fair preponderance of opinion among the capital-importing countries sympathetic to the purposes of the Convention. These, however, ranged from countries who were in favor of the proposal embodied in the draft as it stood, to countries whose support was qualified by reservations as to one or more substantive features of the draft. He believed that these differences of opinion were negotiable; on the other hand, the only way to ascertain whether that was true would be to try to negotiate them, and that was precisely the aim of the procedure proposed in Mr. Woods’ memorandum.

38. Mr. Woods, referring to Mr. Garland’s emphasis on the attitudes of the capital-importing countries, pointed out that the Bank’s proposal ought not to be characterized as being essentially and primarily in the interests of the capital-importing countries. In his view it was equally in the interests of the citizens of the capital-exporting countries.

39. Mr. Larre said that as a representative of a capital-exporting country he believed it was essential to ascertain the views and reactions
of the governments of capital-importing countries regarding the Bank's proposal. He recalled that with that end in view he had long ago proposed that the Bank, after preparing a draft, should undertake to canvass directly the views of member governments. Another means of ascertaining the views of governments was the series of consultative meetings which had just been completed, but it now appeared that the main objective of these meetings had been to elicit comment on the technical legal aspects of the draft prepared by the staff rather than to explore the attitudes of member States. The French delegation to the Geneva consultative meeting had suggested that the views of governments could be obtained most efficiently by convening a diplomatic conference but that method had been rejected as being too cumbersome. He saw no objection to the procedure now proposed by Mr. Woods and his government would support it.

40. Mr. Woods pointed out that a government, if it were asked whether it would accede to a Convention of this type would probably respond by wanting to study the document. With such a reaction in mind what the Bank was seeking to do was first to have legal experts formulate a clear and legally precise text. Had he been in the Chair when Mr. Larre had suggested canvassing the views of governments, his reaction would have been that it would not be practicable to approach governments until after a precise document had been formulated.

41. The Convention as now conceived was not a treaty which would on signature make it mandatory for the parties to take certain action. All it did was to create a house; the door of the house would be open and governments would be free to enter - to accede - with respect to a given controversy. The proposal had been discussed at the consultative meetings, over a period of some 9 months and had come to be widely known. He therefore felt that the meeting of the Board of Governors in September 1964 would be an appropriate occasion for the Executive Directors to ask the Governors for authorization as to the next step. He hoped it would be possible to recommend to the Governors that the Bank's proposal was desirable and request instructions to work out any remaining matter of detail and then submit the text to governments for such action as they might deem appropriate.

42. Mr. Machado said that as he was speaking in the Committee of the Whole and not as a member of the Board the views he would express would be his own and would not necessarily be those of any of the governments he represented.

43. He believed that of the various alternative recommendations that the Board could present to the Governors that suggested by Mr. Woods was the best. He had been surprised when at the meeting in Santiago, which was attended by distinguished jurists, there had been recognition of and praise for the idea of the Center, and many of the delegates had become intrigued with the solution offered by the Bank. Many of them had supported it primarily because of the essentially voluntary nature of recourse to the facilities which permitted the conclusion of ad hoc agreements in every case - either for conciliation or arbitration - and insured respect for the principle of sovereignty of States. Indeed one important Latin American country which had refused the Bank's invitation to participate in the Santiago meeting had, after hearing of the proceedings at that meeting and analyzing the Bank's proposal, become
interested in it and even asked to be invited to the Geneva meeting.

44. On the question whether first to formulate a convention, or to set up the Center, he had felt that the Convention method would result in inordinate delay. He had always been in favor of creating the Center forthwith and letting it sell itself to member countries through successfully settling a few disputes. However, he felt that the recommendation in Mr. Woods’ memorandum represented a practical approach to speedy creation of the Center. He was convinced that once the Center was created a number of countries would use its facilities.

45. Mr. Rajan said that many capital-importing countries had doubts regarding the principles embodied in the Convention which represented a radical and important departure from the accepted norms of international relations and international law. While there was a general appreciation of the problems with which the Convention sought to deal and the feeling that it should be pursued with all expedition, it would be desirable to have as large a consensus as possible on crucial provisions such as the jurisdiction of the Center. In particular, it would be desirable to obtain the enthusiastic support of the capital-importing countries.

46. He appreciated that no country would be compelled to accede to the Convention, and that even if a country did so accede it need not bring all its investment disputes within the Convention. However, in practice, after a few countries had joined there would be pressure on other countries to do so and in future every investor would ask that his investment should be brought within the jurisdiction of the Center.

47. It was his view that it would be helpful to convene a diplomatic conference or a conference of government representatives. While it had been argued that such a conference would entail delay, he felt that a delay of possibly three or six months would be justified in order to obtain the consensus and support of the large majority. If the Board were to accept the course of action proposed in Mr. Woods’ memorandum, he hoped that decisions would be made in the manner envisaged by Mr. Donner, viz., on the basis of a consensus of views rather than a vote. In conclusion he would strongly support Mr. Mirza’s suggestion that each member should be invited to send its legal expert to the proposed committee and that the Bank should pay the expenses of the expert.

48. Mr. Woods said that if it were decided at the end of the present series of discussions that the Bank should pay the expenses of delegates, the question would arise for what period of time the Bank should pay those expenses. If no period were fixed the Bank would be committed to an indeterminate obligation while if a time limit were imposed those who were rather less sympathetic to the creation of the Center might with some justification say that this was an attempt to limit the discussion.

49. Mr. Suzuki said that while the instructions he had received were not clear as to whether his government had withdrawn its earlier proposal that an intergovernmental conference be convened, his government felt that the time had come for an exchange of views at the official level, and that the Board and the legal committee envisaged in Mr. Woods’ memorandum could be the channels through which that exchange could take place.
50. As to the composition of the legal committee, he felt that it should comprise at least representatives of those countries that were interested in the Convention. He noted that problems could arise for those Directors who represented more than one country, as they would have to secure experts who were approved by their countries and authorized not only to speak for those countries but also to discuss the technical legal aspects of the draft. Among the technical questions of which he had been advised were a determination of the kind of dispute to be referred to the Center, and a possible duplication of functions as between the proposed Convention and those of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and international arrangements for protection of foreign property and investment insurance now under discussion.

51. Mr. Broches said that in considering the question of the composition of the legal committee countries might be divided into three groups, viz., (1) countries that were definitely interested in working on the proposal because they believed it was a good one or that it could be developed into something worthwhile or because they wished to study it with a view to participating; (2) those who were not really interested or whose present interest was not so active that it would induce them to send experts whom they might otherwise have employed on other projects; and (3) those countries which were basically opposed. One could invite (1) all countries and encourage them to attend; or (2) only countries which shared at least the view that the proposal was in principle a good one giving them, however, all freedom to suggest changes; or (3) all countries with the exception of those which were opposed, since the object was to draft a Convention and not to decide whether to draft one.

52. The legal experts would be expected to speak on policy issues as well, so that their participation would simplify, for Directors representing more than one country, the task of sounding out the views of those countries. In this way it would be possible to achieve the main benefits of a broad exchange of views without becoming involved in the technical and political complexities of an intergovernmental conference.

53. Mr. Gutierrez Cano said his countries were basically in favor of the procedure proposed in Mr. Woods' memorandum. He wished, however, to invite attention to two aspects of the matter. The first was his concern with the position in those countries which were not legally able to accede to the Convention and the effect of such a position on their future relations with investors from capital-exporting countries. Secondly, he would like to support the views expressed by some Directors that the Bank should assist member countries - or at least those which had taken part in the regional conferences - to send legal experts, as otherwise there might be room for doubt as to whether the proposal had received adequate support or whether all the opinions expressed on various occasions had been taken into consideration.

54. Mr. Larre said that regarding invitations to participate in the legal committee, he would prefer them to be restricted to countries which had expressed some interest in the proposal. Attendance at the meeting would then give some preliminary idea of who might eventually become parties to the Convention.

55. Mr. Woods said that Mr. Larre seemed to share with Mr. Garland
an uncertainty regarding the number of capital-exporting and capital-importing countries that had shown interest in the proposal. He had the feeling that there had been a very clear indication of broad interest. It was true that there were countries which were prevented under their constitutions from participating, but even they were interested in the sense of wanting to find out how the Center might work if it came into being. As Mr. Broches had pointed out there might also be a number of countries which just could not spare personnel to attend the meeting, and which might take the position that they would decide whether or not to participate only after the Center had been brought into existence.

Mr. Broches agreed that there seemed no doubt regarding the existence of broad interest in the proposal. The proposal was not, however, one on which a final view could be obtained at the present stage. One had first to compel countries to focus on the issues involved, and that would not be practicable unless they were presented with a clear and legally precise draft. While the basic principle underlying the proposal was a simple one, countries would be reluctant to give an opinion on it until they had seen how it had been worked out in the draft.

At Addis Ababa' and Geneva no objections of principle at all had been voiced, whereas at Santiago and Bangkok opinion was divided. In Santiago some countries - Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia - had categorically objected to the principle underlying the draft. Other countries - e.g., some of Mr. Machado's constituents - were very sympathetic to the proposal although some of them made it clear that their present constitutional provisions would make it very difficult for them to join the Convention and that they would have to study the matter further. Among the latter had been Venezuela, probably the only country in the world which had a specific constitutional prohibition against arbitration of international claims by foreign investors. At Bangkok, while the Indian delegation felt very strongly about certain points of jurisdiction, they had expressed agreement with certain other features of the draft. As he understood it, the position regarding the questions they had raised was one of having to meet certain points which in the view of the Indian delegation were essential. To summarize, he had no doubt that there was wide interest in the proposal and that there was a majority in favor of some kind of Convention. However, the procedure outlined in Mr. Woods' memorandum was designed to ascertain whether in fact a Convention could be agreed upon.

Mr. Chen said that his previous statement (SID/64-7, paragraphs 5 and 6) ought not to be understood to mean that he was in favor of inter-governmental discussion of the proposal. He fully supported the idea of convening a legal subcommittee to work in conjunction with Mr. Broches and the Board and wished to make it clear that he was not in favor of an intergovernmental conference as such. He quite agreed that such a conference would be unwieldy and would, in addition, take a long time. Once the text of the Convention had been established the Board could transmit it to members indicating that it was open to them to accept or not as they pleased.

As to the composition of the legal committee he would like to suggest that it consist of 19 members. There were many lawyers on the Board who could sit as members of the subcommittee while Directors who were not lawyers would have to depend on legal experts. Directors representing several countries might be asked to select a qualified expert

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1 See Doc. 25
2 Doc. 34
from among them - perhaps one who had attended a regional meeting. He would like to see the legal committee meet as soon as possible and would even suggest a time limit for its deliberations so as to avoid undue delay. He hoped that before the end of the year they might work out the text of a convention for submission to governments.

60. Mr. Woods said that further thought should be given to the question of the number of experts to be on the legal committee, and no decision needed to be taken at the present meeting. The idea that each Executive Director should have only one legal adviser did not, however, particularly appeal to him in view of the fact that some Directors represented a number of countries with a variety of shades and gradations of differences of viewpoints. Mr. Broches would probably be able to work out an acceptable scheme which would provide the Board not merely with ample, but with a generous amount of legal advice.

61. What the present meeting did have to consider was the recommendation the Executive Directors would make to the Board of Governors. While the present discussions were informal, he hoped that before the recess in mid-August the Directors would vote formally on a recommendation which was now being drafted.

62. Mr. Rajan said he did not think that invitations to be represented on the proposed legal committee should be limited to those who accepted the Convention in principle. In his opinion countries in all of the three categories enumerated by Mr. Broches ought to be invited with a view to having as many as possible (even those who now had doubts) adhere to the Convention eventually. He did not think it would be appropriate or desirable to exclude any country from attending and having their say.

63. Mr. Woods said that the object was to set up machinery which would benefit the preponderance of the Bank's membership and which clearly had their support. It was therefore more important to go ahead and create the machinery rather than spend a disproportionate amount of time persuading those who had doubts. However, he agreed with Mr. Rajan that it would be desirable to have the final draft reflect the viewpoints of the greatest possible number of countries. It would be helpful if countries were able to feel that the document reflected their views to the maximum extent feasible. That would leave the door open for them to sign in course of time.

64. Mr. Belin said that on the basis of his experience at the Santiago meeting he would like to support Mr. Broches' and Mr. Woods' observations that, although the regional meetings were unofficial and no one had been required to express his government's view, one could not help but receive a strong indication of what in fact the views of governments were.

65. Mr. Tazi said that speaking not only as an Executive Director but also as a representative of his constituents, he believed that the course of action outlined by Mr. Woods' memorandum was the most constructive one for two reasons. First, he doubted that a diplomatic conference on the proposal would reach any agreement within a reasonable time having regard to the nature of the issues involved. Secondly, it was important to set up the proposed machinery because it was certainly the best means of attracting foreign capital. In connection with his second point he would like to mention by way of example that one of his constituents had created
a very encouraging atmosphere for foreign investment, but that despite the incentives provided, investors were still reluctant to bring in capital. He hoped that the Bank's proposal would be implemented without delay and that the matter could be put on the agenda of the next Annual Meeting.

66. Mr. Woods asked Mr. Broches whether it would be possible at the present stage to outline to members of the Committee the steps they might take when the Board next met to consider further action.

67. Mr. Broches said that the first step would be for the Executive Directors to make a recommendation to the Board of Governors. He was now preparing a draft of that recommendation which would, in answer to the questions asked by the Governors (Resolution 174 adopted at the Annual Meeting in 1962), say that in the view of the Executive Directors it was advisable to draft a Convention, and ask the Governors to instruct them to do so as soon as possible taking into account the views of governments.

68. Meanwhile, a revised version of the Working Paper would be in preparation and would be ready by the end of August. The Board of Governors would, he believed, vote on the recommendation of the Executive Directors on September 10, whereupon the Working Paper would be dispatched so as to be in the hands of governments within 10 days. He thought that two full months would be ample time to study the document which had already become familiar to at least a few experts in most member countries as a result of its discussion at the regional meetings, so that the Executive Directors could start their round of deliberations - perhaps interspersed with meetings of the legal committee - about November 20.

69. As to the working of the legal committee, as he visualised it the Executive Directors might, for instance, take up Article I of the revised Working Paper and state their positions on important questions. That Article would then be referred to the legal committee which would be instructed to resolve differences, to seek a compromise. Among the matters to be discussed after the Executive Directors had completed their deliberations would be the note of transmittal which ought to reflect the consensus and the general tone with which the Directors would want to submit the document to member countries.

70. Mr. Woods said that if the Executive Directors made a recommendation to the Board of Governors and the Governors approved it, the Executive Directors might be expected to commence consideration of the draft with the assistance of the legal committee between November 15-20 and he hoped that all questions could be resolved by the end of the year. In January and February of next year the Board would consider the kind of communication which would transmit the draft to member countries.

71. Mr. Tesi said it was important that the legal experts be able to make statements in languages other than English, and that therefore appropriate arrangements should be made for simultaneous interpretation.

72. Mr. Lieftinck asked whether he was correct in assuming that there would be two more sets of meetings on this subject before the Annual Meeting, i.e., one before the recess to agree upon the recommendation to be made to the Governors and another after the recess to discuss the new draft of the Convention.
Mr. Broches thought that the new draft of the Convention would simply be a matter to be handled by the staff who would be ready to circulate it to the Executive Directors and their governments as soon as the Board of Governors had approved the Directors' recommendations. There would therefore be only one meeting of the Executive Directors on this subject prior to the Annual Meeting.

Mr. Donner recalled that the selection and composition of the legal committee had been left open earlier in the discussion, and he wondered whether they might now reach agreement on the matter.

Mr. Woods thought that question could be taken up when the Board met to consider the drafts of the recommendation and resolution to be submitted to the Board of Governors. Essentially, their object would be to get the best legal experts in the countries that were sufficiently interested to send experts and could spare them.

Mr. Garland asked whether there would be any advantage, in connection with the question of selecting legal experts, if it were to be suggested to each member country that the Directors would welcome a memorandum setting forth their views on the Bank's proposal. In his opinion it would be useful in this way to leave the impression that each member had direct access to the Board.

Mr. Broches thought that when the draft was circulated, governments might be encouraged (although he was frankly doubtful as to the results) to send either through their Directors or, if they preferred it, directly to the staff, any views which would be helpful in further consideration of the matter.

Mr. Najia said that he would prefer it if the proposed committee were to be composed of government officials of member countries rather than of legal experts. He also had misgivings as to the effect of the system of weighted voting in the decisions of the Board on issues raised in connection with the draft, particularly as it could happen that a Director with, say, 24 experts to advise him, would not have a fraction of the voting power of another Director with but one legal adviser. In the circumstances he felt that that system would be inappropriate and that some other method ought to be adopted.

Mr. Woods suggested that the Executive Directors and particularly those representing several countries give some thought to the problem of the composition and working of the legal committee and let Mr. Broches have the benefit of their views.

The meeting adjourned at 12:50 p.m.
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES

1. At the meeting of the Committee of the Whole on Settlement of Investment Disputes on July 23, 1964, I undertook to give further consideration to the composition of the Legal Committee to be established to advise the Executive Directors, as well as to the question of the expenses incurred by the persons serving on that Committee.

2. I have considered whether it would be possible to limit in some way the size of the Committee, bearing in mind problems of organization of the work of a group which could in theory number 102 persons, as well as the expense which this might impose on the Bank. However, there appears to be no practicable formula which would guarantee a balanced composition of a committee with limited membership, since very few of the Executive Directors representing more than one country represent homogeneous groups. I have therefore concluded that we should give every member government the right to send a representative to serve on the Committee.

3. There is attached a draft letter to member governments which, in accordance with the foregoing, informs each government that it may, if it so desires, designate a representative to the Legal Committee and explains the purpose for which the Committee is established. It will be noted that the letter does not urge governments to send representatives and it is possible that a number of countries will, for various reasons, not send representatives. The Executive Directors might also, in appropriate cases, suggest that governments designate a joint representative. However, I feel that we should be willing to accept the possibility of a large attendance.

4. As regards expenses, I have concluded that we should pay the transportation expense of representatives incurred solely for the purpose of serving on the Committee and that we should also pay a per diem. The details of these arrangements can be worked out after the Annual Meeting.

5. If the Executive Directors agree, arrangements would be made to dispatch the attached letter and its enclosures immediately after the decision of the Board of Governors.

George D. Woods
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES

9. The Executive Directors approved, with minor changes, for submission to the Board of Governors, the draft report and the attached draft resolution of the Board of Governors on the formulation of a convention on the settlement of investment disputes (R64-101).

10. The Executive Directors also approved the report (R64-105) recommending (upon the approval by the Board of Governors of the above draft resolution) the dispatch of an invitation to Governments to designate representatives to serve on a Legal Committee to advise the Executive Directors on the drafting of the proposed convention.

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Excerpt from the address by the President to the Board of Governors

The foreign investor, made to feel welcome, can be a most effective instrument of economic growth, not only because of the capital and technology he can provide, but equally because of the help he can extend in training the labor force and developing local managerial and supervisory skills. Consequently, we regard it as one of the important responsibilities of the Bank and IFC to do what we can to facilitate such investment.

One possible measure to that end is multilateral investment insurance, the feasibility of which we have studied in the past and to which, at the request of the recent United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, we shall again be turning our attention. Another approach, which we have actively sponsored, is the establishment of international machinery which would be available to deal on a voluntary basis with investment disputes between governments and nationals of other states. This is proposed in the draft Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes on which the Executive Directors have submitted a report to you. If you agree, the Executive Directors, assisted by a committee of legal experts designated by interested governments, propose to work out a final text for submission to governments in 1965 and I hope, early in 1965. This proposal, in my view, holds great promise. I recommend it and urge your unanimous approval of it.
III

I should particularly like to stress the opinion of the countries whom I here represent with respect to the draft Agreement on Conciliation and Arbitration.¹

We consider undesirable the resolution submitted to the Board of Governors, which recommends, and entrusts to the Board of Directors of the Bank, the drafting of an international agreement to create a center for conciliation and arbitration to which foreign private investors could have recourse for the settlement of their disputes with governments of the member countries, without necessarily having to exhaust the formalities and procedures of the national tribunals. It is believed that this would stimulate private investment in the underdeveloped countries.

The legal and constitutional systems of all the Latin American countries that are members of the Bank offer the foreign investor at the present time the same rights and protection as their own nationals; they prohibit confiscation and discrimination and require that any expropriation on justifiable grounds of public interest shall be accompanied by fair compensation fixed, in the final resort, by the law courts.

The new system that has been suggested would give the foreign investor, by virtue of the fact that he is a foreigner, the right to sue a sovereign state outside its national territory, dispensing with the courts of law. This provision is contrary to the accepted legal principles of our countries and, de facto, would confer a privilege on the foreign investor, placing the nationals of the country concerned in a position of inferiority.

I must state, Mr. President, that the procedure suggested does not meet with the approval of our countries because it contravenes constitutional principles relating to this question that cannot be ignored.

¹ See Doc. 43
² See Doc. 41
³ See, e.g., Doc. 47
conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between governments and private parties and, if they conclude that such action would be advisable, to draft an agreement providing for such facilities for submission to governments."

2. During 1962-63 the Executive Directors studied the subject-matter on the basis of a staff paper in the form of a convention for the settlement of investment disputes. At the end of that fiscal year the Executive Directors, on the recommendation of the President, decided to convene informal consultative meetings of legal experts designated by member countries, to consider the subject-matter in more detail. The working document for these meetings was a Preliminary Draft of a Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, prepared by the Bank's staff in the light of the discussions of the Executive Directors during 1962-63 and the views of governments. The consultative meetings were held on a regional basis in Addis Ababa (December 16-20, 1963), Santiago de Chile (February 3-7, 1964), Geneva (February 17-21, 1964) and Bangkok (April 27-May 1, 1964) with the administrative support and assistance of the United Nations Economic Commissions and the European Office of the United Nations. They were attended by legal experts designated by 86 countries and proved valuable not only in identifying and elucidating technical problems but also in supplementing the Bank's information regarding the attitudes of some governments.

3. Reviewing the results of the work done over the past two years, the Executive Directors have concluded that it would be desirable
(a) to establish institutional facilities, sponsored by the Bank, for the settlement through voluntary conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between governments and foreign investors; and
(b) to provide for such facilities within the framework of an inter-governmental agreement.

4. The Executive Directors are further of the opinion that as a result of the discussions and consultations which have taken place over the past two years, the issues of policy as well as the technical problems arising in connection with such an agreement have been adequately identified and elucidated and that the time has come to seek to resolve these issues and problems with a view to arriving at a broad consensus.

5. In that connection the Executive Directors have concluded that it would be advisable at this time for the Executive Directors to undertake the formulation of a convention on the settlement of investment disputes between States and Nationals of other States, assisted in this task by legal experts representing member governments which wish to participate in the preparation of a text.

6. In recommending that such a convention be formulated by the Executive Directors and submitted to governments, it is the understanding of the Executive Directors that the formulation and submission to governments, of a convention would be an act of the Executive Directors which would not commit governments. The Executive Directors would submit the text to governments with such recommendations as they may deem appropriate.

7. The Executive Directors recommend that the Board of Governors approve this report and adopt the . . . resolution.

This Report was approved and its recommendations were adopted by the Board of Governors on September 10, 1964.
RESOLUTION NO. 214
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES

RESOLVED:

(a) The report of the Executive Directors on "Settlement of Investment Disputes," dated August 6, 1964, is hereby approved.

(b) The Executive Directors are requested to formulate a convention establishing facilities and procedures which would be available on a voluntary basis for the settlement of investment disputes between contracting States and Nationals of other contracting States through conciliation and arbitration.

(c) In formulating such a convention, the Executive Directors shall take into account the views of member governments and shall keep in mind the desirability of arriving at a text which could be accepted by the largest possible number of governments.

(d) The Executive Directors shall submit the text of such a convention to member governments with such recommendations as they shall deem appropriate.

(Adopted September 10, 1964)

Voted against: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iraq, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
accepted by the largest possible number of govern-
ments.

(d) The Executive Directors shall submit the text of
such a convention to member governments with such
recommendations as they shall deem appropriate."

Pursuant to this resolution the Executive Directors have decided to
undertake the drafting of the text of a convention on the settlement of
investment disputes with the assistance of a committee of legal experts
representing member countries (the Legal Committee). Each member government
may, if it so desires, designate one representative to serve on the Legal
Committee, and your government is hereby requested to notify the Secretary
of the Bank whether it wishes to do so.

The purpose of the establishment of the Legal Committee is to provide
the Executive Directors with technical advice as well as to enable member
governments which are not represented by an Executive Director of their own
nationality to participate directly in the preparation of the convention.

There is enclosed herewith the text of a Draft of a Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States in English, French and Spanish (Document Z-12). The Draft is a
revision of the Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States dated
October 15, 1963 (Documents COM/AF/1, COM/WH/1, COM/EU/1 and COM/AS/1),
which served as the working paper for the regional consultative meetings
of legal experts held over the period December 1963 - May 1964 and reflects
the discussions at those meetings.

The Executive Directors intend to begin consideration of the Draft on
November 17, 1964. The Legal Committee will convene November 23, 1964 at
the Bank and it is hoped that it will conclude its work within a period of
three weeks. The Bank will pay the transportation expense of representa-
tives of member governments incurred for the purpose of service on the
Legal Committee as well as a per diem. Details of these arrangements will
be worked out in the near future.

In order to facilitate the preparation of the work of the Executive
Directors and of the Legal Committee, it will be appreciated if your
government, whether or not it will be represented on the Legal Committee,
will submit written comments on the Draft, preferably by November 1, 1964
and in no event later than November 15, 1964, addressed to the General
Counsel of the Bank.

Sincerely yours,

George D. Woods

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1 Doc. 43
2 Doc. 24
3 See Docs. 25, 27, 29, 37, and 33
DRAFT CONVENTION
on the
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES
BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS
OF OTHER STATES

September 11, 1964

NOTE

1. The attached draft Convention has been prepared by the Staff of the Bank in the light of the discussion of the working paper entitled "Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States" at the four regional Consultative Meetings held at Addis Ababa (December, 1963); Santiago de Chile (February, 1964); Geneva (February, 1964) and Bangkok (April, 1964). The Comment which follows each provision of this revised text indicates whether and if so to what extent it differs from the corresponding provision of the Preliminary Draft (P.D.).

2. Background documentation for this draft consists of the Preliminary Draft, the Summary Records of the discussion at the four regional Consultative Meetings (Reports Nos. Z-7, Z-8, Z-9 and Z-10), and the Chairman's Report on issues raised and suggestions made with respect to the Preliminary Draft (Report No. Z-11).
PREAMBLE

The Contracting States

1. CONSIDERING the need for international cooperation for economic development, and the role of international investment therein;

2. BEARING IN MIND the possibility that from time to time disputes may arise in connection with such investment between Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States and bearing in mind the desirability that such disputes be settled in a spirit of mutual confidence, and with due respect for the principle of equal rights of States in the exercise of their sovereignty;

3. RECOGNIZING that while such disputes would usually be subject to national legal processes, international methods of settlement may be appropriate in certain cases;

4. ATTACHING PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE to the availability of facilities for international conciliation or arbitration to which Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States may submit such disputes if they so desire;

5. DESIRING to establish such facilities under the auspices of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development;

6. RECOGNIZING that mutual consent by the parties to submit such disputes to conciliation or to arbitration through such facilities constitutes an agreement to be observed in good faith which requires in particular that due consideration be given to any recommendation of conciliation, and that any arbitral award be complied with; and

7. DECLARING that no Contracting State shall by the mere fact of its ratification or acceptance of this Convention be deemed to be under any obligation to submit any particular dispute to conciliation or arbitration in the absence of a specific undertaking to that effect,
HAVE AGREED as follows:

CHAPTER I

INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES

Title 1

Establishment and Organization

Article 1

(1) There is hereby established the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereinafter called the Center).

(2) The purpose of the Center is to provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes in accordance with the provisions of this Convention. The Center may in addition undertake such ancillary activities, including research and the collection and dissemination of information in the field of international investment, as the Administrative Council may, by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes of all its members, from time to time authorize.

Comment. Article 1(1) corresponds to P.D. Art. I, Sec. 1. The title of the Center has been changed and provision reworded. No change of substance. Article 1(2) is new.

Article 2

(1) The seat of the Center shall be established at the headquarters of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (hereinafter called the Bank). The Center shall make arrangements with the Bank for the use of the Bank's offices and administrative services and facilities. The seat may be moved to another location by decision of the Administrative Council adopted by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes of all its members.

(2) Conciliation and arbitration proceedings pursuant to this Convention shall be held at the seat of the Center or elsewhere as may
be determined in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII. In order to facilitate the conduct of proceedings at places other than the seat of the Center, the Center may make arrangements with the Permanent Court of Arbitration and other public international institutions for the use of their offices and their administrative services and facilities.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. I, Sec. 2. The provision has been reworded and, in addition, now includes the substance of P.D. Art. I, Sec. 6(vi) concerning removal of the seat. The two-thirds majority required for arrangements with "other public international institutions" has been deleted.

Article 3

The Center shall have an Administrative Council, a Secretariat, a Panel of Conciliators and a Panel of Arbitrators.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. I, Sec. 3, reworded.

Title 2

The Administrative Council

Article 4

(1) The Administrative Council shall be composed of one representative and one alternate representative of each Contracting State. No alternate may vote or otherwise act as a representative except in case of the absence or inability to act of his principal.

(2) In the absence of a contrary designation, each governor and each alternate governor of the Bank appointed by a Contracting State shall be ex officio the representative and alternate representative of that State on the Administrative Council.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. I, Sec. 4. In paragraph (1) the words "or otherwise act as a representative" have been added.
Article 5

The President of the Bank shall be ex officio Chairman of the Administrative Council (hereinafter called the Chairman) but shall have no vote. During the President's absence or inability to act and during any vacancy in the office of President of the Bank, the person for the time being acting as President shall act as Chairman of the Council.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. I, Sec. 5. Provision for the casting vote of the Chairman has been deleted and the second sentence reworded.

Article 6

In addition to the powers and functions vested in it by other provisions of this Convention, the Administrative Council shall

(i) adopt such administrative rules and regulations, including financial regulations, as may be necessary or useful for the operation of the Center;

(ii) adopt rules governing the procedure for the institution of proceedings pursuant to this Convention;

(iii) adopt procedural rules applicable to conciliation and arbitration proceedings instituted pursuant to this Convention (hereinafter called the Conciliation Rules and the Arbitration Rules, respectively) by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes of all its members;

(iv) approve the terms of service of the Secretary-General and of any Deputy Secretary-General;

(v) approve the annual budget of the Center;

(vi) approve the annual report on the operation of the Center; and shall exercise such other powers and perform such other functions as it shall determine to be necessary or useful for the implementation
of the provisions of this Convention and for the achievement of its purposes.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D., Art. I, Sec. 6. Clause (ii) is new and a residual clause has been added.

Article 7

(1) The Administrative Council shall hold an annual meeting and such other meetings as may be provided for by the Council, called by the Chairman, or convened by the Secretary-General at the request of not less than one-tenth of the members of the Council. The annual meeting of the Administrative Council shall be held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the Bank.

(2) Each member of the Administrative Council shall have one vote and, except as otherwise herein provided, all matters before the Council shall be decided by a majority of the votes cast.

(3) A quorum for any meeting of the Administrative Council shall be a majority of its members.

(4) The Administrative Council may establish a procedure whereby the Chairman may obtain a vote of the Council on a specific question without calling a meeting of the Council; provided, however, that in the case of a vote taken pursuant to such procedure, unless replies are received from a majority of the members of the Council, the motion shall be considered lost.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D., Art. I, Sec. 7. Provision has been made for meetings at the request of members. The previous provision for a vote without meeting has been elaborated.

Article 8

Members of the Administrative Council and the Chairman shall serve as such without remuneration.
The Secretariat

Article 9

The Secretariat shall consist of a Secretary-General, one or more Deputy Secretaries-General and staff.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. I, Sec. 7(5), worded.

Title 3

Article 10

(1) The Secretary-General and Deputy Secretaries-General shall be elected by the Administrative Council upon the nomination of the Chairman. The Chairman may propose one or more candidates for each such office. A majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes of all members of the Council shall be required for their election.

(2) The offices of Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General shall be incompatible with the exercise of any political function. Neither the Secretary-General nor a Deputy Secretary-General may hold any other employment or engage in any other occupation except with the approval of the Administrative Council.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. I, Sec. 8, unchanged. Para. (1) now opens the possibility of a list of candidates, and requires a two-thirds majority for election. Para. (2) no longer gives the Administrative Council discretion to permit exercise by the Secretary-General or a Deputy Secretary-General of any political function and now leaves decision on other employment or occupation (including employment by the Bank and the Permanent Court) solely to the discretion of the Council.

Article 11

(1) The Secretary-General shall be the principal officer of the Center and shall be responsible for its administration, including the appointment of staff, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
and the rules adopted thereunder by the Administrative Council. He shall perform the function of registrar and shall have the power to authenticate arbitral awards rendered pursuant to this Convention, and to certify copies thereof.

(2) During any absence or inability to act of the Secretary-General, and during any vacancy of the office of Secretary-General, the Deputy Secretary-General shall act as Secretary-General. If there shall be more than one Deputy Secretary-General, the Administrative Council shall determine in advance the order in which they shall act as Secretary-General.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. I, Sec. 10, elaborated.

Title 4

The Panels

Article 12

The Panel of Conciliators and the Panel of Arbitrators shall each consist of qualified persons, designated as hereinafter provided, who are willing to serve thereon.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. I, Secs. 11(1) and 12(1) combined.

Article 13

(1) Each Contracting State may designate to each Panel four persons who may but need not be its nationals.

(2) The Chairman may designate ten persons to each Panel. The persons so designated to a Panel shall each have a different nationality.

Comment. P.D. Art. I, Secs. 11(2) and 12(2) are combined in Article 13(1); P.D. Art. I, Secs. 11(3) and 12(3) are combined in modified form in Article 13(2).

Article 14

(1) Persons designated to serve on the Panels shall be persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the fields of law,
commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to exercise independent judgment.

(2) The Chairman, in designating persons to Panels, shall in addition pay due regard to the importance of assuring representation on the Panels of the principal legal systems of the world and of the main forms of economic activity.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. I, Sec. 15. The second sentence of Sec. 15(1) has been deleted and its provisions reworded and elaborated. Section 15(2) is substantially unchanged.

Article 15

(1) Panel members shall serve for four years.

(2) In case of death or resignation of a member of either Panel, the Contracting State or the Chairman, as the case may be, which or who had designated the member, shall have the right to designate another person to serve for the remainder of that member's term.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. I, Sec. 13.

Article 16

(1) Designation to serve on one Panel shall not preclude designation to serve on the other.

(2) If a person shall have been designated to serve on a Panel by more than one Contracting State, or by one or more Contracting States and the Chairman, he shall be deemed to have been designated by the authority which first designated him or, if one such authority is the State of which he is a national, by that State.

(3) All designations shall be notified to the Secretary-General and shall take effect from the date on which the notification is received.

Comment. Para. (1) corresponds to P.D. Art. I, Sec. 14(1), unchanged; para. (2) corresponds to Sec. 14(2) modified; para. (3) is new.
Article 17

To the extent that expenditure of the Center cannot be met out of charges for the use of its facilities, or out of other receipts, it shall be borne by the Contracting States which are members of the Bank in proportion to their respective subscriptions to the capital stock of the Bank, and by Contracting States which are not members of the Bank in accordance with rules adopted by the Administrative Council.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. I, Sec. 16, unchanged.

Title 6
Status, Immunities and Privileges

Article 18

The Center shall have international legal personality. To enable the Center to fulfil its functions, it shall have in the territories of each Contracting State the capacity, immunities and privileges hereinafter set forth.

Comment. This Article and Article 19 are an elaboration of P.D. Art. I, Sec. 1.

Article 19

The Center shall have the capacity

(i) to contract;

(ii) to acquire and dispose of movable and immovable property; and

(iii) to institute legal proceedings.

Article 20

The Center, its property and assets shall enjoy immunity from all legal process.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. I, Sec. 17, elaborated.
Article 21

The Chairman, the members of the Administrative Council, persons acting as conciliators or arbitrators, and the officers and employees of the Secretariat

(i) shall be immune from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity;

(ii) not being local nationals shall be accorded the same immunities from immigration restrictions, alien registration requirements and national service obligations, the same facilities as regards exchange restrictions and the same treatment in respect of travelling facilities as are accorded by Contracting States to the representatives, officials and employees of comparable rank of other Contracting States.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. I, Sec. 18(1) extended to apply to conciliators and arbitrators.

Article 22

The agents, counsel, advocates, witnesses, experts and other persons participating in proceedings pursuant to this Convention shall be accorded in any Contracting State where their presence is required in connection with such proceedings such immunities and facilities for residence and travel as may be necessary for the independent exercise of their functions.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. I, Sec. 18(2), redrafted.

Article 23

(1) The archives of the Center shall be inviolable.

(2) The official communications of the Center shall be accorded by each Contracting State the same treatment as is accorded to the official communications of other Contracting States.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. I, Sec. 19, unchanged.
Article 24

(1) The Center, its assets, property and income, and its operations and transactions authorized by this Convention shall be immune from all taxation and customs duties. The Center shall also be immune from liability for the collection or payment of any taxes or customs duties.

(2) No tax shall be levied on or in respect of expense allowances paid by the Center to the Chairman or members of the Administrative Council, or on or in respect of salaries or emoluments paid by the Center to officials or employees of the Secretariat who are not local nationals.

(3) No tax shall be levied on or in respect of fees or expense allowances received by persons acting as conciliators or arbitrators in proceedings pursuant to this Convention for their services in such proceedings, if the sole jurisdictional basis for such tax shall be the location of the Center or the place where such proceedings are conducted or the place where such fees or allowances are paid.

Comment. Para. (1) corresponds to P.D. Art. I, Sec. 20(1), unchanged; paras. (2) and (3) correspond to Secs. 20(2) and 20(3), reworded.

Article 25

Each Contracting State shall take such action as may be necessary in its own territories for the purposes of making the provisions of this Title effective in terms of its own law.

Comment. Article 25 is new. It is based on Art. VII, Sec. 10 of the Articles of Agreement of the Bank.

CHAPTER II

JURISDICTION OF THE CENTER

Article 26

(1) The jurisdiction of the Center shall extend to all legal disputes
between a Contracting State (or one of its political subdivisions or agencies) and a national of another Contracting State, arising out of or in connection with any investment, which the parties to such disputes have consented to submit to it.

(2) Consent to the submission of any dispute to the Center shall be in writing. It may be given either before or after the dispute has arisen. Consent by a political subdivision or agency of a Contracting State shall require the approval of that State.

Comment. Combines P.D. Art. II, Secs. 1 and 2(ii), modified. Secs. 2(ii) and 2(iii) have been deleted. Article 26 permits a political subdivision or agency of a Contracting State, under the conditions stated, to be a party to a dispute before the Center.

Article 27

(1) Consent to have recourse to arbitration pursuant to this Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, be deemed consent to have recourse to such proceedings to the exclusion of any other remedy.

(2) Consent by a Contracting State to the submission of any dispute with a national of another Contracting State to the Center shall, unless otherwise stated, be deemed consent to the substitution of that national in proceedings pursuant to this Convention by its State or by any public international institution if that State or institution, having compensated such national for its claim, has been subrogated to its rights.

Comment. Article 27(1) corresponds to P.D. Art. IV, Sec. 16, reworded. The idea formerly expressed in the parenthetical clause of P.D. Art. II, Sec. 1 is now elaborated in Article 27(2) and extended to cover an international investment guarantee fund.

Article 28

No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection or bring an international claim in respect of a dispute which one of its
nationals and another Contracting State shall have consented to
submit or shall have submitted to arbitration pursuant to this
Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have failed to
abide by and comply with the award rendered in such dispute.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. IV, Sec. 17(1),
rewarded.

Article 29

Any Contracting State may at any time transmit to the Secretary-
General for purposes of information a statement indicating in general
or specific terms the class or classes of dispute within the jurisdiction
of the Center which it would in principle consider submitting to con-
ciliation or arbitration pursuant to this Convention. Such statement
shall not constitute, or be deemed to constitute, the consent
required by Article 26.

Comment. Article 29 is new.

Article 30

For the purpose of this Chapter

(i) "investment" means any contribution of money or other
asset of economic value for an indefinite period or, if the period
be defined, for not less than five years;

(ii) "legal dispute" means any dispute concerning a legal
right or obligation or concerning a fact relevant to the determination
of a legal right or obligation;

(iii) "national of another Contracting State" means (a) any
natural person who possessed the nationality of a Contracting State
other than the State party to the dispute on the date on which the
parties consented to jurisdiction of the Center in respect of that
dispute as well as on the date on which proceedings were instituted
pursuant to this Convention; and (b) any juridical person which possessed the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to the jurisdiction of the Center in respect of that dispute, and any juridical person which the parties have agreed shall be treated as a "national of another Contracting State".

Comment. Paras. (i) and (ii) of Article 30 are new. Para. (iii) replaces P.D. Art. X.

CHAPTER III
CONCILIATION

Title 1
Request for Conciliation

Article 31
(1) Any Contracting State or any national of a Contracting State wishing to institute conciliation proceedings pursuant to this Convention shall address a request to that effect to the Secretary-General in writing.

(2) The request shall contain information concerning the subject-matter of the dispute, the identity of the parties and their consent to conciliation sufficient to establish prima facie that the dispute is within the jurisdiction of the Center.

(3) The Secretary-General shall forthwith notify the other party to the dispute of the request, if it is found to conform to the provisions of paragraph (2) of this Article.

Comment. Para. (1) corresponds to P.D. Art. III, Sec. 1. Paras. (2) and (3) are new.

Title 2
Constitution of the Conciliation Commission
Article 32

(1) A Conciliation Commission (hereinafter called the Commission) shall be constituted as soon as possible after the request made pursuant to Article 31.

(2) (a) The Commission shall consist of a sole conciliator or any uneven number of conciliators appointed as the parties shall agree.

(b) Where the parties have not agreed upon the number of conciliators and the mode of their appointment, the Commission shall consist of three conciliators, one conciliator appointed by each party and the third, who shall be the president of the Commission, appointed by agreement of the parties.

Comment. Para. (1) is new. Para. (2) corresponds to P.D. Art. III, Sec. 2, elaborated.

Article 33

If the Commission shall not have been constituted within three months after notice of the request has been dispatched by the Secretary-General pursuant to Article 31(3), or such other period as the parties may agree, the Chairman shall, at the request of either party, and after consultation with both, appoint the conciliator or conciliators not yet appointed.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. III, Sec. 3(1), modified.

Article 34

(1) Any conciliator appointed pursuant to Article 32(2) (b) or Article 33 shall be selected from the Panel of Conciliators.

(2) Any conciliator appointed from outside the Panel of Conciliators shall possess the qualifications stated in Article 14(1).

Comment. Article 34(1) combines provisions for appointment from the Panel of Conciliators formerly contained in P.D. Art. III, Sec. 2(2) and P.D. Art. III, Sec. 3(2). Article 34(2) is new.
Title 3

Powers and Functions of the Commission

Article 35

(1) The Commission shall be the judge of its own competence.

(2) The Commission shall be constituted notwithstanding any claim of a party to the dispute that that dispute is not one in respect of which conciliation proceedings may be instituted pursuant to this Convention, or is not within the scope of its consent to such proceedings. Such claim shall be submitted to the Commission which shall determine whether to deal with it as a preliminary question or to join it to the merits of the dispute.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. II, Secs. 3(1) and 3(2), to the extent applicable to conciliation proceedings. The new text leaves it to the discretion of the Commission whether or not to deal with objections to its competence as preliminary questions. P.D. Art. II, Sec. 3(3) has been deleted.

Article 36

Except as the parties shall otherwise agree, any conciliation proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the Conciliation Rules in effect on the date on which the consent to conciliation was given. If any question of procedure arises which is not covered by the Conciliation Rules or such other rules as may be agreed by the parties, the Commission shall decide that question.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. III, Sec. 4, modified to conform to the corresponding provisions in Chapter IV.

Article 37

(1) It shall be the duty of the Commission to clarify the issues in dispute between the parties and to endeavor to bring about agreement between them upon mutually acceptable terms. To that end, the Commission
may at any stage of the proceedings and from time to time recommend terms of settlement to the parties.

(2) If the parties reach agreement, the Commission shall draw up a report noting the facts in issue and the submission of the dispute, and recording that the parties have reached agreement. If, at any stage of the proceedings, it appears to the Commission that there is no likelihood of agreement between the parties it may declare the proceedings closed, and shall, in that event, draw up a report noting the submission of the dispute and recording the failure of the parties to reach agreement. If one party fails to appear or participate in the proceedings, the Commission shall so state in its report.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. III, Sec. 5, reworded. P.D. Art. III, Sec. 5(3) has been deleted.

Title 4
Obligations of the Parties

Article 38

The parties shall cooperate in good faith with the Commission in order to enable the Commission to carry out its functions and shall give their most serious consideration to its recommendations. Except as the parties to the dispute shall otherwise agree, the recommendations of the Commission shall not be binding upon them.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. III, Sec. 6, reworded.

Article 39

Except as the parties to the dispute shall otherwise agree, neither party to a conciliation proceeding shall be entitled in any later proceeding concerning the same dispute, whether before arbitrators or in a court of law or otherwise, to invoke or rely
on any views expressed or statements or admissions or offers of
settlement made by the other party in the conciliation proceedings,
or the recommendations, if any, made by the Commission therein.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. III, Sec. 7,
modified to permit the parties to waive the
protection afforded by that section.

CHAPTER IV
ARBITRATION

Title 1
Request for Arbitration

Article 40

(1) Any Contracting State or any national of a Contracting State
wishing to institute arbitration proceedings pursuant to this Convention
shall address a request to that effect to the Secretary-General in
writing.

(2) The request shall contain information concerning the subject-
matter of the dispute, the identity of the parties and their consent
to arbitration sufficient to establish prima facie that the dispute is
within the jurisdiction of the Center.

(3) The Secretary-General shall forthwith notify the other party
to the dispute of the request, if it is found to conform to the pro-
visions of paragraph (2) of this Article.

Comment. Para. (1) corresponds to P.D. Art. IV, Sec. 1.
Paras. (2) and (3) are new.

Title 2
Constitution of the Tribunal

Article 41

(1) An arbitral Tribunal (hereinafter called the Tribunal) shall
be constituted as soon as possible after the request made pursuant to Article 40.

(2) (a) The Tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator or any uneven number of arbitrators appointed as the parties shall agree.

(b) Where the parties have not agreed upon the number of arbitrators and the mode of their appointment, the Tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators, one arbitrator appointed by each party and the third, who shall be the president of the Tribunal, appointed by agreement of the parties.

Comment. Para. (1) is new. Para. (2) corresponds to P.D. Art. IV, Sec. 2(1) elaborated and reworded.

Article 42

If the Tribunal shall not have been constituted within three months after notice of the request has been dispatched by the Secretary-General pursuant to Article 40(3), or such other period as the parties may agree, the Chairman shall, at the request of either party, appoint the arbitrator or arbitrators not yet appointed.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. IV, Sec. 3, modified.

Article 43

(1) No arbitrator appointed pursuant to this Convention shall be a national of the State party to the dispute or of a State whose national is a party to the dispute, shall have been designated to the Panel of Arbitrators by either of those States, or shall have acted as a conciliator in the same dispute.

(2) Any arbitrator appointed pursuant to Article 41(2)(b) or Article 42 shall be selected from the Panel of Arbitrators.

(3) Any arbitrator appointed from outside the Panel of Arbitrators
shall possess the qualifications stated in Article 14(1).

Comment. Para. (1) which corresponds to the second sentence of P.D. Art. IV, Sec. 2(2), modified, now applies the rules precluding appointment of certain classes of persons from serving as arbitrators to all appointments of arbitrators under the Convention. The provisions of para. (2) correspond to the first sentence of P.D. Art. IV, Sec. 2(2) which was incorporated by reference in the second sentence of P.D. Art. IV, Sec. (3). Para. (3) is new.

Title 3
Powers and Functions of the Tribunal

Article 44

(1) The Tribunal shall be the judge of its own competence.

(2) The Tribunal shall be constituted notwithstanding any claim of a party to the dispute that that dispute is not one in respect of which arbitration proceedings may be instituted pursuant to this Convention, or is not within the scope of its consent to such proceedings. Such claim shall be submitted to the Tribunal which shall determine whether to deal with it as a preliminary question or to join it to the merits of the dispute.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. II, Secs. 3(1) and 3(2), to the extent applicable to arbitration proceedings. The new text leaves it to the discretion of the Tribunal whether or not to deal with objections to its competence as preliminary questions. P.D. Art. II, Sec. 3(3) has been deleted.

Article 45

(1) In the absence of agreement between the parties concerning the law to be applied, the Tribunal shall decide the dispute submitted to it in accordance with such rules of national and international law as it shall determine to be applicable. The term "international law" shall be understood in the sense given to it by Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
(2) The Tribunal may not bring in a finding of non liquet on the ground of silence or obscurity of the law to be applied.

(3) The provisions of this Article shall not prejudice the power of the Tribunal to decide a dispute ex aequo et bono if the parties agree thereto.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. IV, Sec. 4, elaborated and re-drafted.

Article 46

Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal may, if it deems it necessary at any stage of the proceedings

(i) call upon the parties to produce documents or other information, and

(ii) visit the scene connected with the dispute before it, and there conduct such enquiries as it may deem appropriate.

Comment. Article 46 is new.

Article 47

Except as the parties otherwise agree, any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the Arbitration Rules in effect on the date on which the consent to arbitration was given. If any question of procedure arises which is not covered by the Arbitration Rules or such other rules as may be agreed upon by the parties, the Tribunal shall decide that question.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. IV, Sec. 5, reworded.

Article 48

(1) Whenever one of the parties has not appeared before the Tribunal or has failed to present its case, the other party may call upon the Tribunal to accept its submissions and to render an award in its favor.
Before doing so, the Tribunal shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction and that the submissions are well-founded in fact and in law.

(2) The Tribunal shall grant to the party which has failed to appear a period of grace before rendering the award unless it is satisfied that the party in default does not intend to appear.

Comment. Para. (1) corresponds to P.D. Art. IV, Sec. 8, reworded. Para. (2) is new.

Article 49

Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal may hear and determine incidental or additional claims or counter-claims arising directly out of the subject-matter of the dispute provided that they are within the jurisdiction of the Center.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. IV, Sec. 9, elaborated to make clear that Article 49 does not extend the competence of the Tribunal to disputes not already within the jurisdiction of the Center.

Article 50

(1) Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal may, if it considers that the circumstances so require, prescribe such provisional measures as it deems necessary to prevent or halt any action by either party which might frustrate an eventual award.

(2) The Tribunal may fix a penalty for failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Comment. Para. (1) corresponds to P.D. Art. IV, Sec. 10, reworded. Para. (2) is new.

Title 4

The Award

Article 51

(1) The Tribunal shall decide all questions by a majority of
Article 52

(1) The award of the Tribunal shall be delivered by the Tribunal or by the Secretary-General, acting at the request and on behalf of the Tribunal, the parties or their agents or counsel being present or having been duly summoned to appear. The award shall be deemed to have been rendered on the date on which it was so delivered.

(2) The Secretary-General shall promptly transmit certified copies of the award to the parties.

Comment. Article 52 is new and incorporates the provisions of P.D. Art. IV, Sec. 7(2), elaborated.

Title 5

Interpretation, Revision and Annulment of the Award

Article 53

(1) If any dispute shall arise between the parties as to the meaning and scope of the award, either party may request interpretation of the award by an application in writing addressed to the Secretary-General.

(2) The request for interpretation shall, if possible, be sub-
mitted to the Tribunal which rendered the award. If this shall not be possible, a new Tribunal shall be constituted in accordance with the terms of the agreement, if any, between the parties regarding the constitution of the Tribunal which rendered the award, and otherwise pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter. The Tribunal may, if it considers that the circumstances so require, stay enforcement of the award pending its decision.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. IV, Sec. 11, reworded.

Article 54

(1) Either party may request revision of the award by an application in writing addressed to the Secretary-General on the ground of the discovery of some fact of such a nature as decisively to affect the award, provided that when the award was rendered that fact was unknown to the Tribunal and to the applicant and that the applicant's ignorance of that fact was not due to negligence.

(2) The application for revision must be made within three months after the discovery of the new fact and in any case within three years after the date on which the award was rendered.

(3) The request for revision shall, if possible, be submitted to the Tribunal which rendered the award. If this shall not be possible, a new Tribunal shall be constituted in accordance with the terms of the agreement, if any, between the parties regarding the constitution of the Tribunal which rendered the award, and otherwise pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter. The Tribunal may, if it considers that the circumstances so require, stay the enforcement of the award pending its decision.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. IV, Sec. 12, reworded.
Article 55

(1) Either party may request annulment of the award by an application in writing addressed to the Secretary-General on one or more of the following grounds:

(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted;
(b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers;
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal;
(d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or
(e) failure to state the reasons for the award, unless the parties have agreed that reasons need not be stated.

(2) Upon an application pursuant to paragraph (1) of this Article the Chairman shall forthwith appoint from the Panel of Arbitrators an ad hoc Committee of three persons which shall be competent to declare the nullity of the award or any part thereof on any of the grounds set forth in the preceding paragraph. None of the members of the Committee shall have been a member of the Tribunal which rendered the award, shall be a national of the State party to the dispute or of the State whose national is a party to the dispute, shall have been designated to the Panel of Arbitrators by either of those States, or shall have acted as a conciliator in the same dispute.

(3) The provisions of Articles 44-48, 51, 52, 56 and 57 shall apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings before the Committee.

(4) An application pursuant to this Article must be made within sixty days after the date on which the award was rendered except that when annulment is requested on the ground of corruption such appli-
cation shall be made within sixty days after discovery of the cor-
ruption and in any case within three years after the date on which
the award was rendered.

(5) The Committee may, if it considers that the circumstances so
require, stay enforcement of the award pending its decision.

(6) If the award is annulled the dispute shall, at the request
of either party, be submitted to a new Tribunal constituted in the
manner specified in Articles 41-43.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. IV, Sec. 13,
elaborated.

Title 6
Recognition and Enforcement of the Award

Article 56
The award shall be final and without appeal. Each party shall
abide by and comply with the award in accordance with its terms.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. IV, Sec. 14,
reworded.

Article 57
(1) Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered
pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce it within its
territories as if it were a final judgment of the courts of that
State.

(2) To obtain recognition and enforcement, the applicant shall
furnish to the domestic authority which each Contracting State shall
designate for this purpose (the Competent Authority) the duly authen-
ticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof. Each Con-
tracting State shall notify the Secretary-General of the designation
of the Competent Authority and of any subsequent change in such
designation.
(3) Execution of the award shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure in force in the State in whose territories such execution is sought. The writ of execution shall be issued by the Competent Authority without other review than verification of the authenticity of the award.

(4) Each Contracting State shall take such action as may be necessary to enable it to carry out its obligations under this Article.

Comment. Para. (1) corresponds to P.D. Art. IV, Sec. 15. Paras. (2)-(4) are new.

Article 58

Nothing in Article 57 shall be construed as derogating from the law in force in any Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or of any foreign State from execution.

Comment. Article 58 is new.

CHAPTER V

REPLACEMENT AND DISQUALIFICATION OF CONCILIATORS AND ARBITRATORS

Article 59

(1) After a Conciliation Commission or an Arbitral Tribunal has been constituted and proceedings have begun, its composition shall remain unchanged; provided, however, that if a conciliator or an arbitrator should die, become incapacitated, or resign, the resulting vacancy shall be filled by the method prescribed for the original appointment.

(2) If a conciliator or arbitrator appointed by a party shall have resigned without the consent of the Commission or Tribunal of which he was a member, the Chairman shall appoint a person to fill the resulting vacancy.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. V, Sec. 1, reworded.
Article 60

A party may propose the disqualification of a conciliator or an arbitrator on account of any fact indicating a manifest lack of the qualities required by Article 14(1). A party to arbitration proceedings may, in addition, propose the disqualification of an arbitrator on the ground that he was ineligible for appointment to the Arbitral Tribunal under Article 43(1).

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. V, Sec. 2(1). Sec. 2(1)(b), which contained special rules on disqualification of arbitrators and conciliators appointed by the Chairman, has been deleted.

Article 61

The decision on any proposed disqualification shall be taken by the other members of the Commission or Tribunal as the case may be, provided that where those members are equally divided, or in the case of a proposed disqualification of a sole conciliator or arbitrator, the Chairman shall take that decision. If it is decided that the proposal is well-founded, the conciliator or arbitrator to whom the decision relates shall resign, and the resulting vacancy shall be filled in accordance with the procedure prescribed for the original appointment.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. V, Sec. 2(2), the last sentence of which has been modified.

CHAPTER VI
COST OF PROCEEDINGS

Article 62

The charges payable for the use of the facilities of the Center, as well as the fees and expenses of members of the Conciliation Commission or Arbitral Tribunal, shall be borne equally by the parties,
and each party respectively shall bear such other expenses as it may incur in connection with any conciliation or arbitration proceedings; provided, however, that if in any arbitration proceeding the Tribunal determines that a party has instituted proceedings or has conducted its defense frivolously or in bad faith, it may assess any part or all of such charges, fees and expenses against such party.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. VI, Sec. 1, reworded.

**Article 63**

The charges payable by the parties for the use of the facilities of the Center shall be determined by the Secretary-General in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations adopted by the Administrative Council.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. VI, Sec. 2, reworded.

**Article 64**

(1) Each Conciliation Commission and each Arbitral Tribunal shall determine the fees and expenses of its members within limits established from time to time by the Administrative Council and after consultation with the Secretary-General.

(2) Nothing in paragraph (1) of this Article shall preclude the parties from agreeing in advance with the Commission or Tribunal concerned upon the fees and expenses of its members.

(3) The fees and expenses of the members of the Arbitral Tribunal may be included in the award.

Comment. Paras. (1) and (2) of Article 64 correspond to P.D. Art. VI, Sec. 3, redrafted. Para. (3) is new.
CHAPTER VII
PLACE OF PROCEEDINGS

Article 65
Conciliation and arbitration proceedings pursuant to this Convention shall be held at the seat of the Center except as hereinafter provided.

Article 66
Conciliation and arbitration proceedings may be held, if the parties so agree,

(i) at the seat of the Permanent Court of Arbitration or of such other public international institution with which the Center has entered into arrangements pursuant to Article 2(2); or

(ii) at any other place approved by the Conciliation Commission or Arbitral Tribunal after consultation with the Secretary-General.

Comment. Chapter VII corresponds to P.D. Art. VII, redrafted.

CHAPTER VIII
DISPUTES BETWEEN CONTRACTING STATES

Article 67
Any dispute arising between Contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall be referred to the International Court of Justice by the application of either party to such dispute, unless the States concerned agree to another mode of settlement.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Article VIII, modified to make clear that the provision establishes compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
CHAPTER IX
AMENDMENT

Article 68

Any Contracting State may propose amendment of this Convention. The text of a proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than three months prior to the meeting of the Administrative Council at which such amendment is to be considered and shall forthwith be transmitted by him to all Contracting States.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. IX, Sec. 1, modified by substituting the Secretary-General for the Chairman as the channel of communications.

Article 69

(1) Amendments involving new obligations for Contracting States or any fundamental alteration in the nature or scope of this Convention shall require for their adoption approval by all the members of the Council.

(2) All other amendments shall be adopted by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes of all the members of the Council.

(3) Each amendment shall become effective for all Contracting States at the end of twelve months following its adoption; provided, however, that such amendment shall not affect the rights and obligations of any Contracting State or of any national of a Contracting State under this Convention with respect to or arising out of proceedings for conciliation or arbitration pursuant to consent to the jurisdiction of the Center given prior to the effective date of the amendment.

Comment. Para. (1) is new. Paras. (2) and (3) correspond to P.D. Art. IX, Sec. 2. The majority required for adoption of amendments has been reduced to two-thirds.
CHAPTER X
FINAL PROVISIONS

Title 1
Entry into Force

Article 70

This Convention shall be open for signature on behalf of States members of the Bank, States members of the United Nations or any of its specialized agencies and States parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. XI, Sec. 1, modified.

Article 71

This Convention shall be subject to ratification or acceptance by the signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. The instruments of ratification or acceptance shall be deposited with the Bank.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. XI, Sec. 2, modified.

Article 72

At any time after this Convention shall have been ratified or accepted by 12 States, the Executive Directors of the Bank, acting on the recommendation of the President, may declare that this Convention shall enter into force and this Convention shall enter into force 90 days after such declaration. It shall enter into force for each State which subsequently deposits its instrument of ratification or acceptance on the date of such deposit.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. XI, Sec. 3, modified.
Title 2
Territorial Application

Article 73
This Convention shall apply to all territories for whose international relations a Contracting State is responsible except those which are excluded by such State by written notice to the Bank either at the time of signature or subsequently.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. XI, Sec. 4, reworded.

Title 3
Denunciation

Article 74
Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by written notice to the Bank.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. XI, Sec. 5(1).

Article 75
The denunciation shall take effect six months after receipt by the Bank of such notice; provided, however, that the provisions of this Convention shall continue to apply to the obligations of the State concerned with respect to or arising out of proceedings for conciliation or arbitration pursuant to consent to the jurisdiction of the Center given prior to such notice by that State, by any of its political subdivisions or agencies, or by any of its nationals.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. XI, Sec. 5(2), modified.
Inauguration of the Center

Article 76

Promptly upon the entry into force of this Convention, the President of the Bank shall convene the inaugural meeting of the Administrative Council.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. XI, Sec. 6.

Registration and Notifications

Article 77

The Bank shall register this Convention with the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and the Regulations thereunder adopted by the General Assembly.

Comment. Corresponds to P.D. Art. XI, Sec. 7, reworded.

Article 78

The Bank shall notify all signatory States of the following:

(i) signatures pursuant to Article 70 of this Convention;
(ii) ratifications and acceptances pursuant to Article 71 of this Convention;
(iii) exclusions from territorial application pursuant to Article 73 of this Convention;
(iv) declarations pursuant to Article 29 of this Convention;
(v) the date upon which this Convention enters into force in accordance with Article 72 hereof;
(vi) denunciations pursuant to Article 78 of this Convention.

Comment. Article 78 is new.

DONE at Washington, D.C. in the English, French and Spanish languages, all three texts being equally authoritative, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which has indicated by its signature below its agreement to fulfill the functions with which it is charged by Articles 76 and 77.